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ABSTRACT 
The Turkish banking sector has been comprehensively restructured since the late 
1990s. Historically Turkish private banking has been integrated into commercial-
industrial conglomerates (called Finance Capital), so the reform of banking caused a 
wider restructure of capital within Turkey. This thesis explores the contradictory interests 
within Turkish Finance Capital and how state policies, under the supervision of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), mediated those interests during the restructure of 
Turkey's banking system. 
The class analysis of the thesis shows that there is no such set of right policies to 
be followed by the state on behalf of national interest as mainstream and nationalist 
economists assume. There are (fractions of) classes and state, as the constellation of 
particular class forces, pursues the advance of accumulation in line with the interests of 
the dominant fraction of capital. The Turkish case reveals the relationship between the . 
state and the hegemonic part of Finance Capital which seeks for an inclusion into 
international capital. 
The thesis's empirical findings contrast with the nationalist interpretation which 
sees the state- (and IMF-) supervised reform as an assault on the Turkish economy. The 
analysis shows that the reform was rooted in the specific needs of certain fractions of 
capital in Turkey. As the dominant fraction within Finance Capital pursued further 
articulation into global accumulation, the state managed the reorientation in accumulation 
from state-based financial rents towards global competitiveness. While managing the 
shift in the form of accumulation, the state at the same time ensured stable decline for 
capitals judged incapable of making the transition towards global integration. Hence, the 
state (and the IMF) involvement in the fractional conflicts of banking reform process can 
best be understood as mediation between different spatial patterns of accumulation within 
capital. 
Drawing from the Turkish case, the thesis argues that current 'globalisation' 
debates which center on weakening or enduring power of nation state neglect that as a 
node of global accumulation, nation state oversees the reproduction of social relations of 
capital globally. 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 
Table 4.2 
Table 4.3 
Table 4.4 
Table 4.5 
Table 4.6 
Table 4.7 
Table 4.8 
Table 4.9 
Table 4.10 
Table 4.11 
ChapterS 
Table 5.1 
Chapter7 
Table 7.1 
Table 7.2 
Chapter 9 
Table 9.1 
Chapter 10 
Table 10.1 
Table 10.2 
LIST OF TABLES 
Local banks that were converted to national banks 
Holding banks in Turkey (1981-82) 
Established/acquired holding banks in the 1980s 
Foreign banks in Turkish financial markets in the 1980s 
Purchases of foreign banks by Turkish conglomerates in the 1990s 
Investment banks established in the second-half of the 1980s 
Banks established in the early 1990s 
Bank transfers between owners in the 1990s 
Acquisitions of privatised banks by conglomerates 
Investment banks established in 1998 and 1999 
Holding banks and owner conglomerates ( 1998) 
Periodisation of economic change in Turkey (late 1950s-1999) 
Official reasoning for the bank transfers to the SDIF 
Primitive accumulators 
Net working capital of banking (USD ron) 
Banks taken-over by the SDIF and current status thereof 
(as ofJune 2005) 
The list of seized banks 
xi 
80 
81 
87 
89 
91 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
102 
117 
161 
162 
234 
239 
256 
xu 
Chapter 11 
Table 11.1 Concentration in the banking sector (% share in sector total) 277 
Table I 1.2 Number of banks in Turkey (1980-2003) 278 
Table H.3 Intra-group bank mergers within the first division 285 
Table 11.4 Foreign partnership within the first division 286 
Table 11.5 Bank acquisitions within the second division 288 
Table I 1.6 Foreign partnership within the second division 291 
Table 11.7 Foreign acquisition within the third division 291 
Table 11.8 Merger within the third division 293 
Table I 1.9 The size of balance sheets for the bank groups (1980-2001)% 294 
Table 11.10 Foreign banks in the M&A process 295 
ASO 
BAT 
BIS 
BRSA 
BSBIG 
CAR 
CBT 
CEO 
CIS 
CUP 
EU 
FC 
FDI 
FX 
FYP 
IAV 
IDI 
IMF 
lSI 
ITO 
M&As 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Ankara Camber of Industry (Ankara Sanayi Odasz) 
Banks Association of Turkey (Tiirkiye Bankalar Birligi) 
Bank for International Settlement 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankaczlzk Denetleme ve 
Diizenleme Kurumu) 
Independent Social Scientists- the Economists Group (Bagzmszz Sosyal 
Bilimciler iktisat Grubu) 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Central Bank of Republic of Turkey 
Chief Executive Officer 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Committee for Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Treakki Partisi) 
European Union 
Finance Capital 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign Exchange 
Five-Year Plan 
Economic Research Association (iktisadi Ara!jtlrmalar Vakji) 
International Direct Investment 
International Monetary Fund 
Import Substituting Industrialisation 
Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (Istanbul Ticaret Odasz) 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Xlll 
MUSIAD 
NBR 
NICs 
NIDL 
OECD 
OYAK 
SDIF 
SEEs 
SMEs 
SPO 
TCC 
TEB 
TGNA 
TNCs 
TNS 
TOBB 
TUSIAD 
us 
WB 
YKB 
Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (Turkiye 
Mustakil Sanayici ve i§adamlar1 Demegi) 
National Bank of Romania 
Newly Industrialised Countries 
New International Division of Labour 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Turkish Armed Forces Pension Fund (Ordu Yard1mla§ma Kurumu) 
Savings Deposits Insurance Fund 
State Economic Enterprises 
Small-to-Medium Scale Enterprises 
State Planning Organization 
Transnational Capitalist Class 
Tiirk Ekonomi Bank 
Turkish Grand National Assembly 
Transnational Corporations 
Transnationalisation of the State 
Union of Chambers and Comrriodity Exchanges of Turkey (Turkiye 
Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi) 
xiv 
Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Turk Sanayicileri 
ve i§adamlan Dernegi) 
United States of America 
World Bank 
Yap1 ve Kredi Bank 
CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
With financial markets now globally integrated there are ambiguities in the very 
concept of a 'national banking system'. Indeed with banks themselves operating 
internationally, and finance circulating across national borders effectively at will, the 
institutions of finance cannot be considered in isolation. 
However, in general, banks are regulated on a national scale, and many banks 
could be generally understood as having national histories and, perhaps still national 
identities. Any restructuring of a 'national banking system' will therefore undoubtedly 
show characteristics that are both nation-specific and global at the same time. The latter 
dimension may be thought of as universal - the tendency towards 'globalisation' of 
financial flows. The nation-specific dimensions are historically determined. 
Accordingly, this thesis, analysing recent banking reform within Turkey, must 
address both the global tendencies of capital and the specific historical evolution of 
Turkish banking: its dynamics and its contradictions. 
Turkey has experienced a rapid capitalist development since the establishment of 
the Republic in 1923. As a late capitalising country, the development of a national 
banking sector has been central to accumulation. This process has had two characteristics. 
First, the banking sector has functioned as part of state development policies. Second, 
banks have been incorporated into conglomerates which operated in diversified sectors. 
The formation of a national banking system was initiated under the guidance of 
the state for the nourishment of Turkish-Islamic bourgeoisie. Starting from the early 20th 
century, during the Ottoman period, many national, mostly local, banks were established 
in order to break down the dominance of foreigu banks in finance and to channel 
financial resources towards bourgeoning Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie. 
The formation of a national banking system gained momentum with the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic. The state took the initiative to boost domestic capital 
accumulation through industrial plans in which newly created state banks had played a 
r 
! 
t 
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central role in the 1930s and 1940s. As the nascent bourgeoisie achieved necessary 
capital formation, bourgeoning conglomerates started to move into the finance sector and 
gained control of banks in the 1940s onwards, which is a formation that will be called 
'holding banking' in Turkey. The joint ownership between ·banks and industrial-
commercial conglomerates became more prevalent as part of the Import Substituting 
Industrialisation (lSI) policy by the late 1970s. The policy of utilising holding banking to 
fuel capital accumulation for those handful of conglomerates was not abandoned when 
the economy was integrated into global accumulation via 'trade and finance 
liberalisation' after 1980. In the so-called liberalisation era, the sector provided privileged 
access to financial resources for those capitals which had organised themselves mainly 
into a holding structure which brought affiliates from various sectors under the control of 
a family conglomerate. Other non-banking large scale industrial/commercial capitals also 
benefited from the easy access to finance through their participation in state debt finance 
during this period. The rise of the integration between banking and industrial capital 
provided a shelter for those conglomerates in finance at a time of economic crisis during 
the outward-oriented restructuring in accumulation in the post-1980 era. 
Having such a central role in accumulation, but especially on behalf of the leading 
edge of capital, the banking sector has been comprehensively restructured since the late 
1990s under the supervision of the IMF. More than 20 banks have been taken over by 
state rescue programs and have been rationalized in the reform. The state's effective 
subsidy of banking via high interest state borrowing has been put in a gradual termination. 
Furthermore, the surviving banks needed to transform themselves for global financial 
markets through comprehensive legislative and institutional changes. The state-
subsidised consolidation process in banking brought about rising concentration of 
banking capital along with the rising participation of foreign banks. 
The underlying rationale that has driven banking reform is the issue explored in 
this thesis. It will be seen that in a country where there are traditionally close ownership 
links between banking and industrial capital these reforms have deep significance for 
total capital. 
At the dawn of banking reform, government officials, IMF executives, top 
bankers, corporate executives, business associations and academia in unison complained 
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about the 'distortions' in banking. They accused the state of creating those distortions and 
demanded the launch of the painful, but necessary 'healing' of the sector. However, in 
those debates it was systematically overlooked that the operation of Turkish banking in 
the pre-reform era and associated state policies met the needs of certain fractions of 
Turkish capital that arose in the domestic accumulation process. 
This thesis seeks to dc:;velop an alternative explanation of the recent reform of 
banking by tracing its roots in the historical dynamics of capital accumulation process in 
Turkey. By utilising categories of Marxian political economy, the thesis recognises the 
central role of class dynamics underlying the transformation of banking. More 
specifically, the thesis explores contradictory interests between fractions of Turkish 
capital and the role of Turkish state (and IMF) policies in mediating between those 
tensions within the context of the rising integration of the domestic accumulation process 
into global process. This approach will make possible the clear and systematic exposition 
of a concrete historical subject. 
Overall, it will be seen that the state has been pivotal in the change process. In 
particular, state policy has played an important role not only in the integration of banking 
and industrial capital, but with the IMF also in setting up the conditions for accumulation. 
The state intervened in the. process of construction of a hegemonic fraction of capital. 
From this perspective, banking reform becomes part of a comprehensive 
restructuring of capital accumulation in Turkey under the supervision of the state and the 
IMF. The social security reform, the elimination of state subsidies in the farm sector, the 
deregulation of the energy and telecommunication sectors, the taxation and public finance 
reform, privatisation and international arbitration, etc. have been various facets of this 
restructuring. In this process, residuals of the welfare state have been liquidated and 
labour markets have been made further flexible so that conditions of accumulation have 
been adjusted to the rules of global competition. For 'domestic' capital, this shifted the 
source of profit from state-based financial rents to the requirements of productivity 
growth. 
The discussion of banking reform will shed light on how the widely contended 
tense relationship between 'nation state and globalisation' is played out in a specific 
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country. The case study will provide empirical evidence for the theorisation of the state 
within the context of internationalisation of capital. 
Amid a wide spectrum of arguments, from 'the end of nation state', to 'the state 
that has still some scope of manoeuvre for governance', this thesis approaches the state as 
a moment of capitalist class relations. The argument progresses from abstract theoretical 
propositions about capital and the state to focus to a particular capitalist state (the Turkish 
state) and the analysis of particular banking conglomerates. The analysis shows how the 
state mediates between contradictory interests within capital while pursuing the agenda of 
global competitiveness by some of its fractions. Briefly, this thesis seeks to explain the 
process of banking reform within the broader context of capital accumulation, and in 
terms of the way in .which bank reform is being used to support and transfer the 
hegemonic fractions of capital in Turkey. 
I chose the Turkish banking reform as a case study for the discussion of the nation 
state in the context of global accumulation for three reasons. Firstly, banking reform has 
exposed wider conflicts within Turkish capital, particularly due to the ownership of banks 
by conglomerates and permitted to gain an in-depth understanding of the role of the state 
in terms of underlying fractional tensions within capital. Therefore, the study of banking 
reform reveals significant explanations not only on the restructuring of a national banking 
sector, but also on a much broader transformation in Turkey. 
Secondly, the close involvement of the IMF in the reform process makes it 
possible to shed light on the role of the IMF in the reorganisation of Turkish capital. The 
nature of the relationship between national and supra-national governance mechanisms of 
capital is one of the fundamental issues in the current debates on the nation state. 
Thirdly, the role of the IMF is considered in a country case, Turkey, which is 
assumed to be part of the so-called 'Third World'. The hierarchy of nations in world 
capitalism is also one of the critical references in the nation state debate. The analysis of 
the Turkish banking reform will question the analytical validity of the primacy of the 
nation. 
By challenging the dominant interpretations on banking reform, the thesis argues 
that banking reform could not be analysed by approaching to banking in isolation. 
Turkish banking has been characterised by the ownership of conglomerates that 
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accumulate in various sectors beyond banking. Therefore, this thesis utilises a finance 
capital approach in order to specify underlying fractional conflicts within capital that 
paved way to banking reform. In doing this, not only banks, but also banking 
conglomerates as a whole will be focused on. 
Th·e class analysis of the thesis is specifically clarifies the fractional tensions 
within Turkish Finance Capital (FC). Therefore, the thesis is not particularly concerned 
with productive and commercial capitals since a detailed discussion of the implications of 
banking reform for these fractions remains beyond the confines of this thesis. Therefore, 
productive and commercial capitals will be included in the analysis only to the extent that 
it would contribute to the elaboration of the main fractional focus of this thesis on FC. 
On this basis, two key questions will be explored in the study of Turkish banking 
reform: 
• What are the tensions among fractions of capital during banking reform? 
• What are the different implications of the. state (and the IMF) policies for different 
fractions? 
The desire for the analysis of contradictions within Turkish capital and state 
mediation of those tensions comes from the recognition that transformation of the state 
apparatus on behalf of the working class requires first an understanding of the vested 
interests that state policies serve. Moving from this point, to be able to develop effective 
strategies for a working class movement, the left needs to grasp the current structural 
change in Turkey. 1 The analysis of the transition in Turkish bankingffurkey with a class 
perspective becomes particularly vital given the limitations in the analyses developed by 
dominant schools of political economy. 
The thesis, therefore, challenges the argument of the irrelevance of class in the 
analysis of social reality in the current era of world capitalism. The thesis is framed 
within a Marxist approach to capital and class. It does not seek to argue a defence of this 
approach, but to argue that the legitimacy of the theory is to be found in its capacity to 
gen.erate coherent, distinctive and persuasive analysis. Accordingly, the thesis is based on 
extensive use of detailed empirical material - In the exploration of fractional tensions 
1 This view is consistent with Radice (1984, 113), (1999, 13, 19) and Panitch (1994, 61-
62). 
6 
within capital associated with banking reform, firstly, content analyses of reports 
published by official/non-official institutions such as the IMF, Turkish government, 
banks, corporations and business associations have been made. Secondly, newspapers 
and financial journals have been extensively surveyed back to the early 1990s. Thirdly, 
interviews in the financial press with key figures in leadership positions in corporations 
and banks as well as with government officials have been utilised. Fourthly, official web 
pages of corporations and banks have been searched. Lastly, public pronouncements of 
bank and corporate executives and government and IMF officials have provided an 
additional source of information. 
Throughout the analysis it will be seen that competing and often contradictory 
agendas of fractions of Turkish capital in the process of capital accumulation are central 
to the change and the state (and the IMF) intervention in those tensions serves the global 
advancement of accumulation mainly on behalf of some parts of the Turkish capitalist 
class. 
In the analysis of the nation state within the context of globalisation of capital, 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical issues that will be explored in the case of Turkish 
banking reform. Among different interpretations of the current change in the functions of 
nation state three issues appear central: the conceptualisation of the state vis-a-vis capital; 
the concepts of fractions of capital, and the position of the nation state within the 
emerging multi-level governance mechanisms of world capitalism (here the relation with 
the IMF comes to the fore). 
Drawing from the theoretical discussion of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 looks at how 
different schools of political economy explain the changes in Turkey accompanying the 
Turkish banking reform. On the basis of this review, the thesis signifies the importance of 
the consideration of the ownership of banks by industrially diverse conglomerates. This 
characteristic leads the restructuring in banking to have wider ramifications beyond 
banking. The reform reconfigures intra-capital class dynamics in Turkey for a new capital 
accumulation regime. 
Chapter 4 discusses the historical development process of FC in Turkey as a basis 
for the fractional analysis of the reform in the following chapters. It develops a 
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periodisation, different from that commonly used, which gives focus to the central 
changes in FC. 
On the basis of this exploration of the formation of FC, Chapter 5 lays out a 
general framework for the analysis of banking reform as a class process. In addition to 
considering the mediative role of the state regarding tensions within Turkish capital, the 
IMF involvement in the reform process is taken into account as the representative of 
supra-national governance mechanisms of world capitalism. In this way, the linkage 
between state policies, fractions of capital (domestic and foreign) and the (global) capital 
accumulation process is investigated. This chapter provides a bird's eye view on 
fractional conflicts within the reform process before narrowing the focus of the fractional 
analysis in the following chapters. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 concentrate on the fractional divisions within FC as the 
driving logic of banking reform. This specific fractional focus carries the class analysis to 
a finer level. This fractional discussion is especially significant for the Turkish case 
because intra-capital class dynamics behind the transformation in Turkey remain widely 
unexplored. 
Within this context, Chapter 6 provides a methodological consideration in 
identifying a coherent pattern to the determination of which banking conglomerates 
survived which went into liquidation during banking reform. It will be seen that the 
fractional divisions accompanying the reform are rooted in different patterns of 
accumulation (including various forms of global integration) by two groups of 
conglomerates. These are the conglomerates that 'won' in the reform and these that 'lost'. 
These are termed, respectively, the dynamic accumulators and the primitive accumulators. 
The chapter argues that the difference between these two is to be explained by their 
patterns of accumulation and, in particular, their mode of acquisition of surplus value. 
Yet beyond broad generalisations that support this binary division, it must be recognised 
that there is not one 'recipe' for dynamic accumulators, nor primitive accumulators. 
Accordingly, Chapter 7 specifies the first division of FC, the primitive 
accumulators, which are excluded from finance through bank seizures. Chapter 8 focuses 
on the second division of FC, the dynamic accumulators, which have strengthened their 
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existence in banking. Both chapters distinguish the characteristics of patterns of 
accumulation which led conglomerates to either seizure or survival in finance. 
After the analysis of fractional divisions within FC, the state (and the IMF) 
intervention in those fractional tensions is exemplified. To this end, .the following two 
chapters analyse two main mechanisms that were used for the reconfiguration of holding 
banking in Turkey. Chapter 9 addresses new regulations that shape the new era of FC. In 
particular, legislative changes which rearranged relations of credit and equity holdings 
between banks and their owner conglomerates are the foci. 
Chapter I 0, on the other hand, illustrates how the state and the IMF intervention 
played out itself in the case of bank seizures. The clarification of the actual process of 
reconfiguration of holding banking in Chapters 9 and I 0 will provide a deeper 
understanding of the fractional conflicts as well as the state (and IMF) mediation between 
those tensions in the reform process. · 
Chapter 11 analyses how the surviving banks' conglomerates solidified their 
hegemony in finance through the consolidation process. As a controversial issue of 
banking reform, the role of foreign participation within the consolidation of banking is 
also considered in this chapter. 
While the analysis here is detailed, it is not exhaustive of all financial issues in 
Turkey. The thesis will focus on the most central ones of the new codes that rearranged 
the relations between banks and their conglomerates - relations of credit and equity 
holdings - in order to exemplify state intervention in setting-up new conditions for 
accumulation. Also, the analysis of banking reform will concentrate on private domestic 
deposit-taking commercial banks which accounted for about one-half of the banking 
system's assets and liabilities as of August 2001. Banks which are not owned by Turkish 
conglomerates - state-banks, development/investment banks and foreign banks - are 
included in the analysis as long as they are relevant with the discussion of private 
commercial banking in Turkey. Furthermore, not all aspects of the seizure process will be 
addressed. Takeover of fmancial groups made up of leasing, factoring, insurance and 
brokerage companies as well as some other affiliates operating in other sectors will not be 
discussed. 
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Finally, there is a need for three points of clarification. The first is a clarification 
of terminology used relating to the concepts of 'foreign' and 'international' banks. To 
prevent any confusion, the term 'foreign banks' refers to international banks that are 
owned by foreigners. But the term 'international banks' is more general as it also cover 
some Turkish banks that play in the global banking league. Essentially, the last decade 
has seen 'Turkish' banks joining 'foreign' banks in the development of international 
banking. 
Second, the references in this thesis follow the Harvard style. 2 However, given the 
extensive number of sources from newspapers, news portals as well as corporate and 
other web pages, full citations of those sources appear only in the footnotes, but not in the 
bibliography. 
Third, many sources used in this thesis are in Turkish language. These sources 
which appear in the footnotes and bibliography as .titled in Turkish are translated by the 
author. 
2 I have consulted Referencing-the Harvard Referencing System, Educational Services 
and Learning Support, Central Queensland University, January 2002. 
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This thesis analyses the recent reform in Turkish banking which served the 
reorientation in accumulation towards rising global integration. The case study shows the 
links between the nation state, supranational governance institutions and the dynamics of 
the capital accumulation process in the context of Turkish banking. How these 
connections are to be framed is not self-evident, but presents a theoretical problem to be 
solved. This is not to suggest that these connections can be 'solved' at the level of formal 
theory, but it is important to consciously debate the way the connections should be 
·framed. 
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Where to draw the lines around theoretical debate is always difficult - which 
issues warrant deep investigation, and which are peripheral - is never entirely clear, so it 
is important to state some theoretical benchmarks up front, for these are necessary to 
focus the debates. 
The theoretical focus here is the question of the role of the nation state in the 
globalisation, and that immediately opens up its own spectrum of debate: is the state in 
decline? Conversely, is the state part of globalisation? 
This thesis takes as its theoretical starting point that there is a need to bring the 
analysis back to the fundamental characteristics of capitalism. In particular, the objective 
position of the state in maintaining social relations of capital provides a solid starting 
point for the analysis of the current changes in the functions of the state. What the 
process of globalisation refers to is the expanding trans-territorial accumulation by 
capital. The state, as part of capitalist accumulation, serves the realisation of the inherent 
tendency by capital towards global expansion. This framing points to the issue of 
particular constellation of class forces within states. Various forms of integration of 
domestic processes of accumulation into global process rise on a con junctura! balance of 
class forces. 
Accordingly, this thesis argues that a class fractional analysis of state policies 
is a helpful approach to such issues for it casts the role of the state in terms of the diverse 
ways in which different parts of capital integrate globally, and hence in terms of 
conflicting demands on the state. This thesis approaches to the state as 'the political 
location in which divisions between classes and, divisions between fractions of capital 
are mediated' (Bryan 1987, 271). Consideration of inter-state relations as well as 
supranational governance institutions of world capital, such as the IMF, also requires first 
addressing which particular forms of accumulation (pursued by certain fractions of 
capital) that nation state seeks to oversee in the domestic context. 
When these general issues are applied to a study of Turkish banking reform and 
the role of the IMF therein, three issues emerge crucial. Firstly, in the reform process the 
IMF plays the role of a promoter and co-ordinator of the globalisation of capital, 
performing the role of overseer of the Turkish state's mediation of relations between 
capitals. This conflicts with the widely held view of the IMF as an external imposer of a 
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neo-liberal policy agenda on behalf of advanced countries' capital. This thesis contends 
that the IMF is better seen as part of the Turkish state process. The state and the IMF 
together managed and supeivised the reform in banking. 
Secondly, the nature of the determination of fractions of capital is central to the 
study of the Turkish reforms. The divisions within capital are not contingent on the scale 
(large/small) or nationality of ownership (foreign/national) of capital, etc. They are more 
usefully seen as fractions based on different circuits of accumulation. That is, the 
conflicts between capital that the reform process mediates and conflicts about the 
particular paths down which capitals seek to expand, with the state facilitating some paths 
and inevitably blocking others. Two critical criteria come to the fore in defining the 
divisions: firstly, how individual capitals integrate globally; and secondly, how they 
capture surplus value. Both of these criteria point to the relationship between the state 
and capital. State policies play a crucial role in the construction of the patterns of 
accumulation, and thus, of the divisions of capital. 
Thirdly, approaching the state as a mediator between fractions of capital 
challenges the popular argument that Turkey as a whole (the 'Turkish economy') 
occupies a particular 'position' in the global system, such suggested in the theory of the 
New International Division of Labour (NIDL) and the World Systems Theory. These 
theories and the national positioning that follows from them serve to occlude 
consideration of divisions between capitals within nation, and impute nationalist agendas 
onto state policy. Accordingly, this thesis rejects the idea of an IMF imposition as it is a 
more complex process than that. The study of the Turkish banking reform verifies that 
the issue is not the loss of policy autonomy by the nation state in the so-called Third 
World countries; the Turkish state and the IMF acted together to systematically reposition 
capital over accumulation globally and the reform process could not occur without the 
state and the IMF. 
In the context of these propositions, this chapter addresses the relationship 
between the nation state and globalisation. The objective is not to determine in 
abstraction the explanation of Turkish bank reform, but to make explicit that any 
empirical investigation of this topic must be predicated on a clear set of theoretical 
insights. 
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2.2 Framing the Globalisation Debate 
In the study of the relationship between the state and globalisation, different, 
albeit overlapping, classifications of globalisation theories have been adopted. For 
example, Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999) offer a widely-recognised 
tripartite classification: the hyperglobalizers, the transformationalists, and the sceptics. 
These are, in essence, those who see the decline of the nation state; those who challenge 
the reality or national impact of globalisation on the capacity of nation states, and, in the 
middle, those who see that the role of states has been transformed, but not increased or 
decreased. 
The problem with this taxonomy is that views from different theoretical 
perspectives, (e.g. neo-Iiberalism and Marxism), are merged under the same category. 
According to Held and McGrew (2002, 2) 'the very idea of globalisation appears to 
disrupt established paradigms and political orthodoxies', but the effect is that different 
theoretical premises underlying those theories becomes secondary to taxonomy and it is 
therefore impossible to 'graft' an analysis of globalisation onto established theoretical 
debates. 
Nordhaug (2002) also defines a tripartite classification: liberal globalisation 
theory, globalisation scepticism and Marxist globalisation theories. In this classification, 
the liberal theory claims that the nation state has been enfeebled by globalisation. 
Scepticism has two strands. One, in contrast to the neo-liberal view, posits the autonomy 
of national policies and institutions from globalisation. In the other, it is argued that the 
pressure for convergence between national policies stems not from anonymous market 
forces but from dominant states which also control international organisations. Marxist 
globalisation theories are also divided into two categories: moderate and strong versions. 
Both versions link economic transnationalisation to the transnationalisation of capitalist 
classes (class fractions); the second version additionally contends a tendency towards the 
formation of a non-territorial state. Despite the difficulty in terms of equating these 
groups directly with particular authors, Nordhaug's work provides a more solid base from 
which to develop a more useful classification of globalisation theories. 
This chapter adopts three categories in the study of the theories of globalisation: 
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1. The nee-liberal globalisation thesis, 
2. The neo-Weberian sceptical thesis, and 
3. The Marxist globalisation theories. 
The chapter will consider these theses in tum, with a particular focus on the third, 
Marxist approach. Marxist theories of globalisation will be discussed under two 
categories: one which claims the primacy of the nation state in the organisation of global 
capitalism and the other which points to a transnational ruling class as the engine of the 
globalisation process with direct implications for the understanding of nation states. 
Other Marxist debates on globalisation will be included under the following discussions 
of two critical issues for the Turkish case study: what will be called 'position' theories 
and the role of IMF vis-a-vis nation states. 
2.3 The Neo-Liberal Globalisation Thesis 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, rising fragmentation of discrete national economies 
led some scholars to argue the end of the nation state. Starting with an absolute 
dichotomy between 'national and 'global', these scholars contended that the increasing 
mobility of capital contrasted with the relative territorial boundedness of the state and 
undermined the state capacity to manage the national economy. For example, among the 
so-called 'hyperglobalists', Ohmae (1990; 1993) and O'Brien (1992) asserted that the era 
of the nation state was over, that national level governance was ineffective in the face of 
globalised economic and social processes. 1 
These scholars claimed that transnational corporations (INCs), rather than states, 
are the key actors in this 'borderless world', developing global production, sales and 
financial strategies relatively free from the restrictions of territorial state borders. 
Therefore, nation states in this perspective became local authorities of the global system 
and lost their capacity to manage the level of economic activity within their territories 
independently. From a neo-liberal perspective, though not a nationalist one, there were 
1 This end of state thesis is readily understandable as a nee-liberal, pro-market 
perspective. Interestingly, it is also shared, though with different conclusions, by the radical 
nationalist tradition. They describe essentially the same logic, but see the decline of the nation 
state as a process that must be resisted in (e.g. Strange 1995). 
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benefits for all countries from the shift to this one dominant global economic system: 
trade and capital market liberalisation, minimised state intervention and the pursuit of 
international competitiveness would serve to generate global growth and efficiency 
(Ohmae 1990, 216). 
The claims of the decline of the nation state have not been verified empirically. 
On a global scale, we see the emergence of not laissez faire (the so-called Washington 
consensus), but what Stiglitz (1998) has termed the 'post-Washington consensus': the 
recognition that global markets need systematic regulation. At the national level, the case 
explored in this thesis is an emphatic illustration of the on-going centrality of state 
regulation. It shows that markets are not self regulating, but require state management. 
Moreover, this management i~ not an exercise in securing 'efficiency' of markets, but in 
managing accumulation: an altogether more political and contested process. 
2.4 The Sceptical Thesis 
The neo-liberal globalisation thesis has been challenged by some who see its 
emphasis on global flows of trade and investment highly exaggerated. They contend that 
these movements, relative to the size of global production are still less than in a previous 
period of so-called globalisation: the late nineteenth century. Rather, they contend that 
the world economy is increasingly a regionalised economy with the three major trading 
blocs (Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America) (Hirst & Thompson 1995; Drache 1996). 
In this framework, intemationalisation has been accompanied by the growing economic 
marginalisation of many 'Third World' states as the intensifying trade and investment 
flows within the rich North exclude much of the rest of the globe (Hirst & Thompson 
1995). 
Yet, despite the agreement on the exaggeration of 'globalisation', sceptics part 
company regarding the extent of the loss of regulatory capacity of nation states. Some 
argue that nation states have lost capacity to manage their domestic economies. There is a 
need for states to regain control of their economies to protect national interest against the 
volatility of global business cycle (Drache 1996). 
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On the other hand, some other sceptics argue that nation states remain an 
important locus of accumulation (Wade 1996). Even though certain traditional powers of 
nation states (such as sovereign power or as autonomous national economic management) 
are declining, nation states are the key source of legitimacy and the delegator of authority 
between international and sub-national agencies of economic coordination (Hirst & 
Thompson 1995). 
The pressure for the convergence among national policies does not stem from 
transnational market forces, but from elsewhere. For some, convergence comes from 
multilateral organisations, such as the IMF, which have become tools of US foreign 
policy (Wade 2001).2 Others emphasise domestic drivers (e.g. Weiss 1999b),3 especially 
states seeking to promo.te the internationalisation of national corporations. 'Catalytic 
states' which facilitate coordinated and collective action with other states, transnational 
institutions, and private sector groups have emerged in order to create more real control 
over their economies (Weiss 1997). If nation states can take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by global economic activities they can improve the position of the 
nation within the world economy (Weiss 1997; Hobson & Ramesh 2002). 
There is, of course, debate about the potential for such policies to deliver national 
growth. But it is important to notice in the context of this thesis the nationalist premises 
that underlie the sceptical position. At the basis of their scepticism is the proposition that, 
despite the indicators of 'globalisation', nations remain core economic units, such that 
evidence of the on-going significance of national economic units is thought to constitute 
a refutation of 'globalisation'. As a corollary, they also frame the capacitr of nation states 
in terms of the capacity to deliver 'national' benefits.4 If, however, we question the 
cohesion of nations as economic units, and instead identify divided interests within 
'As an example, Wade (2001) notes the US role in the rapid financialliberalisation in 
Asia which caused the financial crises in the region throughout the 1990s. 
' For example, the Asian crisis was originated in the decomposed institutional capacities 
of the states and the role of the US policy, partly through the auspices of the IMF, only deepened 
the crisis (Weiss 1999b, 319). 
4 For instance, Hobson and Ramesh (2002, II) assert that states play off the domestic and 
global realms against each other when they face constraints from any of them. Yet, the authors 
neglect that when states push through measures by resisting opposition from some 'powerful 
domestic groups', this means that state policies support other parts of capital. For other examples 
of this analytical problem see Weiss (1999a, 72, 86, 88). 
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nations with respect to 'globalisation', the issues look rather different. Rather than the 
nation state pursuing national benefits in the national interest, states can be seen to be 
mediating between divided interests within the nation 
The neo-liberal and sceptical theses of globalisation have been criticised by 
Marxist scholars on the basis that the state and capital are misleadingly conceptualised as 
two independent spheres rather than as part of a totality. Most of the debates on 
'globalisation' mask the continued importance of the nation state in the global 
reproduction of capital and of the continued pre-eminence of national structures of 
political economy (e.g. Pooley 1990; Panitch 1994; 1996). 
2.5 The Class Determined Nature of the State 
The analysis of the state, as Marx states, needs to start from the specific form of 
the extraction of surplus value from the direct producers by the owners of production. On 
this basis, the consideration of the 'political' (the state) can be introduced (Burnham 
2002, 118). 
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct 
producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly 
out of production itself and. reacts back on it in turn as a determinant. On this is based the 
entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of 
productions,. and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct 
relationship of the owners of production to the immediate producers ... in which we find 
the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the 
political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short the specific 
form of state in each case. (Marx 1894, 927) 
In capitalism, the main relationship which marks the whole social structure is the class 
relation between capital and labour. The separation of labour from means of production 
and fulfilment of exploitation through commodification of labour power allow the 
abstraction of immediate force from the capitalist production process. As Holloway and 
Picciotto (1977, 179) put it: 
The abstraction of relations of force from the immediate process of production and their 
necessary location (since class domination must ultimately rest on force) in an instance 
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separated from individual capitals constitutes (historically and logically) the economic 
and political as distinct, particularised fonns of capitalist domination. 
The role of the state in capitalism is not to organise the production process 
directly, but to create necessary preconditions for the private organisation of this process 
and to oversee its reproduction. Thus, the state takes place in the public sphere to provide 
general conditions for capital accumulation which is realised by the capitalist class in the 
private sphere (Giilalp 1993, 77). In this framework, the state is understood as a moment 
of the class relations; neither as 'autonomous' nor as 'determined' by a supposed 
economic base (Burnham 2002, 116). Therefore, the development of the forms and the 
functions of the state needs to be tracked down within 'the antagonistic and crisis-ridden 
development of capitalist society' (Holloway & Picciotto 1979, 5; Holloway 1994, 128). 
Yet the state is not seen here simply as the 'referee' in relations between labour 
and capital, but as the manager of capital's domination over labour. Radice (1984, 119-
120) puts it succinctly: 
The central conflict in the capitalist mode of production is seen as being between capital 
and the state, rather than between capital and labour. But it is not enough to insert 
'labour' into the analysis on an equal footing, forming as it were a triangular disposition 
of social forces ... It is necessary to highlight the evolving patterns of domination by 
capital over labour, and how the state ... fits into this. The increasing role of the state over 
the last century should be seen ... as the consequence of an ad hoc accretion of state 
functions, arising from a sequence of conjunctural pressures on capitalist class 
rule ... From this perspective, the 'weakening of the state' ... signals, rather, a complex 
process of restructuring of the class relations of capitalism. 
Statements such as this are clearly at odds with propositions about the decline of 
nation state power. The state remains central, but with a class agenda, not simply a 
national one. Moreover, as capital tends to expand globally, so the state's conception of 
national policies (and 'national goals') is itself globalised. Bryan captures this point when 
he contends that capital, in its concept, is neither national nor international: the process of 
capitalist exploitation (sites of the production and appropriation of surplus value) is not 
intrinsically reducible national (or international) level in the geography of global 
capitalism (Bryan 1987).5 'The international movement of capital is therefore a historical 
'·See also Ruccio et aL (1990, 18). 
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product of the (spatially) expanded reproduction of the capitalist mode of production 
within a system of nation states' (Bryan 1987, 253). Yet at the current stage of world 
capitalism, the reproduction of social relations of capital is still basically secured by 
nation states: 
So while capital value may tend to move internationally, the class relations necessary for 
the production of capital value arise and are reproduced politically within the space of the 
nation, and by means of the nation state, thus, in the period of internationalisation of 
industrial capital, it is the nation state which secures the political preconditions for 
international accumulation by ensuring the reproduction of the class relations of 
capitalism. 
The issue therefore is that the nation is not the "natural" space of the circulation and 
reproduction of capital, but capital nonetheless requires nation states to secure its social 
and economic conditions of reproduction. (Bryan 1987, 254) 
According to Bryan (1995), the contradiction between the internationality of 
accumulation and the national regulation of the conditions of accumulation arises because 
'the space of the nation is increasingly just one (spatial) section of an international 
process of accumulation' (Bryan 1987, 255; 1995, 422). Therefore: 
[T]he state plays a contradictory role. On the one hand, it must secure the domestic 
conditions of accumulation, including class relations, and, on the other hand, it must 
integrate these processes into international accumulation, in a way which reflects the 
domestic balance of forces. (Bryan 1995, 429) 
This finding clarifies the conflicting nature of the relationship between the nation state, 
domestic accumulation process and globalising accumulation of capital. Accordingly, a 
central issue for Marxist approaches to the state and capital is the different and 
contradictory ways in which capital accumulates, and the demands this places on nation 
states. 
Therefore, for example when Holloway (1994, 30-32) and Burnham (1996, 102-
103) define the state as a node of global accumulation, (i.e. part of the political 
management of the global circuit of capital), there is a need to stress that it would be 
misleading to simply argue that the state fulfils the necessities of global accumulation. 
That is, 'global accumulation' should not be seen a priori to class. Iri contrast, the 
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dynamics of global accumulation are continuously redefined by specific state policies 
which mediate conflicting demands of (fractions of) classes arising from the 
accumulation process. 
Accordingly, an understanding of these conflicting demands of capital is integral 
to an understanding of the role of the state in general, and especially in relation to issues 
of globalisation, where capital has ambiguous relations with 'nations' and hence also 
with nation states. A conventional point of entry into this matter is the depiction of a 
circuit of capital, as outlined by Marx (1885) in Volume II of Capital. 
M-C ... P ... C'-M' 
Throughout its circuit, capital takes three different forms: Money is transformed 
into money capital (M) when it is used for the purchase of production inputs. M is 
exchanged for commodities (C) that are physical means of production (MP) and labour 
power (LP). When LP is combined with MP in the capitalist production process, capital 
takes the form of productive capital (P). The commodities (C') produced in this process 
embody surplus value produced by labour power. That is, C' has a greater value than the 
commodity capital (C) which entered production process. When C' is converted into the 
money form (M') by exchange, the quantity of money is larger than which entered the 
circuit. In this circuit, capital appears the social relation of value in movement. 
This circuit shows the fundamental class relation in capitalist accumulation as the 
relationship between labour and capital, depicted as the creation of new value (and 
surplus value) in production. But it also gives insight regarding relations between 
individual capitals which are intertwined with each other within the total social circuit of 
capital. As Marx put it: 
Capital, as self-valorizing value, does not just comprise class relations, a definite social 
character that depends on the existence of labour as wage-labour. It is a movement, a 
circulatory process through different stages, which itself in turn includes three different 
forms of the circulatory process. Hence it can only be grasped as a movement, and not as 
a static thing. (Marx 1885, 185) 
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Marx's formulation of circuits of capital assists to see there is a number of phases 
in the reproduction of each capital. As Bryan ( 1984, 86) states, in each of the different 
forms that the individual capital assumes (money, commodities and production) in its 
overall movement, it is subject to different conditions of and <;onstraints on its 
reproduction. This gives the basis to differentiate fractions of capital as money, 
productive and commodity capital (or in the reified forms banking, industrial and 
commercial capital). Capitals form into fractions according to shared conditions and of 
constraints on each of the metamorphoses of their reproduction. Accordingly, the state 
must mediate these different 'circuits of capital', (or different fractions of capital, as they 
have come to be called) and their contested claims on state policy 
How the differences (and conflicts) between these fractions of capital are to be 
specified remains an open and contested theoretical issue. A prevalent interpretation here 
has been to define fractions in ternis of specialisation within the circuit - a conflict 
between financial, commercial and industrial capitals. This interpretation is most widely 
associates with Poulantzas (1968) and Clarke (1978). 6 This division of capital helps to 
explain fractional conflicts as individual capitals specialise in one of these functions 
within the circuit of capital - each appropriates surplus value in a different form: finance 
as interest, commerce as mark-up pricing, and industry as profit. But it cannot be 
presumed that individual capitals always specialise in one or other of these functional 
forms. They may, but they may not, and, in the case of Turkey, with a predominance of 
conglomerates which occupy all three 'positions' in the circuit, this is not going to reveal 
all tensions within capital, and certainly not the tensions that arise with 'globalisation. 
This tripartite definition of fractions refers to a higher level of abstraction and 
there is a need for a further level of analysis in mapping out the fractional structure of 
capital in specific contexts. The critical issue is here that fractions of capital cannot be 
pre-ordained rigidly because the issue on which capital divides is historically specific. A 
Marxist theory of fractions can argue that there will be division because the circuit of 
6 The criticism of Poulantzas by Clarke can be noted here. Poulantzas (1968, Chapter 2) 
argued that to constitute a fraction those individual capitals must have 'pertinent effects' at the 
political level. The definition of fractions according to their political effects Jed to the neglect of 
the economic basis of fractions. Clarke (1978, 36) criticised the Poulantzian theory on the basis 
that this definition of fraction Jed the fractional analyses to be concerned with attaching interests 
to the particular organisations or institutions (as in the analyses of South Africa). 
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capital itself is a contested process, but how capitals divide depends on specific issues. 
What can be expected, in the context of Turkish banking and globalisation, is that 
divisions will arise over the form of integration into global accumulation. At this point, 
an alternative definition of fractions by Bryan (1987) is helpful. Bryan defines fractions 
of capital according to position in the international circuit of capital in which the state 
intervention is accounted for as a factor: 
Fractions have been differentiated according to the stages in the process of its 
accumulation at which each individual capital is integrated into (isolated from) the 
international arena (Bryan 1987, 271) 
Bryan's theorisation of capital fractions shows the structural basis for shared interests 
between 'domestic' and 'foreign' capital in particular kinds of state policies (Glassman 
1999, 680).7 In the identification of capital fractions, the consideration of the position in 
the international movement of value becomes critical for the analysis of the nation state 
within the context of global circulation of capital. 8 While some capitals expand 
internationally and some remain nation-based, state policies which regulate global 
movement of capital affect individual capitals differently according to their various forms 
of global integration. 
From this perspective, this thesis contends that the observed changes in state 
policies in line with neo-liberalism serve the advance of global accumulation on behalf of 
particular fractions of capital rather than implying the transcendence of the state by the 
globalisation process. 
Underlying this is a tendency for capital to expand spatially there are implications 
for the state. In the process of capital's transformation 'from its embryonic form to a fully 
developed global entity', the state must re-organise its role in order to reproduce relations 
7 For example, TNCs which invest to produce for local markets may benefit from import 
substitution policies together with domestic capital that produces for home-market. 
8 Yaghffiaian (1998, 249) points to the fractional conflicts within capital within the 
context of global accumulation as follows: 'Different forms [of intemationalisation of 
accumulation] coexist and accordingly affect nation-state policy. Individual capitals' uneven 
integration into international economic activity and their involvement in various forms 
international accumulation become the context of fierce competition of capitals and their 
conflicting demands on state policy'. 
23 
of capital in this expanded scale (Bina & Yaghmaian 1991, 119). This continuing 
adaptation by the state (see Arrighi 1997, 4) needs to be addressed by the debates on 
globalisation. 
2.6 Marxist Globalisation Theories 
Starting from the need to understand whether there is a change in the form of the 
'political' to sustain accumulation of capital within an increasingly globalised context, 
some Marxist scholars observe rising transnational accumulation by capital; but there is 
no agreement within Marxist tradition on the primacy of the national form of state 
accompanying the process of transnationalisation of classes. Some scholars note an 
ongoing role of the nation state while capital increasingly circulates globally. Others 
stress changing character of the form of 'political' in relation to the circuit of capital, 
instead of enduring nature of nation state (Burnham 1996, 97; 2002, 115). On this basis, 
the rise of transnational capital claimed to give way to the supersession of the nation state 
system as the organising principle of capitalist development. 
The following section addresses these debates among Marxist analysts on the 
relationship between the transnationalising accumulation and the nation state. It will be 
seen that these debates have some relevance to the practice; but, the different analytical 
levels that those Marxist discourses focus on cause an overlook of some dynamics of the 
relationship between the state and capital within a global context. 
2.6.1 The Nation State in Global Accnmnlation of Capital 
Irrespective of the tendency for capital to expand spatially, some Marxist scholars 
contend that global capitalism remains nationally organised and irreducibly dependent on 
nation states. (e.g. Wood 1999, 2002; Tsoukalas 1999). In this view, the nation state 
continues to be critical in a global context for two reasons. Firstly, capitalism remains 
dependent on the nation state for the reproduction of social relations of capital (Wood 
2002, 31). Tsoukalas (1999, 71) claims that nation state serves better than a model of 
'Super-State': 
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The symbolic and functional presence of national states is more necessary than ever for 
the cohesion of social formations at the same time that their economic and ideological 
interventions are far more "deregulating" than before. 
Secondly, it is contended, we are still a very long way from a truly global 
capitalist class (Wood 1999, 6; 2002, 26-28). National classes are likely to persist 
precisely because global integration itself intensified competition among national 
capitals. Much of what goes under the name of globalisation consists of national states 
carrying out policies to promote international competitiveness of their own national 
economies, maintain or restore profitability to domestic capital. According to Wood, to 
the extent that capitalists who operate on the global stage have interests in common with 
others across national boundaries and to the extent that these transnational capitalists 
have certain international agencies at their command, they could (with great caution) be 
said to constitute a global capitalist class. But even they must rely on the coercive powers 
of national states: 
It is. no doubt true that national governments are now more than ever obliged to act in the 
interests of 'global' no less than local capital, including the interests of 'transnational' 
capital with its home base elsewhere. But this is significant not only because those 
capitalist interests are global but also because they need the nation-state to sustain them 
(Wood 2002, 27) 
For Wood, therefore, the critical point is the organisation of capital on national principles 
even if there is a global capitalist class in formation. Indeed, capitalism has spread by 
reproducing its national reorganisation. 
The formation of the global capitalist class is also acknowledged by Tsoukalas. 
Following Poulantzas (1974), Tsoukalas stresses that 'autonomous national bourgeoisies' 
are being increasingly disarticulated as parts of this class must 'de-localise' and become 
part of 'international capital' in order to remain viable (p.62). Accordingly, contradictions 
between fractions of capital within nation states are 'internationalised' 
In this framework, 'international agencies of capital, like the 1MF or the World 
Bank (WB), a(e above all agents of specific national capitals, and derive whatever 
powers of enforcement they have from nation-states - both the imperial states that 
command them and the subordinate states that carry out their orders' (Wood 1999, 5) 
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Therefore, these agencies reflect state-sponsored processes of globalisation (Tsoukalas 
1999, 61). 
This Marxist approach gives the analytical priority to political processes and 
builds the analysis of contemporary capitalism on the primacy of national units of 
accumulation. Wood emphasises that nation states have been carrying out policies mostly 
to promote international competitiveness of their own national economies. This is, no 
doubt true, but it avoids a question central to this thesis: how does the state mediate the 
relations between fractions of capital when different parts of capital have different 
expectations of the state with respect to the global mobility of capital. 
2.6.2 The Thesis of the Transnational Class Formation 
Another group of Marxist analysts, similar to Wood and Tsoukalas, also claim 
that capital still relies on a national base for reproduction of its social relations as well as 
for expansion across borders. What distinguishes them is that they argue an emerging 
transnational capitalist class (TCC) is the material force that drives rising globalisation 
of capitalism (Gill1990; Cox 1987; Vander Pijl1998; 2001/2002). 
These neo-Gramscian scholars treat capital as globally-integrated and see that 
there are political forces that cross national boundaries. Yet within this apparent 
transcendence of a national taxonomy of capital there remains an underlying nationalism 
not dissimilar form that of Wood. This shows through when a transnational cla.ss is 
defined in terms of the affinity of a number of different national capitalist classes. Such a 
class can be said to be, 'transnational' because it is constituted by an aggregation of 
national capitalist class interests, not bec11use it has a distinctive, transnational class 
interesL An alternative conception emphasises not national affinity, but an international 
integration of capital, and hence a single interest. Sklair (2001, 2002), for example, 
stresses the need for conceiving classes outside state-centrism by arguing that the 
formation of a transnational capitalist class hollows out the notion of national interest. 
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However, Sklair fails to adequately theorise the state within the context of rising 
transnational integration of capital. 9 
Rooted in the post-imperialism theories of 1980s (e.g. Becker et al. 1987), some 
other scholars, on the other hand, criticise the nation-state-centred concept of class 10 and 
develop the theory of the transnationalisation of the state (1NS). 11 These Marxist scholars 
argue that the old international alliance of national bourgeoisies has mutated into a 
transnational bourgeoisie which is a bourgeoisie whose coordinates are no longer national 
(Robinson 2002, 215).12 
The thesis of the lNS claims that the nation state is becoming transformed and 
absorbed into a larger structure of a transnational state. The global decentralisation and 
fragmentation of the production process and the supranational integration of national 
productive structures redefine capital accumulation, and classes, in relation to the nation 
state (Burbach & Robinson 1999; Robinson & Harris 2000; Robinson 2001a, 2002). 
Corresponding to the emergence of transnationalised fractions of 'local' dominant groups 
in every country in recent years (Robinson & Harris 2000, 23) (with ramifications for a 
transnational proletariat), the state as a class relation is also becoming transnationalised. 
The nation states and a wide variety of supranational institutions, as part of a 
transnational state, aim to convert the world into a single unified field for global 
capitalism through standardisation in the codes and rules of the global markets (Robinson 
& Harris 2000, 29; Robinson 2002, 220-223). In this framework, supranational 
institutions are not merely instruments of a world bourgeoisie against world labour; they 
are also instruments of some fractions of capital against others (Robinson & Harris 2000, 
' Sklair, by conflating class with state, includes 'globalising bureaucrats and politicians 
('the state fraction') among the components of transnational capitalist class. 
10 See Robinson & Harris (2000) and Robinson (200112002) for the critique of Van der 
Pijl, Cox, Gill and Sklair. 
11 Glassman (1999, 673) also introduces the concept of the internationalisation of the 
state which he defines 'as a process in which state apparatus becomes increasingly oriented 
towards facilitating capital accumulation for the most internationalized investors, regardless of 
their nationality'. Glassman acknowledges the simultaneous representation of national and 
foreign capital within the state in the process of the intemationalisation of capital; but, he does 
not make such a claim that a new form of non-territorial state is in formation. 
12 Yet, in response to the criticism made by Block (2001), Robinson (200lb, 232) 
acknowledges at the same time conflicting pressures within this fraction which prevent its real 
internal unity. 
, 
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29). They suppress national fractions and promote the interests of transnational 
fractions. 13 
Overall, both the post-imperialist and neo-Gramscian theorists explain the 
developments in global political economy since the 1970s with . reference to the 
international self-organisation of the capitalist ruling class. Their emphasis on the 
. agency of TNCs or the more complex ideological and institutional mechanisms that 
characterise hegemonic world orders respectively14 makes these theories over-
prescriptive. For example, by giving the priority to the international scale, Robinson and 
Harris readily accept that nation states are captured by the will of a TCC. This disregards 
that the nation state is continuously redefmed through the conflicts between (fractions of) 
classes. These Marxist accounts not only leave no place for class struggle between labour 
and capital, but also easily assume that national fractions of classes became 
spontaneously subordinated to the inore globally organised fractions of capital. The 
current rise of globally oriented fractions of capital as the hegemonic part of capital in 
many country contexts corresponds to a certain historical phase in the development of 
world capitalism. 
The study of Turkish banking reform does indeed present elements of this theory, 
for the outcome of the reform process has indeed been to advance the connections 
between big 'Turkish' banks with some of the world's largest banks. Yet the state 
intervention in the reform process also had some elements which oversaw the 
reproduction and advance of accumulation for total capital, including the Jess globally 
13 The thesis of the TNS is criticised on the ground that it is not supported by much 
empirical evidence (see Mann 200112002; Arrighi 200112002). Robinson (2001/2002, 500) 
indeed accepted the need for more empirical researches to test their thesis. Robinson states that 
their works are early approximations in an ongoing research agenda which intended to lay out the 
theoretical argument and map the direction of further investigation. Yet Robinson and Harris 
(2000, 20-21) stress that the argument of the continued existence of the phenomenon of nation 
state within the globalisation process of capital does not validate their view of globalisation as an 
epochal shift in the development of world capitalism. National and transnational class fractions 
and contradictions among them can coexist. Yet 'what is important for niaterialistanalysis is the 
capture of the direction of historic movement and the tendencies underway, even when such 
historic processes are open-ended'. And Robinson and Harris assert that the tendency is towards a 
transnationa/isation of the state corresponding to the process of the transnationalisation of 
capital. 
14 For a critical review of these two approaches see Colas (2002, 197-203). 
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oriented fraction. In brief, there is a need to put the class determined nature of the state at 
the centre of analysis and, on this basis to study historically-specific and contested state 
mediation between fractions of capital. 
Here, as we found in relation to the theory of fractions, there are dangers of over-
generalising about the way in which contradictions will be played out. Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to focus on the issues raised in our consideration of Marxist theory, and apply 
them to Turkish banking reform in some preliminary way. 
2.6.2.1 Implications for the Analysis of Turkey 
Whether the nation state is being superseded by a supranational form of state or 
will continue to be a fundamental pillar in the reproduction of global social relations of 
capital is an open-ended and historical question. Yet the following arguments by Marxist 
theorists of transnational class formation are observed in the Turkish case. 
1. The process of the formation of a TCC and the role of nation state within this 
process: 
The main issue that arise from the Marxist debates is the formation of a TCC that 
shares transnational interest vis-a-vis domestically oriented capitals. Consistent with 
Robinson and Harris, we see the Turkish state, in collaboration with the IMF (and some 
other supranational institutions), promoting global advancement of accumulation on 
behalf of a particular fraction of Turkish capital, which is concentrated, globally oriented 
and pursuing further global accumulation. 
2. The transnational orientation by the Third World's capital: 
Robinson and Harris (2000, 35) assert that even if it is in the Third World where 
transnational class formation is weakest and where· 'national' bourgeoisies may still 
control states, some sections of Third World's capital are increasingly being part of 
transnational capital by their own international direct investments (IDis) and by 
integrating into global circuits of accumulation. This point is crucial because, as the 
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following sections will discuss, the idea of the polarisation between the North and the 
South continue to be prevalent even among Marxist scholars. Consistent with Robinson 
and Harris (2000), the empirical analysis shows that during the recent restructuring of 
capital, the leading Turkish conglomerates oriented more towards glo)lal accumulation, 
including via their rising lOis. To allocate a position to Turkey in the international 
division of labour neglects the divergent positions of individual Turkish capitals in the 
global circulation of capital. 
3. The transnational concentration of capital through global merger and 
acquisitions (M&As) contributes to the rise of transnational bourgeoisie 
The argument by Robinson and Harris (2000, 34) that is the rising concentration 
of capital through global M&As is being observed in Turkish banking with the search for 
foreign partners by the leading Turkish conglomerates. In order to get stronger in global 
financial markets, with the support of the state, the conglomerates restructured their 
banking arms and have tended to establish partnerships with leading world banks. These 
conglomerates increasingly seek inclusion into global capital not only in their production 
operations, but also in their financial arms. This is an ongoing process, indicating that the 
TNS thesis gives important signals for the future direction of capitalism in Turkey. 
Robinson & Harris (2000, 38) acknowledge this point on a global scale: 
There are of course still local and national capitals, and there will be for a long time to 
come. But they must "de-localise" and link to hegemonic transnational capital if they are 
to survive. Territorially restricted capital cannot compete with its transnationally mobile 
counterpart. 
4. The effects of the unfolding world economic crises in terms of accelerating 
transnational integration of local capitalists of affected countries: 
Robinson and Harris (2000, 39) note the restructuring in the powerful financial-
industrial capital groups of South Korea (the chaebols) in the aftermaths of the Asian 
crisis. The chaebols have been compelled to sell off national assets to TNCs and at the 
same time they have forged partnerships with corporations from other areas of the world. 
This observation is also valid in the Turkish case. Under the adverse effects of the recent 
Asian and Russian financial crises, which were aggravated by two crises in Turkish 
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financial markets in 2000 and 200 I, the Turkish conglomerates also needed to reorganise 
their overall corporate strategies, including their banking arms. This restructuring towards 
global market orientation, as the thesis will explain in detail, involved foreign partnership 
searches inside and outside Turkey as well as rising !Dis. 
These scholars argue that the IMF 'used' the crises 'to place greater leverage on 
Third World countries to further open up to global corporations' (Robinson and Harris 
2000, 44). This argument by Robinson an Harris is not verified by the empirical study of 
the Turkish case. The analysis of Turkish banks (and their conglomerates) indicates that 
their restructurings were not originated simply in the IMF' s trap. One fraction of Turkish 
FC, together with other large and externally-oriented capitals, led the change in Turkey 
and solidified their hegemony within the Turkish bourgeoisie. 
5. The IMF may pursue transnational capitalists' interests which should not be 
reduced to specific national interests: 
Mann (200 112002, 466), in his critique of Robinson and Harris, argues that the 
staff of the IMF, WTO, etc. are the protectors of national capitalists interests of their own 
country of origin. Yet Robinson (200112002, 504-505) criticises this view as it comes 
from the 'fatal nation-state-centric-flaw in Mann's reasoning'. Robinson claims that 
fractions of hegemonic transnational capital have gained a commanding influence over 
most nation states. Seen in this light, officials from particular governments who staff the 
IMF may well be pursuing transnational capitalists' interests within these organisations 
and not 'American', 'German' or 'Japanese' interests of their country origin. 'This then 
becomes an empirical question as to state policies and practices and particular and 
shif\ing historic constellations of social forces that dive them', Robinson adds. Some 
other authors (e.g. Panitch & Gindin (2004), Gowan (2003)) see the IMF as the 
expression of the hegemony of a distinctly US version of capitalism. The thesis does not 
engage the· debate about whether the c\ment form of global capitalism can be attributed to 
the US hegemony of a distinctly US form of capitalism. It simply contends that, 
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irrespective of this, the IMF is not the agent of particular capitals according to their 
nation of origin _IS 
The analysis of the IMF involvement in the Turkish bank reform shows that 
seeing the IMF, and other international institutions, as simply the agents of advanced 
countries' capital overlooks the more complex relationship between the nation state and 
those institutions. In the Turkish case, the IMF acted effectively as part of the Turkish 
state on the basis of a particular constellation of domestic class forces. Therefore, the 
IMF is better to be presented as the institution of world capital (advanced particular 
capital) within particular national agendas. The IMF seeks .the expansion and 
reproduction of the global circuit of capital. 
2.7 Does a Nation State Occupy a Single Position in the Global System? 
An underlying issue that informs many of the above theoretical debates, and is 
certainly important in the Turkish debate, is the notion that nation states occupy positions 
in a structure (usually hierarchy) of nation states. Nations and their states are often 
labelled 'core', 'periphery', 'semi-periphery', etc. with the presumption that this is some 
explanation of the pattern of accumulation within a nation. This thesis contends that 
·attributing nations with particular single position in a global structure occludes ·an 
understanding of the restructuring of capital that sees some fractions of capital, and some 
individual capitals occupying some sorts of relations with global accumulation, and other 
fractions and individual capitals occupying other positions. An analysis of structural 
change must see 'positions' as transforming, and with no reason to assume that all 
capitals within a nation occupy the same position. 
Nonetheless, the notion of nations occupying positions is prevalent, and warrants 
some consideration. 
The early theories of imperialism before the First World War and the second 
wave of theories of imperialism after the Second World War started from the supposed 
hierarchy of the world on the basis of nations. First wave of theories mostly focused on 
15 This thesis does not take the strong position that the world is structured under the 
hegemony of US capital. It is an important debate but not germane to the Turkish case. 
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the power struggle among major European countries for the domination of the globe (e.g. 
Bukharin 1915, Hilferding 1910, Kautsky 1914 and Lenin 1917). The latter wave of 
theories was more concerned with the inequality between developed and underdeveloped 
countries (Sutcliffe 2001, 139). The central idea in these position theories has been the 
polarisation between the core and peripheral countries through a transfer of surplus 
product from the latter to the former and the resultant oppressed economic development 
in the periphery (e.g. the Dependency Theory (Baran 1957, Frank 1966, Amin 1974), the 
World Systems Analysis 16 (Wallerstein 1974), and the NIDL Thesis (Frobel, Heinrichs 
& Kreye 1980)). 
The NIDL thesis emerged in the early 1980s. It is centred on the idea that nation 
states keep functional positions within the world capitalism. This thesis argued the 
relocation of industries to the periphery and de-industrialisation of the centre whose 
capital was in the search of low-abundant wages of the former. The NIDL theorists see 
this division of labour as driven by TNCs' pursuit of maximum profit, especially via use 
of cheap labour while bringing no genuine development for Third World. 
The issue of the international division of labour has been central to recent debates 
in Turkey. As Chapter 3 will address, the nationalist/developmentalist scholars, who pose 
the debate in the context of Turkey, have attributed the neo-liberal orientation in the 
economy to the NIDL, imposition of foreign capital and its global institutions, making 
Turkey a branch plant for TNCs at the cost of an independent, nationally-integrated, 
state-led development strategy. 
The above discussed TNS thesis challenges this division of the world economy. 
This theory argues that the transnational integration of fractions of capitalist classes 
within a global production system leaves behind spatial dimensions of the global division 
of labour (see Robinson 2001/2002, 502-503). On this ground, the geographic core-
periphery polarisation is being replaced by a social core-periphery polarisation which 
cuts across all societies and regions of the world (Robinson 2001a, 558; Robinson 
2001/2002, 502-503). 17 The process of globalisation leads to de-nationalisation of capital 
16 While there are notes of a 'semi-periphery', the theoretical framework is nonetheless 
conceived through a theoretical binarism. 
17 
'Transnational integration of production systems cutting across the North-South divide 
suggest the need for rethinking development not as a national process, in which what "develops" 
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which is the opposite idea of imperialism: class not nation forms only fundamental basis 
of division of the world social system (c.f. Sutcliffe 2001, 148). 
In contrast to the TNS thesis, world systems analysts and other polarisation 
theorists see recent developments in the globalisation process as a new form taken by 
imperialism in the polarisation/dependency sense (c.f. Sutcliffe 2001, 147). The 
globalisation process, it is argued, is deepening the polarisation between the North and 
the South. Third World's economies are opened up to Northern capital since otherwise 
they would be subjected not only to economic stagnation, but also to political 
destabilisation (c.f. Radice 2001, 14). The neo-liberal restructuring under the supervision 
of the international institutions such as the IMF, WB, etc. increases the power of the 
countries of the North over those of the South. The Southern state has become more 
subordinate than any time since the colonial era (e.g. Wood 1999, 2002; Hoogwelt 1997; 
Scholle 1997). 
For instance, Arrighi (2001/2002), from the perspective of the World Systems 
Theory, agrees that a world state is indeed in formation (pp. 473-4). Yet the North-South 
division has continuous significance, particularly in shaping processes of world-state 
formation. The dispersal of manufacturing activities in the South has not resulted in any 
reduction of the income gap between the two formations (Arrighi 2005, 34). 18 
The main deficiency in position theories is that change in domestic economies of 
the 'Third World' is too readily attributed to external forces and 'internal' class dynamics 
of those countries are neglected. As Overbeek (1990, 13-14) states, the argument that 
position in the international division of labour is the main determinant in the structure of 
the world economy regards primarily the position of geographical units, not that of 
classes or class fractions (see also Jenkins 1984). Indeed, capitalist class relations were, 
from their very inception, located in a global context (the world economy). 
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is a nation - but in terms of developed, underdeveloped, and intermediate population groups in a 
transnational environment' (Robinson 2001/2002, 502). 
18 Robinson (2001/2002, 502) in response criticises Arrighi's use of Gross National 
Product (GNP) per capita as an indicator of the continued inequality between the North and the 
South .. This is a nation-state-centric data which in fact disguises the processes involved in 
transnational class formation, Robinson argues. 
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This issue is of critical importance in the study of Turkish restructuring. Instea~ of 
depicting Turkey as a 'peripheral' country, with an associate of propositions about the 
subordination of 'Turkish' capital and the incapacity of the Turkish state to secure the 
conditions of accumulation, this thesis develops a vastly different analysis. Later chapters 
show that different parts of Turkish capital have integrated globally in different ways, and 
that this difference has been overseen by the state (and the IMF). 
Related to position .theories, IMF structural adjustment programs are widely 
evaluated as imposing neo-liberal restructuring in developing countries, and locking these 
countries into certain policies that generate certain economic structures that are then 
judged functional for global capital. In other words, an 'outside-in' approach is almost 
unquestionably adopted in the literature. For example, Yaghmaian (1998, 259, 261) 
asserts that IMF policies help national institutional restructuring and wage regulation 
conducive to international accumulation in order to facilitate integration into the world 
market. It is labour that bears the cost of international competitiveness through lower real 
wages and higher productivity. These latter observations are not disputed here. What is 
contested is the impetus that drives this subordination of labour. Yaghmaian stresses that 
these policies have been enforced in different national sites by supranational institutions, 
including the IMF: 
Loan-seeking states are required to accept the structural and regulatory conditions of 
capitals in the global circuit by removing national obstacles to international 
accumulation. 
The apparently assertive stance of the IMF over the Turkish state during the reform could 
have Jed to such a conclusion. Indeed the IMF put pressure on the Turkish state to 
implement some policies which the state itself found hard to implement. But the 
empirical analysis of the Turkish case shows that the IMF acted effectively as part of the 
Turkish state in the process of banking reform. Seeing the IMF as an agent of Western 
capitalism and with objectives contrary to those of Turkey implies there is a collective 
interest in Turkey and that the IMF wants Turkey play a certain role in the world 
economy, and imposes policies to secure this role. Here it needs to be considered that 
certain fractions of capital within 'developing countries' also seek this national 
restructuring in order to facilitate their inclusions into international capital. 
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This issue points to the opposing interests of fractions of capital within the 
accumulation process and state mediation between those interests. The following section 
lays out the basis for the empirical study of the thesis in light of the reviewed literature. 
2.8 Questions to be explored in the Turkish Case 
In order to understand the restructuring of capital within Turkey, the thesis started 
from the question of how 'endogenising' those so-called external forces can allow us to 
think about Turkey differently. This permits the study of Turkey as part of global 
accumulation and the analysis of the Turkish state as a mediator between different parts 
of capital having various spatial agendas. This particular way of framing the question will 
bring about a very different explanation of the change in Turkey from the wider debates 
on the relationship between the state and globalisation. 
On this ground, the issues explored in this chapter raise the following questions to 
be studied in the Turkish case: 
• The role of the state. in the reproduction of capital in the context of banking 
sector crisis, 
• State mediation between fractions of capital with different spatial patterns of 
accumulation, 
• The participation of foreign capital in banking reform as being integral to the 
restructuring by Turkish FC, 
• The manifestation of global integration of Turkish FC as an accumulation 
strategy for the Turkish state, and 
• The role of the IMF in the domestic policy. 
The objective of this thesis is to present state mediation of contradictory relations 
between fractions of capital during the Turkish banking reform, and particularly within 
the context of the close supervision of the IMF. The thesis utilises the circuit of social 
capital as the basis of defining fractions of Turkish FC. When these fractions are defined 
with respect to their circuits of accumulation, it becomes apparent that this defmition 
does not correspond particularly closely with differentiation on the basis of size or 
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nationality of ownership: the 'usual' way divisions are defined. In the definition of the 
links or alliances between individual capitals on state policies of bank reform, two criteria 
are crucial. Firstly, at which point in the circuit of social capital the individual capitals 
capture surplus value; and secondly, at which points in the circuit do they participate in 
global integration, and what particular form of integration, with respect to the production 
and distribution of surplus value. 19 
Framed in this way, the state policy has impacts on these criteria. The Turkish 
state (under the supervision of the IMP) managed the reform of banking by advancing 
particular forms of global integration by certain divisions of FC. To do this, it had to shut 
down other forms of accumulation, undertaken by other capitals. 
In this framing, globalisation is not an outside force, but integral to the 
reproduction of relations of production within the nation. That is because space of 
accumulation and· space of nation territory are not the same. Different parts of capital 
integrate with global accumulation process in different ways and the state mediates 
between fractions of capital having various spaces of agendas. 
2.9 Conclusion 
Most of the debates on globalisation are imprisoned to the counterposition 
between the nation state and globalising capital. Where analysis has been able to move 
beyond this counterpositioning, the role of the nation state remains contentious. 
This thesis argues that the nation state oversees the integration of domestic 
accumulation process into global process on the basis of domestic balance of class forces. 
Here the state is approached as a constitution that is continuously redefined by class 
struggle. Thus, the state mediation between divided interests of capital, including foreign 
19 In the application of the fractionalist approach to any change process, there is a danger 
of too rigid definition of fractions. The determination of fractions relates to divisions between 
circuits of capital, and especially spatial divisions and corresponds to a particular stage of 
capitalist development. So the application of the factionalist approach to any specific context 
needs. to avoid of over-formularisation or pre-determinism This means that we can identifY 
fractional divisions separately for each specific context, which is suitable for the exposition of 
that particular case. 
f 
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capital, becomes the central issue in the theorisation of the nation state within the context 
of global expansion of capital. 
This proposition does not, however, provide a formula from which state policy 
can be 'read-off. On the contrary, it involves framing the contradictions of state policy in 
a way that points to the need for detailed case studies in order to find out particular class 
forces that underlie particular state policies in different spatial and historical contexts. 
The study of Turkey involves an historical exploration of the relationship between 
the nation state and the globalisation of capital. The details of this study are presented in 
subsequent chapters, but two propositions form its starting point. 
First, it is not helpful to depict Turkey as a 'peripheral' economy if the 
implication is that all state policy is destined to enforce that status for all capital. 
Different capitals in Turkey have particular histories, and they are not inherently shackled 
by such national branding. Their particular patterns of accumulation need to be explored, 
so that the contradictions which the state must mediate can be defined. 
Second, while the IMF was integral to bank reforms in Turkey, it should not be 
presumed that its role was to impose a single reform 'script' on the Turkish state, and 
certainly not a script that read 'deregulate'. The IMF may have over-arching agendas, but 
in a particular reform process, it confronts the same contradictory interests of capital as 
does the state, and, certainly in the Turkish case, these contradictions cannot simply 
solved by decree, but involve the playing out of class processes. 
We can now begin the detailed story. 
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CHAPTER3 
DISCOURSES ON TURKISH BANKING REFORM 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 The Neo-liberal Approach 
3.3 The Institutionalist Approach 
3.3 .1 Populism and the Fiscal Crisis of the State 
3.3 .2 The Asymmetric Relation of Capital with the State 
3.3.3 The IMF with a Short-Term Policy Vision 
3.4 The Nationalist/Developmentalist Approach 
3.5 The Marxist Approach 
3.5.1 Nationalism vis-a-vis the Logic of Capital Accumulation 
3.5.2 State Policies in the Context of the Global Orientation in Domestic 
Accumulation 
3.5.3 The Need for a Fractional Analysis of Banking Reform 
3.6 Conclusion 
3.1 Introduction 
As the Turkish economy slumped into a severe recession which was accompanied 
by the outbreak of two financial crises, bank reform came to form the core of the debates 
in Turkish mass media with a particular focus on the embezzlement of banks. What were 
the reasons for those bank failures? What might be the solution for the recovery of 
banking? 
Among different schools of political economy there has been a deep disagreement 
about the origin of the problem faced by Turkish banking, the way crises have been 
handled, and the required structural reform. It must be acknowledged that this debate has 
been often at cross _purposes - different themes, generating different interpretations. 
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This chapter addresses how various theories explain changes in the Turkish 
economy accompanying the reform of banking. This discussion wiii show how their 
different world views and analytical categories point these discourses to particular 
interpretations of the reform. 
The review of different schools' stance on banking reform will begin with an 
analysis of their general analytical frameworks on the Turkish economy before discussing 
their specific arguments on banking. This focus is adopted for three reasons. 
Firstly, Turkish banking reform has been paid little attention among different 
schools of political economy. Indeed, the majority of the literature is limited to stating 
empirical facts and chronological events regarding the reform. Also, in many works, 
banking reform is not given primary attention and appears only as a secondary issue in 
the discussion of other topics. Therefore, this literature review will address not only how 
different schools analyse banking reform, but also, where they situate the reform within 
broader economic change. 
Secondly, the banking reform represents a new stage in the global advancement of 
Turkish capitalism in the post-1980s era. The reform is closely related to other important 
aspects of the period such as state borrowing policy and financial liberalisation. After the 
mid 1980s - especially the 1989 capital account Iiberalisation- the state borrowing 
policy (in which banks were the largest customer) became a source of protectionism for 
FC. The banks placed foreign loans and other deposits in government securities, which 
earned them unprecedented margins. Due to the organic links between banks and industry, 
banks became a bridge between their conglomerates and state borrowing in channelling 
money capital. Hence, locating the discussion of banking reform within the broader 
context of the change in Turkish economy will show how different schools explain the 
links between those important aspects of capital accumulation regime and position 
banking reform. 
Thirdly, the ownership of banks by conglomerates requires consideration of the 
wider ramifications of this ownership structure in the analysis of the banking sector. To 
isolate the banking sector for discrete analysis fails to recognise the pervasive effects of 
the conglomerate structure. Thus, departing from general analytical frameworks of 
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different schools will allow us to see how they approach to the articulation between 
finance and production spheres. 
On this basis, the neo-liberal, institutionalist, nationalist/developmentalist and 
Marxist approaches will be reviewed: how they explain the transformation that Turkey 
has been experiencing; their policy agendas; how they analyse banking reform and the 
role of the state and th!'l IMF within it; and the contributions/limitations/contradictions in 
these explanations. 
This thesis is conceived within a Marxist framework. The Marxist interpretation, 
it will be seen, brings the dynamic class dimension of bank reform to the fore, and later 
chapters will utilise this approach to give the details of bank reform a wider social and 
economic meaning. This opens up a quite different analytical agenda to one based solely 
on inefficiency and market forces, or institutional relations which retard national 
development. Just why these alternative views are seen as limited in the context of 
Turkish banking reform is the subject of this chapter. Moreover, there is no unified 
Marxist approach and no absolute divide between·the Marxist paradigms, so this chapter 
is also an attempt to develop a particular set of Marxist-informed questions which address 
the process of bank reform. 
3.2 The Neo-liberal Approach 
The neo-liberal discourse contends that market forces, if allowed, serve the 
interest of the whole society. The approach explains the failures in the economy as a 
result of inefficient and rent-seeking state intervention. In order to put into effect the rule 
of market forces, the neo-liberals demand a smaller economic role for the state (Aktan 
1997). Accordingly, fiscal austerity and anti-inflationary policy, increased 
competitiveness and privatisation are advocated as the solution to financial crises and 
rebuilding macro-economic balances in the economy. In particular, it is argued that there 
is a need to eradicate state subsidies for agriculture and social security, remove high 
government deficits and public sector borrowing (see <;olak 2001; Ak~ay, Alper & 
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Ozmucur 1996; Ak9ay, Alper & Ozmucur 2001, Ak9ay 2001). 1 Yet, an interrogation of 
interest payments to benefactor fractions of capital from the budget is systematically 
excluded and primary surpluses are supported to reduce state debt stock. The policies 
implemented in line with the neo-liberal policy agenda meant squeezed welfare state 
expenditures and repressed income policy for labour during the recent fiscal crisis of the 
state. 
As such, as a program of reform, neo-liberalism also demands a clear state agenda 
to implement the reforms, including supervision by the IMF. The state is both the source 
of the problem (distortions) and the source of the solution (the removal of distortions). 
Hence, the neo-liberal approach is at once a political agenda of breaking down vested 
conservative interests and eradicating associated corruption in the interests of facilitating 
market forces. The failure of reforms is therefore posed as a failure of the state (see Alper 
2001, Egilmez 2001a).2 
Specifically, in relation to banking, Ersel (1999), <;:olak (2001) and Ak9ay (2001) 
point to the state as the party responsible for the distortions in banking: the existence of 
full-insurance scheme, the problems associated with state banks (such as their unfair 
competition, weak financial structures due to duty losses), insufficient regulation and 
supervision of banking which caused corruption and misuse of some banks, foreign 
banks' limited participation in the sector and their high engagement with arbitrage gains, 
etc. 3 
1 More left-liberals contend breaking down the conglomerates so as to create (so-called) 
competitive markets. 
2 When the three-year lMF stabilisation program collapsed almost 12 months after its 
launch, the neo-liberals criticised improper management of the government authorities and some 
design flaws in the program which was otherwise the cure for macroeconomic imbalances and 
non-sustainable growth. 
3 Within the neo-liberal discussion, a common stress is made on the 'puzzle' between 
high profitability and limited foreign presence in the banking sector. For instance, Ak9ay (2003, 
170-171) argues that 'astonishing question' on Turkish banking is that though the sector enjoyed 
'above-n9rrnal economic profits' why foreign banks with their higher efficiency and scales were 
not lured to the sector and the presence of foreign banks remained extremely low compared to 
similar emerging markets. He explains this situation with lax and arbitrary supervision in the 
sector which created 'a potentially non-competitive environment open to favoritism'. He also 
indicates that the paradoxical' situation disappears 'when one realizes that the presence of 
foreign banks had exceeded their visibility. In other words, the share of foreign assets held by 
those banks had been substantially lower than their share in government securities transactions.' 
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Furthermore, considering the unstable macroeconomic environment created by 
the state, the engagement of banking with state debt finance instead of credit allocation 
becomes justifiable to the public as it led banks to arbitrage gains (Alper eta!. 2001). For 
Ak~ay 'a permanent solution to the banking sector ultimately boils down to the reduced 
borrowing need of the Treasury, and thus to increased fiscal discipline and improved 
public sector balance' (Ak~ay 2003, 186). Establishment of macroeconomic balances will 
allow banking to realise its financial intermediary role effectively. 
From this brief summary, we can raise a number of concerns about the neo-liberal 
approach- apart, that is, from its ideological starting point, which is taken as given. 
Firstly, this approach views finance as a discrete sector without concern for the 
catalytic role of banks within their conglomerates' overall accumulation (Ertugrul & 
Sel~uk 2001; Erzan, Ak~ay & Yolalan 2001). Even if 'the misuse of banks by their 
owners' is sometimes mentioned (e.g. Ak~ay 2001; Aks:ay 2003), it is considered merely 
as an issue of treated at the level of corruption by the owners of small banks and 
politicians, not as a systemic part of capital accumulation in Turkey. 
Secondly, the concern for marke! efficiency as a historically conceived goal 
leaves the issue of conflicts within banking, which drives the analysis of later chapters, as 
a.rather minor and untheorised issue. The conflicts within banking are considered mainly 
between small and large banks as well as between private and state banks. The 
explanation of the reform also centres only on state-driven distortions. For example, 
Aks:ay (2001, 40-42) contends that the misused banks owed their existence to the state 
due t<i the allocation of bank licences to people 'whose creditworthiness as credit 
customers would be questionable at best', insufficient supervision of banking, full 
insurance scheme, etc. The state banks, on the other hand, are accused of increasing the 
fragility in banking along with small banks: 'the abuse and mismanagement had been 
limited to the "small bank" sub-sector of the banking industry, but coupled with the 
humongous problems of the state banks, the systemic risk to the entire banking 
community had become quite sizable' (Aks:ay 2001, 40). By indicating the absence of a 
prudent regulatory environment as the underlying factor for these distortions, Aks:ay 
(2003, 172) continues: 
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A 100 percent guarantee deposit insurance scheme that was enacted during the 1994 crisis 
served as an extreme case of "moral hazard" and distorted the system in favor of the 
improperly managed, inefficient, and aggressive banks at the expense of the properly 
managed ones. Reckless behavior by small and aggressive banks in collecting deposits, in a 
way similar to that of the state banks who had a free hand in creating the so called "duty 
losses", weakened the status of the overall sector as the full guarantee worked as a risk 
cover for the small sharks, while the risk was being taken care of by the state. 
Hence, the neo-liberal political analysis is posed in terms of individual actors, not 
systems and of equilibrium, not conflicts. Therefore, they cannot explain a systematic 
realignment in relations between capitals, which this thesis argues is at the core of the 
• 4 
restructunng. 
Thirdly, it follows that the role of the state is framed only in terms of its 
facilitation or distortion of the market, not in terms of its role in managing conflicts over 
banking reforms. The effect is a rather limited conception of politics in the neo-liberal 
analysis. Instead of framing the entrenched interests that the state has to combat in 
implementing reform, the role that the state played in rebuilding capital accumulation, 
and the delicacy of managing the closure of financial institutions without creating 
financial crises, the neo-liberals tend towards making absolutist stands on 'correct' and 
'incorrect' policy. But bank disclosures cannot be reduced to a moral hazard problem, 
and bank reform cannot be conceived in terms of simulating perfect competition. The 
neo-liberal analysis, centring on relations of exchange and sphere of circulation and 
4 There are many other works that classif'y banks according to changing combinations of 
fmancial ratios by using different statistical methods and periods of time. In these works, firstly, 
it is generally argued that foreign and private banks were more efficient than state banks in the 
post-1980 period (for a literature review on this issue see inan 2000). 
The second argument is that while small-to-medium scale banks suffered in their 
performance after the 1994 crisis, large scale banks had a relatively better performance (Mercan 
& Yolalan 2000). Thirdly, via ordering individual deposit banks according to their calculated 
efficiency scores, many works try to prove that the banks that were transferred to the Savings 
Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) were the most inefficient banks in the sector (Canba~ & Vural 
2002; Pekkaya, Aydogan & Tosuner 2002). 
However, even though the confiscated banks were likely to be the weakest ones in the 
sector, this kind of grouping of banks does not clarif'y what led those banks to perform so 
poorly. Thus, the link between overall accumulation strategies of the owner conglomerates and 
bank financial performances remains unaccounted for. Secondly, just considering banks' 
financial ratios causes confusion in understanding the seizure process, as it is possible to see that 
some of the most ailing banks are placed above non-confiscated banks in many efficiency 
sequences of banks (see for instance Canb~ & Vural, 2002, Pekkaya et al. 2002). 
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surface reflections of capital accumulation process such as interest, inflation and 
exchange rates, leads to disregard of the class issues of bank reform (Ercan 2002a, 6). 
3.3 The Institutionalist Approach 
'Institutionalism' is a loosely defined term in the Turkish context, as it is 
generally. Clearly, it gives focus to institutions, but it does not present an alternative 
theory or world view. Yet there is a spectrum of opinion in Turkish social science that 
self-identifies as 'Institutionalist' (e.g. Oni~ and Bugra) and their works are focused here. 
The institutionalist approach presents a more political and less mechanistic 
understanding than does the neo-Jiberal approach of the ongoing transformation in the 
Turkish economy. At the centre of this discourse is the state, its policies and, in relation 
to banking, its relationship to major financial institutions. While the neo-liberals criticise 
the state for the creation of distortions, institutionalists criticise the state for not focusing 
on 'limited and well-defined objectives' for enhancing productivity and competitiveness 
in global markets. Instead, in the view of institutionalists state policies have led to 
macroeconomic imbalances and to the outbreak of financial crises. 
Their policy proposals accordingly focus on the creation of macro balance. It is 
argued that to avoid the 'overload' expenditure demands, the state should focus on 'a 
limited number of well-defined objectives' (Oni~ 1999b, 506). To do this, there is a need 
for a transition to the 'post-populist state'. This state should play a complementary role as 
opposed to a direct entrepreneurial role for enhancing productivity and accumulation via 
infrastructural investment, support for key infant industries, and utilisation of non-
populist instruments of income distribution (such as tax reform and better education and 
health care) (Oni~ 1999a, 470-472). 
This thesis shares some key common approaches to the interpretation of Turkish 
economy with the institutionalists, in particular the emphasis on the 'state-created-nature 
· of the bourgeoisie' and the fractional structure of capital. Yet the institutionalist approach 
takes a specific focus on the institutionalist framework, and one that proves limited in 
explaining bank reform as a class fractional process. It is therefore appropriate to present 
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the general framework of the institutionalist analysis so that this more particular issue can 
be placed in context. 
4.3.1 Populism and the Fiscal Crisis of the State 
The Turkish state's mounting debt is posed, in the framework of O'Connor (1973) 
as a fiscal crisis of the state in terms of demands for state expenditure which exceed state 
revenue-raising capacity. These systemic state deficits are explained as 'populist cycles', 
which are themselves linked to the distributional forces at work in the society (e.g. Oni~ 
1999b, 496). 
During the 'populist cycle' of 1987-1993, the state expenditures increased due to 
the distributional pressures which are mainly attributed to wage earners and agricultural 
producers (Oni~ 1999b, 500; Alper&. Oni~ 2003a, 10). With the relaxation of restrictions 
on political parties and union activity after 1987 that had been put into effect after the 
1980 coup, workers and agricultural producers ('the losers' of the early phase of 
stabilisation and export orientation in the post-1980 era) were able to create distributional 
pressures to counteract their losses. Also, subsidies to capital that compensated 'the 
winners' (such as low tax, cheap import inputs and preferential access to public banks' 
credits) are secondarily referred 5 to as the source of the distributional pressures (Oni~ 
2001, 501; Alper & Oni~ 2003, 16). 
Capital account liberalisation in 1989 is linked to the aim of the government to 
regain electoral support under' these distributional pressures (Alper & Oni~ 2003a, II; 
Oni~ & Aysan 2000, 129). This is not presented as an argument against capital account 
liberalisation. It is an argument that the state mismanaged the process under distributional 
pressures. The existence of populist cycles is the reason leading the economy to periodic 
fiscal crisis of the state and encountering with the IMF, rather than the process of 
financiallibera:lisation itself (Oni~ 2002, 3). The liberalisation process only contributed to 
a higher frequency of crises. Oni~ (2002) accepts the unstable nature of global capital 
' 'It would be misleading to equate the emergence of populist cycles of the neo-liberal 
era purely with the distributional pressures from below. In fact, governments tried to distribute 
rents to both winners and losers of neo-liberal reforms in order to build broad-based electoral 
coalitions' (Alper & Oni~ 2003a, 15). 
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movements, but in his view, Turkey could have benefited from financialliberalisation by 
attracting FDI if the state had withdrawn itself from short-term politics and clientelistics 
relations and channelled resources to improve export competitiveness. 
Here, the concept of democracy becomes crucial. Turkey is classified as 'a fragile 
or weak second wave democracy' with an all powerful leader, the relative absence of 
intra-party democracy, electoral support based on clientelistic ties, etc. (Alper & Oni~ 
2003a, 8). Then, by linking capital account liberalisation to this political structure, it is 
argued that a country's 'democratic deficits' may undermine its political and institutional 
capacity for fully capitalising on the benefits of the financial globalisation (p.3). 
Conversely, 'the benefits of financial globalisation are crucially dependent on 
overcoming the democratic deficit and the resulting cycles of economic populism' (p.22). 
In terms of bank reform, the state liberalised the financial system without 
sufficient regulation and prudential supervision of banking. This neglect arose, it is 
argued, because of the specific political structure of Turkey: 
In the context of a highly fragmented party system, successive coalition governments in 
the 1990s lacked the capacity and the incentives necessary for undertaking fiscal 
stabilisation and regulation of the banking sector, measures which are critical to the 
success of both financial and capital account liberalisation. (Oni~ 2002, 9) 
Therefore, despite this specific stress on the country's political structure, the 
institutionalists share a similar interpretation of banking reform with the neo-liberals. The 
distortions in banking are attributed again to the state (Alper & Oni~ 2002, 10-12): the 
use of state banks for rent distribution (subsidised lending to SMEs and agriculture); the 
engagement of private banking with float income and arbitrage opportunities under soft 
budget constraints of the state; and the counterproductive, negligible presence of foreign 
banks in the sector that collaborated with domestic banks in sharing excess profits from 
state debt finance. As a result, the banks appear as passive agents such that their 
engagement in state finance was simply following profit signals, with the risks incurred 
by the state, and not the banks.6 This conclusion is similar to that of the neo-liberals. 
The essential issue here, which differs from the approach of this thesis, is that the 
institutionalists in Turkey have explained state policy, including capital account 
6 For a similar analysis see also Yenal (2000). 
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liberalism and bank reform, in terms of the state's populist political agenda (Oni~ 1999a). 
The problem, as will become apparent later, is that bank reforms cannot be explained by 
reference to populism. Many elements of the reform were greeted in a hostile manner by 
powerful parts of capital and wider Turkish society (indeed, it will be argued, the state 
was happy to hide behind the authority of the IMF in order to avoid populist criticism of 
its reforms. 
Therefore, the evaluation of the source of populism determines the policy 
suggestions of the institutionalist approach. This approach recognises that large business 
significantly benefited from lending to the state (see Oni~ 1999c, 519). Yet, by linking 
fiscal deficits to the pressures of workers and agricultural producers (the losers of the 
'gross disparities of income and wealth '), privatisation and elimination of direct 
redistributive policies in favour of low-income groups such as agricultural support system 
is justified (see Oni~ 1999b, 509). Meanwhile, while the state should focus on improving 
competitiveness in global markets (Oni~ 1999a), improvement in income distribution is to 
be a long-run objective. For the sake of 'the long-term development interest of the 
country', first the populist cycle is to be broken (Oni~ 1999b, 510). Therefore, in these 
works, populist/distributional pressures appear to be filtered according to the objective of 
'development' which is based on an implicit idealised concept of the state who serves 
'long-term, common interests' of a homogenous society. 
We can now see how this framework is applied to a fractional analysis of capital. 
3.3.2 The Asymmetric Relation of Capital with the State 
In the institutionalist discourse, the relationship between .the state and the 
bourgeoisie is a central theme. It is posed as an asymmetric relationship in which the state 
nurtures the development of capital, while capital seeks autonomy from the state. This 
overall 'struggle' is framed as integral to the process of 'development'. 
As a well-known example, Bugra (1987, 1994, 1995, 1997b, 1998) depicts the 
tense nature of the relationship between the state and capital. 7 For her, all developments 
in the formation process of the bourgeoisie (such as its improved or retarded progress, its 
7 For a summary of her description of this tense relationship see Bugra (1994, 16-17). 
------------------
48 
engagement with rent-seeking rather than production, 8 and its organisation in business 
associations) are explained with reference to the asymmetrical relationship between the 
state and the bourgeoisie. 9 The state shapes the bourgeoisie 'in conformity with the 
imperative of international competition and economic development' (Bugra 1994, 14), 
but also creates uncertainty and ambiguity by precluding the formation of 'a self-
confident class' (Bugra 1997b, 106). 1° Conversely, the Turkish bourgeoisie is depicted as 
struggling to be emancipated from the domination of the state throughout the history of 
Turkey. For Bugra the key question is the changing degree of the dependence of 
b · · h II ourgeoiSie on t e state. 
In this framework, where capital is a creation of the state and the state dominates 
capital 'for the national development goal', institutionalists have a narrow definition of 
fractions of capital and the terms of their conflicts These fractions divide on observable, 
policy-driven issues. The main divisions are defined on the basis of scale (small and large 
capital) and jUnction (productive, commercial and industrial) and the fractional tensions 
are explored via the business associations, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's 
Association (Turk Sanayicileri ve i§adamlarz Dernegi- TUSIAD) and the Association of 
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (Tiirkiye Miistakil Sanayici ve i§adamlarz 
Dernegi MUSIAD), in which these divisions are organised. They are empirically highly 
' See Bugra (1994, 19, 29). 
• Fbr instance, Bugra, besides some other entrepreneurial concerns (1994, 24), links the 
development of multiactivity firms in some developing countries to the preference of 
governments to lessen the burden on government planning (1997b, 104) as well as to ambiguities 
in business-state relations (1994, 28). 
10 Indeed, Bugra (1997b, I 02-108) recognises that businessmen benefited from the 
'atbitrary and particularist nature of state-business relations in late-industrialising countries'. 
While big business firms had little difficulty in gaining access to government authorities, labour 
and small-business remained 'at the mercy of the state - big business partnership'. Yet, she 
continues to limit her analytical framework to making the point that the bourgeoisie is 
shaped/nurtured/limited by the state as part of a national development project 
11 For example, if an indigenous busfuess class is virtually nonexistent, as in the case of 
the early years of the Turkish Republican period, the business class becomes more subordinated 
to the state, in contrast to the case of Latin American economic development in the twentieth 
century. 
Besides the pre-existence of indigenous business class, this degree of subordination is 
dependent on the possibility of industrial capital's forming alliances with foreign investors or 
with landowners as well as rootedness of the legal system and bureaucracy (Bugra (1994, 20, 
23)). In such a framework, the participation of foreign capital in the economy helps to limit the 
state control over big business rather than to be in conflict with national interests as argued by 
the nationalists (see Bugra (1994, 28)). 
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visible divisions, not defined according to opposed positions in accumulation. We will 
see in later chapters that the divisions over banking reform are explicable neither in terms 
of division over policy nor size, but over forms of global integration: a 'line' of division 
outside the institutionalist discourse. 
Despite this, the works of Oni~ & Tiirem (2001a, 200lb, 3-9) do come close to 
this thesis's preferred analysis. They identify a fractional division of capital on the basis 
of the scope of 'global reach of activities'. Yet, they also explore the fractional tensions 
through business associations, as the TUSIAD (representing big business) pursues 
competitiveness and success in the global market, while the MUSIAD's members are 
classified as national-based and lacking global reach. The business associations and their 
relations to fractional conflicts during the bank reform process will be the focus of 
Chapter 5. 
These works offer significant empirical information regarding the formation of 
the capitalist class in Turkey. They highlight many aspects of the Turkish business 
associations. Yet; as will be seen in the following sub-section, there is a need to carry the 
analysis of fractional tensions beyond business associations. Moreover, the definition of 
fractions on the basis of observable processes becomes particularly limited in the study of 
Turkish banking reform. The institutionalists cannot clarify, for example, the divisions 
within banking capital that are organised under TUSIAD. 12 Later chapters will highlight 
different patterns that· banking conglomerates accumulate as a solid base for the 
discussion of banking reform at a deeper level. 
3.3.3 The IMF with a Short-Term Policy Vision 
The institutionalists see the IMF involvement in bank reform in an eclectic 
combination ofneo-liberal and nationalist terms. 
12 As opposed to the older generation businessmen with closer links to the state, the sub-
groups within TUSIAD that lead the chimge in state-capital relations are indicated as more-
externally oriented members with close links with the EU and as younger businessmen, as well as 
those who have looser links to the state and are less dependent on state resources (Oni~ & Tiirem 
200la, 21). This sub-grouping does not provide a solid basis for tracking down contradictions 
among banking conglomerates. 
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On the one hand, they see the IMF as easing the radical reform of banking by 
making controversial legislative changes feasible and providing relative autonomy from 
domestic resistance to the regulatory agency (Alper & Oni~ 2003b). On the other hand 
they criticise the IMF on a number of grounds: pandering to vested interests (e.g. 
intervention in the choice of the board members of the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA) (the state branch that oversaw the liquidation of insolvent 
banks) as undermining the credibility of the BRSA (see Alper & Oni~ 2002, 23); focusing 
on a return to fiscal balance rather than having a concern for bank restructuring (Oni~ 
2002, 14-16; Alper & Oni~ 2002, 24). Therefore, this view holds that with a different 
sequencing of reforms and policy design, recent financial crises might have been averted 
and some banks could have been saved from collapse. 
In later chapters we argue that the IMF' s agenda was primarily restructuring with 
an international orientation, rather than advocating an agenda of domestic 'efficiency'. 
This involves pursuing a program to make some banks large and internationally viable, 
rather than pursuing domestic 'competitive conditions' in banking. 
On the other hand, the developmental agenda that pervades the institutionalist 
approach leads institutionalists to see the long-term impact of the IMF in terms of 
domestic efficiency. For example: 
Long-term growth, however, depends critically on building up domestic capacity and 
improvement in the country's competitiveness in international markets, issues, which are 
tangenti'llly addressed by IMF programs ... A key challenge therefore is to transform the 
state from a soft state to an effective, market augmenting "competition state" in the 
economic realm, whilst softening the "hard state" in the politicru rerum through a process 
of democratic reforms. (Oni~ 2002, 23) 
But the focus on democracy also leads the institutionalists to argue the potential 
for the IMF to pursue agendas contrary to the national interest (Alper & Oni~ 2003b, 4). 13 
This takes some institutionalists into the realm of developmental nationalists whose ideas 
will be considered shortly. 
13 The institutionruists prefer a change process not primarily driven by extemru forces (as 
happened in the case of Turkey) but mainly driven by domestic forces, namely through the 
actions of civil society organisations and balanced media coverage care (see Alper & ani~ 2003b, 
25). 
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Overall, the institutionalist approach focuses mainly on political phenomena such 
as populism and weak democracy but fails to consider adequately the structural dynamics 
of the capital accumulation process (Ercan 2002a, 8). The key feature of this approach is 
that the state is brought to the fore as an institution and all social . developments are 
attributed to the state. 
The institutionalists recognise the power of conglomerates, as in the case of the 
'fierce resistance' by <;::ukurova Group, (which succeeded in restructuring its massive 
debts with the BRSA in the seizure process of Pamukbank) (Alper & Oni~ 2003b, 22). As 
such, the institutionalist scholars recognise that big business, while getting less dependent 
on the state, benefits from a range of policies and processes: state debt finance; the 
socialisation of the losses in the context of bank failures; the acquisitions of media 
companies to support other business ventures; and links with the military (Oni~ & Tiirem 
2001a, 23; 2001b, 20). However, the.state's role, especially in relation to capital, is given 
a limited perspective in the institutionalist approach. The institutionalists may refer to the 
role of banking lobbies, 14 for example, but there is no attempt made to explain the 
material basis of these lobbies (the economic basis of their interests). As well, the lobbies 
are seen as exogenous to the state and are treated as political pressures on an otherwise 
independent state. Moreover, in this independent role, the state is simply presumed to 
pursue a national developmentalist agenda, and this framework precludes asking which 
particular fractional agendas state policies serve. The institutionalists attribute the causal 
relationships in the state-capital relation proceeding from state-led-development towards 
capital rather than from fractional interests towards particular state policies. 
It will be seen in later chapters that the relation between the state and capital is 
more complex than can be captured by this institutionalist framework. 
3.4 The Nationalist I Developmentalist Approach 
The nationalist/developmentalist approach has been the most prominent line of 
critique in the study of the Turkish economy, undoubtedly because it focuses directly on 
14 For instance, 'banking lobbies' are iodicated as resistant to the formation of the BRSA 
as an independent actor (Alper & Oni~ 2002, 21). 
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the controversial issue of the post-1980 increasing articulation <if the Turkish economy 
with world capitalism. In Turkey, as elsewhere, a nationalist response has emerged to 
challenge the negative impacts that have come with increasing global integration. The 
economic dimension of this challenge is termed here the 'nationalist/developmentalist 
approach'. This is so as invariably its advocates pursue nationalist agendas because these 
scholars believe these agendas will generate greater and more equitable economic 
development within Turkey. 
Whereas the institutionalists start with a Turkey-specific political structure and 
demand restructuring of the state in order to benefit from 'globalisation', the 
nationalist/developmentalists stress the negative effects of foreign imposition, especially 
via the IMF, 1NCs and deregulated international capital flows. They demand an active 
state that pursues independent national development by keeping out advanced capitalist 
countries and 'their' international institutions. With this perspective, banking reform 
appears a state response to a general fragility in the economy that has been caused by 
externally imposed neo-liberal economic policies. 
The nationalist/developmentalist approach makes a significant contribution to 
understanding some dynamics of the transformation of the Turkish economy, although, 
this thesis contends; it is pre-disposed to judge rather than understand. The propositions 
of a nationalist approach (border controls on fmancial, investment and trade flows, and a 
state that pursues investment in growth and income redistribution) are well understood, 
so the focus in this review is on the conceptual propositions that underlie this framework. 
The central pillar in the nationalist/developmentalist discourse is the focus on the 
role given to Turkey as a peripheral country in the so-ca11ed 'New International Division 
of Labour' (NIDL) (see Chapter 2, section 2.7). They see IMF policies as steering the 
NIDL project. 
To briefly reiterate, the central proposition of the NIDL thesis is that 
manufacturing was leaving the advanced capitalist countries in search of low wages, and 
that states in low wage countries were being compliant in terms of tax rates and labour 
· and employment conditions. This process has been part of the division of world 
capitalism between the 'centre' and the 'periphery', in which surplus is continually 
transferred from the latter to the former through unequal exchange and technological 
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dependence (for descriptions of Turkey in these terms, see Som~ag 2002b, 2002c; Some! 
200 I, 2002, 2003 ). 
On these grounds, economic policies in Turkey as a peripheral country have been 
determined by Western capitalism (Onder 2003). Turkey, it is said by the NIDL thesis 
advocates, has been developing as a branch plant for international corporations, seeking 
cheap labour to produce goods for export. 
In this process, foreign capital (and its 'agents' such as the IMF) are the source of 
the problem, but the state is culpable for failing to stand up to these initiatives. The shift 
from the lSI to an export-led strategy in the 1980's served to lock Turkey into the 
peripheral role depicted in the NIDL thesis (Artun 1987). The consequence is that low 
wages have become locked in as the basis of Turkey's viability. Industry has become 
dominated by TNCs and there are no developmental spin-offs within Turkey itself 
(Manisah 2003). 
Central to the developmentalist agenda is that the state must ensure that finance is 
directed towards productive, not 'circulatory' or 'speculative' uses. The nationalism that 
attaches to developmentalism sees the flow of foreign capital into Turkey as a drain on 
the economy and at the core of its economic crises. As such, the IMF is posed as the 
source of the problem, rather than the solution. 15 
According to the nationalist/developmentalist scholars, the state has also failed to 
protect Turkey form speculative attacks of international finance capital. Moreover, the 
argument develops, Turkey was systematically thrown · into debt by the advanced 
capitalist countries so that interest payments could be extracted. After the Latin American 
debt crisis, Turkey, with some other developing countries, was integrated into 'the 
depressed international monetary system' as 'a borrowing economy' and the export-led 
strategy adopted after I 980 was to provide regular debt service (Artun 1987); 
In this context, the IMF stabilisation and structural reform programs are seen as 
part of a larger project defining Turkey's role in the NIDL as a peripheral economy 
(Yeldan 2002, 12). According· to the Independent Social Scientists - the Economists 
15 This discourse overlooks the fact that state intervention in financial markets in the last 
two decades has set up conditions for internationalised accumulation mainly on behalf of large 
Turkish conglomerates and instead criticises it, since it served rentier type of accumulation 
(Yeldan 2000, 200la; Boratav & Yeldan 2001). 
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Group (Bagzmszz Sosyal Bilimciler hctisat Grubu-BSBIG) (2001, 12), (which is formed by 
the nationalist/developmentalist scholars), the economic program 16 aims at continuing 
the policies of the last twenty years in order to integrate Turkey with the world capitalist 
system as a dependent country. The program: 
... plans the realisation of industrial investments by foreign companies, the liquidation of 
the state-owned banks and their replacement with foreign banks ... , the detennination of 
our agricultural production structure by commodity prices and surpluses of other 
countries. Instead of an internally integrated economy, this vision is a project of creating 
an economy that is integrated with the developed countries in a marginalized and sub-
contracted position along with being unprotected ... against external shocks. (BSBIG 
2001, 36) 
The analysis of class formation within Turkey follows accordingly. With the 
capitalist class structure dominated by TNCs from the advanced capitalist countries, there 
has been no real focus on domestic chiss conflicts since the 1980s. There is, therefore, no 
perspective with which to identify opposed interests of capital within Turkey that arise 
with and in turn influence, the reform program. Two consequences follow from the 
nationalist/developmentalist view which juxtaposes Turkey and the 'world capitalist 
economy'. 
First, the international aspirations of Turkish capital are framed in terms of 
becoming a mere extension of foreign TNCs' global marketing-production networks, 
through the rising control ofTNCs in the joint-ventures. The large Turkish conglomerates, 
it is argued, preferred to save themselves by sacrificing a domestically integrated Turkish 
economy in which its capital, state, working class and farmers would have been in a 
union of destiny to develop the national economy (Manisah 2003). In later chapters, we 
will see that the way in which Turkish banks (and conglomerates) have sought to expand 
their international linkages has been a key determinant of the bank restructuring process, 
and that this has been played out as a fractional conflict within Turkish capital, and 
cannot be reduced to Turkish companies simply 'attaching' to foreign TNCs. 
Second, where it is apparent that some parts of capital in Turkey have indeed 
benefited in the post-1980s neo-liberal period, these capitals must be rationalised as not 
16 Strengthening the Turkish Economy - Turkey's Transition Program, which was 
announced with the agreement of the IMF after the February 2001 crisis. 
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'truly' Turkish: their gains are contrary to the national interest. The developmentalists 
point to • domestic globalist large scale capital' as a 'comprador' bourgeoisie (BSBIG 
2001, 36) or an oligopolistic 'second-class bourgeoisie' (Onder 2003) that is in conflict 
with national interests. In finance, this gets associated with the formation of a rentier 
class (Boratav, Tiirel & Y entiirk 1996, 19). 17 
Not surprisingly, the nationalist/developmentalist school sees the process of bank 
reform as externally driven (especially by the IMF) (Yeldan 2002, 5). 18 The turmoil in 
banking during the reform process which intersected with recent financial crises appears 
as an extension of the general fragility in the economy caused by international finance 
flows (Boratav & Y eldan 2001 ). In this framework, there is no particular need to focus on 
the details of the reform process - the details of political and economic conflicts in the 
various twists and turns of the reform process are unimportant in the light of overarching 
nationalist concerns. 
The only specific explanation for banking reform is provided by Soms:ag (2002a). 
He argues that Turkey applied to the IMF in 1999 because the owners of around 20 
'cartoon banks' which had developed through financing state borrowing in the last 
decade lobbied for the reform of banking. The owners of those ailing banks were aware 
that. the state-indebtedness was unsustainable, but could be reversed by the IMF. With 
this .program, they could have saved their banks. Yet, Soms:ag argues, as the inherently 
crisis-tending IMP-program collapsed, not only those banks went bankrupt, but the whole 
banking system was harmed. In this context, the main aim of the IMF program was to 
guarantee the repayment of international loans and so to draw surplus out of Turkey. 
This preoccupation does not explain the deeper agenda thaf the state and the IMF 
have pursued. Their agenda was about more than making banking profitable again. As 
17 As Tanydmaz (2004, 29) quotes from Boratav, the reason for not having a 'Korean 
miracle' in Turkey was the parasitic, rentier and speculative character of Turkish bourgeoisie 
instead of a creative and dynamic one. 
18 Bank seizures are also explained as a result of the adverse effects of the Russian and 
East Asian crises in addition to the major earthquakes of 1999 which led the economy to a deep 
recession (Akyilz & Boratav 2002, 9). Hence, the banks simply end up being pressurised by 
external dynamics and swept to liquidations. Despite the validity of the adverse effects of these 
external factors, since banks cannot be considered within the overall accumulation strategies of 
their owner conglomerates, bank seizures cannot be systematically explained. 
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will become apparent in later chapters, the state and the IMF wanted to make 
accumulation in Turkey reach a new level via reconfiguration of FC as globally 
integrated, dynamically accumulating and competitive. 
The disagreement that this thesis has with the nationalist/developmentalist 
approach goes to the fundamental categories of this approach: that Turkey as a unit can 
be seen to occupy a particular spot in the global economy, that there is a single 'national 
interest', and that all 'Turkish' capital is seen to be determined by this aggregated 
position. The alternative perspective developed in this thesis contends that the interests of 
different parts of capital vary, according to how they integrate into the global 
accumulation processes. 
Hence the basic point of divergence of this thesis from the 
nationalist/developmentalist approach is whether it is useful to conceive of Turkey as a 
discrete economy with a discrete set" of interests occupying a discrete (and exploited) 
position in the world economy. The proposition of this thesis is that this depiction is not 
analytically verified - a point that shows through in the difficulty that the nationalist 
approach has in explaining 'Turkish' capital that is flourishing in the current era. This 
part of Turkish capital must be dismissed as 'comprador', and in some deep sense 
traitorous. 
While competition and relations among capitals are increasingly organized as 
intertwined global networks, macroeconomic performances of countries do not coincide 
with individual performances of capitals (Ercan 2003a, 616, 651 ). As rising global 
expansion of capital has been increasingly fragmenting distinct national economies, the 
demand by nationalists for an independent, nationally integrated, state-led development 
strategy loses its material basis that is the national form of capital: 'The partial 
confinement of capital to national sites - the national form of capital - has been a 
changing phenomenon, declining in scope with the development of the forces of 
production' (Yaghmaian 1998, 247). We can no longer operate with a simple 
differentiation of 'Turkish' and 'international' capital (except as a statement about 
historical origins) because Turkish capital is itself becoming 'international'. 19 The 
19 For instance, a foreign-national dichotomy precludes explaining the participation of 
foreign banks in the consolidation of banking, as will be seen in Chapter 11. As such, the 
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transformation of Turkey may in some senses be 'imposed' by the IMF, but, more 
broadly, it is the expression of the aspirations of 'Turkish' capital for global expansion, 
and the Turkish state and the IMF trying to give order to that expansion. 
Therefore, the crucial point in this thesis is that the Turkish state itself was at the 
centre of the policy design. Seeing the state as a mere tool responding to the IMF 
intervention (and having failed to defend 'the national interest') ignores the multiple 
dimensions in which the Turkish state has sought to systematically steer the advance of 
accumulation during the restructuring process. 
3.5 The Marxist Approach 
The Marxist approach locates state policies within the broader context of capital 
accumulation processes and focuses on the fractional interests of capital underlying these 
policies. It draws attention to the rising integration of certain fractions with the global 
circuit of capital whlch is a process that undermines nation-based coalitions for the 
developmental policies yearned for by the nationalists. By moving beyond the dichotomy 
between foreign and national capital and seeing the nation state as the facilitator of the 
global accumulation of capital, this discourse allows simultaneous consideration of the 
domestic and international determinants in the transition of the Turkish economy. 
3.5.1 Nationalism vis-a-vis the Logic of Capital Accumulation 
In contrast with nationalists' emphasis on wrong state policies imposed by foreign 
capital, Marxist works draw the analysis back to domestic class processes, recognising at 
the same time that 'domestic' and 'international' processes are not mutually exclusive. 
The analytical departure point for Marxists is the process of capital accumulation 
which (re-)produces capitalism as a system. This brings the centrality of fractional 
divisions and conflicts into the analysis. For the case under consideration in this thesis, 
the principal concern is the articulation of financial and industrial capital within Turkey. 
international expansion of Turkish banking cannot be adequately analysed within a context of 
national banking damaged by foreigo banks. 
58 
Moving from these basic points, the need for a multi-level analysis is indicated by 
Marxist scholars: 
To be able to reach a complete analysis of capitalist social relations, it is necessary to 
develop a multi-level and dynamic framework including domestic total circuit of capital, 
the historical development dynamics of this circuit, the linkages of these dynamics with 
the international circuit of capital, at a more concrete level, domestic class and intra-class 
dynamics, and lastly the strategic position of the state in the face of these variables. 
(Ercan 1998, 27) 
This approach allows consideration of the roles of domestic fractions of capital 
and the state so that neither foreign dynamics are perceived as the unique origin of 
transformation, nor is the domestic dynamic discussed in isolation from the global one. 
While the nationalists argue that large domestic bourgeoisie has collaborated with 
Western capital and has been an obstacle to independent national development, Marxist 
scholars challenge the concept of national development itself in favour of an approach 
that focuses on contradictory class interests that are not nation-specific (Tiirkay 2002; 
Ercan 2002a). 
Given that capital has its own logic of motion at the global scale which does not 
fit into limitations of national dynamics, Tiirkay (2002) stresses that the bourgeoisie 
which inherently bears internationalisation within itself uses nationalism as long as it 
serves its own accumulation. This emphasis gains more relevance considering that the 
n'!tion state itself increasingly becomes functional in facilitating the international 
integration of those fractions of capital pursuing global accumulation. 
The Marxist discourse argues that national development in the so-called 
underdeveloped countries led to unequal integration of those countries into the 
hierarchical structure of world capitalism as a result of the law of uneven and compound 
development. Notwithstanding, in terms of its fractional implications, it is recognised that 
despite the unequal nature of this integration, national development practices allowed one 
fraction within capital in those countries to mature and pursue the agenda of 
internatiortalisation (Tiirkay 2002). 
Accordingly, Marxists point out that it would be misleading to analyse a domestic 
economy on the basis of highly aggregated macroeconomic data in an era of globalising 
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accumulation (Ercan 2002a, 27). The performances of factions of capital which are in the 
process of integration with international capital will not be consistent with generalisations 
on the national economy. In this process, the distinction between national and foreign 
capital gets blurred: 
Today the historical contradictions of the process of unequal articulation of capital 
accumulation in Turkey into world capitalism have become clearer. The fundamental 
determinant of this contradiction is that the interests and strategies of certain individual 
large scale capitals and the interests of the country's economy do not necessarily 
coincide . 
. . . In an age when capital accumulation processes take place on the world scale, the 
choices and strategies of capitals that have reached a certain level have begun to be 
detennined by alliances on the world scale. (Ercan 2002b, 34) 
In what follows, how Marxist scholars explain the change in Turkey within this 
broader framework is discussed. 
3.5.2 State Policies in the Context of the Global Orientation in Domestic 
Accumulation 
The Marxist discourse challenges the widely held view of the suppression of civil 
society by the authoritarian Turkish state and emphasises the necessity of approaching the 
state as a moment of capitalist social relations in which contradictory interests between 
and within classes are represented (Dinler 2003; Ercan 2003a). With such an approach, 
state policies which neo-liberals and institutionalists depicted as 'inefficient' and 
'populist' and the nationalists depicted as 'foreign-imposed' and 'irrational', are seen to 
be enhancing accumulation by certain conglomerates which are pursuing global 
integration. 
From this perspective, the neo-liberal orientation in Turkey was not a foreign 
imposition; it was a consequence of a simultaneous and dialectic determination by the 
restructuring process of capital at the global scale (following the crisis in advanced 
capitalist countries in the 1970's) and the need of a hegemonic part of domestic capital 
for integration into the 'new division oflabour' (Tanyiimaz 2004, 34). 
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There were two domestic reasons that pushed some parts of productive capital, in 
particular producers of durable consumer goods, to reorient their accumulation 
internationally after 1980. The first reason is the saturation of the domestic market for 
durable consumer goods. The second reason is that more FX was needed to import high 
technology inputs for the production of intermediate and capital goods as this would 
provide higher surplus value creation (Ercan 2001, 4-5). In this process, significantly, 
money capital gained a strategic importance given the outward oriented restructurings of 
conglomerates under crisis conditions (Ercan 1998, 38; 2001, 5). 
Accordingly, a range of fractional tensions are identified by Marxists: in 
particular between globallymore and less integrated capitals (Ercan 1998, 46-47; 2001, 2) 
and between conglomerates incorporating banks and those without banks (Ercan 1998, 3 8; 
2002b, 29-30). 20 These two foci reflect the key preoccupations of Marxist economic 
analysis: global integration and the relationship between finance and production. State 
policy is understood as the process of mediating these broad divisions. 
Marxists approach state policies of the period in terms of the fractional agendas 
that they serve. In the face of international competition, in addition to further extraction 
of absolute and relative surplus value through real wage erosion and limited technological 
development, the state socialised the costs of the global orientation of capital through 
privatisation, lower tax on capital and export subsidies (Ercan 2001, 56; 2002b, 26-27). 
Accordingly, issues such as Turkey's indebtedness and the 'rent economy' are 
posed not in terms of centre-periphery/NIDL models of the role of Turkey in the global 
economy, but in class fractional terms. The so-called 'rent economy', in fact, has 
provided the transfer of domestic and international financial resources to a limited 
number of individual capital groups. This aimed to accelerate the transition towards a 
new capital accumulation regime in which the state borrowing policy has been also 
functional (Ercan 1998, 49). This process, according to Ercan, made individual 
20 fu contrast to the institutionalist argument that bank ownership was not crucial to the 
fonnation of holding companies (such as by Bugra 1994, 199), Marxist scholars emphasize that 
· control over money capital through bank ownership reinforced those holding companies during 
this period (Ercan 2002b, 29-30). 
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conglomerates that could control money capital more able to reproduce profitably as 
productive and commercial capitals. 
On the specific issue of bank reform, it follows that, in contrast to the common 
tendency of considering banking in isolation, Marxist scholars consider the particular 
articulation between finance and industry in the analysis of state policies. By 
acknowledging the ownership of banks by conglomerates, i.e. the formation of FC in 
Turkey, Ercan argues: 
When talking about the profits of banks, one should not assume that these profits accrue 
to agents [who are] different from the owners of productive capital. Hence, the concept of 
a ''rent economy" should be viewed rather critically, for it is the domestic sectors of 
productive capital that organize under the form of holding companies that appropriate 
banking profits as well. (Ercan 2002b, 30) 
Ercan's broad approach appears to set the framework for a number of Marxist studies that 
directly address the subject of this thesis: bank reform. 
3.5.3 The Need for a Fractional Analysis of Banking Reform 
There are studies by Kline and Slinmez that are relevant here. 
Kone (2003) stresses the necessity of evaluating the role of banking in capitalist 
economies within the totality of the social circuit of capital instead of a counterposition 
between 'finance and real spheres'. Also, she recognises the rise of holding banking in 
Turkey in the 1970's. Yet, Kline fails to develop an explanation of banking reform within 
the context of capital accumulation process and the emerging contradictions of capital. 
In Kline's analysis, the shift in Turkish banking to state debt finance in the post-
1980 period is consistent with global trends towards lessening the financial intermediary 
role of banking due to the availability of alternative finance sources for the corporate 
sector. However, as will be addressed in Chapter 4, banks continue to be the most 
important institutions of money capital .in Turkey. Turkish banking did not engage in 
state deficit finance because of the rivalry of developing capital markets; indeed, it was a 
strategy to support the international orientation in accumulation by large Turkish 
. conglomerates. Instead, by disregarding domestic fractional dynamics, in particular, the 
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ramifications of holding banking structure in the post-1980 period, Kiine falls back on the 
nationalist/developmentalist approach. Kiine claims that financial liberalisation did not 
provide expected economic development, but instead left the structure of production in a 
state of volatility. As a result, the IMF program appears to be aimed at the recovery of 
money capital from the crisis, but is not part of a fundamental reconfiguration of capital 
for a new accumulation regime in Turkey. Thus, even though Kiine stresses many aspects 
of the reform process (such as increasing concentration through the consolidation process 
and the socialisation of the associated cost by the state), neither of these can be included 
in a systematic fractional analysis for a Marxist explanation. 
Siinmez (2003), on the other hand, focuses on media ownership by conglomerates 
and analyses fractional divisions within capital through the conflicts which have emerged 
within the media sector. On this basis, he explains recent developments in the media and 
finance sectors as interrelated processes. 
Importantly, Siinmez provides insight regarding fractional divisions within 
Turkish capital accompanying the recent financial crises and IMF stabilisation program. 
He groups the large Turkish bourgeoisie into two divisions and states that this divide has 
recently revealed itself through the media sector (pp. 24-25). The conglomerates whose 
banks were confiscated collaborated in the media by criticising the BRSA and the IMF 
while the conglomerates of the surviving banks supported the IMF reforms again through 
the media (pp. 67- 68). Thus, the developments in this sector became a reflection of the 
struggle in banking between the two divisions oflarge capital. 
Sonmez' s analysis shows the fruitfulness of the finance capital approach: it 
contributes to understanding some fractional dynamics by addressing developments in the 
media and finance sectors simultaneously. It shows that the tensions in the media were 
rooted in a general distribution struggle between two groups of conglomerates extending 
to banking and other sectors. The author also highlights many facts on banking 
conglomerates, and gives company histories of conglomerates which lost their banks. 
However the analysis of FC is left unresolved, for it is only at the level of the 
media that contradictions are identified. Hence, the sub-divisions among banking 
conglomerates could not be specified and a deeper fractional analysis has not been 
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developed. 21 Nonetheless, Sonmez's work on bank reform will be further referred to in 
later chapters. 
While existing Marxist works can provide a cogent explanation for the general 
change process in Turkey, there is still a need for a systematic fractional analysis of 
banking reform. 
This thesis' analysis of banking reform is not only an applied study within an 
existing Turkish Marxist framework. It brings new developments into this framework, 
particularly in terms of how fractions are conceived. This thesis will elucidate how the 
elements of the NIDL thesis in existing Marxist works are obstacles to explaining 
banking reform. Also, Sonmez argues that power struggles among conglomerates in 
banking and other sectors and the coalition among survival banks' conglomerates, the 
state and the IMF are all driving the reform process. Yet, these surface power struggles 
are inadequate in explaining the deeper criteria in the selection of which banks are to be 
confiscated. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the fractional divisions within FC will be identified 
according to different forms of global integration and foci on capturing surplus value 
among banking conglomerates. 
This thesis's analysis needs to incorporate two crucial points that are neglected by 
other discourses: Firstly, the integration of finance and industry is a crucial aspect of the 
transition. Secondly, there is no clear division between national and 'foreign' capital in 
an era of the globalising accumulation of capital. Therefore, state finance policies to 
promote accumulation in Turkey cannot be finance-specific and cannot be (narrowly) 
nationalist. The thesis' focus on banking reform within the broader context of the capital 
accumulation process will fill the aforementioned gap in the Marxist literature by 
challenging the limitations of the neo-liberal, institutionalist and nationalist/ 
developmentalist schools. 
21 For instance, Sonmez claims that of the seized banks, Pamukbank and Demirbank 
should be classified along with other older, surviving banks which were established to finance 
the industrial investments of their conglomerates. Here, as Chapter 7 will discuss, by beginning 
from an old/new bank division, Sonmez fails to note that these two banks shared similar 
characteristics with the newcomer banks which were used to mediate in state borrowing and 
were embezzled. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In the explanation of the fragility in banking among mainstream schools of 
political economy, we see a common emphasis on inadequate state policies. Yet they 
attribute this inadequacy to different sources: inefficiency of the state (by the neo-
liberals), weak democracy and distributional pressures (by the institutionalists) and 
foreign imposed neo-liberal policies (by the developmentalists) appear responsible. 
All these schools treat banking in isolation from the overall process of 
accumulation and agree that rebuilding macroeconomic balances and restructuring 
banking would restore the intermediary role of banking for growth. To this end, state 
prudential regulation is needed as banking is a special industry. 
Crucially, however, none of these schools adequately explain the tensions within 
banking/capital accompanying reform and how the state and IMF mediation among those 
tensions is itself played out in the reform process. 
The dominant free market rhetoric points out the tensions between large and small 
banks as well as private and state banks; but, the rhetoric claims that once the distorting 
state intervention in banking is eliminated and sufficient prudential supervision is 
established, self-regulative market forces will work effectively. 
Even though the institutionalists refer to domestic forces such as 'banking 
lobbies' that resisted the change and see IMF involvement as a counter force that eases 
the reform of banking, the discussion of tensions cannot extend beyond the small-large, 
private-state bank distinctions. 
On the other hand, nationalist rhetorical focuses on the IMF as an exogenous 
enforcer of a neo-liberal agenda and brings forward national interest; yet the issue is not 
national interests, but particular interests. The fractional divisions of capital and their 
compelling agendas cannot be systematically included in the explanation of banking 
reform by the developmentalists. 
Marxist analysts explain state policies in the post-1980 era by considering the 
dynamics of domestic and global accumulation simultaneously. They stress that capital in 
Turkey has been changing its process of accumulation by being more globally integrated, 
via finance, trade and, for some capitals, production. The Marxists argue that this IMF-
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supervised industrialisation process did not mean a loss for total capital (see Tanytlmaz 
2004). There were winners and losers within Turkish capital. The winners have been 
those capitals that are the export-oriented (also dominant in the domestic market) and 
integrated into the global production chains of lNCs. On the other hand, those 
domestically-oriented and not integrated with lNCs have faced losses. 
Therefore, while mainstream schools fail to adequately engage with the class 
issue, by utilising the Marxian analytical categories, this thesis stresses the class 
dynamics behind the agenda. More specifically, it considers the integration between 
banking and productive capital and defines the divisions within banking/FC in terms of 
different patterns of accumulation of the banking conglomerates. 
The formation of FC in Turkey will be addressed in Chapter 4. Then, after the 
discussion of tensions accompanying banking reform at a general level in Chapter 5, the 
finer divisions within FC will be the focus of the following chapters. These analyses will 
permit us to understand the conflicts within FC which led to banking reform. In brief, the 
thesis will develop a systematic analysis of FC in order to achieve a finer grasp of 
banking reform within the Marxian analytical framework. 
CHAPTER4 
THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCE CAPITAL IN TURKEY 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Elaboration of the Concept of Finance Capital 
4.3 The Period before 1945: The Integration of Banking and Industrial Capital as 
State Enterprises 
4.4 The Period of 1945-1979: The Proliferation of Private Holding Banking under 
the lSI 
4.4.1 The Rise of Private Banking in the 1940s and 1950s 
4.4.2 The Proliferation of Holding Banking 
4.5 The 1980s onwards-Trade and Financial Liberalisation: A Further Rise in 
Holding Banking 
4.5.1 Continuous Attraction of Holding Banking with the Pivotal Role of 
Banking in Financial Resource Allocation 
4.5 .2 Mechanisms for Penetration into Banking by Conglomerates 
4.5.3 Legislative Amendments on Banks' Connected Lending and Equity 
Participations 
4.5.4 The Internationalisation of Turkish Banking: Expansion of the 
Integration between Banking and Industrial Capital to the Global 
Scale 
4.6 Conclusion 
4.'1 Introduction 
This chapter develops the general theoretical themes discussed in Chapter 2 in 
the context of Turkey since the establishment of the Republic in the 1920s. The 
objective is to give an account of the evolution of holding banking in Turkey in order 
to have a sound basis for the exploration of the tensions within capital. that provide 
the context for banking reform. 
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The Turkish economy is a good example of the concept of finance capital (FC) 
gtven the unified control of many conglomerates over the circuits of money, 
commercial and industrial capital. In contrast to the Anglo Saxon banking model, the 
interlocking ownership of banks with industrial/commercial corporations has fostered 
capital accumulation in Turkey despite transformations in capital accumulation 
regimes over time. Therefore, understanding the formation of Turkish FC appears 
critical in the discussion of banking reform. However, although focusing on only 
finance rather than finance capital causes misinterpretation, finance is generally 
looked at as a sector in the analysis of the reform, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Accordingly, despite the significance of holding banking, there has hitherto been no 
systematic analysis of the evolution of the integration ofbanking and industrial capital 
in Turkey. Hence, this chapter will clarify the historical formation of Turkish holding 
banking in order to have a sound basis for the analysis of banking reform. 
Chapter 3 presented a critique of the literature on the new capital accumulation 
regime that has been evolving for the last 20 years in Turkey and the role of banking 
reform therein. This analysis addresses the way in which the relations between 
financial and industrial capital have been transformed under the auspices of the state. 
This is basically about change in the balance of domestic forces, and four key 
elements are prominent. The first is the cri.tical role of the state in transforming the 
relations between financial and industrial capital. The second is the way in which, 
under the auspices of the state, some key individual capitals in the Turkish economy 
have themselves transformed their process of accumulation between the circulation of 
finance and the production of value. The third issue concerns the way in which these 
transformations have changed the form of engagement between capital in Turkey and 
the international process of capital accumulation. The fourth element, which comes 
later historically in the process (and is considered in detail in later chapters), is the 
role of the IMF in this transformation of accumulation. 
The contemplation of economic change in Turkish FC considered here is to be 
understood as partial, focusing on those issues that will lay the foundations for a 
systematic class analysis of changes in finance and banking since the 1990s. 
Accordingly, the concept of 'class' is to be used in a narrowly economic sense, with 
the focus being on relations between different fractions of capital (or forms of 
accumulation). This is not a comprehensive approach to class, but serves well the 
objectives ofthis chapter. 
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To explore the ·transforming relationship between money and industrial 
capital, the role of legislative arrangements, development plans and general economic 
policies will be considered within the broader context of the capital accumulation 
process. To this end, the significance of the banking system in the allocation of 
financial resources, as well as changing forms of engagement of FC in Turkey with 
international capital, will be analysed. 
The evolution of holding banking will be traced back to the establishment of 
the Republic in the 1920s, but the main focus of this chapter will be on the post-1980 
period in which FC became mature. The analysis will be developed under three sub-
periods. First, the period before 1945, which involves the formation of FC through 
state enterprises, will be briefly reviewed. The historical analysis will continue with 
the period of 1945-1979 in which bourgeoning private holding banking proliferated as 
part of the lSI policy. Then, mechanisms facilitating the rise in holding banking in the 
post-1980 financialliberalisation era will be analysed. 
Overall, an understanding of the historical dynamics of holding banking will 
provide a solid base from which to analyse the Turkish banking reform via the 
fractionalist approach. This is because, as Chapter 5 will discuss, reconfiguration of 
the integration of banking and industrial capital for a new capital accumulation regime 
was at the core of the reform. The underlying tensions between fractions of capital 
and how these tensions were played out during the reform will be the issue of the 
following chapters. The objective here is to set the ground for the fractional analysis 
by shedding light on the development of the banking arm of FC. This will serve to 
clarify the divisions within FC by allowing for the consideration of the link between 
historical characteristics of the entries to banking and overall corporate strategies of 
the conglomerates. 
4.2 Elaboration of tbe Concept of Finance Capital 
In popular usage, finance capital has come to be applied to only the growing 
influence of financial institutions with industrial capital and the wider economy. 
Financial markets, in a dichotomy with productive capital, are widely seen as an 
outlet for speculation and rent-seeking. As addressed in Chapter 3, this view has been 
widely applied in the study of the Turkish economy, particularly by the 
developmentalist school. The juxtaposition of banking and industrial capital and the 
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priority given to industrial capital over banking capital contrasts with Marxist theory 
that treats money and productive capital as essential elements for the realisation of the 
total social circuit of capital. 
In the Marxist tradition, starting with Hilferding, the evolving links between 
industrial conglomerates and finance institutions have been acknowledged. Yet the 
analyses have generally remained within the confines of empiricism, focusing on 
institutional linkages rather than a systematic explanation for the basis of labour value 
theory. 
The original work of Hilferding (1910) became the grounds for subsequent 
Marxist analyses on FC. According to Hilferding (1910, 301), FC: 
signifies the unification of capital. The previously separated spheres of industrial, 
connnercial and bank capital are now brought under the connnon direction of high 
finance, in which the masters of industry and of the banks are united in a close 
personal association. · 
Hilferding has been criticised for over-generalising his findings drawn form 
the German case and claiming that they mark a new stage of capitalist development: 
the 'Finance Capital' stage. However, given that both German and Turkish banking 
have fmanced industry not only through credit allocation, but also through 
interlocking ownership between banks and industrial corporations, this concept of FC 
becomes critical in understanding the Turkish case. 
Nevertheless, in order to map out the links between industrial/commercial and 
banking capital in Turkey, some clarification needs to be made of the applied concept 
of FC. Hilferding's conceptualisation of FC centres on the dominance of banks over 
industrial corporations. He links banks' control over industrial capital to the 
concentration and centralisation tendencies of capital. Increasing credit demand by 
industrial capitals along with the expansion of the scale of capitalist production, the 
growth and concentration of banking capital and the generalisation of the joint-stock 
company, enabled banks to exert a greater control over industry. Even though 
Hilferding stressed the conversion of banking capital to industrial capital, his main 
emphasis remained on the dense network of institutional links between banks and 
industrial enterprises. 
In his critique of Hilferding' s analysis, Ercan (1997) reminds us that treating 
banking and industrial capital as separate, specialised units in the capital accumulation 
.------
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process contradicts the historical dynamics of capital. He emphasises the tendency to 
incorporate three fimctions of capital within one individual circuit of capital along 
with its rising concentration and centralisation tendencies. In particular, in this 
process, industrial capital would tend to establish its own fmancial institution. Here, 
the integration is not simply an issue of institutional linkage, but the establishment of 
systematic control over the forms of value (commodity and money) within the circuit 
of capital. Ercan's definition (1997, 167) ofFC therefore includes: 
• the establishment of a coalition between individual money, productive 
and commodity capitals, or 
• simultaneous inclusion of the three fimctions of capital in the circuit of 
individual capital. 
The joint control of money and industrial capital helps those individual capitals to 
achieve extended reproduction in· times of expansion, and also to avoid de-
valorisation in times of crisis (Ercan 1997, 163). 
When we look at the Turkish case, consistent with Ercan, the traditional 
tertiary division of money, commodity and productive capital lacks relevance to the 
conglomerates that have tended to gain control over these three fimctions 
simultaneously. Those conglomerates took advantage of the control over money 
capital particularly during the outward orientation in accumulation in the post-1980 
era. However, in order to achieve the return of invested money capital as more money, . 
money capital must enter the production process for the creation of surplus value. 
As will be seen in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this point becomes crucial in the 
analysis of FC in Turkey. With their different patterns of accumulation, 
conglomerates forming FC displayed divergences in terms of where they capture 
surplus value in the total circuit of capital. This variation provided the material basis 
for the divisions within FC. Some conglomerates used their controls over banking 
capital to capture a higher share in the redistribution of surplus value via state 
mediation; some oriented themselves towards achieving· absolute surplus value (low 
wage low productivity) producing activities; some others charmelled money capital 
for the production of absolute and relative surplus value (high productivity) with a 
more long-run-viable accumulation basis. The different stances in accumulation, with 
various forms of global integration, determined which conglomerates would decline 
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and which ones would solidify their positions during the recent restructuring within 
Turkish capital. 
Moreover, although the unified control over money, industrial and commercial 
capital has been used to fuel accumulation by those conglomerates, the form of this 
merging was challenged by the pressures some parts of FC in the 1990s felt to 
internationalise. That is because this form of integration which is contingent upon 
state-based rents turned out to be an obstacle under the fiscal crisis of the state and 
needed to be reconfigured in order to facilitate the global advancement of 
accumulation, as Chapter 5 will discuss. 
Before addressing the reconfiguration of this form of integration via banking 
reform in the following chapters, its historical development process will be clarified. 
4.3 The Period before 1945: The Integration of Banking and Industrial 
Capital as State Enterprises 
In addition to the characterisation of Turkish banking as having close links 
with industry, the strong state involvement in the creation ofthis link distinguishes 
the Turkish case from many others. 
As Oncii and G<ikl(e (1991, 106) argue, the strong presence of the state in the 
banking sector and the high degree of interpenetration between finance and industry 
are a historical legacy of the early decades of the Republic. Although the formation of 
national banking goes back to the 1860s, 1 to the era of the Ottoman Empire, its 
development gathered momentum after the foundation of the Republic in 1923. 
During that period, despite the existence of some national banking, 2 foreign banks 
' Mernleket Sandiidan (1863) as the origin of today's Ziraat Bank was the first 
national bank established in the Ottoman Empire in order to fmance agriculture. Yet national 
banking in the form oflocal banks started to develop in the Ottoman Empire particularly after 
the Committee for Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Treakld Partisi) (CUP) (1908-1918) came to 
power in 1908. The CUP supported the establishment of local banks under its strategy of 
creating an Islamic-Turkish bourgeoisie through the replacement of minorities. As a 
consequence, under the CUP government, 15 of 24 banks were founded by Islamic-Turkish 
merchants and )andowhers (Bugra 1994, 40) to overcome the difficulty in getting credits from 
foreign and/or minority banks. In this process, the CUP became 'the vanguard of the nascent 
Turkish bourgeoisie' with the high involvement of CUP members in the establishments of 
joint stock companies and banks (Bugra 1994, 42). However, many of these local banks faced 
liquidation before the Republican period because of the competition with dominant foreign 
banks as well as adverse economic conditions (Oksay 2003, 59). 
2 In 1923, there were 18 national (mostly local) and 13 foreign banks in Turkey. 
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were dominant in the credit market as wei} as in foreign trade finance. 3 Therefore, 
given the insignificant level of private capital accumulation in Turkey, the state itself 
took the initiative to develop a national banking system to support capital 
accumulation. At the First izmir Economy Congress (1923), it was decided that the 
state needed to enhance national banking so as to end the dominance of foreign 
capital and to further Turkey's economic development (Akgii9 1992a, 19-20). 
Following the decisions taken at the Congress, new national banks were established 
between 1923-1932, either directly by the state or under significant influence of the 
state.4 Many single-branched local banks were also established for the credit and 
banking needs of local merchants (Oksay 2003, 56-57). During this period the 
liquidation of foreign banks in Turkey was iuitiated with the result that their shares of 
deposits fell from 78% to 19% and credits from 53% to 15% between 1924 and 1945 
(Oksay 2003, 60). 5 
In the 1930s and 1940s, state involvement in the economy itself took the form 
of integrating industrial and money capital: industrial development plans were 
fulfilled through the creation of a number of state banks. Because of the insufficient 
level of private capital accumulation and the negative effects of the Great Depression 
on the economy,6 the government abandoned its policy of privately driven 
3 These banks provided credits basically to foreign and minority capital that operated 
in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, in the pre-republican period, the most important 
function of the foreign banks was to mediate between the Ottoman governments and foreign 
capital for the purpose ofraisiog external debt (see Oksay 2003,50-5 1). 
4 For example, i~bank was established as the first national bank in 1924 with the aim 
set by Atatfuk, the founder of the Republic, to give credit and iovest io different sectors (see 
'History of i~bank', URL: http://www.isbank.com.tr/englishlhistory.html (accessed 8 
November 2002)). Hence, as one of the largest conglomerates today, i~bank represents the 
early integration of finance and iodustrial capital io Turkey. 
Importantly, with the establishment of the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) (1930) 
domestic currency started to be issued by the national bank whereas earlier it had been carried 
out by the foreign capital Ottoman Bank. The other banks established at that period were the 
first development bank 'Tiirkiye Sanayi ve Maadin Bankas1 (1925)', and Emlak ve Eytam 
Bankas1 (1927) which specialized in the construction sector. 
5 Akgii9 (1992a, 1ll-112) notes that after the establishment of the Republic, foreign 
banks continued to enter Turkey between 1924 and 1929, as the economy remaioed externally 
open and foreign trade had a high share in national iocome. However, followiog the Great 
Depression, iocreased controls io foreign trade and foreign exchange (FX) transactions 
limited the operations of foreign banks. Therefore, between 1929 and 1977, no siogle foreign 
bank or bank branch was opened io Turkey. The number of foreign banks continuously 
declioed from 15 to 4 between 1924 and 1980 and then gradually iocreased to 26 in 1990 
under the new regime (Akgi19 1992a, 95-97). 
6 The Great Depression cauSed the bankruptcies of ten local banks between 1932 and 
I 938. Because of the adverse effects of the depression especially on the export-oriented 
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industrialisation. Consequently, from the 1930s onwards, the state became the driving 
force in the industrialisation: 'most industrial plants were set up as state enterprises 
or, if in private hands, owed their existence to official support and protection' 
(Verhoff 2000, 145). In order to provide credit and to facilitate infrastructural and 
industrial investments stipulated by economic development plans, state banks were 
established in specialised sectors such as Siimerbank (1933), Belediyeler Bank 
(1933), Etibank (1935), Denizbank (1938) and Halk Bank (1938). Siimerbank, for 
example, fulfilled the First Industrial Plan (1933-1938) by establishing 13 of the 20 
factories covered in the plan in the manufacturing sector. Etibank , on the other hand, 
was expected to facilitate, manage and finance the enterprises in the field of mining 
and energy under the Second Industrial Plan, which started to be implemented in 
1936, but could not be carried out completely (BAT 1998, 11; Kocabl!lioglu, Sak, 
Sonmez, Erkal, Gokmen, Seker, Ulugtekin 2001, 260). 7 The role of these state banks, 
therefore, was to orient public savings and foreign credits to national capital 
accumulation. 
4.4 The Period of 1945-1979: The Proliferation of Private Holding Banking 
under the lSI 
4.4.1 The Rise of Private Banking in the 1940s and 1950s 
During the state-led industrialisation period, the national bourgeoisie was 
nurtured via state policies, as the young state aimed to take control of trade and proto-
industrial production from Turkey's Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities. Within 
this context, today' s largest Turkish conglomerates produced the first capital 
accumulation in the areas of services, trade and building (Sonmez 1992a, 113). 
Selling commodities to the state, marketing the products of newly established State 
Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and building state institutions were the main channels 
of capital accumulation for the bourgeoisie. For example, Bugra (1987, 146) indicates 
agriculture sector, increasing non-perfonning credits played a vital role in those bankruptcies · 
(Yay 1983, 158). 
7 The Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) notes that the plan could not be 
implemented due to increasing defence expenses stemming from World War II and the 
absence of financial resources for industrial investments (see BAT 1998, 11). 
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the role of close contacts with government officials and members of the Republican 
People's Party in the development ofKo~ Group in the 1930s and 1940s. 8 
The banking sector also helped to develop local capital: the inadequate level of 
capital accumulation was buttressed by cheap bank credits created from small public 
savings (Giinliik 1985a, 192). Private capital accumulation gathered further 
momentum during the Second World War years owing to high inflation and scarcity, 
especially in the areas of trade and agriculture. 
Under a nascent bourgeoisie, the integration of the Turkish capitalism into 
world capitalism accelerated after the Second World War. In the process, economic 
policy became more liberal. Accompanying this change was an increase in credit 
opportunities from Western capitalist countries, especially under the Marshall Plan. 
Rising investments in trade, industry and agriculture brought developments in 
transportation, mechanisation and urbanisation (Ate~ & Eroglu 1999, 261~262). The 
consequent monetisation of markets and rising credit demand in the expanding 
economy brought about a rapid development in private banking in Turkey between 
1945 and 1959. 
As interest rates and banking commissions were determined by the state and 
only the CBT was authorised to undertake FX transactions, branch banking and 
competition over deposit collecting gained importance. As a consequence, 30 new 
banks (including mergers between existing banks) were established while the number 
of branches in the sector multiplied four-fold between 1944 and 1959 {Akgiiy 1992a, 
43-44). The process of branch banking contributed to the elimination of local banks 
(BAT 1998, 13). Also, the number of foreign banks decreased from 9 to 6 between 
1943 and 1958 (Ate~ & Eroglu 1999, 274). 
Access to cheap credit was the driving force leading industrial and 
commercial capitals to establish new banks in this period. The large banks of today, 
such as Yap1 Kredi Bank (YKB) (1944), Turkey Garanti Bank (1946), Akbank (1948) 
and Pamukbank (1955), were established in this period. Thus, Artun (1983, 46) 
declares that 'the 1940s could be evaluated as the years of formation of the private 
sector banking of today'. Of these early banks, Akbank represents. Turkey's first 
8 The founder of Sabanct Group also benefited from similar opportunities (see Bugra 
(1987, 147). As well, some monopoly concessions given to i~bank (such as the monopoly 
right on glass production given with a law in 1935) contributed to the Group's rapid 
expansion. 
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example of a holding bank controlled by a family conglomerate. Increasing control 
also over the other early banks was established by today's large conglomerates in the 
following decades. 9 
4.4.2 The Proliferation of Holding Banking 
Under the lSI policy of the late 1950s onwards, commercial capital, the 
dominant fraction of capital by then, gradually converted to industrial capital (Ercan 
2002a). The rapid accumulation process under the lSI was supported by the state 
through many mechanisms. This showed itself in three key ways. Firstly, in addition 
to the protectionist trade regime and a lower exchange rate, 'the state banks played a 
key role in channelling foreign aid and credit as well as domestic public credit to 
private industry' (Oncii & Gok~e 1991,106, emphasis added). Secondly, joint 
ventures with SEEs as well as their.artificially low-priced inputs supported industrial 
capital (Siinrnez 1992a, 114-115). Thirdly, while the sectors which became profitable 
together with the rapidly growing market were left to the bourgeoisie, the state 
increasingly focused on the production of intermediate and capital goods requiring 
high technology and scale economies (Sonrnez 1998, 67). 
The establishment of the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (1950), in 
which i~bank, Ko~ and Sabanc1 Groups were among the shareholders, had a special 
place in the formation of industrial capital. This bank channelled credits with the 
sponsorship of the WB by accelerating the conversion to productive capital. 10 For 
9 The control of the YKB was acquired by <;:ukurova Group from Dogu~ Group in 
1979. <;:ukurova Group, a shareholder during the establishment of Pamukbank, also acquired 
its total control in the mid-1960s. Hence, in the process, the <;:ukurova Group gained control 
over three banks: The YKB, Pamukbank and Selanik Bank. Selanik Bank, which started to 
operate in 1888, was acquired by the <;:ukurova Group in 1969. It was later renamed twice 
(first Uluslararas1 EndUstri ve Ticaret Bank, then Interbank) and sold to Nergis Group in 
1996. 
Garanti Bank, on the other hand, after an unresolved struggle between Ko9 and 
Sabanc1 Groups to gain control of the bank, was sold to Dogu~ Group in the early 1980s. The 
.struggle between Ko9 and Sabanc1 Groups over Garanti Bank in the late 1970s was related to 
their competition in the automotive industry. Ko9 Group wanted control of the bank, which 
then had a large stake in a Sabanc1-owned tire company that was becoming a danger to a Ko9-
dominated tire manufacturer. When the two Groups could not gain a majority stake, they 
eventually sold their interests in the financial institution. Ko9 eventually acquired its own 
bank, Koy Bank, to rival Sabanct Holding's Akbank, one of Turkey's largest commercial 
banks ("Koc-Sabanci Rivalries Divide Turkish Economy", Turkish Daily News, 8 August 
1996, URL: http://www.Turkishdailvnews.com/o1d editions/08 08 96/feature.htm). 
10 See Ate~ & Eroglu (1999, 272). 
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example, Sabanc1 Group built Bossa (producing cloth and thread) as a product of this 
period (Bugra 1987, 147; Sonmez 1992a, 73). 
Therefore, these leading family conglomerates have prospered under 
supportive state policies in the name of 'creating' a national bourgeoisie throughout 
the history of Turkey. Despite this nationalist focus, however, it must be stressed that 
close links with TNCs have accelerated their rapid expansions inside and outside 
Turkey since the early period. Besides gaining control over banks as the financial 
engines of their rapid accumulation since the 1940s, 11 these conglomerates started 
local manufacturing investments which replaced imported goods via partnerships with 
TNCs. Some of these conglomerates had already been representative agencies of the 
exporter TNCs. 
In addition, via the establishment of a network of trading companies covering 
many parts of the country for the distribution of the finished products, the integration 
of productive and commercial capital was enhanced. 
Hence, these conglomerates grew to their present size due to the close 
collaboration with international industrial capital from the very beginning and joint 
ventures with foreign firms provided their entries and expansions into industry. For 
example, according to the official company history ofKos; Group, the founder Vehbi 
Kov realised the necessity of establishing foreign relations and by the end of 1940s, 
the Group had become active in the manufacturing sector via licence agreements. It 
established the first light bulb factory in cooperation with General Electric in 1948 
since 'at that time, it simply was not possible to establish a light bulb factory with 
local means only'. 12 The relations of Kos; Group with foreign capital have proceeded 
with joint ventures in various sectors. Therefore, the developments of these 
conglomerates are a result of their links with the state and international capital. 
According to Barham and Field: 
Turkey's most powerful conglomerates grew to their present size in the hothouse 
environment of closed markets and nurtured by a paternalistic state ... Tbe most 
successful Turkish groups have all drawn heavily on connections with multinational 
corporations. Most of the companies owned by Kos: Holding are joint ventures with 
some of the word's leading corporations, such as Fiat, Unisys and Ford. Kos: 
provided access to Turkish markets which were otherwise closed to foreigners, while 
11 With the exception of i~bank that was founded in the 1920s. 
12 
"Transition to Industry", URL: 
http://www.Koc.com.tr/englishlkurumsal/endustriyegecis.asp (accessed 8 November 2002). 
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foreigners contributed capital and technology. Turkish groups, sheltered behind 
ferocious trade barriers, coddled by thickets of regulation and nourished by close 
political links with Ankara, grew in every direction, vertically and horizontally. The 
Sabanc1 Group, Turkey's second-largest industrial conglomerate, has interests in 
almost every conceivable industry and almost always in association with foreign 
partners, such as Toyota, Philip Morris, IBM, and Dupont. (Barham and Field 
1997, 12) 
Contributing to this rapid accumulation, the formation of holding companies · 
uniting affiliates in different sectors under the control of a founding family became 
the distinctive feature of the lSI period. The model of the multi-functional holding 
company united commercial, industrial and banking capital for a higher capacity of 
surplus value production via rising industrial investments. As a result, while only two 
holding companies were established between 1949 and 1962, the numbers were 39 
between 1963 and 1971, and 142 between 1972 and 1979 (Kazgan 1985, 2398). 
The formation of the holding structure was accelerated by the state through 
new legislation and development plans during the lSI. Firstly, a new banking law 
passed in 1957 13 had special importance: a bank could not give credits amounting to 
· more than 10% of its OWn funds to a company; however, the bank could give 
unlimited credit if it owned more than 25% of the firm's capital. This encouraged 
capital to establish industrial firms with the partnership of a bank (Tekeli & Mente~ 
1982, 267). Consequently, while some industrial-commercial capitals tended to have 
their own banks, some banks expanded their activities to other sectors (Tekeli 1985, 
2390-2391). Thus, as in the cases of i~bank, Akbank and the YKB, a cluster of 
affiliated companies around banks had already appeared even before the legislative 
incentives (Tekeli & Mente~ 1982, 267). 
The second incentive for the proliferation of holding companies was 
Commerce Law no. 6762 (1957) which made it easier to establish joint-stock 
companies. This facilitated the graded structure among companies within a holding 
organisation through equity control (Tekeli & Mente~ 1982, 265-266). Thirdly, tax 
advantages were an important factor (Bugra 1994, 184). Amendments in the corporate 
taxation system in 1963 eliminated double taxation by exempting from tax the 
revenues which a central holding company derived from its participation in affiliated 
firms. 14 Fourthly, the legislation (no.903 in 1963) that facilitated the establishment of 
13 Act No.7!29-Clause 38. 
14 This exemption was abolished in 1986 (Bugra 1994, 184). 
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foundations within the holding structure was effective in the establishment of more 
holding companies. 15 These foundations served to establish control over holding 
companies as well as to reduce the overall tax burden within the holding structure 
(Tekeli & Mente~ 1982, 268-269). These legislative changes met the demands of the 
capitalist class at that period: the Ko9 Group, for example, had lobbied for these 
changes (Tekeli & Mente~, 1982). 
In this process, as indicated above, 'interlocking ownership of banks and 
corporations gained further momentum as the nascent private conglomerates began 
to move into financial markets towards the end of the 1950s' (Oncii & Gok9e 1991, 
106, emphasis added). The state supported the formation of an oligopolistic holding 
banking structure to accelerate capital accumulation. 16 With a negative real interest 
rate policy, holding banks collected low-costs deposits and provided cheap financial 
resources to their holding companies (Kazgan 1985, 2402). Thus, in the 1960s and 
1970s, bank ownership became the conditio sine qua non of comparative advantage in 
financial markets (Oncii & Gok9e 1991, 106)_17 Consequently, almost all private 
deposit banks became subject to the control of certain conglomerates and the 
ownership of some banks was also transferred between conglomerates in the 1970s. 18 
15 Foundations which had been an important component of the pre-republican law 
system were ended along with the Republican regime in 1926. While these institutions were 
re-included in order to support the holding formation in 1963, it was detenriined that if they 
allocated 80% of their incomes to the areas which were dealt with general, private and 
supplementary budget administrations, they would be fully exempted from tax (Tekeli & 
Mente~ 1982, 268). 
16 For a similar emphasis by the BAT see (BAT 1998, 15). 
17 Bugm (1994, 199) argues that incorporation of banks by large holding companies 
did not centrally serve to enhance their accumulation. Not all major holding companies had 
their own banks and the acquisitions or sales of banks were not turning points in the 
development processes of those companies as in the case of Ko~ Group ·which sold off 
Garanti Bank and remained without any activities in banking until the 1980s. Bugra also 
claims that bank ownership did not reduce the fmancial dependence of Turkish holding 
companies on the state. 
This point of view contrasts with the thesis' findings. Not all major conglomerates 
had their own banks because there were restrictions on bank establishments and therefore, 
even high competition was observed among conglomerates for bank ownership. On the other 
· hand, having their own banks eased access to state subsidised credits for holding companies 
as part of the state policy for using holding banking to enhance accumulation. Yet Bugra's 
explanation of the formation of holding banking as a process against the authoritarian state 
precludes her drawing this conclusion. 
18 For example, the majority shares in Istanbul Bank established in 1953 by a group of 
businessmen from Istanbul were acquired by Kemal Has-Has Holding in the early 1970s 
(Sonmez 1992a, 299). See also footnote 10. 
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As such, the development plans aimed at increasing the concentration of 
banking through bank mergers and restrictions on new bank establishments (Akgiiy 
1992a, 54-55). 19 Bankruptcies of many banks - especially local and small ones -
following the economic turmoil at the end of the 1950s and stabilisation measures of 
1958 also contributed to the rise in the sectoral concentration. This led to a run on 
bank deposits. Liquidations and mergers within banking continued· in the following 
years. In sum, 15 banks were liquidated between 1960 and 1964 (Akgiiy 1992a, 52; 
Aytekin 2000b, 18).20 Meanwhile, since investment/development banks were 
preferred to support the projected sectors in the development plans (Aytekin 2000b, 
19), 21 only seven new banks (five development and two commercial banks 22) were 
allowed to be established and the number of banks decreased to 40 in 1980 from 47 in 
1963 (Ate~ & Eroglu 1999, 321). As a result, the market became dominated by large 
private and public banks. 
The credit system was also functional in the integration of banking and 
industrial capital. In this period, new legislation encouraged banks to give credit to 
their subsidiaries investing in prioritised sectors (BAT 1998, 15). Oneil and GOkye 
. note the functioning ofthe credit system as follows: 
Both the price of foreign currency and the price of credits were administratively 
defined at below market rates, and bureaucratically allocated according to 'policy 
and/or political priorities' ... Hence, numerous sectors of the economy were subsidised 
through low cost credit . .. specific quantity directives, interest surcharges and rebates, 
preferential tax treatments, and the like further served to manipulate the cost of 
credit. The extensiveness of these administrative controls meant that only an 
estimated one quarter of total credit was free from government controls. It also 
meant that in practice, all investments benefited from encouragement schemes of one 
19 The state interventions strengthened large banks at the expense of smaller banks as 
in the example of criteria for branch opening which served to hinder the growth of small 
banks (funay & Uzuner 2000, 117). As such, banking law allowed banks to collect deposits 
in proportion to their scales and 50% of the deposits, which exceeded this limit, were to be 
placed at the CBT (Reisoglu 1999, 6). For more details on banking policies stipulated in the 
Second Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1968-1972) see Ate~ & Eroglu (1999, 317). 
2
° For more details on these bankruptcies see Yiizgiin (1983, 168). 
21 The insufficiency of the commercial banks in raising medium and long-term 
finance for the stipulated investments in the development plans led to the establishment of 
these investment banks (Kumaz 1999, 92). 
22 The commercial banks, Amerikan Tiirk-D1~ Ticaret Bank (1964) and Arap-Tiirk 
Bank (1977) were the first examples of external. opening of Turkish banking during the 
planned period (AkgUy 1992a, 63). Amerikan Tiirk-D:i~ Ticaret Bank (after 1970, Tiirk D1~ 
Ticaret Bank-Dt~bank) was the first bank established with foreign capital participation 
(American and Italian) in the Republican period and aimed at fmancing foreign trade. Arap-
Tiirk Bank, on the other hand, was the first bank built with foreign capital majority (60% 
Libya and Kuwait) in this period in order to attract Arabic capital (see Akgiis; 1992a, 62-64). 
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type or another, that is, the policy of low cost credit. .. 'Cheap' loans, or State 
subsidized credit at preferential interest rates, were in turn channelled into 'The 
Group' investments; the interlocking ownership of financial institutions and 
corporations was accompanied by less than arm's length lending and underwriting 
practices. (Oncii & Goks;e 1991, 110-111, emphases added) 
Given that major industrial corporations controlled an important part of banking 
through the ownership of holding companies, these corporations tended to rely 
excessively on bank credit, encouraged by the banking Jaw for connected lending 
rather than equity and direct security issues (Degirmen 2003, 57-58). 
In this process, as can be followed from Table 4.1, some conglomerates, 
which could not own their banks because of restrictions on bank establishment, 
tended to transform local banks of the 1920s into national banks. It was the only way 
for those capitals to eliminate their disadvantageous positions with other bank owning 
conglomerates. 
Table 4.1 Local banks that were converted to national banks 
Conglomerate Local Bank National Bank 
Ya~ar Akhisar Tiitiinctiler Bank (1924) Tiitiinctiler Bank (1981) 
Kozanoglu-<;:avu~oglu Afyon Terakki Serve! Bank (1926) Hisarbank (1979) 
Kozanoglu-<;;avu~oglu Elazig iktisat Bank (1929) Odibank (1980) 
Colakoglu Kocaeli Halk Bank (1927) Tiirk Ekonomi Bank 
(TEB) (1982) 
Ergiir & Erikoglu Denizli iktisat Bank (1927) iktisat Bank (1980) 
6zakat izmir Esnafve Ahali Bank (1928) Egebank (1975) 
Siirmenler Manisa Bagcilar Bank (1917) Bagbank (1982) 
Sources: Developed from Sonmez (1992b, 160); Yiizgiin (1983, 156, 166). 
Consequently, the banks that were controlled by conglomerates in 1981-1982 
could be summarised as in the following Table 4.2: 
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Table 4.2 Holding banks in Turkey (1981-82) 
Conglomerate Bank 
Ko~Group Garanti Bank 
Sabanc1 Group Akbank 
<;ukurova Group ~, Pamukbank, Uluslararas1 Endiistri ve Ticaret Bank 
4bankGroup i~bank, D1~bank 
Has Group Istanbul Bank 
Cavu~oglu-Kozanoglu Group Hisarbank, Odibank 
Ozakat Group Egebank 
Dogu~Group imarbank 
Ya~arGroup Tiitiinciiler Bank 
Zeytinoglu Group Esbank 
<;olakoglu Group TEB 
Ergiir Group iktisat .Bank 
Cmg~lhoglu Group Dernirbank 
Siirmen Group Bagbank 
-
Source: Summarised from Kazgan (1985, 2406). 
Overall, in the plarrning period, through the significant state control over the 
banking sector, 'the limited resources in the sector, under limited competition 
conditions, tried to be allocated in line with the development plans' (BAT 1998, 14). 
Oncii and Gok~e (1991, 111) describe the 1950-1980 period as 'riskless banking' 
since banks worked in a market in which there was no risk of interest and exchange 
rate fluctuations and no price and commodity competition. They bought and sold 
Turkish money at administratively defined low interest rates with an elaborate branch 
network. This 'riskless banking' continued in the post-1980 era despite the process of 
financial 'liberalisation' due to the socialisation of the risks through state intervention 
in financial markets. A banking crisis was inevitable! 
4.5 The 1980s onwards-Trade and Financial Liberalisation: A Further Rise 
in Holding Banking 
The neo-liberal argument for the liberalisation and deregulation of financial 
markets in developing countries is that rising financial resources will enhance 
82 
development along with increasing efficiency in resource allocation. 
Developmentalists, on the other hand, contend that this process has made developing 
countries' financial markets playgrounds for arbitrage-seeking capital of advanced 
countries and thus, conflicts with developmental objectives.Z3 
Nevertheless, despite the dominant 'deregulation' rhetoric and its nationalist 
critique, the Turkish experience shows that the financial liberalisation process and 
accompanying state finance policies brought about different implications for divisions 
of capital. Crucially, they played an important role in the historical formation of the 
hegemonic fraction of capital. Accompanying the financial liberalisation process, 
large conglomerates which formed FC used their rising control over the use of 
financial resources for international expansion. However, mostly small-to-medium 
scale capitals faced rising costs of funds and more limited access to bank credit. All 
aspects, therefore, contributed to the rising centralisation and concentration of capital. 
Turkish financial markets have been further integrated with global markets 
through banking reform. Before the discussion of this further integration, the 
following section will review the financial deregulation process in the post-1980 era 
and accompanying developments in the formation ofFC. 
4.5.1 Continuous Attraction of Holding Banking with the Pivotal Role of 
Banking in Financial Resource Allocation 
In the late 1970s, the crisis in the import substituting accumulation, which 
manifested itself in the form of a FX crisis, led to the transition to the outward-
oriented accumulation regime. The large conglomerates, having increased control 
over domestically-oriented accumulation, faced constraints under the lSI together 
with the saturation of domestic markets, especially the market for consumer durables. 
The scarcity of FX was a globally-derived constraint on industry expansion. As Ercan 
(2002a, 44-46) indicates, the production of surplus value was inherently limited by the 
dominance of assembling operations in manufacturing industry. These industries 
could not achieve internationally competitive prices and quality under the heavy 
protection of the ISI; with insufficient level of exports, Turkey could not earn the 
needed FX. Moreover, given the dependence of industrial production on imports of 
23 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
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necessary inputs, the planned transition to the next phase in the lSI (the production of 
intermediate and capital goods) required even more FX for their imports. 
The acute crisis of FX was also reinforced by the contraction in foreign aid 
and credits that came with the global recession. As Western governments and supra-
national institutions became more reluctant to issue state-to-state loans or project 
credits for the finance of development plans based on the lSI, the Turkish state tried to 
continue implementing its plan by relying essentially on short-term borrowing from 
private creditors. This continued despite the first oil shock of 1973-74. A combination 
of these forces led to balance of payment difficulties in 1977: Turkey was unable to 
service its foreign debt which had become increasingly short-term in nature. The 
rapidly deteriorating macroeconomic balances during 1978-1980 and the rising 
tension between the IMF and the Turkish state heralded a turning point in economic 
policies.24 The stabilisation package announced in January 24, 1980 opened a new era 
of trade and financial liberalisation, a shift that was heavily backed by the IMF and 
theWB. 
Hence, in the face of the limits of the lSI, the dominant parts of capital, having 
made the transition from commercial to industrial capital, wanted to expand their 
operations internationally. Posed from a national perspective, the export-led 
accumulation regime after 1980 provided the needed environment for these 
conglomerates to expand into the rising FX -earning sectors of the 1980s such as 
tourism, finance, international transportation and foreign trade.25 From the perspective 
of the dominant capitals themselves, this was the opportunity to expand. As Sonmez 
(1992b, 154) states, achieving competitive price and quality in external markets 
required restructuring in their production. 
The internationalization of these large conglomerates continued with the first 
burgeoning of !Dis in the late 1980s and they pioneered the steadily increasing 
internationalisation of productive capital throughout the 1990s. For example, the Koy 
Group established facilities for the production of household appliances in the early 
1990s in some North African countries (Sonmez 1992b, 171). 
24 For the tensions between the Turkish state and the IMF see Ekinci (1996, 3). 
25 The overwhelming majority of the Foreign Trade Companies operating in this 
period were set up by large holding companies and they captured the main share of foreign 
trade incentives (see Bugra 1994, 183). 
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Yet, given that those conglomerates 'were very important at the domestic scale 
but insignificant at the international scale' (Tekeli & Mente~ 1982, 262), collaboration 
with international capital continued to be a key to accelerate global expansion. 26 In 
this process, a limited number of family conglomerates established control over the 
economy and they have been surrounded by a sea of small scale firms (Ercan 2002a, 
32). 
Along with trade liberalisation and export promoting policies, the financial 
system was deregulated and gradually integrated into global financial markets. The 
end of the inward-looking process of capital accumulation under the protection of the 
state also necessitated a structural change in its financial system. Hence, to meet 
increasing capital needs of the bourgeoisie in the transition to the outward-oriented 
accumulation, capital, money and FX markets were developed by the state.27 In this 
process, the elimination of control on interest rates provided a wider deposit base for 
banking. 28 In addition, gradual removal of restrictions on FX transactions during the 
1980s and finally on capital movements in 1989 (with decree no. 32) allowed the free 
international flow of funds. Thus, banks became the central agent in the domestically 
mediated external borrowing of the state over the following decade. 
The continuous dominance of banking in the allocation of financial resources 
attracted new conglomerates to enter the banking industry. Indeed, given that margins 
between interest rates of bank credits and deposits were high in the period 1980-1990, 
Turkish capital markets were expected to be developed as a cheap source of finance 
for the corporate sector. However, at the start of the 1990s, in spite of some progress, 
29 especially in terms of establishing the necessary institutional and legal base for 
26 For example, to compensate for its backwardness in foreign partnerships compared 
to Ko(: Group, Sabanc1 Group gathered more foreign partners after 1980 (Sonmez 1992b, 
158). 
27 The main elements of this development process were: the permission for banks to 
keep foreign currency abroad and so to become involved in FX transactions in international 
markets in 1984; the introduction of open market transactions in 1987; the beginning of the 
sale of government securities through periodic auctions in 1985; the inclusion of special 
finance houses and leasing companies in 1985; the establishment of the Interbank Money 
Market for the Turkish Lira in 1987, Foreign Exchange and Foreign Banknotes Markets in 
1988 and Gold Market in 1989. 
28 Interest rates were liberalised in 1980 and the CBT was authorised to fix interest 
rates on deposits again in 1983 since competition (via offering higher interest rates by some 
small banks and brokerage firms) threatened the fmancial system. The determination of 
interest rates was left to the market again in 1988 (for the details see Akkurt, Eginli, 
Hakioglu, Karayalym, Ko(:, Ozcet, ~enel, Usta & Varol 1992, 7-9). 
29 See Eser (1995, 27); Una! (1996, 40). 
85 
capital market development, the banking sector, particularly commercial banking, 
continued to dominate the financial system of Turkey. Actually, the financial sector in 
aggregate was almost equal to the banking sector.30 The dominance of banking in the 
fmancial system continued into the late 1990s.31 Moreover, while the funds that 
industrial corporations gathered through capital markets tended to decrease, banks 
raised increasing resources from these markets between 1987 and 1993 (Eser 1995, 
45), 32 indicating that banks were increasingly mediating corporate fund raising. 
BRSA (2002d) describes the dominance of banking in Turkey's financial system as 
follows: 
A significant part of the flow of funds is performed through the banking sector in 
Turkey. Although the number and size of non-bank financial institutions tended to 
increase in the recent years, the banking sector has still a share of 75% in total 
financial sector assets. The fact that a significant part of non-bank fmancial 
institutions are subsidiaries of banks increases the dominance of the banks in the 
financial sector. 
Importantly, another factor that made bank ownership critical in accessing 
money capital during that period was the state debt finance by the banking sector. As 
explained in Chapter 3, the state borrowing, mainly from the banking sector, became a 
source of protectionism mainly for FC in the post-1980 era. The state indebtness 
channelled money capital to FC and other benefactor large scale 
industrial/commercial capital in a period when they sought to intemationalise their 
accumulation. 33 
As will be specified below, in the 1980s and 1990s, the state took some 
measures to loosen the integration of industrial and banking capital and to bring the 
30 1n the total balance sheets of fmancial institutions, including the CBT, the share of 
special financial houses, insurance and leasing companies and stock exchange was less than 
6%. The same situation was also valid in the secondary markets. 1n the period 1982-1990, 
while the share of capital market instruments in financing private sector remained at a low 
level, bank credits had a share of 95%; as such, the share of banks in secondary markets was 
around 90% (Erdem 1993, 176-177). 
31 While the share of the banking assets in total financial system was 72% in 1998, 
special fmancial houses, insurance and leasing companies had a share of only 5.2% (Giirlesel 
1999, 75-76). Also, between 1997 and 1999, around 90% of the transactions in the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange bond market were made by commercial banks (Tunay 2000, 99). 
32 Following the opportunity for raising funds through capital markets with the 
Capital Market Law in 1981, industrial corporations could obtain 87.9 % of the funds derived 
from capital markets in 1987, whilst this share decreased to 55% in 1993. On the other hand, 
partly due to the initiated participation of banks in the process of public issue in 1989, banks 
increased their shares in the raised funds from capital markets (Eser 1995, 42). 
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European Union (EU) banking standards to the sector. However, the financial 
deregulation measures of the post-1980 period did not displace or undermine the 
pivotal role of the Turkish banking sector in the allocation of financial resources. 
Owing to the relative backwardness of capital markets and the wide activities of 
banks in these markets, holding banking continued to be highly attractive to 
conglomerates. In addition, the lucrative state-debt-finance in the 1990s increased the 
appetite of individual capitalists to enter banking as all private banks became the 
beneficiaries of the associated arbitrage gains and float income. 
4.5.2 Mechanisms for Penetration into Banking by Conglomerates 
Conglomerates used different mechanisms to penetrate into banking 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, indicating the continuous attraction of holding 
banking. 
The relaxation of entry barriers into banking with decree no. 70 (22.7.1983) 
Jed to a decrease in sectoral concentration. Some conglomerates, which had been able 
to add banking capital to their circuits, established new national banks, some with 
foreign partners. As a consequence, between 1980 and 1990, 19 commercial banks 
(eight of which were foreign banks) and eight development/ investment banks (four of 
which were with foreign capital) were established. The entry of 19 new foreign banks 
was especially remarkable. The number of banks continued to rise in the 1990s and, 
by 1998, there were 36 private banks (up from 19 in 1980) and 18 foreign banks (up 
from 4), whereas the number of state banks decreased from 8 to 5 via privatisation. 
The number of private banks especially increased in the 1990s. 
One of the driving forces leading non-banking conglomerates to have their 
own banks in the 1980s was the desire to take advantage of expanding foreign trade 
and capital markets. 6ncii and Gokye summarise the trend succinctly: 
By 1985, many of the prominent private Groups, had given birth to a new generation 
of 'trade-finance banks', either in joint ventures with foreign banks or independently . 
... the slowness of the over-branched, over-staffed traditional deposit banks in 
shifting into foreign currency markets also provided scope for ·the emergence of a 
number of new and small independent trade-finance banks of domestic origin. These 
enterprising new mavericks, employing aggressive Madison Avenue techniques, were 
able to take advantage of the expanding foreign trade and funding markets, and 
33 For more information on state borrowing policy see Ekinci (1996), Giirler (1998). 
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established themselves in a banking sector long dominated by the 'Groups' [such as] 
Esbank, Netbank, Finansbank, Iktisat Bank, Ekonomi Bank, Ithalat!Thracat Bank, 
Adabank ... (Oneil & GOkve 1991, 113) 
Consequently, banks that conducted wholesale banking with limited branches 
and small/medium scale increased in number, while the market share of large-scale 
private banks was reduced. These wholesale banks mainly engaged in foreign trade 
financing, leasing, factoring, forfeiting, brokerage and short-term credit-giving by 
drawing on funds from international financial markets. Table 4.3 shows the banks that 
were established or acquired over this period. 
Table4.3 Established/acquired holding banks in the 1980s 
Bank Conglomerate Year 
Garanti Bank Dogu~ & Sabanct (from Kov) 1983 
Titibank (later Impexbank) Ulusoy & Ytlmaz (later Can Elye§iller) 1984 
Iktisat Bank A vrupa ve Am erika (from Ergiir) 1984 
Ada bank Uzan 1985 
Imarbank Uzan (from Dogu~) 1985 
Tekstilbank Akm 1986 
Finansbank Fiba 1987 
Netbank (later Mannara Bank) Net 1988 
TYT (Turizm Yatmm) Bank Lapis 1988 
In the post-1980 period, the deregulation of interest and exchange rates had 
momentous implications for banking. In addition to the removal of price controls over 
foreign currency, commercial banks were allowed to engage in foreign currency 
operations. As Oneil and Gokve (1991,112) state, the most immediate consequence of 
the decentralisation of foreign currency operations, when coupled with the softerting 
of restrictions on capital inflows from abroad and the introduction of an export 
encouragement scheme, was the arrival of international banks which had so far 
eschewed Turkish financial markets. As well, Turkey's relatively rapid economic 
growth and gateway position with respect to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) countries attracted foreign banks (Denizer 2000, 8). 
While foreign banks (mainly US, European and Middle Eastern origin) first 
entered via agencies or branches (e.g. Citibank, Manufacturer Hannover Trust, Chase 
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Manhattan and First National Bank), a different mode of entry started to be observed 
in the mid-1980s: building corporate banks with Turkish conglomerates (Sonmez 
1992a, 77-78). In this process, Yl!llar, Koy, Sabanc1, ENKA and Dogu~ Groups 
became partners with foreign banks. 34 In addition, in 1991 and 1992, some of the 
foreign bank branches 35 turned themselves into corporate companies to benefit from 
the revaluation fund 36 that could not be utilised by small taxpayers until 1992. Some 
of these banks had domestic partners. For example, the First National Bank of Boston 
was transformed into an independent Turkish bank in which OY AK. (Turkish Armed 
Forces Pension Fund-Ordu Yardzmla§ma Kurumu), Alarko and Cerrahoglu Groups 
together controlled a majority stake. 37 The foreign capital banks established in the 
1980s can be seen from Table 4.4. 
34 Irving-Thrust became a partner in Tiitiinbank ofYa~ar Group; Koy-Amerikan Bank 
was a joint venture between Koy Group and Amerikan Express; BNP-Ak was a Bank 
Nationale de Paris and Akbank joint venture. ENKA Group which had been one of the non-
banking conglomerates established Chemical-Mitsui Bank with Japanese and American 
capital. Dogu~ Group, on the other hand, after selling off the YKB to <;ukurova Group in 
1983 and imar Bank to Uzan Group in 1985, re-entered banking with Korfezbank, a joint 
venture with Qatar capital. 
35 First National Bank of Boston, Manufacturers Hanover Bank, Tiirk Bank Ltd 
(became Turkish Bank), Banque lndosuez, Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait and Credit Lyonmiis 
are examples. 
36 The revaluation fund allowed banks to revalue their fixed assets every year 
according to increases in the wholesale price indices and to add the hidden reserves arising 
from inflation to bank's own funds. 
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Table 4.4 Foreign banks in Turkish financial markets in the 1980s 
Bank Year National Origin 
Citibank 1981 American 
. 
BankMellat 1982 Iranian 
BCCJ 1982 Luxemburg 
Tilrk Bank Ltd. 1983 Cypriot 
Habib Bank Ltd 1983 Pakistan 
M. Hanover Trust'" 1984 American 
Chase Manhattan 1984 American 
F.N.Bank ofBoston" 1984 American 
Saudi-American 1985 Saudi-American 
Chemica1.Mitsui'" 1985 Amer.-Japanese-Turkish (ENKA Group) 
Irving Trust/Tiitiin" 1985 Amer.-Turkish (Yasar Group) 
BNP-AK•• 1985 French-Turkish {Sabanct Group) 
Koy-Amerikan" 1986 American-Turkish {Koy Group) 
Bank ofBahrain/Kuwait"" 1986 Bahrain-Kuwait 
Banque Indosuez•• 1986 French 
Standard Chartered~ 1986 British 
Credit L yonrulis 1988 French 
1 
Korfezbank" 1988 Qatar-Turkish (Do~ Group) 
Sources: Developed from 6ncii & Gl!kl'e (1991, 112); Baysal & Kol' (1993, 116-117) 
38 It was renamed Chemical Bank in 1991 and became Sitebank in 1997 as a national 
bank. 
39 With the partnerships of OY AK and Alarko Groups, it was renamed Tiirk Boston 
Bank in 1991. 
40 Its name was changed to Tiirk Mitsui Bank in 1989 and renamed Tiirk Sakura Bank 
in 1991. All of the bank's stakes of the bank were bought by F iba Group in 1999 and was 
renamed Fiba Bank in 2000. 
41 Irving Trust sold off 40% of its stakes to Ya~ar Group in 1987 and it was renamed 
Tilrkiye Tiitiinciiler Bank-Ya~arbank in 1996. 
42 Dresdner Bank became a partner and the bank was renamed BNP-AK-Dresdner in 
1989. 
43 It was established in 1981 as American Express. In 1986, with Koy Group's 
partnership, it became a national bank and was renamed Kay Amerikan Bank and in 1993 
Kol'bank. 
44 In 1992, it was converted to a national bank with the name 'Tasarruf ve Kredi 
Bank'. 
45 In 1992, it became Banque Indosuez Tiirk and in 1993, Banque Indosuez Generale 
Euro Tiirk (EuroTiirk Bank). Following the change in its shareholder structure, it became a 
national bank in 1995 and was renamed Bank Kapital Tiirk. 
46 It was renamed Westdeutsche Landesbank Europa (West LB) in 1990. 
47 Birlesik Tiirk Korfez Bank. Its statute changed it to a private national bank in 1995 
with a change in its capital structure. 
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Despite the high number of entries in the 1980s, the shares of foreign banks in 
terms of assets, loans, credits and deposits did not increase over time. One reason for 
this trend was that these banks focused on wholesale banking and foreign trade 
fmancing with limited-numbered branches (BAT 1998, 18; Denizer 2000, 9). 48 
Also, foreign participation in Turkish banking remained low throughout the 
1990s as many of foreign banks sold their banking franchises and left Turkey. As of 
1999, the shares of foreign banks in total deposits and credits were 2.7% and 3% 
respectively (Akgii9 2000, 41). In accounting for this tendency, Miinir (1998) cites the 
chairman of one of the largest banks of Turkey: 
Erol Sabanc1, chairman of Akbank, agrees that the family stress of Turkish banking is 
the biggest obstacle to foreign participation. "A well-established foreign bank wants 
to deal with an institution, not with a family," he says. "Many families exploit their 
banks. Many banks have bad assets arising from loans to parent companies - the 
family lends itself money and then does not repay. This constitutes a large-scale risk 
which a foreign bank will not tolerate." 
But "clean banks" are not attractive either, says Sabanc1, because buying them 
involves an unpalatable amount of exposure to Turkey risk ... 
Importantly, Alper and Oni~ (2002, 12) indicate that while foreign banks, in 
general, were unwilling to participate on a meaningful scale in a system characterised 
by weak supervision and high volatility, only certain types of foreign banks tended to 
enter the sector. Those banks collaborated with domestic banks in sharing excess 
profits derived from state-debt finance. 49 
As those foreign banks left Turkey in the 1990s, purchases of foreign banks 
and foreign capital shares in joint venture banks became a new channel for further 
infusion into banking by conglomerates. Table 4.5 shows nine banks that were the 
result of these acquisitions: 
48 In 1990, the share of foreign markets in total deposits and credits was 2.4% and 
3.5% respectively (Akgii9 1991, 6). 
49 For more data on the high share of government securities in foreign banks' assets 
see Erzan, Akyay & Yolalan (2001, 13). 
Table 4.5 Purchases of foreign banks by Turkish conglomerates in the 1990s 
Foreign Capital Bank National Capital Bank Conglomerate Year 
Kos: Amerikan Bank Kos:bank Kos: 1991 
Bank of Bahrain Tasarruf ve Kredi Bank Dogu~ 1992 
Bank of Boston Tiirk Boston Bank'" OYAK 1991 
Eurocredit Bank ' 1 Yurtbank Balkaner 1994 
Banque fudosuez Bank Kapital Cey1an 1995 
Osmanh Bank'" Osmanli Bank Dogu~ 1996 
Chemical bank" Site bank Sunneli 1996 
Saudi American Bank Ulusal Bank Cmgtlhoglu 1996 
Tiirk Sakura Bank'' FibaBank Fiba 1999 
-·---
Sources: Derived fromAkgiis: (1991, 1992b, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001); 'Faa! Bankalar', URL: 
! 
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http://www.tbb.org.tr/Tiirkce/diger bilgiler/faalbanka.xls and URL: 'Kapah 
Bankalar', http://www.tbb.org.tr/Tiirkce/diger bilgiler/kapalibanka.xls (accessed 25 
February 2003). 
In addition to the new generation of trade-finance banks and the acquisitions 
of foreign banks, the third form of entry for conglomerates into the sector was through 
development/investment banking. In the second half of the 1980s, seven 
development-investment banks were established and their number reached 12 in 1992 
(up from 6 in 1980). This trend was led by state policy, as the government tended to 
give new bank licences for investment banking rather than commercial banking. 
Yavuz Canevi, the Undersecretary of the Turkish Treasury, explained the reason for 
this policy as follows: 
50 Later Oyakbank. 
51 Eurocredit Bank (Euro Credit Tiirk Fransiz Ticaret Bank) was established in 1993. 
Seventy percent of its shares belonged to <;arm!ldt Group and 30% to Compaigne Financiere 
De Camondo of France. Its name was changed to Yurt Ticaret ve Kredi Bank (Yurtbank) in 
·1994 and sold to Balkaner Group in 1996. 
52 French capital. 
53 Its name was changed to Site bank in 1997. 
54 It was renamed Fiba Bank in 2000. 
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After overcoming the crisis ofKastelli55 [the bankers' crisis in the early 1980s], in the 
period of 1984-1986, since banking was living its golden years by selling and buying 
foreign exchange with a premium of 2-2.5 % ... everybody wanted to own their own 
banks. In front of the door of the Treasury, tens ... of individuals, groups appeared. 
We started to worry. Since we had announced that the entry to banking had been 
liberalised, how could we give a licence to everyone who had the necessary minimum 
capital? We found a tricky way ... and we thought that if there were a banking type that 
did not risk savings deposits, we could both please these people and we could remove 
the closeness. of the system simultaneously ... We were convinced of the idea of 
'investment banking'. We said "everybody who wants to do banking can do it, but we 
do not allow deposit banking ... If you want to establish an investment bank, you can 
do so. We shall see your performance in the market first ... and after 2-3 years, you 
can apply for the conversion of your banks to deposit banks ... CiAV 1990, 70-71) 
Therefore, the state saw investment banking as a way to reduce the risk of excessive 
number of deposit taking commercial banks. 
The WB also played a role in the establishment of these investment banks. 
Aikin (2002, 40) notes the credit conditionality by the WB on the reduction of an 
excessive number of deposit banks· and the development of investment banking in 
Turkey. Aikin indicates that despite the initial conformation to this 'suggestion', when 
the incumbent government gave new deposit banking licences in 1991, the WB froze 
the release of subsequent credits. 
Nevertheless, investment banking had a special attraction for conglomerates. 
The established private investment banks were dominantly either in .the form of joint 
ventures with foreign banks or in the form of subsidiaries in which the largest 
shareholders were foreign banks. This foreign partnership was needed 56 because 
55 Cevher Ozden, better known as Kastelli, was a broker whose name became 
synonymous with the Bankers' period of the early 1980s. After positive real interest rates 
came into force in the 1980s via the adjustment of nominal interest rates for inflation, despite 
lags, in Turkey there was a rapid expansion in private brokers ("Bankers" as they came to be 
called in Turkey) who offered extremely high interest rates in order to fund their lending to 
firms which were badly in need of money. As Ekinci (1996, 6) states, while the operations of 
private brokers soon turned ·into a case of Ponzi finance, some banks that marketed their 
negotiable certificates of deposits through the brokers were also drawn into the Ponzi scheme. 
In this process, some holding companies which had their own banks such as the <;:ukurova 
Group, and non-banking _ones such as Transtiirk Holding, Eczactba§i Holding and Profilo 
Holding, established their own brokerage firms. 'Within a short time, the nation came to boast 
one broker per 45,000 people' (Ate~. Uras & Kahan 1999, 393). For details of the collapse of 
the brokerage system in 1982 which resulted in thousands of unpaid deposit holders as well as 
in bankruptcies of three cooperating banks (Istanbulbank, Hisarbank and Odibank), see Ate~. 
Uras & Kaban (1999, 334-335; 388-394) and Asomedya (2001, 43-46). 
56 See the statement by Mehmet <;:ekinmez, Director of Banking Department of Turkish 
Treasury and Foreign Trade Undersecretary in jAV (1990, 77). 
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conglomerates' needs for finance could not be met due to the decreasing subsidised 
credits provided by the state. 57 Bugra explains this trend as follows: 
The growing shortage of public funds used to support the private sector has thus been 
instrumental in leading private enterprises to reconsider their financial strategies. 
These developments coincided with changes in banking regulations which enabled 
banks to deal with foreign currency operations and greatly liberalised the activities of 
foreign banks operating in Turkey. In this environment, it became inore attractive for 
banks to engage in merchantlinvestment banking rather than remaining in their 
traditional general commercial banking activities, often through the formation of joint 
ventures with foreign partners. This new orientation was especially attractive for 
holding companies because investment banks are not limited by the same regulations 
which restrict the amount of credit that a group bank can extend to any single 
enterprise on the one hand and to affiliated enterprises within the group on the other. 
Moreover, through joint ventures with foreign banks, group banks could raise much-
needed capital resources in an environment in which subsidized credit was becoming 
scarce. In the second half of the 1980s, big Turkish enterprises have thus begun to 
consider joint ventures with foreign banks as a way of dealing with financial 
bottlenecks. (Bugra 1994, 204-205, emphasis added) 58 
The amendment to the banking law59 in 1993 also encouraged the 
establishment of investment banks. Firstly, investment and development banks were 
allowed to be converted to deposit banks with the permission of the Council of 
Ministry. Secondly, investment banks gained rising imp?rtance in the primary 
securities market as this legislative change authorised these banks to deal with 
57 The preferential credit system that was used to support prioritised sectors during the 
lSI was simplified after 1983. 'Banks were no longer obliged to lend a certain proportion of 
deposits to specific sectors and differential reserve ratios to specific sectors were abolished' 
(Degirmen 2003, 51). 
The CBT' s rediscount credits were used to support preferential sectors until 1989 by 
applying lower rates to the credits extended to these sectors, especially to the exporter or 
export-promising sectors. However, the volume of these credits was continuously diminished 
throughout the 1980s and the allocation of medium-long term credits used in financing the 
industrial sector was ceased in 1989. The new credit policy focused on controlling and 
supporting the liquidity need of the banking sector on the basis of short-term crediis (for more 
details see Ada (1993, 82); IAV (1990, 44-49)). As a result of the cessation of medium-term 
industrial credits, the share of commercial credits in the CBT credits to banking increased and 
as ofNovember 1999, it approximated almost 100% (Akgii9 2000, 27). 
58 The developments that generated a potential market for investment banking after 
1980 were the following: the deregulation of interest rates and exchange rates; the allowance 
for fund raising from abroad; the rise in capital market operations; the establishment of the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange; and the easing of foreign entry into the domestic banking sector in 
the 1980s (see IAV 1990, 75). Furthermore, expected competition from European companies 
in the ongoing process of Turkey acquiring EU membership compelled changes in the capital 
structure of Turkish companies either through being quoted on the stock exchange or having a 
foreign partner. This has been cited by Mehmet Nazmi Erten as another potential source for 
investment banking, in addition to the intensified privatisation attempts in the 1980s (IAV 
1990, 84). 
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security issues by the corporate sector together with brokerage agencies (~engfil 
(1993, 14). Table 4.6 displays the investment banks established in this process. 
Table4.6 Investment banks established in the second-half of the 1980s 
Investment Bank Owner Year 
Tekfen Yatmm ve Finans Bank Tekfen Group (Turkish capital majority) 1988 
Birlesik Yatmm Bankoo Kavala Group (Turkish capital majority) 1989 
Tilrk Merchant Bank " Bankers Trust &Is Bank& Dt~bank 1988 
Yatmm Bank•' Foreign capital-owned ., 1988 
A vrupa Tilrk Yatmm Bank~ Foreign capital-owned 1990 
Sources: Developed from/AV(1990, 76); Akgii9 (1992a, 114). 
Owing to eager pressure exerted on the Government and the Treasury by 
conglomerates for banking licences, four new deposit and two investment bank 
licences were given in 1992 which resulted in the establishment of six new banks 
(Aitematifbank, Bank Ekspres, Toprakbank, Kentbank, Park Yatmm Bank and 
Tatbank). Subsequently, around 30 conglomerates made new applications to the 
Treasury. However, the bankruptcies of three banks (TYT Bank, Impexbank and 
Marmara Bank) during the 1994 crisis created an adverse environment for new bank 
allowances by the Treasury. 65 
The full insurance scheme for deposits, which began during this crisis to 
prevent a run on banks, discouraged new bank licence to be given by the state. 
59 Banks Act No. 3182 (25.4.1985) through the Governmental Decree in Force of 
Law no. 512 (16.9.1993). 
60 Its banking permission was ended in 1999. 
61 The shares of !~bank were purchased by Banker Trust in 1992 and it was renamed 
Bankers Trust in 1997. After the purchase of Banker Trust by Deutsche Bank worldwide, 
Banker Trust Turkey was renamed Deutsche Bank in 1999 (Finans Diinyasz 2000c, 64). 
62 It was renamed Taib Yatmm Bank in 1997. 
63 Ninety-five percent of the bank belonged to Trans Arabian Investment Bank E.C. 
64 EuroTilrk Bank. It was renamed Indosuez Euro Tilrk Merchant Bank iri 1995 and 
then Credit Agricole Indosuez Tilrk Bank in 2000. 
65 The sudden rise in interest rates and the devaluation of Turkish Lira in 1994 
affected the whole banking sector, but especially small-to-medium scale banks because of 
their high foreign currency open positions. Those banks tended to rely on external resources 
rather than domestic fi.mds in the pre-crisis years. The sudden rise in FX prices put those 
banks under a high burden in proportion to their foreign currency open positions. In addition, 
the run on deposits during the economic turmoil further affected those banks. Therefore, three 
banks, namely TYT Bank, Impexbank and Marmara Bank went bankrupt as they could not 
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Following the decree of 22 June 1994, previous applications were annulled and 
conglomerates that had applied for a banking licence were asked to renew their 
applications, but with quadruple the necessary minimum capital for a bank 
establishment (Ye§iloglu 1996a, 26). 
Abram Rutgers, Turkey's General Director of Holantse Bank Universal, 
warned that if permission were granted for new bank licences (which then stood at 
23), the sector would be overbanked (Baysal & Ko9 1993, 116). Turkey's General 
Director of Chase Manhattan, Isak Antika also pointed out that there was an excess 
number of banks in corporate banking and branches in retail banking such that a 
consolidation of the banking sector would be necessary in time (Ko9 1993, 55). 
· On the other hand, the Undersecretary Representative of the Treasury and 
Foreign Trade, Osman Unsal, explained the stance of the state on new bank 
establishments as follows: 
At this stage, our preference is to evaluate new bank establishments after sales of the 
state banks which are either currently undergoing a privatisation process or will be 
privatised in the future. (BabU§yU & Kutlay 1993, 10) 
Under these circumstances, after 1992, only one bank licence was granted to EGS 
Investment Bank of EGS Group in 1995. Table 4.7. displays the banks established in 
the early 1990s. 
Table 4.7 Banks established in the early 1990s 
Bank Founder Year 
Altematifbank Dogan Group 1992 
Bank Express Ibrahim Betil 1992 
Toprakbank Toprak Group 1992 
Kentbank•• . Siizer Group 1992 
Park Yatmm Bank Karamehmet Family 1992 
Tat Yatmm Bank Tathc1 Group 1992 
EGS fuvestment Bank., EGSGroup 1995 
Source: Developed from Bilen (2000b, 31 ). 
meet their liabilities (for more details of these bankruptcies see Gi.indogdu 2000, 53-54; 
TGNA 1999e, 17). 
66 Its original name was Tiirkiye Konut ve Endustri Bank and renamed Kentbank in 
1994. 
67 It was converted to a commercial bank in 1996. 
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Nevertheless, after overcoming the 1994 financial crisis, in the mid-1990s 
many conglomerates sought to have their own banks to profit from the lucrative state 
debt finance and to ensure reliable access to financing. As a result, it was predicted 
that there were around 70 bank licence applications waiting in the Treasury (Y e~iloglu 
1996a, 26). However, because of the reluctance of the Treasury to facilitate new bank 
establishments, purchases of banks from other conglomerates appeared as a feasible 
alternative leading to heavy inflation in the acquisition cost of banks. 68 Therefore, in 
the 1990s, many banks changed ownership between conglomerates as Table 4.8 
shows. 
Table 4.8 Bank transfers between owners in the 1990s 
Bank Previous Owner New Owner Year 
Egebank Ozakat Group Bayraktar Holding 1990 
lrnpexbank Asil Na!fir Can Eliye~il 1991 
Bank Ekspres Ibrahim Betil Dogu~Group 1994 
Bank Ekspres Dogu~Group Korkmaz Yigit 1994 
Dt~bank"' i~bank Group Dogan Group 1994 
Altematifbank Dogan Group AnadoluEndustri Group 1996 
Interbank <;ukurova Group Nergis Holding 1996 
Garanti Investment Bank'" MNGGroup Do~ Group 1997 
Derbank" Dervis Temel BaymdtrGroup 1998 
Egebank Bayraktar&Thlas Groups Demirel Group . 1998 
Sources: Developed from Ye~iloglu (1996b, 169); Ta~demir (1997, 34); Akgii9 (1998, 3); 
Arslan (200 1, 230). 
In addition, the acquisition of privatised banks became another alternative path 
to enter banking (Ye~iloglu 1996b, 169-70), as Table 4.9 indicates. Forty-one offers 
for the three privatised banks in 1997 indicate the wide interest in the acquisitions of 
these banks (Tll\idemir 1997, 32). Of the privatised banks, Siirnerbank was bought by 
Garipoglu Group in 1995. Zorlu, Ba~aran, Nergis and Medya Groups also succeeded 
68 See Barham & Field (1997, 47-48). 
69 Previously American Tiirk Dt~ Ticaret Bank. 
. 
70 Later MNG Bank. 
71 Later Baymdtrbank. 
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to enter banking through privatisation in 1997.72 Some of the unsuccessful groups in 
the acquisition of privatised banks, such as Ceylan, Anadolu Endiistri and Siirmeli 
Groups, purchased other holding banks as mentioned above. 
Table 4.9 Acquisitions of privatised banks by conglomerates 
Privatised bank 'j Conglomerate Year 
Silmerbank Garipoglu 1995 
Etibank Nergis & Medya 1997 
Denizbank Zorlu 1997 
Anadolubank Ba~aran 1997 
I 
The last mechanism that was utilised to penetrate banking was a new wave of 
investment banks in 1998. While the establishment of deposit banks was restricted, 
investment banks were approved d:uring the ministry of Giine~ Taner.75 From that 
year, a new condition was to be introduced for new bank licences: according to a draft 
law aiming to reform the financial sector, for deposit banks some US$ 40 million (I 0 
trillion TL), and for investment banks some US$ 25 million (6 trillion TL) would be 
required to be paid to the Treasury. Taner stated that many bank applications were 
waiting for a licence and added: 'instead of making them wait, let's give the licences 
and let the money come to the Treasury' .76 
72 Sumerbank and Etibank were confiscated by the state during banking reform. 
73 The state bank 'Etibank' was divided into three as Etibank, Denizbank and 
Anadolubank and these three bank licences were sold by the state. 
74 The first privatisation bidding was won by the Dogan Mensucat Group. But this 
group failed to pay the instalments, thus, Etibank was sold to Nergis Holding of Cavit c;::aglar 
and Medya Holding of Din9 Bilgin who became the bank's partner with c;::aglar in the bank 
after the bid. For the controversial sale of Etibank see Turkish Daily News, 14 November 
· 2000, URL: http://www.Turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/!! 14 00/unver.htm and 
"<;:aglara San~ Usulsiiz mil", URL: 
http://www.netbul.com/superstar/ozeldosyalar/ekonomi/icibosaltilanbankalar/caglar.asp 
(accessed 13 December 2002). 
75 There are two common forms of investment banking. The first one is the 
investment banking which is done by commercial banks and the second one is characterised 
by .the separation of investment banking from commercial banking (Bilen 2000a, 66). In 
Turkey, Capital Market regulations allowed commercial banks to do investment banking until 
1997. After that, a new arrangement was made to separate commercial and investment 
banking (Bilen 2000b, 31 ). 
76 Harun Gilrek, "Parayt Veren Bankay1 A9ar", Milliyet, 29 May 1998. 
It was argued that charging for bank licences would discourage some conglomerates 
from entering banking. In addition, Taner announced that the full state guarantee on deposits 
would be removed. This was expected to discourage especially small-to-medium scale banks 
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As a result, seven of the ten new bank licences given by the Treasury in 1998 
were for investment banks (Bilen 2000a, 65). In this process, some non-bank 
conglomerates such as Okan, Nurol, Diler and <;ahk Groups entered FC for the first 
time while some conglomerates that already owned commercial banks, GSD,77 Siizer 
and Toprak Groups, also built investment banks. Table 4.10 shows the seven 
investment banks established during this period. Consequently, in 1"998, the number 
of banks rose to 81 and in the process almost all media owners also became owners of 
one or more banks. 78 
Table 4.10 Investment banks established in 1998 and 1999 
Investment Bank Conglomerate 
Okan Investment Bank Okan 
Nurol Investment Bank Nurol 
Diler Investment Bank Diler 
, <;:ahk Investment Bank <;:ahk 
GSD Investment Bank GSD 
Siizer Investment Bank * SOzer 
Toprak Investment Bank Toprak 
*It was renamed Atlas Investment Bank in 1999. 
A closer look at the underlying forces that led to the establishment of these 
investment banks reveals information consistent with the thesis' conglomerate 
analysis of Turkish banking. 
During the period in which the Treasury discouraged commercial bank 
establishments, conglomerates viewed investment banking as a first step to enter 
banking since investment banks could be later converted into deposit banks (Hatisaru 
1998, 60). The Treasury had a more positive attitude for investment bank 
establishments since these banks were contributing to the development of financial 
markets. In addition, they were creating their funds from domestic and international 
investment banks and international institutions instead of deposit collection. 
from deposit banking. While these banks opposed the removal of the full insurance scheme, 
large banks supported it ("Bankacthk Sektoriinde Biiyiik Sok", Finansal Forum, 2 June 1998). 
77 The General Director of GSD Holding, Ferruh Tanay, stated that the Treasury gave 
an investment bank licence to GSD Holding because of its shareholder structure as well as its 
export volume (Uygun 1998, 38). The Holding then had 96 textile producers as shareholders. 
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Investment banks were also desired by conglomerates since these banks were able to 
perform most of the financial activities of deposit banks, including operating in 
money and FX markets, undertaking treasury transactions and leasing. The only 
function that they could not fulfil was deposit collection. Furthermore, investment 
banks were exempted from some legal liabilities such as a required reserve ratio, 
precisely because they did not collect deposits. Additionally, while commercial banks 
could only extend credit in proportion to their capital, there was no such limit for 
investment banks (Hatisaru 1998, 61 ). 
Ozdemir and Tiirker (1999) provide a clear account of the determinants which 
led conglomerates 'consciously' to establish these investment banks. They point out 
that the Capital Market Board prohibited banks from conducting capital market 
intermediary activities (pursuant to Decision no. 3, dated 15/8/1996). Because of this 
decision, banks were compelled to establish separate brokerage institutions so that 
they could deal with these activities. The regulations of this decision were arranged 
with another Board decision numbered 1996/35. Even though this decision was 
eventuaJly cancelled by the Council of State on November 3 1998, in the meantime, 
the banks that wanted to undertake capital-market-intermediary activities had already 
become partners in established brokerage institutions, or established their own legally 
distinct brokerage companies. As of July 2000, 46 of the 131 brokerage institutions 
that worked in the Istanbul Stock Exchange belonged to banks (Bilen 2000a, 67). 
Ozdemir and Tiirker (1999, 36) affirm that investment banking lost its former 
attraction once capital market transactions had composed a large part of investment 
banks' operations and the Capital Market Board had made its decision.79 
Hence, the question of why these conglomerates still sought to obtain 
investment bank licences would appear to be critical. This pursuit of an investment 
bank licence is also ambiguous since Turkey has been. a country with a volatile 
macroeconomic environment, in which it has been difficult to raise and place long-
term funds. Ozdemir and Tiirker (1999, 38) draw attention to the fact that although 
investment banks could be used as a first step to enter banking, there had not yet been 
78 Banu Salman, "Tllrkiye Banka Cenneti", Cumhuriyet, 12 October 1998. 
79 For the complaints by investment banks about the restriction on capital market 
intermediary activities see Mehmet Ali Kantarc1, "Yatmm Bankalan Uygulama Sa~lam", 
Diinya, 25 May 1999. 
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many examples of this tendency (indeed, the only example of this was EGS Bank).80 
Hence, they argue, the main reason for the establishments of these investment banks 
was actually to benefit from reciprocal transactions between their legally distinct 
subsidiary banks. This provided two advantages. Firstly, by being exempted from the 
crucial limitations of banking law arranging credit and equity share relations between 
banks and their conglomerates,81 having an investment bank as the second bank of the 
conglomerate offered important advantages. For example, deposits collected by the 
deposit bank could be transferred to the investment bank with the aim of being placed 
as group credits and/or for equity holdings by getting rid of legal restrictions on 
deposit banks. 
Secondly, having both deposit and investment banks made it possible to 
relocate non-performing credits and other negative items of one bank's balance sheet 
to another bank (or 'balance sheet-make-up'. Finally, the authors draw attention to the 
possibility of this misuse not only within the same conglomerate but also among 
different conglomerates on the ground of a 'gentlemen's - agreement' (Ozdemir & 
Tiirker 1999, 39). However, as the restructuring of banking occurred so soon after the 
establishment of these investment banks, it is probable that these banks were of little 
use for conglomerate expansion. 
While new conglomerates continually entered banking in the post-1980 
period, exit from the system was highly rigid. The Banks Act 82 was biased against 
direct liquidations of weak banks so that risky banks continued operation. According 
to clause 64, regulating measures for banks in financial trouble after their 
'supervision', those banks were to be merged with or transferred to another bank, 
generally a state bank as it mostly happened in practice. 
The more solid banks criticised this rigidity in the elimination of weak banks 
since their existence in the system was in conflict with full competition. This situation 
With a new communique by CMB no. V/46 and issued in Official Gazette dated 
7.9.2000 and no. 24163, the disadvantageous position of development/investment banks was 
eliminated and they regained their function for capital market activities (Bilen 2000b, 32). 
80 Ismal Canseven, General Director of EGS Bank, (Sava~ 1997, 84-85) indicated that 
the reason for applying to the Treasury for a commercial banking license was that the 
investment banking operations of EGS Bank could not meet the wider banking service needs 
of the bank's 500 shareholders who were the customers of the bank. ln addition, Canseven 
noted that the decision of Capital Market Board made investment banks fully dysfunctional at 
that period. 
L 
81 For the list of these exemptions see Ozdemir and Tiirker (1999). 
82 No.3182 (25.4.1985). 
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would also serve to bias mergers in favour of weak banks rather than in favour of 
global mergers and hence global competitiveness. 83 
In response to this pressure, in 1993, with the amendments in Banks Act 
No.3182, this rigidity was removed and exit from banking became viable. 
Altematifbank General Director <;etin Hacaloglu supported the change by stressing 
that it would encourage banks to work more rationally. 84 However, in practice, Clause 
64 interventions had ceased to have any meaning. The govermnent did not get 
shareholders to improve the balance sheets of their banks. While ailing banks which 
were under Clause 64 had distinct advantages such as being absolved from reserve 
requirements, the more viable banks continuously complained about this 
implementation (see Euromoney 1998a). These factors then set the scene for the dawn 
of the banking reform period. The conglomerates that formed FC at this time are 
shown in Table 4.11. 
83 See the statements by General Director of Akbank, Hamit Belli and General 
Director ofi~bank, Una! Kiiriik~ii in Bankaczlar Dergisi (1993, 19). 
84 
"Kamu Bankalan Bir An Once Ozelle~tirilmelidir", Diinya, 21 September 1993. 
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Table4.11 Holding banks and owner conglomerates (1998) 
Conglomerate Bank 
I~bank !~bank, Smai Yat.Bank, Tiirkiye Smai Kalkmma.Bank 
SabanCI Akbank 
Dogu~ Garanti Bank, Ktirfezbank, Osmanh Bank 
Ko9 Ko9bank 
<;olakoglu TEB 
Tekfen Tekfenbank 
OYAK Oyakbank 
. 
Anadolu Endustri Altematitbank 
Zorlu Denizbank 
Ba~aran Anadolubank 
Fiba Finansbank, Fiba Bank 
GSD Tekstilbank, GSD Investment Bank 
Dogan D1~bank 
MNG MNGBank 
c;nkurova YKB, Parnukbank 
Zeytinoglu Esbank 
Toprak Toprakbank, Toprak Investment Bank 
Siizer Kentbank, Atlas Investment Bank 
Korkmaz Yigit Bank Ekspres 
Garipoglu Siimerbank 
Rurneli Imarbank, Adabank 
Ya~ar Ya~arbank 
Cmgllhoglu Demirbank, Ulusal Bank 
A vrupa ve Amerika Iktisat Bank 
EGS EGSBank 
Balkaner Yurtbank 
Siirmeli Site bank 
MedyaSabab Etibank 
Baymdrr Baymdrrbank 
:;>evket Demirel Egebank 
Nergis Interbank 
Okan Okan Investment Bank 
<;ahk <;ahk Investment Bank 
Diler Diler Investment Bank 
Tathc1 Tat Investment Bank 
Nurol Nurol Investment Bank 
Karamehmet Park Investment Bank 
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This list shows an impossibly large number of banks and bank reform would 
inevitably see the list contracted. The critical issue was: which banks would survive 
and which would not? 
4.5.3 Legislative Amendments on Banks' Connected Lending and Equity 
Participations 
The penetration of conglomerates into banking through the use of the above-
indicated various mechanisms was accompanied by legislative amendments designed 
to restrict holding banking. 
Banking laws were re-amended so as to place further limitations on banks' 
party-related credits and equity holdings in 1979, 1983 and 1993. However, lax 
supervision of these limits, permission for new bank establishments during the 
deregulation process, and the cdntinual pursuit by conglomerates to have their own 
banks led to a further rise in holding banking in the post-1980 era. 
Upon the diffusion of holding banking, the first legislative change that 
restricted holding banking was made in 1979. A special decree imposed ceilings on 
connected lending and equity holdmgs (see Turkish Government 1979, 23-24, 30-31). 
85 According to the decree, the grand total of capital to be assigned by banks to their 
participations could not exceed 10% of their total paid up capital (clause 47).86 Also, 
total credits to participations could not exceed 20 % of the bank's total paid up 
capital. Yet the previous legislation allowed unlimited credits to participations 
provided they operate in the sectors indicated in armual programs of the development 
plan. This exemption had led banks to allocate credits much higher than this 20% 
limit (Uras 1982, 18). Therefore, with the new legislation, banks could open credit to 
those participations up to 15 % of the total cash credits they opened the previous year 
85 Decree law no.28 (31.8.1979), modifying the relevant clauses of Act no.7129 
(23.6.1958). 
Accorrung to the general reasoning of the amendment, the policy objective was to 
prevent the use of bank resources by certain capitals via the bank acquisition. The diffusion of 
bank ownership was expected to preclude concentration of capital in the same hands 
(T~y!O~lu 1998, 90). 
86 Yet those operating in sectors indicated in annual programs of the development 
plan, the partnerships founded by a special law, developments and investments banks and the 
subsidiaries of state banks could be participated by banks without any limit. 
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or up to 3 times of their total paid up capital (clause 39). 87 However, these limitations 
could not stop holding banking and as mentioned above, some small and local banks 
were taken over by conglomerates in the early I 980s. 
The second change to restrict party-related bank transactions was made via a 
new decree in 1983. 88 With this decree, the binary division in equity participations 
allowing more equity holdings in selected sectors was ended and the total capital to be 
assigned by banks to participations was limited by the bank's own funds (clause 47-
1). Also, credits to participations could not exceed three-fold the bank's own funds 
and 15% of total credits (clause 39). This clause also widened the definition of 'bank 
participation' in order to further limit holding banking. 89 According to the reasoning 
of the decree, this clause aimed at converting banks to institutions providing credits to 
wider sectors rather than fmancing their own participations (Reisoglu 1983, 38). 90 
The conflicts within capital over the allocation of financial resources paved the 
way for this legislative change. Conflicts arose between conglomerates which had 
been able to integrate with international capital (due to neo-liberal policies) and those 
capitals which had not, especially on interest and exchange rate policies of the period 
(Ercan 1998, 4 7). After the liberalisation of interest rates in 1980, due to rising fund 
costs, holding banks increasingly tended not to give credits beyond their groups' 
companies. This led some other groups in search of lines of credit to acquire local 
banks and convert them to national banks. Other smaller groups as well as small-to-
medium scale enterprises (SMEs) that had limited access to bank credits resorted to 
accessing brokerage firms' credit at higher interest rates. These high rates of interests, 
in turn, led to the bankruptcy of many SMEs when sharp reductions in inflation rate 
and demand contraction reduced the debt servicing capacity of the firms. Hence, 
87 Bank participation was defined as a partnership where a bank owned at least 20% 
of the ca,P,ital. · 
8 With this decree (no. 70 (22.7.1983)), the Banks Act no.7129 was abandoned. The 
decree was converted to a law with the Banks Act no.3182 (2.5 .)985) with some 
modifications. 
89 It decreased the minimum share in capital to 15% from 20% in the defmition of 
participation. Moreover, the companies of which at least 25% of the capital was separately or 
collectively owned by those bank participations, as well as other natural or legal persons 
under guarantee of the participations were included in these credit limits on participations. 
90 Ta~910glu (1998, 109) describes the general reasoning of the decree as follows: 
'The ownership and management in a majority of private banks were concentrated in certain 
hands. As a result, these banks have lost their neutrality; by digressing ... from banking 
principles, they have been operating according to the objectives of the ones who have their 
~ 
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limitations on the party-related credits of banks needed to be enhanced ( Cumhuriyet 
Donemi Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi 1983, 172). 
However, despite the new restrictions on connected lending and equity 
holdings, the 1980s witnessed the forging of closer links between banks and 
conglomerates via two channels. Firstly, the conglomerates in which money capital 
was dominant further expanded their activities to industry and· service sectors. 
Secondly, other non-banking conglomerates added money capital to their circuits via 
acquisitions of banks. i~bank and <;ukurova Groups serve as examples of the former 
(Sonmez 1992b, 160). According to Kazgan (1985, 2405, 2407), the need for these 
groups which oriented towards export to own trade-finance banks contributed to this 
cohesion of banking and industrial capital. She also notes that this cohesion was 
facilitated by the takeovers of bankrupted companies following 1980-stabi!isation 
measures. 
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Nevertheless, the rising equity participations of banks 92 in response to the 
growing non-performing credits of debtor firms in the 1980s became a problem for 
the sector. This increase in banks' equity holdings was indeed facilitated by legislative 
changes which allowed banks to participate in debtor corporate firms by being 
exempted from the limitations on equity holdings in banking Jaw. 93 As a result, in 
1989, the 'free capital' 94 of the banking sector became negative for the first time 
(Ada 1993, 86). Therefore, at the Third jzmir Economic Congress (4-7 June 1992), the 
banking working group, composed of executives from different banks and 
ownership and management. This situation has created significant mismanagement and abuse 
in some banks'. 
91 After 1980, many companies that could not adapt to high interest and exchange 
rates went bankrupt. For example, between 1985 and 1987 the number of those bankrupted 
companies was around 623 (Iktisat 1990a, 34). The firms that had limited funds, worked with 
bank credits and could not adjust their domestically-oriented activities towards external 
markets were the first to be eliminated. These eliminations were realised mainly through 
transfers to the creditor banks or sales to other holding companies (Siinmez 1992b, 153). As a 
result, the restructuring in the accumulation regime contributed to the rising concentration and 
centralisation of capital. 
92 In the work of Ada (1993, 85-86), using data from 14 private and state banks that 
had the largest credit, deposit and asset size in the sector, the average ratio of equity 
participations and ftxed assets to total bank assets is indicated as 3% in the 1980-82 period, 
4.5% in the 1982-87 period and 7-8% in the 1988-90period. 
93 The law .no. 3332 (31.3.1987). This law also included some incentives to encourage 
the sale of the equity holdings which were driven by the non-performing credit-problem (Ada 
1993, 90). 
~ 
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government officials, contended that equity participations in various sectors had 
become a burden for banking: 
Most of the funds placed in participations can not bring enough profit. .. To make 
banks allocate more resources for banking activities, the new banking law draft 
proposes a reduction in the ratio between banks' own funds and participations .... 
Though some banks want to sell off their participations, the stagnation in the stock 
exchange as well as the large size of some of these participations have slowed down 
this tendency. (SPO 1993, 36) 
Banks needed to sen off equity participations to strengthen capital structures in 
the face of rising global competition, in particular by the single European market. 95 
This necessity for a stronger capital structure prompted the state to introduce several 
measures which also led banks to reduce their equity participations and non-
performing credits. The arrangements which increased the minimum capital 
requirement and CAR as wen as required banks to disclose their bad loans and set 
aside adequate provisions accelerated the sale of equity holdings in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.96 
In such a conjuncture, the amendments to the Banks Act in 1993 (Turkish 
Government 1993) imposed even stricter limitations on banks' party-related credits 
and equity shares. The share. that banks might acquire of a company other than 
financial institutions was capped at a maximum of 15% of their own funds. In 
addition, the total amount of such shares was not permitted to exceed 60% of the 
bank's own funds instead of the previous bank's own funds-upper limit. The total 
credits to participations were also restricted to up to two-fold of a bank's own funds, 
and in any case, 10% of the total sum of credits 97 contrary to the previous three-fold 
94 Free capital is calculated by extracting equity participations (affiliates and 
subsidiaries) and fixed assets from banks' own funds and shows the funds that could be 
allocated for banking activities. 
95 See the statements by bankers from Akbank and Turkey. Development Bank in 
Okur (1993, 45) andlktisat (1990a, 19). 
96 CAR was put into effect to induce banks to keep enough capital with respect to the 
riskiness of their assets in line with the Basle standards of the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS) (for related arrangements see Akkurt et al. 1992, 21; Erdem 1993, 161,179). 
The classification and provisioning of non-performing loans, which were at the discretion of 
the banks which had any legal obligations in the 1982-83 period, were strictly arranged in 
accordance with international practices in adherence to the decrees dated December 1985 and 
May 1988. Hence, while only 18% of the past due loans were covered by provisions in 1986, 
this ratio increased to 70.3% in 1990 (Akkurt et al. 1992, 23-25). 
97 The following decree no.538 (22.6.1994), revising the banking regulations as part of 
the April 5, 1994 economic stability package, kept only the limit of 'up to two fold of the 
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and 15% limit respectively. Credits to bank-shareholders were restricted further, as 
well. 98 
The then State Minister Y!ldmm Aktuna evaluated the changes to the Banks 
Act as bringing European standards to banking and indicated that the adjustment 
process would be completed by 1999.99 The banking law in 1993 did synchronise the 
restrictions on banks' non-financial equity participations with the EU in the same year 
that the EU put in force equal limitations on its member countries (with a ten-year 
adjustment period). 100 Selyuk Demiralp, General Director of the Bank and Foreign 
Exchange Directorate of the Treasury, considered that the restrictions on banks' 
equity holdings and connected lending would prevent banks from financing their 
participations since banks were channelling funds collected from the public to their 
participations (Uzman Gozuyle Bankaczlzk 1994, 58). 
The legislative change was expected to accelerate the sale of equity holdings-
a change which was initiated well before by some banks such as i~bank to strengthen 
bank's own funds. 101 Furthermore, the changes to corporate tax Jaw allowed banks to 
add revenue from the sale of equity participations to their capital without being taxed 
(TOBB 1996, 85). Therefore, it was not surprising that the new restrictions on banks' 
party-related credits and equity participations were evaluated by some banks 
positively. For instance, Hamit Belli, the General Director of Akbank, argued that 
these changes would make the sector stronger and consistent with the EU standards. 102 
The banks had to bring their ratios in line with the new legal limits in two years. As a 
result, the ratio of equity participations to total actives which was 
2.9% in 1980 decreased from its peak of 3.2% in 1989 and 1990 to 2.7% in 1991, 
2.3% in 1992 and to 1.7% in 1993 (Y1ldmm & Altun 1994, 80). The downward trend 
also continued in 1994 and 1995 with the ratios ofl.7% and 1.5% respectively (TOBB 
bank's own funds' and excluded '10% of total sum of credits' limit (see Turkish Government 
1994, 46). 
98 According to clause 4 I, total credits that may be exten.ded to bank shareholders 
holding I 0% or more of the capital or to natural or legal persons having an indirect credit 
relation with them were limited half of the own funds of the bank. The limit was previously 
up to total bank own funds and in any case, 5% of total credits. 
99 
"Bankac1hga AT Normu", DUnya, 28 August 1993. 
100 For the related regulation in the EU, see AB Danl:jmanlzk ve Yatmm Hizmetleri AS 
(2001). . . 
101 "~ Bankas1, 3.4 Trilyon Lirahki~tirak:le Birinci", DUnya, 28 August 1993. 
102 NilgUn Karata~, "Bankalar Degi~iklikten Memnun", Diinya, 24 August 1993. 
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1996, 85). The Banks Association of Turkey pointed out the reason for the downward 
trend in equity participations in the post 1980 era as follows: 
After 1980, banks' equity participations were not profitable any longer due to the 
high fund-costs and thus, banks started to sell off their equity participations. This 
tendency was accelerated by the increase in the prices of the equity holdings 
following the opening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 103 Therefore, the share of 
equity participations in permanent assets decreased to 5 percent in.1997. [However,] 
banks' equity participations in financial institutions increased in the recent years. 
(BAT 1998, 28-29) 
Although banks started to sell off their non-financial equity holdings, they 
increased their financial participations. Banks tended to establish their own leasing, 
factoring, brokerage and insurance companies with the encouraging legislative 
changes and increasingly became financial holdings throughout the 1990s. The IMF 
notes this structure as the following: 
Deposit money banks [DMBs] are typically not permitted to engage in such non-
banking fmancial services such as insurance, factoring, leasing, investment banking, 
and brokerage activities. However, most banks are within a holding company that 
includes companies engaged in such activities, as well as nonfmancial institutions . 
... The banking sector is concentrated, with the largest ten banks accounting for 70 
percent of total assets (p.ll9). 
Private DMBs are typically part of larger holding companies encompassing other 
financial and nonfinancial entities, giving rise . both to connected lending and the 
ability of banks to tap the financial resources of the holding company. Most of 
Turkey's insurance companies, brokerage firms, and leasing companies are affiliated 
with banks through such holding companies. (IMF 1998, 122) 
In 1993, when a bank's equity participation to a company was restricted to a 
limit of 15% of bank's own funds, participations in financial institutions were 
exempted from this limitation. ~engiil (1993, 12-13), an inspector in the Capital 
Market Board, pointed out that this development would encourage banks to become 
financial holdings. This prediction by ~engiil became real as banks established their 
own leasing, factoring, brokerage and insurance companies in the 1990s under legal 
incentives.104 
The decrease in the ratio of equity participations to bank assets in the 1990s 
does not refute the argument of this thesis which is the continuous rise of holding 
103 See Akkurt et al. (1992, 20). 
104 See Ozeroglu (2000) and ~engiil (1993) for the legal incentives. 
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banking in Turkey during that decade. The decrease in this ratio must be traced 
separately for the two groups of banks that appeared within banking in the 1990s. 
Importantly, a division within FC started to emerge as one part of FC gradually 
restructured itself in line with state regulations bringing European banking standards 
and aiming to convert banks to independent profit-making units within holding 
structures. These conglomerates were aware of the unsustainability Of using banks as 
their easiest and biggest source of profit under the pressures of global accumulation 
forcing the elimination of state protectionism. However, another part of FC, mostly 
the rising conglomerates of the 1980s and 1990s, continued to use their banks to 
finance their aggressive expansion policies and this stance resulted in the confiscation 
of their banks during the restructuring of the banking sector. 
4.5.4 The Internationalisation of Turkish Banking: Expansion of the 
Integration of Banking and Industrial Capital to the Global Scale 
The intemationalisation of Turkish banking also started to speed up after 1980, 
accompanying the external orientation in accumulation. While some Turkish banks 
had agencies abroad over a long period, 105 after the mid-1980s foreign branches, 
corporate banks with foreign capital and wholly Turkish capital banks formed the 
channels for the international expansion (Sonmez 1992a, 78). For example, 
Parnukbank of <;:ukurova Holding bought Bank Kreiss in Germany in 1987, the first 
important banking initiative abroad. Sabanc1 Group also established Akcintemational 
in London in 1987. Iktisat Bank of the Avrupa ve Amerika Group bought a 70% share 
in Banque Intemationale de Commerce in France in 1989 as the first Turkish bank 
building a joint venture abroad. Consequently, at the end of 1990, there were 18 
foreign branches of the Turkish banks in total and seven banks were the owner or the 
partner of a foreign bank abroad (Sonmez 1992b, -40). 106 This process displayed two 
main characteristics: almost all of the direct investments were realised by five main 
conglomerates and two geographical regions, Europe (especially Germany) and North 
Cyprus, accounted for almost three-quarters of the total overseas banking investments 
(Ekren 1996, 5). These overseas banks/branches aimed to sell banking services to 
105 4bank was the first Turkish bank that had an overseas branch in 1932 (Kocaba~oglu 
et al. 200 I, 549). 
Ill< For the list ofthe overseas banks established at that period see Ekren (1996, 6-7). 
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Turkish firms seeking to expand abroad, enter the European markets and collect 
deposits from Turkish communities living in those European cities. 
The attraction of free-entry and operation in the EU before the year of 1993, in 
which the European Single Market would start to be implemented, accelerated the 
international banking activities of Turkish banks in the early 1990s. In 1993, bank 
establishments and participations in existent banks would become subject to a 
permission procedure on the basis of the reciprocity principle (Erdem 1993, 158). The 
international expansion of Turkish banks continued throughout the 1990s and over a 
wider geographical area. Former Soviet Bloc countries, especially Turkish speaking 
CIS countries and East European countries, had priority by assisting international 
productive and commercial expansions of their owner conglomerates. 
Although the international expansion of Turkish banks after 1980 reflected the 
degree of concentration in the sector, a pre-condition for internationalisation (Sa)'llgan 
1999, 83), the insufficient level of capital still hindered progress. To overcome this, in 
the early 1990s, some private banks and state banks established joint venture banks 
abroad. 107 Hence, as of 1999, the number of financial participations of Turkish banks 
increased to 91 and the number of overseas branches also reached 48 (Akgiio;: 2000, 
7). 
Crucially, throughout the 1990s, almost all private banks opened their off-
shore banking units in countries offering tax advantages such as Ireland, Malta, the 
Cayman Islands, Bahrain, Luxemburg and North Cyprus. One of the fundamental 
reasons that made off-shore banking attractive for the banks was the ability to avoid 
some legal obligations that increased costs of credit allocation and deposit collection, 
such as the Required Reserve Holding. In conjunction with this, channelling revenues 
of group companies to off-shore banking units and using these funds as foreign credits 
by avoiding their legal responsibilities was a lucrative strategy for conglomerates 
(Finans Dunyasz 1999, 96). Furthermore, in many cases, off-shore banking units were 
used as a means of bank embezzlement which resulted in with the confiscation of 
banks by the state during banking reform. 
107 For instance·, Banque de Bosphore was established by Ernlak Bank, Bank Worms, 
Finansbank and Vakiflar Bank in France in 1991; Demir-Halkbank (Netherland) N.Y. was 
also built by Demirbank and Halk Bank in the Netherlands in 1992 (Ekonomi-Politika 1993, · 
77). 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The development of a national banking sector and the building of close links 
between banking and industrial/commercial capital under a state guidance have 
enhanced capital accumulation in Turkey. During the lSI period, a limited number of 
family conglomerates established control over the domestic circuit of capital by 
organising themselves in the form of holding companies. In this process, the 
proliferation of holding banking accelerated those individual capitals' conversion 
from commercial to industrial capital. These conglomerates, together with newcomer 
ones, continued to be sheltered by their participation in finance during the trade and 
fmancial 'liberalisation' of the post-1980 era, as the state socialised the costs/risks of 
their outward orientation. In this period, the control over banking capital was a crucial 
determinant in t~s of which parts of capital would solidify their positions within 
Turkish capital during its restructuring, 
This chapter provided a concise account of the development of FC in Turkey 
with a specific emphasis on its banking arm. This gives a solid ground for the analysis 
of banking reform with a FC approach in later chapters. Crucially, the analysis 
permits further insight into which conglomerates established control over banking 
capital, through which mechanisms, and at which stages of their developments. As 
will be addressed in Chapters 6 to 8, the differences/similarities in this respect are one 
of the determinants of the divisions within FC. 
It will be seen that banking reform has become a means by which the relations 
between banking and industry were reconfigured for a global economy under the 
supervision of the state and the IMF. As a result, banking reform brought about the 
decline of the old structure of holding banking - a process that was key in fosteriilg 
capital accumulation for FC for over a half-century in Turkey. 
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5.1 Introduction 
I do not know what kind of a Turkish model 
Dervi~ [State Minister J and others are struggling 
for. Do they have a model? Or are they just 
pruning the country? 
(Giingor Uras, Milliyet, 21 Jurte 2002) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, banking reform is predominantly addressed in 
terms of restoring macroeconomic balances and eliminating state-based distortions in 
the Turkish economy. It is argued that this will allow efficient allocation of financial 
resources so that the economy will return to growth path. 
However, the reform has much wider ramifications than this; it has served to 
restructure Turkish capital. As will be discussed in the rest of the thesis, the driving 
agenda in the Turkish banking reform should be seen as a class process having 
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transforming effects on fractions of capital rather than just increasing the soundness 
and supervision of banking or rebuilding macroeconomic balances in the economy. 
The latter interpretation, which is widely held, gives the impression that the process of 
restructuring was a matter of the implementation of 'rational', 'pro-market' policy and 
that the outcome of the process of restructuring is a more rational and efficient 
macroeconomy. This is at odds with the analysis that follows, which shows the 
formation of policy as a product of class and class fractional conflicting interests, in 
which a single 'rationality' does not exist. This class approach explains reform as an 
attempt by the state, with the support of the IMF, to reorganise Turkey's capitalist 
class and give it an international orientation. 
The idea of the pursuit of efficiency in banking is at odds with conglomerate 
analysis: that banks and productive capital are the same. Perhaps it is more that there 
is a structural conflict - and needs to be posed this way. Throughout the 1990s, 
productive/commercial capital was· in conflict with banking capital. While limited 
access and high costs of bank credits put the former in a disadvantageous position, 
banks participated in state debt finance at high rates of interest and hence with large 
implicit rents (subsidies). This became a conduit in the redistribution of surplus value 
towards conglomerates that owned the banks as well as other large scale capital: a 
process I will shortly term 'finance protectionism'. Furthermore, tensions within FC 
intensified in the mid-1990s and its two main divisions started to develop on the basis 
of their different relations to these state-based financial rents. 
While state borrowing policy served to secure rents for FC, the state's 
financial viability was coming under challenge in the late 1990s because of its 
unsustainable debt burden. This would hinder the continuity of capital accumulation 
and meant that Turkey was going to become a 'basket case'. Furthermore, state 
insolvency created a systemic risk for international finance markets. It was under 
these circumstances that the IMF was called in to help resolve an imminent financial 
CnSIS. 
Consequently, under the close surveillance of the IMF, reforms in banking 
and in state borrowing policy were introduced. These reforms, which were backed by 
the authority of the IMF, were the means by which the government could restructure 
the finance sector to make it viable. But it also signalled the gradual end of rents to 
banks via public borrowing. Given the dependence of banking in particular, and FC in 
general on these implicit subsidies, the question of which banks would remain viable, 
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and how they would have to amend their patterns of accumulation to secure viability, 
became a central question. Herein is the basis of a fundamental conflict between 
different parts of capital in Turkey, as that class faced the need to accumulate without 
extensive state subsidies. 
This chapter is an introduction to reading the Turkish banking reform as a 
class process. The aim of this chapter is to prepare the ground for the analysis of the 
divisions within FC as the main fractional focus of the thesis which will be analysed 
in the following chapters. Hence, in this chapter, the broader tensions within capital, 
including the tensions between productive/commercial capital and banking capital 
will be discussed at a general level. 
To this end, this chapter first presents a new periodisation of economic change 
in the discussion of the post-1980 period in Turkey. Then, what drove the reform of 
banking and thus the breakdown of protectionism for FC will be discussed. In 
particular, five main points will be addressed. First, the blockage in the capital 
accumulation regime and the stances of the IMF and the state on this issue will be 
addressed. Second, the fear of a crisis of 'systemic risk' for international finance 
markets will be stressed as a motivating factor for the IMF (and international banks) 
to push the restructuring of Turkish banking. After the exploration of the justification 
by the IMF and the Government for the breakdown of implicit subsidies to FC, 
conflicting demands by business associations for the change (reflecting the broader 
conflicts within capital) will be addressed as the third issue. The chapter will proceed 
with an emphasis on labour as the final bearer of the cost of the reorganisation of 
capital. Lastly, the chapter will address the reconfiguration of holding banking as a 
mechanism for the reorganisation of capital in Turkey. 
5.2 A New Periodisation of Economic Change 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the high integration of finance and industrial 
capital is a historical legacy of Turkey. This issue, it will be seen, is of great 
importance in explaining the distinctive periodisation of economic change in Turkey. 
A standard textbook analysis of a developing country such as Turkey would 
point to a period of import substituting industrialisation (industry protection) 
followed, at different times in different countries, by the realisation of the gains from 
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trade and so a shift to export-led-growth. In many cases, this has involved export 
subsidies (export protection). 
In Turkey, specifically, the integration of finance and industrial capital 
accelerated under the state guidance during the lSI policy of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Development plans in line with import substitution built a domestically oriented 
capital accumulation regime which was based on the domestic complementarity of 
finance and industry. Banks, as financial arms of conglomerates, exploited the 
preferential and cheap credit mechanism of the lSI to channel funds to 'in-house' 
industry. 
After 1980, trade and financial liberalisation of the economy · saw the 
loosening of restrictions on new bank establishments. In this context, the fusion of 
money and industrial capital gained a further momentum as many other 
conglomerates sought to include banking to their capital circuits. 
The conventional wisdom posits, in broad terms, a Turkish economy that 
shifted in the early 1980s from the lSI to export promotion. This is posed as the shift 
from protectionism to open and free markets. Yet, when developments in finance are 
addressed along with trade and industry policy, it is apparent that this shift did not 
generate an export-oriented, free market economy. Those parts of capital protected , 
under the lSI remained protected throughout in tiie era of export promotion, but 
through policies of financial protectionism rather than trade protectionism. 1 
Finance protectionism refers to the process in which the Turkish state 
borrowed at inflated (above commercial) interest rates, ensuring profitability to the 
banks purchasing government bonds. Moreover, this involved more than subsidies to 
banks per se. This was the process, as addressed in Chapter 4, where, during the post-
1980 restructuring, conglomerates that were expanding internationally and/or 
domestically. found a shelter in the finance sphere as they acquired needed money 
capital through their bank ownership. In other words, there were systematic means by 
1 Deputy Chairman of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey 
(TOBB) Ali Osman Ulusoy colourfully indicated the state protectionism for Turkish capital as 
follows: 'Between 1983 and 1998, abnormal amounts of money were earned in this country. 
No one can earn that much money even if he or she works for 100 years in this country. In 
1983, the markets were opened up and some people benefited from this excessively. I do not 
think anyone can earn that much money anymore' ("TOBB Deputy Chairman: Turkey 
Getting Better", Turkish Daily News, 2 August 1999, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old · editions/08 02 99/econ.htm). 
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which finance protectionism ensured the protection of wider conglomerates via their 
privileged access to credit. 
Since the mid-1980s, especially the 1989 external financialliberalisation, the 
banking sector became the main beneficiary of state borrowing policy. The sector 
heavily purchased high-yielding government securities. Since almost all of the 
Turkish private commercial banks have been part of corporate conglomerates with 
some industrial-trade bases, the banks channelled money capital derived from state 
debt fmance to expand their conglomerates. Therefore, while mainly small-to-medium 
scale productive capitalists were increasingly excluded from the credit system, banks 
provided a kind of protection for their holdings' activities.2 Intra-group credit 
channelling, exceeding legal limits/ created such a situation that 'no-one [dared] to 
reveal the true account of how much money the shareholders have taken out of their 
banks and which ministers lived with the knowledge of this' (Euromoney 1998a). 
In addition to industrial firms belonging to large holdings incorporating banks, 
other industrial firms with better liquid positions have also benefited by purchasing 
lucrative government paper. As one journalist put it, 'the country's top 500 companies 
made more money from government paper than they did from manufacturing'. 4 As an 
insider, the following statement by ibrahim Betil, an experienced banker and founder 
of Bank Ekspres, strikingly reveals the nature of state protectionism: 
Unfortunately, the full insurance scheme for deposits still continues and I do not find it 
appropriate. If the state guarantee is diminished, softened, and competition among 
banks becomes higher, there will be more different developments. In Turkey, the media 
and banking sectors are heavily protected by the state. For the last decade, every 
holding [company] has tried to have its own bank, newspaper, TV channel and lastly 
powerhouse. Economic activities in Turkey are still controlled by the state. A free 
market economy is not being experienced. (cited in ~ener & Atam 1998, 39) 
2 The IMF (200la, 12) indicated the high concentration of bank loans as follows: 
'Turkish banks have relatively small loan portfolios ... Loan concentration is very high with 
only some 5,000 borrowers (0.1 percent of all borrowers) counting for nearly 40 percent of 
total loan value. This is a reflection of a traditional heavy concentration of lending to related 
group companies, a practice that the authorities are seeking to correct through legal and 
regulatory means'. 
3 While some conglomerates benefited from their banks' funds under legal limits, 
some others had limit-exceeding practices despite the restrictions on party-related transactions 
of banks. To this end, various mechanisms were used such as back-to-back credits between 
banks, off-shore banking, and credit allocation to fictitious companies under lax supervision 
of banking. 
4 Leyla Boultan, Financial Times, 20 November 2000. 
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The preceding quotation suggests that the conventional periodisation of 
economic restructuring is misleading. In contrast, I shall employ the following 
alternative. The period between late 1980s and late 1990s will be called 'finance 
protectionism' in Turkey. This focus, it will be shown, reveals a systematic class 
fractional policy by the state - an order that will not be apparent in an analytical 
framework that focuses simply on a policy shift from ISI protectionism to export 
growth that was followed by 'the boom-bust period of hot money flows' (see Table 
5.1). 
Table 5.1 Periodisation of economic change in Turkey (late 1950s-1999) 
A standard periodisation An alternative periodisation 
• lSI (late 1950s-1979) • lSI protectionism (late1950s-1979~ 
• Export-led growth (the 1980s) • Export-based accumulation (1980-88) 
• Boom-bust period of short-term • Finance protectionism (1988-99) 
money flows (the 1990s) 
-- -
The late 1990s has seen a further change in economic direction, with the end 
of finance protectionism and the need to address foil global integration (i.e. 
industrial, commercial and financial integration) and a reliance on less explicit and 
extravagant forms of protection. (This might be called a protection-free period, 
although, as the thesis shows, there really has been a shift towards more subtle forms 
of assistance, and 'free market' remains but a rhetorical label).5 This shift has 
involved a confrontation with the power of capital that thrived under finance 
protectionism, but which was also retarding overall accumulation in Turkey. 
5 As Chapters 9, 10 and 11 will demonstrate, the socialisation of the costs of the 
bank restructuring gives many examples of these more subtle forms of assistance, such as the 
takeovers of the ailing banks to ensure that the sector does not suffer from systemic crisis, 
facilitation of M&As (even though it may transgress 'competitive' markets) and giving 
survivor banks access to their choice of assets of the SDIF banks. That is, the state is 
'constructing', in a very conscious way, a viable banking sector to meet local retail, funding of 
SMEs and global, 'big league' banking. 
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Hence the period of economic change, which has confronted the interests of 
finance protectionism, has centred on the breakdown of holding banks: 
Banks proliferated in Turkey because banking was made very profitable by the 
government's large public sector borrowing requirement, which was satisfied by 
local banks effectively lending at extremely high interest rates and short maturity. 
Over the years many banking licences were issued to unsuitable businessmen by 
corrupt politicians in exchange for favours. Though the future for turkish banking is 
not clear, it seems that their time is coming to an end. (Miinir 2000) 
Given the interconnectedness of banks and industry, any change in the operation 
of banking inevitably had wider ramifications within industrial/commercial capital. 
Critically, the shift away from finance protectionism led not simply to a reliance on 
'market forces', but to a program of reform that explicitly privileged the agenda of 
global integration that is pursued by the most internationalised fraction of Turkish 
capital. This new program is centring on the capacity of large Turkish companies to 
expand internationally and to engage in partnerships with 'non-Turkish' international 
capital. In essence, Turkish banking reform implies restructuring the domestic 
conditions of accumulation for the Turkish bourgeoisie so that it will integrate 
globally and reduce its reliance on state protectionism. 6 
Verifying this, the State Minister Kemal Dervi~ defined a two-stage-
transformation in the Turkish economy. 7 The first transformation he characterised as 
the creation of a competitive industry by stopping the struggle for rent. This I have 
called the end of finance protectionism. The second transformation Dervi~ 
characterised as the adjustment of Turkey to the global economy. Mete B~ol, 
Executive of Bankers Trust of Turkey, explained the accompanying transformation in 
the banking sector dramatically: 
The institutions and individuals living on interest income, persons addicted to interest 
earnings like heroin will falter. Everybody will have to return to their main jobs. In 
the new period, banks have to do banking; supermarkets have to work like 
6 For instance, the following statement by Ko9bank General Director Engin Akcakoca 
indicates the diminishing capacity for banks to secure state protection from meeting 
international standards on profitability: 'Until now, there were not any charges on credit 
cards, we [banks] did not charge any fee, but now we have to do this. We might charge a 
service fee on money transfers and we will start to charge a commission fee on EFT 
[Electronic Fund Transfer]. In the past, the state was replacing customers who benefited from 
paying no fees. Now, all the charges will be paid [by customers]. In other words, we will earn 
money from doing banking' (Diinya, 21 January 2000, emphasis added). 
7 
"Uygarhk AB'nin I9indedir", Cumhuriyet, 24 October 2002. 
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supermarkets. This is not an easy thing to do. Hence, there will be a shaking and 
waving. There is a serious intention for change. (Finans Diinyasz 2000c, 65) 8 
On this basis, we observe a reconfiguration of the dominant fractions of 
capital as internationally integrated industrial capital rather than rent-seeking 
domestic FC. With the changing borrowing policy of the state, banking reform meant 
that the banks and their conglomerates had to give up their easiest and largest source 
of profit. In this context, capital had to reform its accumulation out of reliance on 
domestic finance. For some, that meant getting out of banking altogether. For all, it 
meant the end of a protected domestic market. In this process, large productive 
capitalists should have started to change their source of profit from rent seeking, 
towards industrially and technologically oriented productive activities realised by a 
more globally integrated capitalist class. The effect of finance protectionism had been 
to delay a reorientation towards relative surplus value production through higher 
technology rather than relying basically on the extraction of absolute surplus value or 
the redistribution of surplus value by the state. 
Keynesian analysts cite wrong state policies as the reason for the failure of 
Turkish industrial development in the post-1980 era, and especially in the 1990s, 
when the fmance sector grew at the expense of industrial production and exportation. 
However, a Marxist approach would suggest that absolute surplus value production 
via cheap labour and bad working conditions was being undermined. That is because 
the policy of subsidising profits through first tariffs and then export subsidies went 
down as Tirrkey gradually liberalised its trade regime and integrated with global 
capital. However, relative surplus value production did not grow correspondingly 
because it was easier for companies simply to lend to the state. As a result, there 
developed no systematic agenda to increase labour productivity as the basis for future 
profitability. This brought the Turkish economy to a crisis and the involvement of the 
8 Aclan Acar, Executive of Tansa~, the supermarket arm of Do~ Group, stated that 
the period of earning money from money under high inflationary conditions is over in Turkey. 
By stressing that the retailing sector would earn money through value-added production, he 
added: 'We will earn money from doing business, not from money. Turkey lived a different 
way of life in the last eight-ten years than the one that should have been. This period is over 
anymore. For everybody, a period of more savings, less expenditures and a rational spending 
has just started' ("Aclan Acann 2001 Yth Degerlendirmesi", URL: 
http://www.Dogusholding.com.tr/sayfa.cfm?Manu=I&N0=373&Savfa=Haberler (accessed 
28 November 2002)). 
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IMF in the restructuring of the economy was precisely to generate international 
competitiveness via productivity growth. 
5.3 The IMF as the Catalyst of the Change 
The IMF involvement in the change process has functioned ·as a catalyst and 
an excuse for the Turkish state to undertake a restructuring which, while unpopular 
with many parts of capital, was nonetheless essential for the future of capital in 
Turkey. The IMF permitted the state to undertake a reform process that was self-
evidently necessary, but politically most difficult. 
The IMF had growing concerns: that state debts were becoming unsustainable, 
that accumulation within Turkey was coming under threat, and it feared international 
contagious effects of a financial crisis. 
On this basis, the IMF at once insisted on the necessity of reforming the state 
and banking sector in Turkey. For instance, Stanley Fischer, Vice-President of the 
IMF, stated: 'Turkey has come to the end of the road. It can not go any further with 
this economy. Shock decisions that can redeem the economy should be taken'. Fischer 
stressed that Turkey was on the verge of a potential crisis due to large budget deficits, 
high interest payments and high inflation: 'high interest rate implementation must be 
avoided; the money earned from repos. is coming from the poor's pocket'. 9 The IMF 
was not particularly worried about the poor, 10 but pursued a structural change as the 
necessary corollary of the ending of finance protectionism. 
The 'clearly unsustainable trend in public finances' (IMF 2000c) and the heavy 
dependence between the Treasury and the banking sector on financing government 
borrowing (e.g. IMF 1998, 118, 127) were underlined by the IMF in its evaluations of 
the Turkish economy towards the end of the 1990s.n Accordingly, Willy Kiekens, 
9 
"IMP: Yolun Sonundasm1z Sok Kararlar Aim", Hiirriyet, 20 October 1999. 
10 However, in the context of the Asian crisis, there was widespread criticism of the 
lMF for the effects of its reform packages on the poor. 
11 Yet, the IMP (1998, 118; 2000, 40) evaluated the banking sector in line with neo-
liberal arguments. The Fund stressed that macroeconomic instability, which was mainly 
rooted in government large budget deficits, created 'a difficult environment' for banks and led 
them to shorter-term lending and arbitrage activities. However, thanks to this 'difficult 
environment', as the IMP (2000, 37; 42) confessed, Turkish banks did achieve higher 
profitability than other OECD countries. 
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IMF Turkey Director, 12 indicated that the Turkish economy came to the threshold of 
bankruptcy in the late 1990s and the state domestic debts reached 'unacceptable' 
levels of 14-15% of GNP. Having highlighted over-banking in the financial sector, 
Kiekens concluded that the time came for real banking after banks' getting used to 
easy money for a long time. Thus, for the IMF (1998, 118), banking sector 
inefficiency, (which had hitherto been masked by high inflation and arbitrage 
income), would inevitably need to be addressed as economic stability would be 
restored and banks reorient their operations toward traditional activities. 13 
These concerns of the IMF were put strongly and continually to the Turkish 
state, no doubt with added emphasis because previous IMF and WB proposals of 
liberalisation had been largely neglected. Ekzen (2003, 658-661) stresses that while 
the IMF and WB programs in the post-1980 period saw the Turkish economy 
significantly deregulated and markets liberalised, the banking system was left to the 
supervision of the Treasury while- the state heavily affected the dynamics in the 
financial market with its borrowing policy. Meanwhile, the Treasury did nothing to 
avert bank dependence on the state for its revenues. 
Perhaps the IMF, at least for a time, turned a blind eye to this practice for two 
reasons. First, it was a means by which Turkish banking developed international 
operations. Second, some of the world's leading international banks were also 
profiting from finance protectionism in Turkey and they, too, could be thrown into 
crisis by its sudden removal. Thus, the 1MF accepted a degree of finance 
protectionism as long as the Turkish finance sector could offer a profitable market for 
global financial capital even though it created a 'distorted' financial market within 
12 MUS/AD Press Bulletin, 8 September 2000, No.068, URL: 
http://www.musiad.org.trlbasinbulteni/08eylul2000.htrn . 
13 Indeed, the IMF warned the Turkish state against a possible banking crisis in 1995 
(Erdal Saglam, "IMF: Banks Krizine Her An Haz1r Olun", Hiirriyet, 13 June 1995). By 
pointing out the distortions in Turkish banking, the IMF argued the necessity for a more 
detailed plan to manage a possible new banking crisis after the 1994 financial crisis. The IMF 
stressed the need for legislative changes that would arrange for the liquidation of insolvent 
banks and that would hold bank owners responsible from those insolvencies. The crucial 
point is here that during the 1994 crisis, the foreign liabilities in the three bankrupted banks 
(which were not then under the state guarantee) created tension between the government and 
international creditors. Therefore, since then, it had become a central issue for the IMF to 
facilitate necessary legislative framework for the liquidation of insolvent banks and to obtain 
state guarantee for foreign banks' credits in bankrupted banks. Chapter I 0 will show that such 
a_guarantee was provided during banking reform. 
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Turkey. But as finance protectionism soon came to threaten the financial solvency of 
the state, the process had to be gradually terminated by the IMF. 
In retrospect, holding banking was seen to be a source of 'distortion' m 
Turkish banking by the IMF: 
Most private national banks (29 out of 31 commercial banks) are owned by families 
and/or industrial groups, as the legal framework in Turkey does not call for a 
separation of banking and non banking enterprises. The widespread cross-ownership 
of private banks with industrial conglomerates complicates the task of prudential 
supervision, because of the additional risk pressures on bank management to allocate 
credit to related parties regardless of creditworthiness considerations. (IMF 1996, 
32, emphasis in original) 
On this basis, the IMF (1995, 19-20; 1996, 34) stressed the necessity for stricter limits 
on credits extended to related parties and on non-financial equity participations, which 
had been tightened in 1994, but remained well in excess of international standards. 14 
If the IMF' s concerns about the internal viability of Turkey's fmancial system 
were not enough to justify its active participation in reform, concerns about the inter-
national implications of a Turkish financial crisis - (i.e. the possibility of a systemic 
crisis with effects beyond Turkey) - added a 'higher order' rationale. 
IMF Executive Kohler (IMF 200ld) raised the risk of systemic crisis: 
'[F]inancial crises are not only triggered in emerging markets but also in the global 
financial centers of industrial countries'. Accordingly, he emphasised 'the recent 
difficulties in Turkey and Argentina have also heightened consciousness of the 
downside risks and interdependencies in the global economy'. Therefore, 
'strengthening the financial systems in member countries [serves) the soundness of 
the international financial system as a whole' Kohler said (IMF 2001j). 
Kohler also warned 'business leaders' against the growing criticism of 
globalisation and the potential for a political backlash against capital market 
liberalisation and integration into the global economy. Then, he admitted that 'both 
economic theory and policy application are clearly lagging behind developments in 
financial markets. This is also an area where the IMF itself needs to catch up' (IMF 
2001 d). On this basis, Kohler pointed out the necessity of completing the financial 
liberalisation process with a sufficient regulatory mechanism: 
14 For the legal changes during banking reform consistent with the IMF' s demands 
see Chapter 9. 
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The further liberalization of capital flows remains an important goal. However, 
progress in this regard, has to draw on the experience gained in the past. That means, 
in my view, that capital account liberalization must be carefUlly sequenced, in terms 
of timing and degree, with the development of a sound financial sector, including of 
adequate regulatory and monitoring frameworks. (IMF 200 I d, emphasis added) 
The BAT (Ozince 2002, 82-83) confirmed that the rising frequency of crises 
since the mid-1990s and resultant instability in the world economy led advanced 
countries and international institutions to build a stable and transparent 
macroeconomic environment and to ·strengthen national ·and international financial 
systems. Banking reforms gained importance in the context of strengthening national 
financial systems. 
Yet the IMF played an additional role to that of calling for sound national 
financial and macroeconomic policy in Turkey. Even though the blockage in the 
accumulation regime was obvious, no government by itself could electorally start a 
reform process that would lead to bank insolvencies and bank confiscations, without 
the backing of the IMF. Indeed, it was possible, at critical stages, for the Turkish state 
to attribute responsibility for the reforms directly to the IMF, thereby abrogating itself 
of responsibility and blame. 
This need for the 'higher' authority of the IMF was all the more apparent 
because of clear conflicts that emerged within banking about who would win and who 
would lose in the restructuring. It would have been unreasonable to expect that all the 
fractions within capital would agree on the breakdown of the old structure of holding 
banking and associated elimination of insolvent banks. The owner holding companies 
of ailing banks would undoubtedly resist the reforms, preferring to be saved by the 
state and continue their current accumulation. 15 But the IMF gave the Turkish state 
the capacity to enforce reform as an externally demanded, non-negotiable condition of 
short-term assistance. 
The effect, however, was that reform was steered towards the IMF's vision of 
a globally-integrated process of capital accumulation with 'Turkish' accumulation 
merged into global processes. There was not going to be just the promotion of a 'free 
market' (and.especially financial market) that was specific to Turkey. 
In this context, banking reform constitutes part of the second wave structural 
adjustment reforms of the IMF and the WB. As Ercan (2003d) indicates, the first 
15 See Chapter 10. 
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wave of the structural reforms in the early 1980s onwards deregulated markets for a 
shift from the lSI to external orientation in accumulation. The current stage in this 
restructuring re-regulates markets for a further articulation with global circuit of 
capital via establishing the necessary institutional and regulatory basis at the world 
scale and minimises risks for any capital, from wherever part of the world, which 
pursues global expansion. The market-based rationalisation from bimking to energy 
and the social security system, from telecommunications to privatisation and 
international arbitration, aims to standardise the conditions for accumulation in every 
site that the capitalist logic of accumulation has penetrated (see Ercan 2003b, 2). 16 
In unison with the IMF, government officials declared that macroeconomic 
imbalances were unsustainable. For example, the Turkish Daily News quoted from 
the Finance Minister Siimer Oral as follows: 
Oral explained that the financing of public sector spending with debt instead of 
regular sources causes excessive increases in interest rates. He added that extremely 
high interest rates leave no funds for the private sector and increase production costs. 
Lending to the state has become more profitable than investing, Oral noted. 
Interest payments on debt [are] the most significant spending item in the budget. 
"Interest payments have reached a level which 9annot be sustained and have 
deadlocked the budget," Oral said. He told deputies that because budget expenses are 
met by borrowing, interest payments on debts have to be paid off through more 
b 0 17 orrowmg. 
Accordingly, in the Letter of Intent (dated December 9, 1999) given to the IMF, the 
adverse effects 'on private capital of the unsustainable path in public finances' were 
stressed: 
By undermining confidence in the Turkish lira, inflation has also resulted in high and 
unstable nominal and real interest rates, with dramatic consequences for the society. 
Speculative and arbitrage activities have attracted more and more resources, and have 
distorted the working of financial markets and institutions. When the government has 
to pay on its debt real interest rates of 30 percent or more, private capital moves away 
from job-creating activities into financial investment. When banks have to charge 
even higher real interest rates on their loans, the credit process is disrupted and 
16 This process may signal the end of small scale capitals that cannot face the 
challenge of large scale, concentrated and established capitals at the global scale. However, 
the most internationalised fractions of capital in the late capitalised countries have already 
established strong links with global capital, in some cases locating themselves in global 
networks of production of TNCs. Therefore, they obviously expect higher returns from the 
rising integration with global capital and lead the second-wave of reforms in collaboration 
with capitals of advanced capitalised countries that chase higher global profitability. 
17 
"Banking Bill Passed, Budget on Hold", Turkish Daily News, 27 June 1999, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/past probe/06 27 99/Econp.HTM#e2 . · 
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enterprises that have limited access to external capital suffer. (Turkish Government 
1999a) 
Thus, with the support of the IMF, the Turkish state acquired the power to 
transform the accumulation regime which indeed meant insolvency for some parts of 
capital. However, the IMF, as a body of neo-liberalism, projected the ultimate goal 
that Turkey needed to attain in the reform of banking. Yet the cruCial issue was the 
necessity of managing the change under a transition period. For banking is not just a 
sector; it is central to accumulation and so critical to the overall economy. Therefore, 
the problem for the state was to choose the path to a new banking regime since every 
different path would mean different winners and losers within capital. 
5.4 The Sources of Tensions within Capital 
Because of the holding banking structure, the implications of the financial 
sector reform have been wide. There was no clear path during the transition; instead it 
was contingent on how intra-class conflicts played out. Therefore, given the fractions 
within capital, neither the neo-liberal, nor institutionalist, nor nationalist' 
developmentalist arguments, (all of which were discussed in Chapter 3), could have 
been a solution for the state to sort out the path for the change. 
This section will identifY the structurally opposed interests within capital 
before discussing how tensions between these interests were played out. 
A high degree of tension between banking and productive /commercial capital 
could be readily observed throughout the 1990s. Finance protectionism was seen by 
non-bank capital as generating 'unfair' and short-term processes of accumulation. 
Four are observable. Firstly, finance protectionism was inflating interest rates, 
increasing the cost of capital to non-banks. High finance costs became the main 
source of the tension between banks and productive/commercial capitalists, whose 
investment capacities were undermined. Industrialists continuously stressed the 
discouraging effects of high interest rates and directly accused state borrowing policy 
as the source. 18 
18 See, for. example, "Finansman Maliyetleri Sanayicinin Kabusu", Diinya, 20 
November 2000. 
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Secondly, and closely related, holding banking, drawing on the easy profits of 
finance protectionism, was choking competition and crowding out investment 
opportunities for non-banks. 19 
Thirdly, finance protectionism by drawing capital into Turkey, was generating 
an overvalued exchange rate which not only contrived an unsustainable pattem of 
intemational trade, but could be seen to advantage the larger corporations which had 
the flexibility to adapt their production between sectors as opportunities for 
competitiveness changed. 
Fourthly, and most generally, high real interest rates along with overvalued 
domestic currency discouraged or postponed investments (indeed, it also channeled 
them into non-tradable sectors) and damaged exports. The effect was to further orient 
capital towards financial profits and at the same time, to diminish the generation of 
new surplus value in production. As Ercan explains, this gave capital accumulation a 
decidedly short-term orientation: 
fu a certain sense, the Turkish economy or Turkish capital has had to adapt to the 
major tendency displayed by world capitalism on the basis of an inadequacy of 
capital accumulation. This adaptation has manifested itself as an orientation 
toward[ s) fmancial means in order to survive in an environment of crisis and 
stagnation. Thus the Turkish economy has had to react to the negative impact of the 
crisis in a short term manner. However, this reaction is but a negation of the capacity 
to create surplus-value, the very condition of the existence of capital itself. However 
much the option of adopting the short term interest-oriented dynamics of money-
capital in place of the long term profit-oriented dynamics of productive capital may 
be an alternative for individual capitals, in general, this option implies stagnation and 
the permanence and intensity of the crisis of the economy of which these individual 
capitals make a part. (Ercan 2002b, 32-33) 
These four factors are often seen as exerting negative effects on the whole 
Turkish economy. But the critical point is that the effects were profoundly uneven as 
between capitals. As Ercan (2002b, 31) puts it: 'This drop in private investments is 
not equally distributed to all capitalist groups. We have to underline the fact that a 
limited number of holding companies with special access to financial means have 
achieved significant development'. 
19 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the dominance of conglomerates. 
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5.5 Conflicts among the Turkish Business Associations Preceding Banking 
Reform 
While govenunent officials and the IMF stressed the necessity of change, 
tensions between banks and chambers of industry and commerce had already come to 
the surface. Business associations were in agreement on the unsustairiability of the old 
regime and so the necessity for change. However, they differed over the path of 
reform. 
Here, it must be noted that fractions of capital do not equate with particular 
business associations as they are not purely made up of only one specific fraction of 
capital; there are conflicts within the associations, as well. Yet the fractional 
positioning of these business associations was important, in so far as each of them 
. was dominated by a particular fraction of capital. As a more detailed fractional 
analysis of reforms unfolds in later chapters, this thesis will return to the issue of the 
specific interventions of business associations. In this context however, a focus on 
business associations is a way to bring fractional conflicts 'to life' as active drivers of 
the restructuring process. 
Of particular relevance, the tension between banking and industrial capital was 
that banks (and their conglomerates) were subsuming industry and also taking a 
disproportionate share of profits. In 1999, for example, the list of the top corporate tax 
payers showed 32 banks and 11 insurers, with Akbank on top of the list. Following 
the release of the list by the Finance Ministry, the business associations that represent 
productive-commercial capital complained about the high profitability of banks. 
Regarding the source of this profitability, banks were accused of getting involved in 
non-bank activities as declared by Fuat Miras, Chairman of the Union of Chambers 
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Tilrldye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi, TOBB). 20 
The Turkish Daily News quotes various chairmen of some chambers as follows: 
"Banks are engaged in commerce and industry," Miras said. "There is no banking 
sector addicted to doing business in such highly-profitable sectors in any other place 
in the world." 
20 The TOBB is a semi-official business association whose membership is compulsory 
for all registered business units in Turkey. It is the umbrella organisation of the local 
chambers of commerce and industry. The TOBB has positioned to represent mainly the 
interests of small and medium scale capitals in time. 
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Ankara Chamber of htdustry (ASO) Chairman Zafer Caglayan said that taxes paid by 
banks constitute only a tiny part of the money earned in the banking sector. Istanbul 
Chamber of Commerce (ITO) Chairman Mehtnet Yildirm said, "When banks become 
top taxpayers, then that means the [nonfinancial] private sector is becoming 
insolvent." 
Miras told the Anatolia news agency that since the banking sector is a very profitable 
sector, everyone is trying to join in. "However, the fmance sector cannot fulfil the 
requirements of existence in an economy. The banking sector is trying anything to 
earn higher profits, just like a merchant." 
Caglayan said: "I must say that this is a regrettable day for Turkish private-sector 
banking, the Turkish nation and for the Turkish economy and industry." Caglayan 
said that such high profit rates were the result of banks lending to a government 
which borrowed in desperate conditions. 
He said that high banking sector profits means that a lowering of real income for the 
masses of people. He added that it was upsetting that 42 banks which appeared in the 
top taxpayer rankings are owned by some of Turkey's biggest holding companies. 21 
Thus, productive-commercial capitalists cited the holding ownership in 
banking as the cause of unfair competition. The Turkish Daily News quotes Zafer 
Caglayan, Head of Ankara Chamber of Industry (ASO), as follows: 
Focusing on fmancial problems, Caglayan said competition has been stifled by 
Turkish conglomerates, all of which bought banks to fmance their operations. 
Recently he wrote a letter to the Competition Authority urging it to probe the 
situation. 
"htdustry and particularly small-to-medium-sized enterprises [SMEs] are facing 
financing difficulties. SMEs are getting a tiny chunk from banks' total lending, yet 
they constantly have to add to their inflation-chewed operating capital to invest in 
new technology, research and development, machinery and equipment so as not to go 
bankrupt. On the other hand, Turkey's financial sector is .already in misery," he said. 
22 
As such, the ASO criticised high real interest rates and overvalued domestic 
clirrency as they damaged exports. 23 
The chambers of commercial and productive capital were not the only voices 
of capital in conflict with banking. This concern about the overall rate of 
21 Turkish Daily News. "htdustrialists denounce high bank profits", 13 May 2000, 
URL: httu://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/05 13 00/econ.htm . 
22 Elif Kelebek , "htdustry leader says the king is naked", Turkish Daily News, 4 
October 2000, URL: htto://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/10 04 00/econ.htm 
23 See "ASO : Structural Reforms are needed", Turkish Daily News, 5 November 
1997, URL: htto://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions!! I 05 97/econ.htm. 
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accumulation led some organisations to adopt positions that appeared contrary to the 
interests of some of their own members, which had their own banks and benefited 
from finance protectionism. The TUSIAD, the business association of large capital, 
was in this position. The Association agreed on the necessity of structural 
transformation, including banking. There was, in TUSIAD, a clear understanding that 
the policy of finance protectionism was starting to hamper the continuity of 
accumulation for total capital. 24 Since TUSIAD members are generally large 
capitalists, they came to see that sectional subsidies to banks, which were stifling long 
term investment, were not in their own long-term interests. The TUSIAD explained 
the necessity for restructuring in the economy as follows: 25 
The current budget finance, high inflation and short-term capital inflows have made 
growth policies unsustainable ip. Turkey. 1n an economy in which the ratio of public 
deficits to national income is I 00%, the total tax income is just equal to interest 
payments, without necessary structural reforms, feasible policies cannot be 
envisaged. The last reforms should be seen as efforts to integrate the Turkish 
economy into the changing global economy. 
Central to TUSIAD's agenda was bank sector reform. As Chairman Ozilhan 
declared: 'a healthy banking system which can finance private sector investments is 
indispensable for sustainable growth. To this end, banking restructuring should be 
completed and any systemic risk should not be left' .26 And the state would be 
responsible to lead this 'long and painful' process as well as to allocate its burden 
equally among related parties ... ' 27 
Indeed, the TUSIAD's demand for bank reform was part of its agenda of a 
comprehensive structural transformation of the economy, which it has demanded for 
over a decade. As the representative of large corporations, the TUSIAD expressed its 
members' willingness to integrate with global capital, to become global players. The 
24 Onis and Tiirem (200la, 23) recognize the dilemma for the TUSIAD as the long-
term interests of the TUSIAD members are in the direction of a more accountable state and 
better governance, while there is wide variations in its membership profile in terms of the 
degree of dependence on the state, degree of international orientation, etc. On this basis, the 
authors raise the question of how many TUSIAD members have actually benefited from the 
socialization of their losses by the state in the context of recent bank failures. 
25 Speech by Chairman Tuncay Ozilhan, TUSIAD Press Bulletin, No.TS/BAS/02-64, 
13 August 2002, URL: http:// www.tus1ad.org.tr. 
26 Speech by Chairman Tuncay Ozilhan at the TUSIAD meeting, 25 September 2002, 
URL: http:// www.tusiad.org.tr . 
27 See the statement by Korkmaz ilkorur, Member of Board of Directors of the 
TUSIAD,"Bankalar Kader Kurbam", Sabah, 14 September 1999. 
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Chairman of the TUSIAD, Erkut Yiicaoglu (1999, 50-51) affirmed that Turkish 
businessmen had made immense progress in adapting their accumulation 
internationally, thanks to the neo-liberal policies of the state in the post-1980 era. 
Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 8, from as early as the beginning of the 1990s, 
some large productive capitalists in TUSIAD had started to build a long-run viable, 
globally-oriented industrial accumulation basis not dependent on finance 
protectionism, while at the same benefiting from the protected domestic banking 
system as a source of profit. Nonetheless, Yiicaoglu stressed that at the 'current' level 
of global integration attained by Turkish businessmen, their competitiveness was 
negatively affected by some features of the domestic economy. For instance, high 
interest rates (associated with high budget deficits and spiralling inflation) diminished 
the competitiveness of Turkish industry. Accordingly, a restructuring in government 
finances was demanded to end the crowding-out of real sector by public budget 
deficits. 28 
The TUSIAD, having a strong pro-EU membership stance, demanded 
necessary adjustments to be undertaken in domestic political and economic spheres. 
The following issues were included in the TUSIAD agenda: market-based reform of 
the social security system, privatisation of public enterprises, tax reform shifting the 
tax burden from large firms to unrecorded economy, further incentives for FDI. This 
willingness for extensive and permanent integration to global accumulation, anchored 
in the level of accumulation already achieved by these large scale capitalists, was the 
basis of the TUSIAD's advocacy of domestic reforms. Thus, it was prepared to forgo 
the conspicuous short term benefits of financial protectionism. The members of the 
TUSIAD were in need of further international expansion if their source of capital 
accumulation was going to change from state-based financial rents towards global 
competitiveness. 
The TUSIAD's agenda, therefore, was to differentiate the accumulation 
agendas of its members from those of other conglomerates whose banks relied 
entirely on finance protectionism, and the path to this was entry into the global 
28 See "Komili: Inflation, budgetary deficit could derail economy", Turkish Daily 
News, 21 June 1996,URL: 
htto://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/06 21 96/dom.htm; Yiicaoglu 1999; and, the 
speech by Tuncay 6zi1han, TUSIAD Press Bulletin, No.TS/BAS/02-64, 13 August 2002, 
URL: http:// www.tustad.org.tr . 
i 
l, 
131 
economy. For instance, Pekin Baran of the TUSIAD demanded public reform for 
effective integration with global economy; 29 
In Turkey, the debates on public reform, which started with economic liberalisation, 
have two bases: the first is the necessity of reforming the state because of its clumsy 
structure; and the second is the requirement for a reorganisation of the state structure, 
which has worked according to patronage instead of economic rationale. 
A stable and predictable macroeconomic environment had become much more 
important for these large corporations than relying on fmance protectionism, because 
they needed to foster their capital accumulation through global competitiveness. As 
Oni.~ and Tiirem (2001a, 12) put it: 
Although big business [represented by the TUSIAD] prospered under the direct 
assistance of the state throughout the Republican era, it managed to attain a 
significant degree of maturity by the 1990s. Big business was now composed of 
internationally competitive firms, with an increasingly global orientation. Its 
dependence on· the state has been significantly reduced during the process. Hence, 
what these large entities needed from the state involved the creation of a predictable 
economic and legal environment as opposed to large favors often distributed on a 
highly arbitrary and clientelistic basis. 
Large scale, globally ambitious capital was not the only advocate of reform. 
Another voluntary business association, the MUSIAD also demanded state policies of 
structural change. 
The MUSIAD became the representative of mainly small-to-medium sized 
businesses, which found themselves in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis larger 
conglomerates, in terms of access to investment funds and state incentives. As they 
could not represent their interests either through the TOBB or TUSIAD (Alkan 1998, 
47; Ugur & Alkan 2000, 140-146), they established the MUSIAD in 1990 as the 
representative of rising Anatolian capital.'0 As Vorhoff (2000, 160) indicates, 
although some managed to expand their businesses to larger multi-functional holding 
29 The Head of the TUSIAD Commission for Parliamentary Issues; Speech at the 
meeting for "Independent Regulatory Bodies and the Turkish Case", 26 March 2003, URL: 
http:// www.tus1ad.org.tr. 
30 Bugra (1998, 528; 1999, 29) notes that the MUSIAD uses Islam at the international 
and domestic level as: (a) a basis for cooperation and solidarity between producers; (b) as a 
device to create secure market niches or sources of investment fmance; and (c) as a means of 
containing social unrest and labor militancy. On this basis, the MUSIAD appears against both 
standard welfare state provisions and organised representation of interest by labour unions. 
Instead, informal and personal support networks that involve kinship ties and religion come to 
thefore (see Bugra 1997). 
'· 
f 
t_ 
~· 
132 
companies within a decade, even these relatively large corporations are merely 
conglomerates of small and medium-sized enterprises. Consequently, the economic 
power of the MUSIAD membership is still equal to only a small fraction of that of the 
1VSL4D membership. 31 
Nonetheless, like the 1VSIAD, MUSIAD's members have been strong 
advocates of . reform. Excluded from holding banking,32 they have regarded 
themselves in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis large capital, which has been 
heavily subsidised by finance protection. They identified the existing practices as 
inefficient and tantamount to embezzlement. The MUSL4D (2002) contended 
'corruption would cause unfair competition between its beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, in addition to decreasing total productivity in the economy'. Moreover, 
its members have endured the high interest rates as a result of these policies (MUSIAD 
2001 and 2002). 
Therefore, MUSJAD (2001; 2002) stressed the necessity of radical precautions 
to limit state domestic borrowing 'which, in the 1990s, had become a resource 
transfer mechanism to banking from other sectors' (2002, 7). In order 'to dry up the 
marsh of domestic debts', the MUSJAD demanded monetisation and consolidation of 
state debts (2002, 5). Indeed, the Association defmed the roots of bank 
embezzlements as the bank permissions by the state to businessmen who had sought 
funds for their own businesses. The MUSIAD also emphasised the adverse effects of 
the full insurance scheme for deposits, which removed the distinction between 'good 
and bad banks'. Finally, the Association stressed that banks should not be allowed to 
be part of holding companies and, in particular, it demanded a restriction on bank 
partnership of persons who were effective in 'manipulative sectors' such as the media. 
31 The strong influence of the 1VSIAD on state policies rests on the significance of 
the TUSIAD's large members for the economy. 6ni~ and Tiirem (2001, 18-19) cite that the 
TUSIAD account for 40.9 percent of total value added in manufacturing, construction and 
banking services. On the other hand, the corresponding figures for the MUS/AD are 10 
percent of GNP. Thus, the authors state that the members of the MUS/AD represent the 
economic and political challenge to the interests of the large business community by the 
rising Anatolian capital, which prospered during the neoliberal era of the 1980s. 
32 Some members of the MUS/AD found an alternative way to raise funds for 
investments. Vorhoff (2000, 161) notes the channelling of the savings of Turkish workers in 
Europe as loans for the consolidation of the small-scale enterprises which were called 
'multiple share holder enterprises' (c;ok Ortaklz Sirketler). However, as a whole, the 
MUSIAD's members remained in a disadvantageous position regarding finance opportunities 
in the considered period. 
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In sum, the MUS/AD (2002) wanted to minimise the state 'in order to make 
the free marlcet economy work'. But this was not an aspiration of a small state for 
libertarian reasons. The MUS/AD simply aspired to 'a minimised state which could do 
its main jobs more efficiently'. By a more efficient state, the MUS/AD meant two 
things: the abolition of corruption in business.state-politician relations and the 
allocation of a larger share of state subsidies and financial resources to SMEs. 33 The 
Association clearly stated that 'some segments of the private sector' have been 
supported by the state throughout history in the name of creating a national 
bourgeoisie, and that this policy has led to the 'formation' of 'powerful elites' and 
hence has been accompanied by negative economic effects (2002, 31 ). 
The chambers of commercial and productive capital, the TUSIAD and 
MUS/AD tell an important story of the tensions that were to result from banking 
sector reform. All were staunch advocates of the reform, but for different reasons, and 
hence with different aspirations of the effects of any reforms. The TUSIAD, 
representing large, globally integrating capital, wanted regulation in Turkey to be 
compatible with global norms, and so, a stable, low inflation Turkish macroeconomy. 
Combined, these would facilitate the merging of large Turkish capital with the 'big 
league' of international accumulators. The MUSIAD, on the other hand, supported 
reforms more with a national vision (or with a view to nationalistic outcomes), 
basically demanding support for SMEs. 
The positions of the chambers of commercial and productive capital portended 
the tensions that would arise in the shaping of reform policy and its implementation. 
There were conflicting interests between capitals which were the beneficiaries of 
financial protectionism, and there were conflicting interests between the opponents of 
protectionism. The opponents were united in their condemnation of corruption and 
inefficiency, and in their advocacy of sound macroeconomic management. But how 
they wanted reform to achieve that goal depended on where they stood in the overall 
accumulation process. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, these differences will be explored in 
detail. 
33 The MUS/AD increasingly switched its stance from the glorification of the East 
·Asian model (Asia-Pacific-centred global integration) to a pro-EU one in the late 1990s by 
expecting to benefit from the integration with the EU for SMEs (Olli~ & Tiirem 2001 a; 
200lb). 
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5.6 A New Economic Program: Papering over the Contradictions 
Before the divisions between capitals are further explored, it is important to 
consider the apparently unified advocacy of sound economic management. In the 
context of reforms that would eradicate finance protectionism and attack corruption, it 
was clearly important for the state to project a unifying agenda. Terms like 
'efficiency', 'sound economic management' and 'macroeconomic stability' project 
exactly that agenda. But at the same time, behind the scenes, as it were, the reforms 
were an incursion into the relations between capital, in which some parts of capital 
would loose, and others win. This outcome, while unavoidable, had to be minimised 
and postponed by the state. 
Hence, the state sought to accentuate what capital shared in common. Two 
factors stand out. The first is that all capitals like growth and stability, and the state 
reforms in banking were framed politically to meet that aspiration. The second, which 
will be addressed in the next section, is that all capitals have a shared relation to 
labour in the desire to secure higher productivity for lower wages, and the state 
continually invoked that shared opposition to garner support from capital. 
The new economic program that was announced after the financial crises in 
May 2001 spoke precisely the language of sound economic management: 
· 'Strengthening the Turkish Economy - Turkey's Transition Program' (Turkish 
Government 2001e). 34 
Added to the discourse of growth and stability was the admission of 
responsibility for past failures, as the precondition for promising future successes. 
Indeed, in the introduction of the program, the State Minister Kemal Dervi§ frankly 
depicted the distortions of the previous period. He conceded that the reason for the 
problems that Turkey had suffered was the accelerating debt burden of the state. 
Whereas the state had previously been able to borrow with very high real interest rates 
for years, this process had now become unsustainable. Dervi~ also emphasized that 
this negative debt dynamic was rooted in the relationship between politics and the 
economy. The rent-seeking link between the state and the private sector was the 
14 It was a continuation of the Staff Monitored Program started in June 1998 and the 
subsequent three-year stand-by agreement with the IMF in 2000. 
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source of all the problems experienced in the banking sector, energy sector etc. This 
he saw as the main source of the chronic inflation problem in Turkey. Dervi~ also 
added: 
· Imagine an industrialist. If other industrialists have an opportunity to borrow with 
cheaper and more convenient conditions from a bank, then the industrialist naturally 
will want to have a bank or to provide the same advantage from a public bank through 
political support. When such behaviours extend throughout the economy, the losses 
accumulate in public banks and the private banks that give credit out of banking 
standards go bankrupt. (Turkish Government 2001 e, i) 
The aim of the economic program was said to be the development of 
competitiveness on the basis of market-orientation and openness to the world 
economy. While it gave all the signals about growth and stability, it predictably 
exposed the tensions between capitals. 
The TUSIAD was broadly supportive of the reform as structural reforms which 
redefined the state's role in the economy lied at the core of the program. The program 
included fifteen legal arrangements that would provide restructuring in four strategic 
sectors (viz. banking-finance, energy, telecommunication-transport and agriculture), 
besides other policy measures, such as increasing budget discipline and transparency, 
and changing public employment and wages policy. Crucially, all these changes 
implied the further integration of Turkey into the circuit of global accumulation. The 
TUSIAD said of the program that it suggested a fundamental change in the 
relationship between economics and politics in Turkey 35 and therefore, it was 'a good 
start for the solution of the problems which have accumulated in the Turkish economy 
for the last decade'. 36 However, the TUSIAD was opposed to tax increases as a means 
of reducing state indebtedness and instead demanding an enlargement of the tax base 
via an inclusion of non-recorded business and a fundamental restructuring of the 
public sector. 37 
The MUS/AD, on the other hand, criticised the program on the ground that it 
did not include a serious solution for the domestic debt problem as had the previous 
IMF programs.38 The Association demanded innnediate and radical solutions to break 
35 Chairman Tuncay Ozilhan, Speech in the TUSIAD meeting, 19 June 2001, URL: 
http:// www.tusiad.org.tr. 
36 Chairman Tuncay Ozilhan, Press Bulletin, No. TS/BAS/01-47, 23 May 2001, URL: 
http:// www.tusiad.org.tr. 
37 Chairman Tuncay Ozi1han, Speech in the TUSIAD meeting, 19 June 2001, URL: 
http:// www.tusiad.org.tr. 
38 MUSIAD, "1990-2001-MUSIAD Ne Dedi Ne Oldu", URL: 
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down the vicious circle of domestic borrowing such as partial monetisation and 
consolidation. 39 
Despite the contradictory views held by among business associations, the 
economic program was consistent with the TMF/TUSIAD stance. First, it aimed at 
guaranteeing debt-service and interest payments. This meant plans to reduce state 
domestic borrowing and associated high interest rates over a transition period. While 
small-to-medium scale capitalists and productive capitalists (who did not own their 
banks demanded an immediate end on resource transfer to FC through interest 
payments, both the IMF (and international creditors) as well as large capital 
incorporating banks, favoured a soft transition rather than a radical break with the 
past. Moreover, besides the concern over protecting the domestic and international 
benefactors of this policy, continuous state borrowing was envisaged also as a tool in 
the state's taking over't~e expected high financial cost of banking reform, as Chapter 
10 will address. 
5.6.1 Labour 
The framework of responsible economic management pointed directly to fiscal 
austerity and low inflation. Hence, the critical question was: who would bear the 
burden of this reform. Eventually, as Chapter 7 will discuss, some part of capital was 
http:// www.musiad.org.tr/NeDedikNeOldu/NeDedikNeOldu.htm (Accessed 16 October 
2002). 
· 
39 The MUSIAD (2002) criticised Kemal Dervis on the ground that he worked within 
a narrow circle of businessmen and bankers and excluded itself from that circuit. The 
Association indicated that the economic program and the Letters of futent given to the IMF 
basically pursued 'to maintain the unsustainable borrowing policy' via primary budget 
surpluses. Therefore this meant, according to the MUSIAD, decreases in all kinds of state 
expenditures such as social security, personnel and investments, but not interest payments 
from the budget. The MUSIAD, on this basis, argued that tlie real sector was overlooked and 
therefore, the economic crisis had become more severe. Accordingly, all the efforts that were 
made for the banking sector by then became palliative, the Association concluded. 
In brief, the MUSIAD declared that the distorted relation between the state and 
finance .sector had to be removed if the economy were to be recovered. Yet the Association 
was opposed to further primary budget surpluses that were demanded by the IMF. The 
MUSIAD demanded the withdrawal of tax increases and the channelling of resources, which 
would be created through partial monetisation of domestic debts, to consumption and 
investments with the mediation of the banking sector (see Press Bulletins, No. Bas.Kom. 05· 
236, 7 January 2003, URL: http:// www.muisad.org.tr/basinbulteni/07ocak2003.htm ; No. 
Bas.Kom. 05-241, 3 January 2003, URL: http:// 
www.muisad.org.tr/basinbulteni/30ocak2003.htm; ·MUSIAD 2002). 
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going to be sacrificed; but, before that, the collective interests of capital required that 
labour take on the burden. 
Consistent with the policies of the post-1980 era, in which the intensification 
of the exploitation of labour power mainly underlaid the 'success' of the export-
orientation of those individual capitals, 40 the burden of the reorganisation of capital 
was mainly put on labour. Amid debates regarding the monetisation and consolidation 
of state debt, the IMF (2001a, 11-13) applauded the final strategy to combat the state 
debt problem: 
(T]he authorities could have fulfilled markets' expectations and monetized the debt... 
But...the authorities believe that it is in Turkey's best interest to avoid a return to high 
inflation rates, which would ultimately undermine Turkey's long-term growth 
prospects. 
The authorities' strategy is strongly based on market-orientation and openness to the 
world economy; it aims to strengthen domestic policies and resume the adjustment 
process with support from the international community and private sector involvement 
sufficient to ensure that the program is financed, and thereby restore confidence ... 
Despite the stress on the support from 'international community', primary 
budget surpluses were used as the main policy instrument to reverse the increasing 
trend of the net public sector debt-to-GNP ratio. This meant a reduction in public 
expenditures on investment, wage-salary payments and agricultural support prices, by 
indexing these to the expected inflation rate rather than the past inflation rate.41 As the 
IMF (200la, 13) noted, the primary budget surpluses derived from cuts to public 
expenditure have been used for interest payments on debt, in addition to the use of the 
income from privatisation and a large part of the state's tax revenue. Therefore, the 
economic program noted: 
40 Owing to a strong suppression of labour movement after the 1980 coup, real wages 
are estimated to have declined by almost 40% between 1980 and 1988, while real profits 
almost doubled. The exploitation of labour has been .intensified through increasingly 
dismantled welfare services as well as rising labour market flexibility (see Onaran & Yentiirk 
2000; Onaran 2002). At the same time, there was a high disparity between productivity and 
wage levels. Ozar and Ercan (2002, 167) quote Voyvoda and Yeldan who note that despite a 
160% rise in average value~added per worker between the years 1980-1996, in 1996, real 
wages only reached their level of 1980. 
41 See Kocaba~oglu et al. (2001, 579, 583). The authors cite. that the reason for the 
policy of using primary budget surpluses was not only to eliminate inflationary pressures, but 
also to maintain debt repayments. The Turkish state wanted to convert domestic debt to 
external debt. To do this, the state needed credibility in international finance markets, so that 
new external funds could be raised. 
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In order to keep the increase in the public sector debt stock under control, it is 
critically important that non-interest public expenditures be subject to discipline and 
that maximum savings be achieved. This is the framework within which the 
program's primary surplus and public finance targets have been established. (Turkish 
Government200ld,28) 
Most of all, the manipulation of state budget policies for a reduction of the 
value of labour power was complemented by a new labour law (no. 4857) in 2003 
which redefmed the conditions for employment and work security. In a time when 
individual capitals have been pursuing integration into global capitalism, the new law 
provided an increased control of capital over labour by facilitating rising flexibility in 
work conditions and weakening the organisational power of labour (Ercan 2003c). All 
this meant wage cuts and declining welfare services, revealing the class dimension 
underlying the rhetoric of'stability' and 'growth'.42 
5.7 The Reconfiguration of Holding Banking for the Reorganisation of 
Turkish Capital 
The conflicts between different parts of capital, which were apparent 
throughout the 1990s in the demands for reform; became critical with the introduction 
of state policy to reconfigure holding banking. The State Minister Dervi~ heralded 
that the banking sector would withdraw from industrial activities in seven years: 
We came to the conclusion that banks will not perform any industrial activities, and 
industrialists will not operate banks anymore. In some countries, these· two are 
intertwined. In Turkey, since the state did not have enough opportunities, banks 
became involved in industrial activities. We will also end this policy anymore. We 
scheduled a seven-year period for this. 43 44 
42 Also, thousands of bank workers lost their jobs during banking reform. 
43 
"Giiven Siirdiikye Bu Arabayt Kullanmm", Hiirriyet, 11 January 2002. 
44 James Wolfensohn, Executive of the World Bank, also warned about the links 
between the state and Turkish conglomerates incorporating banks: 'If there are weaknesses in 
the fmance sector, markets can get into turmoil. In [South] Korea, the state and holding 
companies have had close relations and transparency has disappeared. The state took its 
power from those holding companies but these relations did not work and became fragile. 
Therefore, the Turkish financial system should be restructured from the top to 
bottom ... Turkey should rearrange and supervise the banking holdings which have been 
getting more complicated' ("Devlet-Holding iii~kisi Uyanst", Cumhuriyet, 26 May 2000). 
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For Turkish banks, adapting to this new era became the dominant agenda, (as 
Chapter 11 will show). For instance, General Director of Koybank Engin Akyakoca 
stated the reorientation in banking as follows: 
We (Turkish banks], who have worked by lending to the state so far, ... will think 
'what was our previous job. We should start doing it again'. In this way, some of us 
will merge, some of us will be eliminated under market conditions, we may change 
our products and will specialise further. (Finans Diinyasz 2000a, 63) 
This was exactly the issue that was at the core of the IMF' s interventions. 
Given the small total asset size, capital deficiency and insufficient supervision and 
risk management, the banking system needed to be restructured according to 
international banking standards. It was crucial to increase the competitiveness of local 
banks vis-a-vis giant international banks. This first required the return of banks to 
traditional banking activities instead of financing state debt. As the IMF contended: 
The transition to low inflation will necessitate a reorientation of banking sector 
activities toward traditional lending, and a rise in banking sector efficiency. As 
macroeconomic stability is established, the high cost structure of the banking gystem 
will no longer be masked by high inflation and arbitrage profits. However, 
disinflation is expected to increase bank intermediation, a process that should benefit 
banks, provided that they adapt their operations to more traditional banking in good 
time. (IMF 1998, 131) 
Adaptation also required the centralisation of capital to permit the scale 
economies required in efficient banking, as Chapter 1 I will discuss. The growing 
international integration of banking accentuated this need; for the larger banks gained 
the greater acceptance in international financial markets.45 This proposition was 
confirmed by State Minister Dervi~ who initiated state-facilitated M&As. 
As a reflection of their conglomerates' overall accumulation strategies, the 
banks which could fulfil (or have the ability to fulfil) the requirements of the new era 
continued to exist. However, the banks which could not adapt to the change were to 
45 The executive banker Hasan Ersel (2000a, 46) states that, because of the rising 
world-wide application of risk management in banking according to the principles of the BIS, 
international banks increasingly tend to work with the most credible/large banks in· other 
domestic financial markets. Therefore, Ersel claims, while Turkish banks extensively raised 
funds from international finance markets in. the post-1980 era, this opportunity will be 
available only for a limited number of banks in the new period. 
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be eliminated or merged.46 The following statement by Engin Ak~akoca, the Head of 
the BRSA, explained the change in banking as follows: 
2001 ... symbolises a break from the past and transition to a new banking period. 
Market discipline, competition and risk management will be the main values of this 
new period. Successful finance players of the new period will be the institutions 
which can monitor and manage their risks through the most suitable and developed 
methods at every moment, which can compete with financial institutions on a global 
scale, which will continuously seek to develop new services/products ... and to 
develop strategic cooperation. (BRSA 2001c, ii) 
The transformation in banking necessitated a fundamental shift in banking-
industry relations; that is, in the ownership structure of holding banks. This defines 
the crisis (need for change) for FC. However, this crisis has had different implications 
for different fractions of FC, as will be seen in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
The market-oriented reform of banking not only required the restructuring of 
banks, but, at a broader level, went hand in hand with the restructuring of all 
conglomerates. The clumsy holding structures, which were adequate for the previous 
accumulation regimes, were now in conflict with the necessities of global competition 
and had to be rationalised: 
In Turkey, not only the large capitals but the whole business world got into the 
process of building holding structures which could only survive in the controlled 
economies of the East Asia ... This structure, which emerged from the desire of risk 
allocation or from the preference for 'small but mine', has been able to survive so far 
due to custom tariffs and the bubble economy brought by inflation. Governments also 
supported the building of a holding structure which is in conflict with the current 
trends through incentives. (Y Ildmm 2000, 6) 
Thus, considering the global M&A trend, Turkish conglomerates had to revise 
their sectoral range for higher competitiveness, implying specialization on main and 
strategic areas and withdrawal from uncompetitive businesses. 
The processes by which these changes were affected are discussed in detail in 
later chapters. Here, the objective has been to set the scene of a complex and fractured 
process of restructuring attached to the state's policy to reconfigure holding banking. 
In exploring financial sector reform as a process of fractional relations (rather than 
46 At further stages of the reform process, Engin Akcakoya, Head of the BRSA, 
(Activeline Activity 2002, 2) stated that the adjustment to international standards in the sector 
was attained and added 'as you see, the ones that could not adjust were eliminated'. 
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simply the realisation of 'market forces'), the following chapters will show that it is 
important to look systematically at the different forces within banking and the 
different ways in which different sorts of conglomerates have been rationalised under 
the new regulations. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Reading banking reform as a class process allows a very different 
interpretation of the change in Turkey from that found in the wider literature. It shows 
that banking reform was rooted in the contradictions within capital in the pre-reform 
era. As the previous regime started to hamper the continuity of capital accumulation 
for total capital, the conflicts within capital became more acute and the state and the 
IMF stepped in to manage the necessary reorganisation of capital under the 
supervision of the latter. 
Although the proposed reasons given by the IMF for such a transformation in 
banking have been in line with the standard arguments (such as those which express 
concern about high interest and inflation rates, inefficiency and lack of prudential. 
supervision), the impulse leading the IMF to this demand is related to deeper, 
underlying features of the capital accumulation process. 
It had already been obvious that the budget and borrowing policy of the state 
had reached its limits. Finance protectionism was not sustainable because both banks 
and industry were diverting funds out of 'real' accumulation and into treasury bills.· 
Additionally, and critically, the influence of the IMF meant that the reform 
process would not be an avowedly nationalist one, seeking to build a strong 'national 
economy' in the Keynesian sense of nation-centred accumUlation. The IMF demand 
was for openness, such that the building of strong capital in the reform process meant 
support for those parts of capital that were most likely to succeed in globally 
integrated processes of accumulation. 
Moreover, reform of banking, perhaps more so than reform in any other 
sector, is a delicate policy matter. While reform in another sector may simply see 
some companies become unprofitable and close down, this cannot happen to banks 
without the creation of a systemic crisis of confidence in the whole financial system. 
The reconfiguration of holding banks had to be secured in a way that protected the 
integrity of the banking system generally. In part, this was to be done by ensuring that 
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labour would take on the burden of making 'real' profits for capital, via reduced 
government expenditure on living standards and ultimately via the intensification of 
competition in the labour market. But in part too it was unavoidable that some parts of 
capital would lose out in the reform process. But which parts? There was no simple 
answer. 
The reform process was, therefore, not an 'innocent' process of simply 
introducing market forces and waiting to see the outcomes. It was a systematic 
process to liquidate those parts of capital that could not meet the IMF criteria (but to 
liquidate them in a way that did not create financial crisis) and to facilitate those parts 
of capital that did meet the criterion. The problem is that it could not be known before 
the fact of the reform which individual holding banks fitted within each category. The 
reform process itself was therefore a process of selection (or differentiation of 
fractions). 
On the basis of this chapter'-s bird's-eye-view of the conflicts within capital 
and the state-IMF involvement in the change process, the following three chapters 
will focus· on the central tensions within capital preceding and accompanying the 
banking reform: the contradictions and associated divisions within FC. 
CHAPTER6 
A CLASS FRACTIONAL APPROACH TO THE TURKISH 
BANKING REFORM 
'6.1 Introduction 
6.2 Methodological Consideration 
6.3 The Need to Refocus Accumulation (the late 1990s) 
6.4 The Issues Determining Fractional Divisions in Bank Restructuring 
6.5 An Alternative Classification 
6.6 Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
There is universal agreement that the Turkish banking system of the I 990s was 
unsustainable. Finance protection was leading systematically to a state financial crisis. 
But the reform of finance and banking is always more complex than the rationalisation of 
just another industry. Two factors were critical. 
First, given the centrality of finance to accumulation, and the predominance in 
Turkey of bank integration with industry, any broader developmental agendas of the 
Turkish state (and IMF) would have to confront the role of finance and banking. That is, 
financial sector reform went much further than cleaning up the banking sector - it was 
also to redirect the nature of Turkish capitalism towards a more advanced form of 
accumulation , 
Second, banking, as the institutional face of the money system, is based in trust 
(Ingham 2004). This involves trust in the Turkish currency- (that lira can be converted 
into 'real assets' at predictable rates) - and trust that banking institutions - (that book 
entries in financial institutions will indeed be honoured). Financial protectionism was 
threatening the first form of trust, via hyperinflation. But the danger was that the reforms 
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that would rid the economy of inflation might threaten the second form of trust, for in the 
process of reform, certain financial institutions may become insolvent. Should that 
perception develop, a financial crisis would inevitably ensue. 
So the project for the Turkish state and the IMF was to rid the financial sector of 
protectionism and redirect accumulation towards more advanced capitalist processes, but 
do so without creating any perception that any banks themselves .would be unable to meet 
their commercial obligations. 
The objective of the next three chapters is to identify how banking reform in 
Turkey addressed this agenda. In Chapters 7 and 8, the thesis looks at the banks 
themselves: which banks survived and which did not; the rationale for the state's strategy, 
and the way in which certain banks were liquidated without creating a financial crisis. 
This chapter sets up the broader preliminary issues. It considers the new momentum in 
Turkish capital accumulation and the methodological question of how our analysis can 
best pinpoint the accumulation criteria that determined which banks survived the reforms 
and which did not. In meeting this objective, this chapter moves from the conceptual 
issues developed in Chapter. 2 and applies them to the specific context of Turkish banking 
reforms in the 1990s. 
6.2 Methodological Consideration 
In Chapter 2, the conception of the state that underlies most of the ongoing 
debates on the capacity of nation states in the face of 'globalisation' is challenged. It is 
argued that, instead of 'a weak-strong state' dichotomy, capital and state should be seen 
in a dialectical unity to maintain capitalist social relations: the state is· continuously 
redefined according to the balance of class forces and their needs that arise from within 
accumulation process. On this basis, it is contended that the nation state is still the basic 
organisational unit providing the reproduction of class relations of world capitalism. 
While fulfilling this basic function, furthermore, the nation state has an increasing 
importance/role in the integration of 'national' accumulation processes into global 
processes. The preferred approach to this question developed in this thesis addresses the 
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way m which the state mediates the opposed interests of different parts of capital 
associated with their various integration into (or isolation from) global accumulation. 
With the fractionalist approach to the discussion of any change process, the 
divided interests of capital are brought to centre stage. While every fraction of capital 
pursues its own agenda, the state needs to mediate between those contradictory demands 
for the continuity of overall capital accumulation. Under this requirement, a particular 
fraction (or fractions) of capital establishes its hegemony within total capital through state 
policies and, under this new hegemony, the contradictory continuity of capital 
accumulation can be secured. 
In the following two chapters, the theoretical propositions developed in Chapter 
2 will be applied to an explanation of the Turkish banking reform to identify a coherent 
pattern to the determination of which banking conglomerates survived the IMF-driven 
restructuring, and which went into liquidation. The proposition developed is that the 
coherence of the restructuring is to be found in the way in which the· Turkish state, in 
combination with the IMF, sought to develop a globally-integrated financial sector in 
which globally-integrated finance capital would be the 'leading edge' of Turkish capital. 
This explanation of financial sector reforms is significantly different from 
others that are based on a different conception of the role of the nation state in global 
accumulation. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, those who see the nation state as being 
undermined by (and the basis of resistance to) 'globalisation' poses the process of bank 
restructuring quite differently. They see it in terms of a market-state dichotomy and the 
need of national policy to rebuild macroeconomic balances. But this framework, we will 
see, identifies only the need for restructuring (which is not in dispute) and an asserted 
desire to rebuild a Keynesian system of state management. It does not explain the process 
of restructuring and how the conflicts and contradictions within that process were 
'resolved'. They focus on the IMF as an exogenous enforcer of a developmentalist 
agenda, imposing a neo-liberal vision onto Turkish economic policy. Here, as well, there 
is superficial support for this position, for Turkish state policy has indeed gravitated 
towards a broadly neo-liberal policy program. But this proposition systematically ignores 
the multiple dimensions which the Turkish suite has sought to manage during the 
restructuring process. It is not sufficient to see the Turkish state as the passive 
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mouthpiece of the IMF: too many important facets of the restructuring do not fit this 
depiction. Crucially, an understanding of current (and future) conditions framed within 
the developmentalist agenda fails to identify the class dimension of the reorganisation of 
finance. 
Another conspicuous explanation of bank restructuring, the neo-liberal 
discourse, demands deregulation of markets and withdrawal of state 'intervention'. 
Accordingly, this discourse stresses the necessity of elimination of state-sourced 
distortions in banking for efficient resource allocation. However, at the same time, the 
neo-liberal view concedes the moral. hazard problem as a form of market failure and so 
the need for state prudential supervision on banking. The moral hazard issue does, indeed, 
point to the necessity of bank restructuring, especially the end of state subsidies, and the 
importance of verification of the viability of financial institutions. But here, as with the 
Keynesian explanation, too many details· of the restructuring are left unexplained by the 
neo-liberal discourse. The political dimension of neo-liberal recommendation is simply 
outside the discourse, and policy outcomes inconsistent with the neo-liberal agenda are 
simply depicted as 'distortions'. 
This thesis challenges both the Keynesian and neo-liberal schools' state 
concepts of either passive carrier of externally imposed agenda or independent arbiter. 
The thesis agrees with the Keynesian proposition about the critical, on-going role for 
state management, and it supports to the neo-liberal view that market-driven profitability 
determines the outcomes of restructuring; but contends that, in both cases, the 
relationship between the state and capital has been inadequately theorised. Here; the state 
is approached as a moment of reproduction of social relations of capital. Hence, this 
thesis is concerned to develop an analysis of banking reform via a framework that 
emphasises the divisions within banking capital within Turkey and the way the state {and 
IMF) have sought to mediate these divisions while at the same time transforming the 
process of capital accumulation away from state dependence and towards global 
integration. Through the analysis, it will be seen that this reform, which has been driven 
by the requirements of capital accumulation itself, has had transforming effects on 
fractions of capital and via these effects it has been laying foundations for a new capital 
accumulation regime in Turkey. 
147 
With this focus, the explanation of banking reform looks very different from the 
now-standard explanations mentioned above. The Turkish state actively manages and 
regulates the further integration of a protected domestic banking system with global 
accumulation. 
6.3 The Need to Refocus Accumulation (the late 1990s) 
At this point, it is important to explain why banking reform has to be seen in the 
context of broader processes of capital accumulation in Turkey. Part of the explanation, 
which has already been raised, is that banking cannot be disentangled from wider issues 
of accumulation. But, more than this, it is clear that (as a response for the needs of some 
fractions of capital) the Turkish state (and the IMF) have determined a course for Turkish 
capitalism in which bank reform is integral. It is therefore important to specify that path 
so that the reform can be understood in this light. 
After exploiting low real wages as the basis of the export orientation of the 
industry in the post-1980 period, Turkish capital needed enhanced mechanisation and 
higher-value added production if it was to achieve a higher level of capitalist 
development. Given the concentration and competitiveness in low-technology 
manufacturing sectors, 1 the Turkish economy diverged from the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average trend which is towards high 
technology-based production and export (Saygth 2003, 53). The State Planning 
Organisation (SPO) pointed out that the Turkish economy was far short of the 
technological transformation needed for a healthy long-run growth (Saygth 2003, 26). 
Turkey had specialised in labour- and resource-intensive sectors through 
increasing flexibility of labour markets during the post-1980 export orientation period 
(Kose. & Oncii 2000, 84). However, the Eighth Five Year Development Plan Foreign 
1 Saygth (2003) showed that in 1990-1997 period, low technology sectors, with an 
increasing trend, achieved the highest share of 40% in Turkish manufacturing industry production, 
value added and investments. Among these sectors, food-beverages-tobacco and textile-clothing 
sectors constituted the highest share in production and value added, 36% and 32% respectively. 
Yet, high-technology sectors had a share of only 4.5% in production and 5.5% in value-added 
(p.14). In terms of share in manufacturing industry's export, high technology sectors raised their 
share from 2.46% in 1989 to only 7.53% in 2000 (p.46). 
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Direct Investment Commission (SPO 2000, 5) argued that, in attracting FDI, relative 
cheapness of labour was losing its importance as labour costs comprised such a low share 
( 10-15%) of total costs. Moreover, Turkey was losing its edge on absolute surplus value 
because primitive accumulation conditions in former Soviet Bloc countries offered a 
fresh source of cheap labour for global capital. Also, after 2005, quotas in textile and 
clothing industry, which constitutes the core of the Turkish manufacturing industry's 
production and export, 2 were be removed. This means that producers in Turkey would 
soon face fierce competition from low wage countries such as China. Thereby, traditional 
industrial sectors of Turkey were being forced to improve their competitiveness by 
moving into much higher quality segments which require advanced design and marketing 
skiJls. 
The SPO (2004, 23) points to financial incapability and the widespread 
existence of SMEs 3 as the main weakness of the industry to this end. Besides such need 
for change in traditional sectors, a structural transformation was increasingly required to 
increase the shares of high technology-based sectors in the manufacturing industry's 
production and export. AJI these developments heralded further deteriorating conditions 
for labour that was already used as the primary basis of the outward orientation in the 
post-1980 period. The passing of a new labour Jaw in 2003 (which is discussed in 
Chapter 5) supports this argument. 
Therefore, as finance protectionism fulfilled the mission of accumulating money 
capital at the hands of those capitals who were in need of further internationalisation, the 
Turkish state has recently redefined the industrial policy for a higher level of capitalist 
development. With the Eighth Five Year Development Plan (200 1-2005), higher 
competitiveness and productivity of the manufacturing industry in the face of increasing 
global competition was projected (SPO 2004). For such a transformation in the export 
structure in line with the world trends, the SPO (2003, 46) proposed 'policies ensuring a 
transition of the industrial structure from consumer goods, raw material and labour 
2 Textile and clothing industry had a share of 21.5% in the manufacturing industry's 
production in 2002 and 36.2% in the export; It also provides more than one third of employment 
in this industry (SPO 2004, 22-23). 
· 
3 The share of SMEs with up to 250 employees in 2000 is 99.6% of total number of 
establishments, 63.8% in total employment and 36% in value added (SPO 2003, 37). 
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intensive goods towards information and technology intensive goods and increasing 
market share by creating new technologies' .4 This implies that capital accumulation be 
reoriented to productivity growth. For labour, this shift means a focus on higher skilled, 
higher value-added production (in Marxist terms, the production of relative surplus value). 
Yet the transition towards productivity growth does not mean a lessening significance of 
the extraction of absolute surplus value for capital. Rather, the ongoing restructuring in 
Turkish capitalism is based on the intensification of both absolute and relative surplus 
value production. 
·In order to achieve a productive capital-based accumulation, the banking sector 
had to be transformed accordingly. Crucially, the need for the integration of the Turkish 
financial system into global markets was rooted in the global integration need by Turkish 
productive capital, consistent with Bina and Yaghrnaian.(1998, 259). To orient industrial 
production towards mechanisation and high-tech sectors, funds have to be placed 
increasingly into fixed capital investments. Having more access to domestic and global 
funds is not only needed for extended reproduction of circuits of FC, but also by the 
whole corporate sector. 5 This need explains the leading role in banking reform which was 
played by the conglomerates whose banks survived to follow a long-term banking policy 
without state finance protectionism. 6 
The class implications of this reorientation in accumulation are profound. For 
labour in Turkey, this shift of the source of profits from the state to global capitalism has 
distinct effects. It is a shift from taxation and deficit-induced inflation as the burden of 
4 At the current stage of capital accumulation, the state projects to implement new 
policies to nurture industrial capitalists. To this end, among many components of the new 
industry policy of the Turkish state, which the SPO (2003) declared, ongoing privatisation of 
SEEs forms one of the mechanisms that reinforce the dominance of the bourgeoisie by whom 
more than 80% of production and about 95% of gross fixed investment is realized in the 
manufacturing industry, as the SPO (2003, 36) notes. In addition to the continual withdrawal of 
the state from industrial sector, public sector investments will be intensified mainly on economic 
and social infrastructure in order 'to direct public and private sector resources into rational and 
complementary investment areas' (SPO 2003, 45). As well, new regulations have been introduced 
to attract FDI into Turkey. Also, the state will enhance its role in supporting strategic sectors and 
their orientation to global markets along with policies increasing global competitiveness of SMEs. 
5 See the statement by Altematifbank General Director Murat Ang in Kenan $anh, 
"AbankKurumsalla TasarrufYaptl", Finansal Forum, 24 March 2003. 
6 The rise of SMEs as an important market segment in the new banking era is linked to 
this overall change, as well. 
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labour to enhanced surplus value creation in production. That is, labour once enjoyed the 
benefits of working for companies with guaranteed profitability, but it bore the burden of 
paying the taxes by which profitability was secured. With the shift away from guaranteed 
profits, labour finds that it continues to be at the centre of profitability not so much via 
taxation, but now explicitly via the competitive process to increase the production of 
surplus value. 
For the bourgeoisie, this end has meant an adjustment for capital in general, and 
for FC in particular to a new accumulation regime in which profits are to be derived 
through international competitiveness. The shift has created some 'losers' within capital 
as one fraction of FC was excluded from finance and, in the process, lost its capacity to 
accumulate in other sectors to varying degrees. On the 'winners' side, however, the 
leading fraction of FC has strengthened its position by overriding its dysfunctional 
members. The state stepped in to oversee the change in the reproduction of accumulation 
on behalf of the leading fraction of FC that has been dominant, but not able to transform 
its accumulation regime by itself. 
While the thesis analyses contradictory relations between fractions of capital in 
the context of the Turkish banking sector, tensions within banking coincide with wider 
divisions within total capital. Since banks have been owned by conglomerates, the 
circuits of individual capitals operating in banking extend beyond banking to various 
other sectors of the economy. Thus, the characteristics of overall accumulation strategies 
of these conglomerates, not just their banking operations, determine the fractional 
divisions within banking. Due to the wider ramifications of this ownership structure in 
banking, the reform has become an effective tool for the Turkish state and the IMF in 
order. to reconfigure broader intra-capital class dynamics for a further articulation with 
global capital. 
6.4 The Issues Determining Fractional Divisions in Bank Restructuring 
The need to refocus accumulation towards global competitiveness provides the 
broader context for the analysis of divisions between fractions of capital over banking 
reform. What the state and the IMF wanted from banking reform was to reorient patterns 
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of accumulation of Turkish conglomerates; not just to distinguish between prudent and 
imprudent banks. In deciding who might achieve the IMP-Turkish state standards for a 
certain conceived form of global accumulation, the judgment involved patterns of 
accumulation and forms of global integration rather than just corporate treasuries being 
prudent. This is not to say that the state's judgment on which banks survived and which 
went into decline was always 'right' (for there are no water-tight criteria here). Yet, the 
general rationale for state policy can be depicted in this way, revealing a more 
comprehensive explanation of banking reform that has hitherto been presented. 
Briefly, in determining the line between the failing and surviving banks, the 
state and the IMP sought to support the conglomerates with the capacity to accumulate 
competitively in globally integrated markets. While the state and the IMP were never 
explicit about the characteristics that determined the viability of PC, three were apparent: 
• ability to make investments in globally dynamic industries with growth potential, 
• potential to generate international capital flows from/to Turkey, and/or to raise 
export revenues, and 
• capacity to interact with the globally most advanced individual capitals. 
These are not simple indicators of bank performance, for with banking 
integrated into conglomerates there was more at stake than just prudent banking: the 
whole direction of capital accumulation in Turkey was at issue. Accordingly, these are 
· the criteria that the IMP and the Turkish state appear to have used to form their model for 
what a successful, restructured corporation looks like. The conglomerates having these 
attributes by and large passed the threshold of seizure and constructed the new PC of 
Turkey. 
6.5 An Alternative Classification 
According to three criteria identified above there is a distinction between those 
conglomerates which did, and those which did not meet the criteria. Accordingly, two 
fractions of capital can be identified: 
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• The conglomerates that lost their banks were the primitive accumulators 7 
that based their accumulation on rent seeking and were dependent on it for their 
viability , and 
• · The conglomerates that kept their banks were the dynamic accumulators 
that had a real accumulation basis in addition to benefiting from state-based 
rents of finance protectionism. 
Accordingly, the banks will be grouped into two in line with their conglomerates' 
different relations to state finance protectionism in the post-1980 era. 
In contrast with a division between large and small banks, this grouping of 
conglomerates (and their banks) explain why some of smaller banks were demanding the 
same reform policies as some larger banks. 8 As well, while some smaller banks 
succeeded in surviving, we need to explain why some relatively mqre important players 
such as Demirbank and Pamukbank were eliminated by state reform. That is, both of the 
above-indicated sub-divisions will include relatively large and smaller banks 
simultaneously so that. a large-small dichotomy, while a convenient starting point for 
explanation, proves insufficient. 
Thus, focusing on conglomerates themselves instead of only banks will explain 
why the large/small, old/new and risky/conservative banker are limited explanations -
that the grouping of banks has to be based on the patterns of accumulation of their 
conglomerates. Then the critical aspects of accumulation - e.g. rent-seeking finance; 
relations between financial and industrial components; types of industrial expansion; and 
forms of global accumulation (export, direct investment (and where); joint venture (and 
with whom)), etc. -will come to the fore in exploring the tensions within banking. 
The critical point of differentiation between the primitive accumulators and the 
dynamic accumulators is how they accumulated during the 1980s and 1990s. All of those 
conglomerates benefited from finance protectionism, but some focused their rapid 
accumulation in a range of sectors based on easy finance secured via their banks. These 
7 Regarding primitive accumulation see Marx (1867, Chapter 31). 
8 For instance, small-scale Ko9bank and large-scale ~bank demanded tbe removal oftbe 
full insurance scheme for deposits since tbe scheme allowed some banks to offer high interest 
rates and. this created unfair competition for other banks (see "Engin Ak9akoca: Mevduattaki 
Devlet Giivencesi Smrrlandmlmah", Diinya, Financial Institutions Supplement, 26 April 1999, 
p.6; "Haksiz Rekabeti Durdurun", Curnhuriyet, 28 March 2001). 
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were the primitive accumulators, dependent on state-based rents and thus, vulnerable in 
their accumulation on a long-run basis. 
They mainly relied either on redistribution of surplus value via the state and 
gathered speculative sorts of profit or at best on extraction of absolute surplus value. 
Even though some did produce relative surplus value it was insufficient to sustain the 
whole conglomerate: they were caught up in state-based rents and hit by the cycle of 
downturn. 
The other group of capital, the dynamic accumulators, while gaining rents from 
finance protectionism, so long as they were on offer, were also accumulating via the 
production of new value on a substantial and independently sustainable basis. Hence, the 
dynamic accumulators were distinguished by their capacity to capture relative surplus 
value on a global scale unlike the primitive accumulators who were 'locked in' to the 
surplus value captured by the Turkish state. The dynamic accumulators were the 
conglomerates with flexibility for new forms of accumulation, especially those related to 
global integration. 
While the dynamic accumulators did reap the benefits of state finance 
protectionism, more importantly, they base their accumulation on a long-term viable 
pattern along with. Indeed, almost as if portending a financial crisis, the dynamic 
accumulators started to reorient their banks towards traditional banking activities even 
before the imposition of banking reform. The sectors that they have activated in as well 
as their capacity and forms of integration with global capital allowed them to solidify 
their positions at the leading edge of Turkish capital. 
On the contrary, the primitive accumulators did not fit into this industrial 
reorientation. Despite being sheltered by their. existence in finance, they could not 
establish a long-run, sound accumulation basis, with their concentration in low-value 
added/ highly volatile/ subsidy dependent sectors. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to set up the theoretical framework for making sense of 
bank restructuring as part of a broader reorganisation of capital in Turkey to give it an 
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international orientation, and one in which .capital from Turkey participates as an active 
player. The categories are by no means obvious. The existence of conglomerates means 
that the lines of division within banking are neither clear nor simple. 
But seeing Turkey's banks as part of conglomerates is the. key. They are a 
completely organised 'system' of accumulation, and the division between them must be 
understood in this dimension - not whether banks are large or small, new or old, etc. 
Before developing a detailed explanation of the fractional divisions within 
banking conglomerates, two important points must be emphasised. First, there have not 
simply been two types of conglomerates: primitive and dynamics accumulators. There are 
indeed diverse capitals within each group; and the following two chapters will explore 
these diverse patterns by reference to sub-divisions with the two primary categories. 
Indeed, these sub-categories can be read as tensions within each of the two types of 
accumulation. 
Second, however, it must be noted that there will be some overlapping 
characteristics among these sub-divisions, i.e. these categories are not entirely mutually 
exclusive, but two ends of a continuum. As a result, some corporations do not fall neatly 
onto one category or the other. The aim is here to identify the fractions according to the 
centre of gravity among the characteristics of their patterns of accumulation (such as 
scale of conglomerates (small/large), focused sectors (industrial/non-industrial), 
domestic/international orientation, forms of global accumulation (export/productive 
investments), and link with TNCs). The object is not to label industrial conglomerates 
definitively in one fraction or the other - the object is t~ identify broad patterns of 
accumulation that help to give meaning to the .reform process. 
Accordingly, the argument by Siinmez 9 that is 'confiscated banks were chosen 
by a coalition among surviving banks' conglomerates, the state and the IMF' ignores 
some deeper criteria in the selection process. Siinmez contends that in the seizure cases 
of Pamukbank and Demirbank, the issue was not bank-efficiency; but, the market 
struggle between rival conglomerates extending beyond banking such as the GSM 
market. That point may be true of itself, however, as later chapters will show, it is 
9 See Tuncay Mollaveisoglu, "Oyun iyinde Oyun", Ak!)am, 20 September 2002; Tuncay 
Mollaveisoglu, "IMF-BDDK Geryegi", Ak!jam, 21 September 2002. 
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divisions within banking, as a reflection of wider divisions within accumulation, that 
provides the key. 
On the basis of the general analytical framework developed in this chapter, the 
following two chapters will decompose Turkish FC into the primitive_ and the dynamic 
accumulators. The discussion of fractional tensions within FC will show that the nation 
state's mediative rple between fractions of capital is becoming even more significant as 
capital accumulation becomes increasingly global. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATORS 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 The Primitive Accumulators: New and Old 
7.3 The New-Primitives 
7.3.1 First Sub-division within the New-Primitives 
7.3.2 Second Sub-division within the New-Primitives 
7.4 The Old-Primitives 
7.5 High-Performing Primitive Accumulators: Drawing the Line 
7.6 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The bourgeoisie has been created and nurtured by the state throughout the history 
of Turkey. The tension involved in. this process is that not all parts of capital always 
receive equal nurturing. Indeed, some parts may be nurtured to the exclusion of others. 
The difficulty for the state is to determine which parts of capital (forms of accumulation) 
will be facilitated in their expansion, and which will not. 
In the post-1980 era in Turkey, it appeared that the state could nurture a wide 
variety of capitals through a process that we earlier characterised as 'finance 
protectionism', but it became well-recognised that this was an unsustainable regime. For 
the macroeconomists, the unsustainability was expressed in high interest rates, hyper 
inflation and a blow-out in government debt. For analysts of the dynamics of capital 
accumulation, the unsustainability was expressed through the process of what Marx 
(1867) called 'primitive accumulation' (Capital Volume 1 and Chapter 31). The problem 
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of finance protectionism lay in the fact that the state was nurturing primitive 
accumulation to the exclusion of'real' capitalist accumulation.' 
Marx's distinction here is important. Real capitalist accumulation occurs in fully 
capitalist economies of commodified labour and capital and extensive market relations. 
Profits can be equated with efficiency in the production of value. Primitive accumulation 
is a developmentally prior process. It is associated with the entry of capitalist 
accumulation into essentially non-capitalist contexts. Profits come not from capitalist 
efficiency under competitive conditions, but from the capacity to utilise cheap, non-
commodified labour, free land, and state patronage. 
It is the latter process that connects primitive accumulation to banking. Marx 
(1867, 919-920), in the context of 1600s' Europe, pointed out that state debts were the 
source of primitive accumulation for banks: 
The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As 
with the stroke of an enchanter's wand, it endows unproductive money with the power of 
creation and thus turns it into capital, without forcing it to expose itself to the troubles 
and risks inseparable from its e!flployment in industry or even in usury ... 
At their birth the great banks, decorated with national titles, were only associations of 
private speculators, who placed themselves by the side of governments and, thanks to the 
privileges they received, were in a position to advance money to those governments. 
Hence the accumulation of the national debt has no more infallible measure than the 
successive rise in the stock of these banks .... 
Similarly, at the end of 20th century, the Turkish state heavily borrowed from 
Turkish-based banks at grossly inflated rates of interest, creating a process of primitive 
accumulation. Banks, owned by conglomerates, and other large scale capital placed funds 
to government securities at higher than market rates of interest. Hence, state borrowing 
succeeded in enhancing not only banking capital, but it also nurtured 
commercial/industrial capital. 
As the Turkish state, under the direction of the IMF, sought to withdraw its 
support of primitive accumulation and redirect capital to real, dynamic accumulation, it 
1 However, 'the exclusion of real accumulation' is not used here in a Keynesian sense 
which points to wrong state policies that could not promote industrial development. Rather, the 
thesis stresses that the promotion of primitive accumulation by the Turkish state was a transitory 
phase which temporarily subsidised some fractions of capital to reorient their accumulation 
competitively and globally. 
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faced the reality that private sector profits of banking would decline (at least in the short 
run). The state had to determine which banks (and attached conglomerates) would be 
nurtured and which would be sacrificed. The state had to determine which capitals could 
flourish in the absence of state subsidies and which were irretrievably tied to primitive 
accumulation. 
In this chapter, the conglomerates of banks that were liquidated - the primitive 
accumulators - are identified. In the following chapter, the dynamic accumulators are 
identified. In both cases, the object of the chapter is to identify the patterns of 
accumulation of individual conglomerates. In the context of the primitive accumulators, 
the chapter shows a range of forms of accumulation that, while profitable under financial 
protectionism, and possible even viable after it, were not deemed to have the hallmarks of 
growth, productivity and global competitiveness. 
Before identifying the different patterns of primitive accumulation, three guiding 
principles need to be addressed. 
First, during the period of finance protectionism all bank owners profited from 
financial protectionism. Accordingly, the dividing line between the primitive and the 
dynamic accumulators is not simply related to bank prudence. For instance, the IMF 
pointed out the differentiation within private deposit banking as follows: 
The net income of private DMBs [Deposit Money Banks] accounted for almost three 
fourths of the after tax net income of the banking system ... The average structure of 
income ... masks a wide variation among private DMBs. A number of these banks -
accounting for almost one third of total banking sector assets - are heavily reliant on 
interest income from securities, with such income amounting to well over one third of 
total interest income. While many of these banks are large, well capitalised and engaged 
in a wide range of other activities, some are quite small and appear to rely almost 
uniquely on income from securities transactions. (IMF 1998, 128) 
Hence, there were also dynamic accumulators whose banking practices were 
dubious. 2 This is why we need to look deeper into the accumulation strategies. For some 
2 For instance, Sabuncuoglu (2002) indicates that Koc;:bank of Koc;: Group bore a 
substantial interest rate exposure in 1998 associated with an aggressive maturity gap arising from 
the ratio of commitments from repo transactions to total assets. However, while Koc;:bank could 
manage to reduce this ratio in 1999 and 2000, Demirbank whose off-balance sheet repo 
commitments to assets ratio jumped to 83% in 1999 was caught to November 2000 crisis with 
this dangerous imbalance in its funding structure. 
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(the dynamic accumulators) state debt finance was utilised to restructure their 
accumulation towards global competitiveness. The dynamic accumulators benefited 
hugely from finance protectionism, but it was not their life-line. But for others (the 
primitive accumulators) there was no such long-term viable basis in their accumulation 
and instead, they faced decline when state borrowing started to contract through the 
changes in the finance system. So the issue for primitive accumulators is not that they 
benefited from finance protectionism, but that they were not viable without it. 
Second, it is important that we do not conflate the age or size of banks with their 
forms of accumulation. There may be a tendency to presume that the unsustainable 
corporations were those that had entered banking only recently in order to share the rents 
from state borrowing, and that they would be likely to be small because they were new. 
But this was not the determining factor of survival, for it is the pattern of accumulation, 
not size or age that determined viability. The IMF, cited above, noted that there were 
larger and smaller banks which were not viable and, as will become clear below, there 
were old, established banks as well as new entrants to banking which were confiscated. 
Having said that, size and age are irrelevant to a corporation's pattern of 
accumulation, below there is a distinction between old primitive accumulators and new 
primitive accumulators. Newer banks are likely to be smaller, and smaller banking 
conglomerates are likely to have a different spread of investments from conglomerates 
that have evolved over 80 years. But the point is that size and age per se are not the 
determining factors in themselves - it is only the extent to which those characteristics 
affect a corporation's pattern of accumulation that they matter. 
Third, while the following analysis (and in the next chapter too) seeks to identifY 
particular conglomerates with particular patterns of accumulation, the 'fits' are not 
always exact. After all, individual capitals accumulate in all sorts of particular ways -
As such, some other conservative banks, such as Altematifbank, Anadolubank, 
Denizbank, Tekstilbank and Finansbank, despite having better asset quality compared to the 
primitive accumulators' banks, expanded their open currency position in 1999 and 2000 and thus, 
had weakness originating from currency mismatch (Sabuncuoglu 2002, 70-71 ). The fragility 
created more serious problems for these banks following the February 2001 crisis. During that 
time, Turkey abandoned its currency peg and Turkish Lira was devalued up to 60% within 200 I 
and closed the year with a year-on-year devaluation rate of 54%. This was the reason for a debt-
swap operation by the Treasury, an issue to which Chapter II will return. 
I 
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they are not driven by the needs of taxonomy. So the taxonomy below should be seen as 
depicting a range of processes, not a literal depiction of the accumulation of each and 
every primitive accumulator. 
7.2 The Primitive Accumulators: New and Old 
The primitive accumulators are the conglomerates that lost their banks (and for 
some, other financial/non-financial companies) because of confiscations. They showed 
two general characteristics. Firstly, they aggressively exploited the opportunities of 
finance protectionism to accelerate their accumulation throughout the 1990s .. In many 
cases, they entered banking simply to plunder funds. The opportunity to exceed legal 
limits on connected lending facilitated the transfer of funds to subsidiaries in other 
sectors often when these companies would not have been viable without subsidized credit. 
Secondly, they were centrally involved in state debt finance as a primary form of 
accumulation. Thus, the second complementary attraction for their penetration to banking 
in the 1990s was to be involved in state debt finance. For these banks, .there was no 
difficulty in offering high interest rates to collect deposits since all deposits were under 
the full state guarantee (after the 1994 financial crisis) and the state was paying higher 
rates of interest 'to close the ever-yawning budget deficit' (Miinir 1998). Furthermore, 
the interest-exchange rate anchor encouraged banks to hold open positions 3 in order to 
finance state borrowing. As a result, weak financial structures characterised these banks.4 
Most of these bank embezzlements were done by some rising conglomerates of 
the 1980s and 1990s whik some old/large conglomerates also extensively used their 
banks for dubious purposes. In many cases, bank resources were siphoned off through 
credit allocations . to subsidiaries over legal limits through a complex network of 
mechanisms such as the use of fictitious companies, off-shore bank transactions and 
back-to back credits between banks (e.g. Siimerbank, Esbank, interbank, Egebank, 
Yurtbank and Bank Ekspres). 
3 FX deposits and credits from international financial institutions. 
4 High market and credit risks were accompanied by lower CARs than the sector average. 
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As can be seen in Table 7.1, the seized banks can be grouped into two according 
to the announced legal basis for their transfers to the SDIF. The official reasoning for the 
first group of the banks was their weak financial structure/insolvency (Article 14/3 of the 
Banks Act No. 4389). The BRSA (2003a, II) explained that these banks were taken over 
because their financial positions were seriously distorted and that they lost their solvency 
and liquidity during the financial crises. The second group of banks, on the other hand, 
were seized because of the use of bank resources in favour of the majority shareholders 
and the associated bank losses (Article 14/3 and /4 of the Banks Act No. 4389). 
Table 7.1 Official reasoning for the bank transfers to the SDIF 
Insolvency/illiquidity Embezzlement 
Yru;arbank Interbank* 
Dernirbank Bank Ekspres* 
Sitebank Egebank 
Ulusalbank Yurtbank 
Siimerbank 
Esbank 
Etibank 
Bank Kaoital 
Iktisat Bank 
Baymdtrbank 
Kent bank 
EGSBank 
Toprakbank 
Parnukbank 
Imarbank' 
Ada bank' 
--
Source: Developed from SDIF (2003, 9-1 0). 
* These banks were taken over by the SDIF according to the abrogated Banks Act No. 
3182. . 
' The Imarbank case followed a different procedure than the previous embezzlement 
cases. First its banking licence was revoked and the bank's management and control was taken 
over by the SDIF (according to Articles 14/3 and 16/1 of the Banks Act No. 4389). This was 
followed by the liquidation of the bank. The BRSA preferred the liquidation of Imarbank to its 
seizure because over 95% of the banks' liabilities were formed by deposits. The BRSA did not 
want to take over these liabilities under the armounced guarantee for all bank liabilities by the 
government during the November 2000 financial crisis (see Chapter 10). This allowed the 
payment only for saving deposits covered under insurance and the use of bank assets to meet its 
liabilities (see BRSA 2003b; also the statement by Engin Ak9akoca, Head of the BRSA, in Derya 
Sazak, "Sohbet Odasmm Konugu BDDK Ba!jkani Engin Ak9akoca", Milliyet, 22 July 2003). 
6 After the takeover of the control of Imarbank, the SDIF also took the control of 
Adabank (the second bank ofUzan Group) as the bank shareholders lost the status of bank owner 
according to the banking law. 
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Despite the legal articles explaining bank takeovers as inept management and/or 
embezzlement, the fractional analysis of this thesis will show that what led the primitive 
accumulators to be excluded from finance was anchored in the characteristics of overall 
accumulation of the overall conglomerates. A focus on bank treasuries becomes a limited 
explanation for the takeovers. 
What we see of the conglomerates whose banks were confiscated was that their 
accumulation outside of banking was driven by a reliance on low wage, low productivity 
industries where profits are derived from long working days and oppressive working 
conditions, and investment in unstable, newly-emerging sectors and locations, where 
profits may be high, but so too were the risks. 
The primitive accumulators with these characteristics did not form a single pattern 
of accumulation: there are many paths to being unviable! It is therefore useful to classify 
them into two broad groups: new primitives and old primitives, for the time of entry into 
banking does indeed generate different patterns of accumulation. Within these two 
categories, there can be identified some sub-categories, signalling different corporate 
strategies within each of the old and new primitives. Table 7.2 will help clarify our 
categories before they are explained in detail. 
Table 7.2 Primitive accumulators 
First sub-division 
New primitives Second sub-division 
Old primitives 
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New-primitives were the rising capitals of the 1980s and 1990s. 7 They were the 
conglomerates that were a direct product of finance protectionism. When they diversified, 
it was into low ·investment and/or high turnover industries, especially labour intensive 
production, mainly in the service sector or construction. Thus, they relied on 
speculatively-driven profits and redistribution of surplus value via the state. Some others, 
besides investing heavily in the service sector, at the same time engaged in export-
oriented, but low-value added, non-growth industries (with shrinking export potential in 
the long-run) such as textiles and wood products. Their common characteristic was that 
they relied on absolute surplus value production and tried to accelerate their low levels of 
accumulation by supporting those activities with their banking leverages and, in many 
cases, close links with politicians. 8 With these characteristics, as a whole, the new-
primitives were not viable accumulators in the long- run. 
Old-primitives, on the other· hand, refer to some older/larger conglomerates 
operating in a wider range of industrial sectors. These conglomerates mainly matured 
during the lSI and, internationalised their circuits of capital through export after 1980. 
But they remained in the culture of that earlier period. They expanded from the industries 
7 While some of these conglomerates were established after 1980, some started to operate 
as local companies before then as in the case of Siizer Group. The owner Mustafa Siizer entered 
contracting and trade businesses in 1953 in Gaziantep City and became well known with his 
foreign trade operations during the post-1980 export orientation. However, as a common feature, 
all these conglomerates rapidly developed in the post-1980 period. 
8 In the cases ofKorkmaz Yi~t, Garipoglu and Nergis Groups, the owners' names were 
also mentioned with mafia links. For instance, the Tiirkbank tender that was won by Korkmaz 
Yi~t was cancelled by the government since the mafia was involved in the bid process. The 
decline of the Bay:mdrr Group related to the involvement of the owner Kamuran yOrtilk to this 
. mafia link. This involvement caused a loss of prudence for Ba)'lnd1r Group and as a result, the 
TUSIAD annulled yOrtilk's membership in the Association. 
These kinds of relations were used to finance acquisitions of some banks as well as other 
state tenders. For instance, although Garipoglu Group offered the highest price for the bid of 
POA~ petroleum distribution company in 1998, it not only lost the bid, but also the source of the 
money that the Group offered was investigated by the Financial Crimes Inspection Board (Arslan 
2001, 344; see also for the link between the owner Hayyam Garipoglu and Nesim Malki, a 
famous Jewish usurer, during the acquisition ofprivatised Siirnerbank in Arslan 2001, 342-349). 
Besides using their banks' funds, in many cases, these conglomerates also utilised credit 
from state banks. For instance, the management of Halk Bank was accused of giving high risk 
credits to Demirel Group of companies (see "Usiilsiiz Kredi", Curnhuriyet, 7 October 2000). In 
some cases, the conglomerates used those credits to fmance acquisitions of banks, such as 
Siirnerbank and Egebank 
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that were their lSI base and, despite engaging with profitable, surplus value producing 
activities, these companies heavily based their expansion on the finance of their holding 
banks. Therefore, they were caught up in high debts and rapidly became unprofitable 
when the global recession and the following crisis in the domestic market contracted the 
economy and banking. As a result, during the reform, these conglomerates had difficulty 
in reducing their debt ratios and this limited their capacity to inject capital into the banks 
in order to avoid seizures. However, it was not only unsuccessful corporate management 
that led their banks to insolvency and eventually to the seizures. As will be discussed 
below, some of these old primitives may have been viable in the long run, albeit without 
a capacity to adapt to global competition. But from the perspective of the IMF and the 
Turkish state, they needed to be discarded from finance so that banking capital could be 
the centralised. 
Hence, in common with new· primitives, these conglomerates relied on the easy 
finance of their banks in spite of having a stronger industrial focus in their accumulation. 
However, unlike many dynamic accumulators, despite some bourgeoning in the late 
1990s, they could not expand into global accumulation via IDI. 9 
Overall, the primitive accumulators were unable to adapt to a globally-integrated, 
competitive environment. The division between the old and new primitives highlighted 
essentially where they got 'stuck' in their accumulation. The old primitives got stuck in 
the dependency of their expansions/productions on excessive finance of connected 
lending. The new primitives got stuck in lSI period - especially in industries that were 
outmoded, low-growth and/or non-industrial sectors with a highly volatile (boom-bust) 
character. In a time of downturn, these characteristics led them to be further dependent on 
finance-based rent seeking that was not globally competitive. The new and old primitive 
accumulators will therefore be considered separately. Particular conglomerates will be 
identified within these categories. But, of course; even within these sub-groups, 
individual conglomerates were not identical in their patterns. 
9 Here the large <;ukurova Group was an exception with its IDis. 
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7.3 The New-Primitives 
The new primitive accumulators were made up of two somewhat distinct sub-
divisions, based on their process of capturing surplus value and accompanying different 
forms of internationalisation. While the first new-primitives based their construction and 
service sector operations on state finance protectionism (state-secured, redistributed 
surplus value), the second new-primitives used state-based financial rents mainly to 
support industrial accumulation in outmoded-low value added sectors (absolute surplus 
value). 
7.3.1 The First Sub-Division within New-Primitives 
This sub-division refers to the conglomerates that grew in the service sector 
(mainly finance), media and construction rather than manufacturing industry. They 
accumulated in the sectors that were domestically-oriented· which were, to some degree, 
immune from competition via regulation. These conglomerates entered the sectors in 
which state monopolies had been opened to Turkish capital since the 1980s such as the 
media (TV and radio broadcasting), the defence industry, aviation and energy (Sonmez 
1992b, 154). In addition, they entered internationally-oriented activities that were 
subsidised significantly by the state such as tourism, international construction and 
finance. The crucial characteristic is that this group entered banking in the 1980s and 
especially in the 1990s10 as a means to secure cheap lines of credit to these service 
sector/construction activities that were themselves only viable due to state regulation 
which created monopoly rents. JJ Accordingly, the 'surplus value' they appropriated was 
due not to high productivity production (relative surplus value) but to state protection, 
and lienee, redistributed surplus value. For the construction-oriented ones, for example, 
they could make profits as long as property prices went up, i.e. they were asset-
contingent and speculatively driven in their profitability. 
10 Except Demirbank of Cmgtlhojllu Group which was in banking since the 1950s. 
11 The rate of return on the new activity or finance was so high that this became the 
primary focus of accumulation, and it spread into finance-related and leverage-dependent 
mercantilist activities, like leasing, factoring, brokerage and insurance throughout the 1990s. 
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In this sub-group, we see the following conglomerates: 
• mainly construction focused Ceylan Group of Bank Kapital, Balkaner Group 
of Yurtbank, Siirmeli Group of Sitebank, Baymdu Group of Baymdubank, 
Siizer Group of Kentbank, 12 and Korkmaz Yigit Group of Bank Ekspres, 13 
• media & finance-focused Medya Sabah Group of Etibank and Avrupa ve 
Amerika Group of Iktisat Bank and, 
• finance focused Cmg!lhoglu Group of Demirbank and Ulusal Bank. 14 
The reason for these conglomerates to focus ·on service sector/construction 
rather than other industries was related to overall conditions of accumulation making 
· industrial activities less profitable in the 1990s. The high real interest rate and overvalued 
exchange rate policy, which lured short-term money inflows to Turkey, shifted 
investments from tradable to non-tradable sectors and encouraged imports at the expense 
of exports. Hence, the higher profitability of non-tradable sectors than commodity export 
industries led these conglomerates to operate in finance, construction, tourism, energy, 
aviation, media, publishing, transportation and the health industry. As a result, given their 
lower levels of accumulation, they sought rapid growth in those highly profitable and 
relatively competition-immune non-industrial sectors. 
Besides publishing by the media-focused conglomerates, the main 'productive' 
activity that they moved into was construction- notable for both its links to finance, state 
bids and for its boom/bust character (big profits in the booms, then insolvency). Indeed, 
12 The Turkish Daily News reported that Siizer Group's Atlas Investment Bank (1998) 
was also closed down by the SDIF because of weak financial structure due to connected party 
lending. The Group had established this bank to support its investment projects in Black Sea and 
Caucasus Region (see "Turkey bails out five insolvent banks, closes two others", Turkish Daily 
News, II July 200 I, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/07 11 01/econ.htm#el). 
13 The transfer of Bank Ekspres to the SDIF followed a different path from the other 
banks. The owner Korkmaz Yigit needed to sell the bank to the SDIF since the bank faced 
financial difficulties after his involvement with mafia ·in the tender of Tiirkbank was revealed. 
The SDIF opened a lawsuit on the ground of bank-embezzlement following the purchase of the 
bank (''Yigit'in Banka Sevdas1 Devlete 350 Mil yon Do lara Patlach", Hilrriyet, 25 October, 2002). 
14 The recent annulation of the takeovers of Kentbank and Demirbank by the Council of 
State does not invalidate the thesis' analysis. In contrast, it is consistent with the argument that 
the state and the IMF could save some ailing banks via subsidies, but the need to increase the 
concentration of banking capital required the elimination of some primitive accumulators. 
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being aware of this volatile nature, the construction-originated conglomerates moved to 
other sectors in order to balance fluctuations in this sector. 15 These conglomerates, 
however, expanded into other volatile/marginal sorts of sectors such as tourism, health, 
wholesaling, and finance rather than industrial activities. Consequently, within this sub-
division, the stress on quick accumulation gave focus to the high risk, high volatile, and 
high margin sorts of activities - accumulating as if current conditions in the domestic 
finance, international banking and domestic and international construction would last 
forever. 
Indeed, even though they established themselves in these lucrative non-
industrial sectors of the 1990s, before banking reform, some of the conglomerates 
(particularly Baymd1r and Siizer Groups) tried to internationalise/diversify beyond their 
leverage-dependent, high volatile, high margin sorts of activities. They started to place 
capital to industry and were recognised by their attempts to internationalise through IDis 
and foreign partner searches inside and outside Turkey. 16 As well, these conglomerates 
hoped to capture a share of the ongoing privatisation process in the strategic energy and 
telecommunication sectors via foreign partnerships. 17 Nonetheless, their main focus 
"For instance, Kamuran <;:ortilk of Ba)'lnd1r Group (Gevis; 1998, 141) explained the 
reason for their penetration to other sectors as follows: 'While in Europe there are many old firms 
in construction sector, here [in Turkey] one can not see surviving companies after some period. 
This is not related to skilfulness or incompetency of contractors. This is the destiny for the 
countries living the "boom-bust economy" very often such as Turkey. Once the approach towards 
investments is too volatile, one cannot remain in construction for a long period. Since we knew 
this fact, we always tried to develop into other sectors'. 
16See the statements by Chairman of Siizer Group, Mustafa Siizer in "Siizer: Turkey's EU 
membership 10 years away'', Turkish Daily News, 20 December 1999, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/12 20 99/feature.ht:m and "Siizer takes stakes in 
cardboard producers", Turkish Daily News, 30 May 2000, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/05 30 00/econ.htm ; 
and the statement by Chairman of Ba)'lndrr Group, Karnuran <;:ortilk, URL: 
http://www.Baymd1r.com.tr/KURUM/ingilizlbask mesaj.htm (accessed 27 November 2002). 
For instance, Siizer Group bought the export-oriente.d carton production plant (ZMK. 
Nikopol) in Bulgaria via privatization and entered the insurance sector with Italian Assicurazioni 
Generali (Nurten Erk, "Siizer, Et ve Siite Giriyor", Hiirriyet, 24 July 2000). Siizer Group also 
planned new projects in contracting and tourism with international partners besides expanding in 
fast-food business with Pepsi-Cola with whom the Group already operates the Kentucky-Fried 
Chicken and Pizza-Hut franchises (see Poyraz 2000a, 46-47). 17 Ba)'llldlr Group identified the energy and health sectors as its strategic focus in the 
2000s. The Group aimed to be the first or second operator in the energy sector through 
r 
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remained on non-industrial sectors and domestic accumulation. 18 As a result, the volatile 
nature of their sectoral focus severely affected these basically inward-oriented/non-
industrial groups when there was the dramatic shrinkage in domestic demand during the 
crises. Meanwhile, as in the cases of Ceylan, Balkaner and Korkmaz Yigit Groups, there 
was an attempt to use their banks as a cushion for survival during the slump. 19 
The other area of expansion of some of the new primitives was international 
finance. Perhaps surprisingly, some of these new primitives such as Baymdu, Siizer and 
A vrupa ve Am erika Groups expanded their financial arms to the international arena 
through establishments/acquisitions of overseas banks and branches. 20 Hence, given 
their international operations, it can be questioned that they did not appear to be banks 
that were going to be seized. However, a closer look at their international banking 
collaboration with foreign capital such as English National Power and American Mirnag (see 
Karata~ 1998). 
As such, Stizer Group projected energy and telecommunication sectors as strategic. This 
Group won some electricity distribution bids in Turkey and made a partnership agreement with an 
American energy company. In addition, it joined to GSM tender bids with some domestic and 
foreign partners (see "Fondaki 8 Banka Birle~tirilsin", Diinya, 4 January 2000). Ceylan and 
A vrupa ve Amerika Groups took part in the bidding of electricity distribution projects, as well. 
18 Baymd1r Group entered industry in 1994 via the acquisition of Sagra, an established 
company in food-industry. On the other hand, Stizer Group, besides entering paper industry, was 
in the process of launching meat and dairy production (see Nurten Erk: Stizer, Et ve Sute Giriyor", 
Hiirriyet, 24 July 2000). However, given the insigificant level of involvement in industry, the 
owner Mustafa Siizer stated that they were not assertive in this sector (see Poyraz 2000, 46). 
19 For instance, Mahmut Ceylan of·Ceylan Group stated that they faced difficulties as a 
result of the crisis in the tourism and construction sectors in 1998. This forced, he argued, the 
group companies to utilize loans from their holding bank 'Bank Kapital' which followed a 
prudent policy on connected lending by then (see "Former Manageni of Bailed out Banks Banned 
from Travelling Abroad", Turkish Daily News, 30 October 2000, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/ I 0 30 OO/dom.htm#d2; "Ceylanlann Bank 
Kapital'i 191 Milyon Dolarla Batt!", Hiirriyet, 26 October 2002). 
Also, Ali Balkaner of Balkaner Group contended that the economic crisis and the 
Mannara earthquake adversely affected the Group. The group companies could not repay their 
bank loans because they could not sell the real estate, he added (see ''Balkaner Defends Himself 
with Tears", Turkish Daily News, 20 March 2001, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/03 20 01/dom.htm). 
2
° For example, A vrupa ve Amerika Group firstly entered finance in 1984 with lktisat 
Bank which became an important foreign trade specialist bank and then in the 1990s, media 
became the second focus. In finance, the Group expanded· domestically with Turkey's first 
leasing (1986) and factoring (1990) companies and also became an early representative in the 
international expansion of Turkish banking with four overseas banks in the following years (the 
Park Avenue Bank N.A., Banque Internationale ·de Commerce-Bred, Iktisat Bank Moscow and 
Trade Deposit Bank). 
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operations reveals that they were not long-term-growth oriented even though the degree 
of dependence on primitive accumulation varied among the new primitives. 
Crucially, while many of these conglomerates internationalised their banking 
operations, they were getting into areas without strong prudential supervision that could 
be run as an extension of their leveraged, Turkish operations. Off-shore banking units, 
overseas banks and other financial companies were used to complete the embezzlement 
networks which also included the Turkish bank branches of the conglomerates. Most of 
these overseas banking activities were performed in the East European countries, the EU 
and Republics of Former Soviet Union especially Turkish speaking CIS countries. They 
expanded to these sites, however, not to enter into the globally competitive banking 
industry, but simply to support their own industrial expansions into these transitional 
economies - investments that were themselves in the pattern of primitive accumulation, 
generally using cheap local labour and often outmoded equipment to produce labour-
intensive output. The point is that these global expansions were only profitable so long as 
the transitional economies were in the phase of primitive accumulation, and their 
financial expansions were similarly dependent. Neither would have been viable in the 
advanced capitalist environment of Western Europe. 
Among these conglomerates, distinctively, Cmgtlhoglu Group did not expanded 
into other sectors by exploiting bank resources and remained finance focused. 21 The 
Group aimed to become a regional/global player in international finance markets. To this 
end, it established banks in Kyrgyzstan, Bulgaria, Romania and the Netherlands, 
sometimes in partnership with international institutions such as IFC, EBRD and FMO. 22 
21 The history of Cmg~lhoglu Group goes back to the 1920s, but it had a dramatic 
expansion in the 1990s thanks to the state debt finance; except two of 22 group companies were 
younger than eight years of age (Polat, Bahadtr & <;:elik 2000, 24). 
Despite the finance focus, the Group has an interest in a company that has distributed 
power in central Turkey since 1926. It also established Demir Energy in 1998 to provide technical 
advice on energy projects in Turkey and Central Asia and has been active in air transportation 
since 1997. 
Demirbank was not an embezzlement case, but had a heavy reliance on state deficit 
finance. This overdependence on government securities, the high interest rates and liquidity 
squeeze during the November 2000 fmancial crisis Jed to its seizure. 
22 Distinctively, Cmgtlhoglu Group did not give Up operating in finance despite losing its 
banks. The Group restarted its finance activities through the purchase of factoring and brokerage 
companies. Also, since the Group did not Jose its banks because of embezzlement, but 
mismanagement, the bank shareholders could legally retain the status of bank owner. Therefore, 
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Siizer Group also aimed to be a regional banking player in Eastern Europe and purchased 
National Commercial Bank of Albania together with EBRD and IFC besides applying for 
bank permission to enter Europe. 23 However, apart from the objective of being a regional 
banking player, the main rationale for the establishment of overseas banks by these 
conglomerates, as stated above, was to· support the growth of their international non-
finance businesses that were mainly in service sector and construction. 24 
they were able to buy Toprak Investment Bank from the SDlF-bank and renamed it as 'C Kredi 
ve Kallanma Bankasz-C Bank' which operates as a one branch-investment bank (see ~eyda 
Agtrglil, "Finanstan Vazge9emiyor", Finansal Forum, 24 July 2003). Moreover, while Demirbank 
was sold to HSBC after its confiscation, its subsidiaries abroad went through separate 
privatization procedures. Cmgtlhoj;lu, however, was successful to keep some of its banks abroad. 
In late 2001, the Cmgtlhoj;lu-Doj;an consortium bought Demirbank (Bulgaria), Demir Halk-Bank 
N.V., Demir-Ktrgtz International Bank and Demir Kazakhstan Bank ("Demirbank Bulgaria AD 
Business Card", URL: http://www.demirbank.bg/right-ci.htm (accessed 18 November 2002). 
23 See the statements by Chairman of Siizer Group, Mustafa Siizer in "Siizer: Turkey's 
EU membership 10 years away", Turkish Daily News, 20 December 1999, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/12 20 99/feature.htm and "Siizer takes stakes in 
cardboard producers", Turkish Daily News, 30 May 2000, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/05 30 00/econ.htm. 
24 For instance, to enter the European market, the Ba}"lndu Group had its first bank in 
Romania 'Banco Turco Romania' in 1993 before having BaYJ.fidubank in Turkey in 1998. This 
overseas bank supported the Group's construction investments in Romania (see Karata~ 1998). 
Indeed, Banca Turco-Romania went bankrupt after there was a run on the bank following 
articles in the press regarding the sale of the equity interests owned by Banco ·commerciala 
Romana and Ba}"lndu Holdings, the significant shareholder of the bank. National Bank of 
Romania (NBR) (2001, 87) notes the process that brought the end for the BaYJ.ndtr Group in 
Romanian finance market was as follows: 'The liquidity crisis was sharpened by the bank 
managers' failure to convert into cash the deposits placed fraudulently with banks abroad in the 
form of collateral for some lending transactions carried out by the respective banks in favour of 
Ba}"lfidu Holdings, and deceitfully recorded by the banks as time deposits instead of collateral 
deposits (in off-balance sheet accounts). The wrongful recognition of the respective 
commitments rendered impossible the accurate assesment of the bank's financial standing before 
the breakout of the crisis. The NBR Board, assisted by the Romanian Government, tried to gain 
the support of the Turkish authorities to find and implement solutions to put an end to the crisis. 
The financial and banking crisis that hit Turkey in November 2000 thwarted this endeavour'. 
In order to prevent the bankruptcy of its Romanian bank, some companies of the Ba}"lndu 
Group were apportioned between two banks in Turkey. First of all, the Turkish government 
ordered the state bank, Valofbank, to strike off BaYJ.ndtr's debts totalling $93 million and sent 
$25 million to the troubled bank. In exchange, Valofbank obtained minority shares in Ba}"lfidrr's 
two companies. The use of Valofbank caused tension between the President and the Prime 
Minister as the President asked to his inspectors to investigate the case and then asked the Prime 
Minister to prosecute the managers of the bank. Prime Minster Ecevit defended himself saying 
that 'he was fearful of the adverse effects of the bank's possible collapse could have on Turkish 
Romanian relations and Turkish companies doing business in Romania' (Euromoney 2001a). On 
the other hand, BaYJ.ndtr Group had to transfer its company operating in the health industry to i~ 
Bank in exchange for its credit debts to this bank (see Nurten Erk, "~ Bankast Zorla Girdigi 
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Those conglomerates which did not have overseas banks used their presence in 
domestic banking to expand their domestic and international investments in other sectors. 
The domestically-oriented Ceylan Group, for instance, pursued a policy of opening-up to 
foreign markets and secured some large construction contracts in Israel, Kazakhstan and 
Bulgaria even though the Israel and Bulgarian contracts were cancelled after the 
confiscation of Bank Kapital. 25 The tendency for using overseas banking activities to 
support international expansion was also observed in Ceylan Group. The conglomerate 
declared that it could establish a bank in Israel after winning a construction bid in Israel 
(Hattsaru & Uz 1998, 21). 
Therefore, members of this sub-division of new primitive accumulators were 
indeed profitable companies in the post-1980 period. They might have become viable in 
the long-term. Yet, under the crisis conditions which retarded the realisation of surplus 
value, they went into decline. Banking reform, with strict control over bank-conglomerate 
relations in line with international standards, came at the wrong time for these 
conglomerates. Banking reform not only ended the opportunity of further backing 
holding companies with banks; the reform accelerated their decline also due to the 
seizure of other holding companies along with the banks. 
The dependence on protectionism relied on political connections. In many cases, 
owners of these conglomerates were known for their close links with politicians and 
bureaucrats and it is widely argued that their rapid growth in the 1980s and 1990s was 
contingent on those links. For example, the rapid development of Ceylan Group in the 
1980's was said to be due to its close relations with then Prime Minister Turgut Ozal.26 
In the case of Baymdu Group, which gathered its first accumulation from infrastructural 
Saghk Sektoriinil Sevdi", Hilrriyet, 8 September 2003; "Romanya Yakaladt Kamuran Bey iki 
Bankayt da Yedi", Hilrriyet, 22 October 2002). 
25 
"Ceylan secures much-coveted Israeli airport contract", Turkish Daily News, 21 
August 1998, URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/08 21 98/econ.htm; "Ceylan 
Holding to build three dams in Bulgaria", Turkish Daily News , 29 July 1999, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/07 29 99/econ.htm. 
26 
''Deprem Zengini Ceylanlar", URL: 
http://www.netbul.com/superstar/ozeldosyalar/ekonomi/icibosaltilanbankalar/deprem.asp 
(accessed 13 December 2002). 
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state bids in Turkey, 27 a similar political connection was observed. The owner Kamuran 
<;:ortiik acquired large motorway projects in Romania and Pakistan during the prime 
ministry of Siileyman Demirel who was known having close relationships with <;:ortiik. 
Yet, although part of their primitive accumulation relied on political patronage, their 
connections with politicians could not save them from decline when the time came for 
'objective' criteria to be applied in the selection of conglomerates/ banks. 
To sum up, looking at general patterns of accumulation within FC gives a 
deeper insight into the understanding of what led banks to be confiscated. As banking 
reform eliminated the ailing/embezzled banks under this sub-division, overall 
accumulation strategies of these conglomerates underlay their weak financial structures. 
These conglomerates did not fit the successful, globally competitive corporation model of 
the Turkish state and the IMF and faced decline irr varying degrees with the seizures of 
their banks and some other financial/non-financial companies. 28 
7.3.2 The Second Sub-Division within the New-Primitives 
While the first sub-division of new-primitives specialised in construction and/or 
service sectors and relied on state monopolies (in multiple countries) to secure surplus 
value, the second group of the new primitives relied basically on absolute surplus v~lue 
production. They operated in old lSI industries such as textiles and/or in privatised, 
former state sectors where there were still monopoly practices like broadcasting and the 
defense industry. However, both of these sub-divisions within the new-primitives owed 
their rapid rise to moving to finance sector as well as their political connection. Nergis 
Group of Interbank, EGS Group of EGS ·Bank, Demirel Group of Egebank, Garipoglu 
Group of Siimerbank and Rumeli Group of Imarbank-Adabank are covered under this 
d b d. . . 29 secon su - !VISIOn. 
27 As of 2001, the Ba)'lnd!r Group invested US$ 1.4 bn in 13 state projects (see "lhaleyle 
Biiyiidii Bankalanyla <;:oktii", Sabah, 11 July 2001). 
28 For instance, Ceylan Group withdrew from the media, retailing and finance sectors. It 
sold off its Bonus retailing chain to Do~ Group (see F1rat 2002b ). 
29 Garipoglu and Rumeli Groups are attached to this sub-group even though they operated 
in a wider range of industries. Garipoglu Group operated in chemicals, plastic, food, textiles and 
metal industries. Rumeli Group, on the other hand, first accumulated in the media, construction 
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As with the first sub-division of the new-primitives, these conglomerates had 
grown with close links with the state. For instance, Cavit <;aglar of Nergis Holding, one 
of the majority shareholders in Interbank and partner in Etibank, was a long time 
associate of President Siileyman Demirel as an independent member of Parliament and 
former state minister. Murat Demire1 of Demirel Group-Egebank was the nephew of 
President Siileyman Demirel and this contributed to the rise of the Group. 30 
These conglomerates realised their objective of moving into finance in the second 
half of the 1990s (with the exception of Rumeli Group which entered banking in the 
1980s) to accelerate their growth. In common with the first sub-division of the new 
primitives, they also tended to accumulate in lucrative, but highly volatile/margin 
industries such as housing, media, publication, aviation and the defence industry. 
However, unlikely the first-sub-division that internationalised their non-industrial 
operations mainly via international· banking and construction, these conglomerates 
internationalised through export. They put the money accumulated from trade/ 
construction into the old-lSI industries such as textile/food/wooden products in the late 
1970s onwards and these operations evolved towards export activities in the post-1980 
period. 31 Yet, as indicated in the previous chapter, when the state redefined Turkey's 
industrial policy so as to shift accumulation to capital intensive, high value-added sectors 
(i.e. relative surplus value production) and away from the dominance of cheap labour-
resource intensive sectors, the second division of the new primitives was unable to make 
and finance sectors io the 1980s and then expanded ioto the cement iodustry and power 
distribution through the state privatisation program. Also, the Group achieved the second highest 
market share in the telecommunication sector with its mobile operator Telsim, following 
<;::ukurova Group's Turkcell. 
3° For instance, due to a letter sent by President Siileyman Demirel to Azerbaijan 
President Aliyev, Demirel Group could establish Azerbaijan Economy Bank (see Arslan 2001, 
231). It also appears that Murat Demirel was informed one night before Egebank's confiscation 
through his political connections, but this could not be verified (Arslan 2001, 265). 
31 For iostance, Nergis Group's Ye~im Tekstil (1983) which was the second most 
important clothing company in terms of turnover, was ranked 77th out of a total of 500 111ajor 
companies in Turkey, as disclosed by Istanbul Chamber of Industry for the year 2000. Ye~im 
Tekstil produces for a number of major US and European brands through subcontracting 
(Corporate Magazine 'Once insan', · URL: 
http://www.yesim.eom.tr/yesim english/dergi eskisayilar/mml sm6 3ocak02.htrn (accessed 24 
May 2004)). For the export success of Ye~im Te.kstil see also Goziitok (2005). However, in the 
development of Nergis Group, fictitious export activities in the 1980s also played a role (Arslan 
2001, 357). 
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this transition. Based on low-wages, low productivity production, they could not produce 
surplus value in the long-run even though they had been profitable in some of the largest 
producer and exporter sectors of the Turkish manufacturing industry. 
The tendency to use overseas banking operations to support domestic as well as 
international expansions (mainly through export) was also observed within this sub-
division. Preceding banking reform, EGS Group 32 pursued an overseas bank to back the 
Group's rising export activities which were also supported by its overseas retailing 
companies. 33 Demirel and Garipoglu Groups' overseas banking activities 34 and the 
acquisition of a state-owned oil refinery in Romania by the Garipoglu Group (a contract 
that was cancelled after the Group lost credibility together with Siimerbank's confiscation) 
indicated that these conglomerates were in the process of international opening-up via the 
support of their overseas finance activities. Rumeli Group also had an interest in the 
privatisation of the cement and telecommunication sectors in the ex-soviet transition 
economies and they also wished to complement its banking arm in those markets. 35 
32 Small-to-medium scale Aegean industrialists and exporters operating in textiles jointly 
established a foreign trade company, EGS Clothing Industry and Foreign Trade Company, in 
1993. The rapid growth of the company (Turkey export champion in 1995 and 1996) led to the 
establishment of other holding companies in insurance, transportation, factoring, retailing, textile 
production, energy and off-shore banking. 
The main motive for the establishment of EGS Bank was the limited credit access from 
other banks by EGS Group. For example, EGS Bank General Director Ismail Canseven stated 
that the bank would give financial services in order to support the much higher export potential of 
the Aegean textile industrialists who established the bank (Uzman Goziiyle Bankac!lzk 1995, 88). 
In addition to EGS Group, some other small-to-medium scale industrialists were also 
shareholders in the bank. 
Before the confiscation, the EGS Group pursued wider collaboration with foreign capital. 
Besides gathering a foreign partner in its retailing business in 1998, the Group aimed at setting up 
new free trade zones with foreign partnerships (Ekonomist 1998, 24-25). Also, the Group planned 
to enter electricity production and distribution businesses (see, EGS Enerji ve Egitimde de 
iddiah", Yeniyiizyil, 25 August 1998). However, the EGS Group could not reap the benefits of 
these investments as it faced severe decline after the seizure ofEGS Bank. 
33 Serdar Alyamay, "EGS landing in Southeast again, going public in September", Turkish 
Daily News, URL: http:// www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/08 09 99/dom.htm; SaVlll! 
(1997, 86). 
34 Demirel Group had a bank in Azerbaijan and also attempted to acquire a bank in 
Austria (see Arslan 2001, 263). As well, Garipoglu Group had Romanian International Bank -
1998, West Euro Finance in Ireland- 1997 and was interested in purchasing a bank in Germany. 
35 See "Rumeli Invest in Cement Plants", URL: 
http://www.warsawvoice.pl/v397/BuslnBrief.html (accessed 12 December 2002); "Austro-US-
Croatian Consortium Awarded Second Mobile Phone Network", Turkish Daily News, 9 
September 1998, URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/09 09 98/econ2.htrn. 
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Hence, while these latecomer conglomerates tried to grow rapidly through the use 
of political links as well as bank-leverages in the post-1980 period, this rapid expansion 
was not viable in the long-run (absolute surplus value) and brought about their decline 
when they faced the adverse effects of global recession and domestic crises after the mid-
1990s. They were trapped in outmoded sectors and low value-added production. In 
addition, they had high capital need/debts associated with incautious expansion policies. 
Consequently, they were affected more severely by the Asian and Russian financial crises 
in 1997 and 1998 which caused substantial drops in external demand for the traditional 
industries in which they were active. In order to compensate the decline in their domestic 
and overseas operations, the conglomerates intensified the misuse of the banks as in the 
cases of Nergis, 36 Demirel and EGS Groups. Furthermore, their banks, having weak 
financial structures along with high risk exposure, were severely hit by the financial 
crises.37 For example, EGS Group beeame an inspiration to many other single- or multi-
sector, multi-shared-ownership companies due to its rapid development. 38 39 However, 
the Group could not escape from a sharp decline accompanying the seizure ofEGS Bank. 
After the seizure, EGS Group acknowledged the adverse impacts on the holding 
companies of the two recent crises in Turkey as well as the Asian crisis in 1997, which 
particularly struck Turkey's textile and ready-wear sectors. This was when EGS Group 
supported the shareholder textile industrialists through bank Ioans.40 The founder of EGS 
'
6 See Arslan (2001, 355). 
37 For instance, as Hasan Turhan of EGS Group (Yigit 2001, 30) indicated , EGS Bank 
also faced losses as a result of high interest rate exposure during the 2000 crisis in which market 
rates rose up, whilst T -bill portfolios had fixed yields. 
38 
"EGS landing in Southeast again, going public in September", Turkish Daily News, 9 
AugUst 1999, URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/08 09 99/dom.htm. 
" EGS Group attempted to join together many small capitals since 'it was difficult to 
achieve similar high levels of accumulation with the larger conglomerates such as Kol' and 
Sabanct Groups given the competitive conditions' as Ismail Canseven, General Director of EGS 
Bank, indicated (Sav~ 1997, 86). Since it represented the combined power of SMEs for export in 
the face of international competition, the Group became a case study in Harvard Business School 
(''EGS to be Harward Business School Case Study'', Turkish Daily News , 29 November 1997, 
URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/11 29 97/econ.htm ). 
40 Verifying this, Sabuncuoglu (2002, 63) in his doctoral thesis found that the failure 
probability ofEGS Bank which was 28.3% in 1998 had risen to 84.5% in 1999 mainly due to 
the contribution of increasing '(non-performing loans+accrued income)/total assets' ratio. Indeed, 
in 1997, EGS Bank General Director Ismail Canseven (Sav~ 1997, 85) said that the strength of 
r the bank was due to the 500 exporter shareholders and added that this made EGS Bank luckier 
~ than many other banks in terms of ability to survive during a possible economic crisis. However, 
176 . 
Holding, Hasan Turhan (Yigit 2001, 30) stated that they did not expect such a severe 
crisis in Turkey and, as a result, they had confronted unexpected surprises as a Group 
'which grew very rapidly within a highly volatile environment'. Turhan admitted that 
they could not manage the crisis. 
Rumeli Group was in a unique position. The Group's twin banks, Imarbank and 
Adabank, were the last banks eliminated in 2003. After the withdrawal of the banking 
licence of Imarbank, the BRSA declared that the Imarbank case was the largest 
organised-corruption case ever to be experienced.41 The disguise of true bank records 
from the authorities allowed continuous use of the bank funds in favour of holding 
companies. Rum eli Group's rapidly grown business power had been controversial. 
Blackrnail 42 as well as failed debt repayments were part of the Group's ambitious 
expansion strategy. For instance, Rumeli Group had a litigious record at the international 
level because of its debts to the minority shareholder Motorola by its mobile telephone 
provider Telsim.43 As well, Siemens and Nokia were among other world giants to whom 
it failed to meet debt repayments. Rumeli Group not only utilised the bank funds that 
were collected with distinctively high interest rates for years, but also channelled 
resources from its power distribution companies, <;:ukurova Elektrik and Kepez Elektrik, 
which were acquired through their privatisation in 1993.44 As a result of this general 
stance, international investors with shares in sonie holding companies faced losses.45 
when the bank shareholders were hit by the simultaneous domestic and global crises, this was the 
end for EGS Bank. 
41 See "Imar'daki Yolsuzluk Bilyilk Boyutta", ntvmsnbc news portal, 6 December 2003, 
URL: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/246830.asp?Om~IAY . 
42 See "i~ Bankas1 Star'! '<;ete'den DGM'ye GtltOrdil", 7 September 2001, URL: 
http://arama.Hiirriyetim.com.tr/devarn.asp?id=l4489. 
43 As Turkish Daily News quotes, Rumeli Group had been also in dispute with Turkey's 
Capital Markets Board, the market regulator, since 1994, when Motorola's involvement with 
Telsim began (see FT: Motorola, Nokia Hire Investigator to Probe Uzan Family", Turkish Daily 
Ne\vs, 20 July 2001, URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/07 20 01/econ.htm). 
44 See "Raids on Two Uzan Companies Expose Mismanagement History", Turkish Daily 
News, 9 July 2000, URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/past probe/07 09 00/Econp.HTM. 
45 
"Motorola: <;ukurova Elektrik'e Balan, Uzan Yagmasm1 Gtlrtln", 2 February 2002, 
URL: http://ararna.Hilrriyetim.com.tr/devarn.asp?id=52293 . 
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Crucially, the energy and telecommunication sectors in which Rumeli Group was 
active are also sectors in which the dynamic accumulators have shown interest. 46 Thus, 
as Rumeli Group tried to use a primitive form of accumulation in order to fuel its 
expansion, it was inevitable that it would disturb the dynamic accumtJlators and would 
db 47 48 need to be stoppe y the state. 
In conclusion, as stated by an executive banker, Hasan Ersel (2000a, 50-51), the 
newcomer conglomerates of the 1980s that acquired banks to finance their own 
companies tried to replicate the post-1950 era. At that time, large capital was 
increasingly organised as holding companies and holding banks became functional in 
channelling subsidised credits of the lSI to their conglomerates. Thus, the holding banks 
played a vital role in the formation of today's powerful conglomerates such as Kos; and 
Sabanc1 Groups. Yet, Ersel argued, those newcomers could not see that the conjuncture 
that had given life to the early conglomerates since the 1950s was over and it was 
impossible to repeat the same path in the current context of globally-integrated 
accumulation. However, it must still be acknowledged that the newcomers had a chance 
to use a similar mechanism in order to back their expansion during the outward 
46 Rumeli Group was interested in many strategic privatizations in the energy and 
telecommunication sectors. For instance, for the auction of Tiirk Telekom, Rumeli, Ko9 ·and 
Sabanc1 Groups expressed their interests (see "Rumeli Interested in Telekom Sell-off', Turkish 
Daily News, 20 December 2000, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/12 20 00/econ.htm). In the case of the Petkim 
auction, Rumeli Group won the tender in which Zorlu Group (in pariDership with Sanko) offered 
the second best offer. Yet, the sale was later cancelled as the Rumeli Group could not fulfill the 
conditions of the tender (see Petkim ihalesi iptal, Cumhuriyet, 6 August 2003). 
47 For instance, in power distribution, Sabanc1 Group confronted Rumeli Group. Sabanc1 
Group applied for the cancellation of the monopoly right of Rumeli Group to be able to use and 
sell the electricity that its Eneijisa produces (see "Sabanc1 Niye Taraf Oldu", Sabah, ·18 June 
2003). <;ukurova Elektrik and Kepez Elektrik were taken over by the state due to both companies' 
violation of the Electricity Market Law ("hnar Bankas1'na BDDK Yonetimi", Dilnya, 4 July 
2003; HC Istanbul Equity Research, "Corporate Governance on Display", February 9, 2004, p.5, 
URL: htto://www.teb.com.tr/2004/download file/res res rep-17.pdf (accessed 5 December 
2003). The takeover of this subsidiaries triggered the seizure process of ltnarbank, as the bank 
· faced liquidity squeeze after losing the cash flows from these two companies (''Para Odeyemedi, 
Merkez Bankas1'run Istedigi Teminan da Veremedi", Vatan, 4 July 2003). 
48 The BRSA did not eliminate hnarbank while confiscating more than 20 banks because 
Rumeli Group disguised its true bank records as well as supported the bank by taking cash flows 
from the bank's subsidiaries, <;:ukurova Elektrik and Kepez Elektrik (see Ekonomistler Platfdrmu 
2003, 6-7; also the statement by Engin Aks;akoca, Head of the BRSA, in Derya Sazak, "Sohbet 
Odas1run Konugu BDDK B~kan1 Engin Akyakoca", Mil!iyet, 22 July 2003). 
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orientation in accumulation. Even so, it took more than a decade before banking reform 
excluded from banking the conglomerates that could not succeed to structure their 
accumulation in line with global competitiveness despite benefiting from state finance 
protectionism. 
7.4 The Old-primitives 
Although most of the banks that were eliminated were the new primitive 
accumulators, some established, older/larger conglomerates also lost their banks. This 
division is particularly important as the counterfactual to analyses which simply explain 
banking reform in terms of new/small and large/old banks. These conglomerates are 
<;ukurova Group of the YKB-Parnukbank, Ya~ar Group of Y a~arbank, Toprak Group of 
Toprakbank and Zeytinoglu Group ofEsbank. 
On the surface, these looked like the sorts of institutions that would survive the 
reform. In common with the surviving institutions, the dynamic accumulators, they had a 
strong, sustainable base in industry as well as receiving state subsidies through their 
banking operations. They started in trade 49 and converted to productive capital during 
the lSI period. 50 These conglomerates, as a whole, achieved large scale export activities 
in the post-1980 period from this industrial focus and built foreign trade companies to 
promote those export activities. 51 In brief, they established control over industrial, 
commercial and banking capital before the new primitives had entered banking. 52 Also, 
49 <;:ukurova Group initially operated also in agriculture. 
50 Toprak Group, which started in construction in 1977, despite being one of the rising 
conglomerates of the 1980s and entering banking in .the early 1990s, is also included within the 
old-primitives. This is because industrial accumulation is the defining characteristic of the Group 
and it achieved a larger industrial base than the other newcomer conglomerates (for a wide range 
of industries that it activated · see "Toprak Holding Industry Group", URL: 
http://www.toprak.com.tr/topraksite/end site/htrnl/l.l.htrn (accessed 15 November 2002) ). 
51 For instance, Toprak Group's foreign trade companies in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France, Poland and the US; Ya~ar Group's foreign trade companies in Germany, Dubai 
and Russia. 
52 Under the then prevalent restrictions on new bank establishments, through the 
conversions of acquired local banks to national banks, Zeytinog1u and Y ~ar Groups, which were 
established in the 1920s and 1940s respectively, were able to penetrate into banking in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Zeytinoglu Family that had stakes in Esbank since the 1950s gained 
control of the bank in 1977. The bank was then converted from a regional bank to a national bank 
(see "Zeytinoglu Holding'in Yeni Hedefi Ene!ji Sektorii", Dilnya, 9 September 1998). Among 
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they initiated international production activities as well as international banking 
operations 53 Regarding IDI, the large Cukurova Group, (a leader in information 
technology-related industries),54 and Ya~ar Group, 55 (with its recent progress), came to 
these conglomerates, despite being one of the largest conglomerates in Turkey and having 
operated since the 1920s, the <;ukurova Group could not isolate itself from the seizure process 
and was forced to withdraw from banking. 
" <;ukurova Group has been operating in international financial markets through 
overseas banks and branches since the 1980s: for example, Bank Kreiss in Germany in 1987, 
Yap1 Kredi Deutschland which was established as a branch of the YKB in 1990 and converted to 
a bank in 1998, Yap1 Kredi Moscow in Russia (previously Yap1 Toko Bank) in 1993 and Banque 
de Commerce et de Placements in Switzerland in 1991 shows the wide existence of the Group in 
international banking. The other large conglomerates also expanded their financial activities to 
international markets: Zeytinoglu Group's Esbank AG in Austria (1996) and Y~ar Group's 
Y~arbank GMBH in Germany (1992). 
54 <;ukurova Group had a recent emphasis on communication and related new economy 
ventures and aimed to become a leader in mobile telecommunication in neighbouring Asian 
Countries. The Group was an early mover into the telecommunication sector. 
Its Turkcell, established as a joint . venture among Turkish, Swedish and Finnish 
companies, has quickly become one of the top five networks in Europe and number seven 
globally since 1994 (Euromoney 1998c). As well, Turkcell is the first Turkish corporate whose 
stocks are traded in NYSE (New York Stock Exchange). The company wants to become a major 
network operator in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. With its GSM network, it 
controls the markets of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan through joint ventures with national telephone 
operators and Georgia and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus through with other partners. 
("Communication and Information Technology", URL: 
http://www.Cukurovaholding.sorn!Cukurovaholding/comm-inforrnationlindex-comm.htm 
(accessed 8 November 2002). 
55 Y ~ar Group, having trade deals with over 40 countries, now pursues further 
international expansion . through productive investments mainly in the EU, Eastern Europe, 
Middle East, Russian Federation and Turkish Republics of the former Soviet Union. For instance, 
the Group overcame the EU's restrictions on the export of animal products from Turkey by 
producing in member countries, mainly Germany, and by establishing a marketing company in 
Romania ("Y~ar Holding Go to Public", Turkish Daily News, 9 June 1999, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/06 09 99). As well as investments in Romania 
for paint production, the Group plans to establish a joint venture with domestic capital in Egypt 
for the production of meat and dairy goods and then to export these commodities to Middle East 
and African countries (l>oyraz 2001,40). 
The orientation towards international production was part of the Group's recent 
restructuring to recover from the economic crisis. That is why Y ~ar Group planned to earn 25% 
of its total revenue through international trade and direct investments in the 2000s (see Devrim 
Dordilncii, "Y~ar Holding Yatmm Ata~nda", Dilnya, 18 May 1998). It also gathered foreign 
partners in its two leading companies, Pmar and DYO, in order to ease the Group's global 
expansion (see "Y~ar Grubu Evlilik Arifesinde", Finansal Forum, 6 February 2003). Y~ar 
Group's Pmar Food Group is a leader in its sector and its ultimate goal is to be a world brand. 
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the fore. On the other hand, Toprak and Zeytinoglu Groups have had mainly export focus 
despite some initial attempts for IDis. 56 
In terms of foreign partnerships, however, contrary to <;ukurova and Ya~ar 
Groups, 57 Toprak and Zeytinoglu Groups concentrated on domestic growth as sole 
initiatives. Therefore, they did not benefit from global capital to ease the cost of 
investment funding. Instead, they needed to base their expansions on their banks' finance. 
However, contrary to many dynamic accumulators, while basing their 'legitimate' 
surplus producing/exporter industrial operations on the excessive connected lending, they 
did not expand into global accumulation via IDI. Importantly, these conglomerates were 
in need of internationalising their production activities as well as further international 
banking and trade operations. Therefore, they were deprived of the opportunity to benefit 
from collaboration with foreign capital that could have mitigated the adverse effects of 
economic crises, especially through ·easing their international expansions or sales of 
stakes in some businesses. They could not develop collaborative ventures becaus.e they 
were in sectors that were not appealing to TNCs, or they had corporate management 
practices that, for whatever reason, were not compatible with joint management. 
Despite the common characteristics with the dynamic accumulators, nonetheless, 
the old-primitives, in general, could not restructure themselves competitively and 
suffered from over-diversification and lack of focus. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, 
the dynamic accumulators succeeded in adapting to the changing conditions; they revised 
the sectors in which they operated and overhauled their overall strategies for higher 
56 Zeytinoglu Group established its company Tunus Turk Konteyner Sanayi ve Sinai AS 
in 1991 in Tunisia (see Bema Beyhan and Burak Togrul, "Tarunsal Uretimden Sanayiye 70 Yilhk 
Uzun BirYiliilyii~", Finansal Forum, 30 February 1997). On the other hand, Toprak Group was 
planning to establish a ceramic factory in the United Kingdom in 1998 (see Mine ~enocakh, 
"Toprak ile Beko ingi1izler'i ~~trttt", Sabah, 30 July 1998). 
57 For instance, <;:ukurova Group had established joint ventures with international 
companies since lSI. As such, Y ~ar Group had collaborated with foreign capital in industry and 
finance. The group, for instance, started foreign capital production in DYO in 1963 with Danish 
paint producer Sadolin ("Ortak Y ~ama Katla-ilkler" URL: 
http://web.Yasar.com.tr/ortak vasan1a katki/ilkler.jsp (accessed 7 June 2004)). Also, Tuborg's 
malting/brewery operations started .in 1969 as a joint venture between Danish Carlsberg and 
Y~ar Group. By 1987, Y~ar Group acquired a majority stake. During the recent restructuring 
for specialisation within Y~ar Group, Carlsberg acquired whole stakes ofY~ar Group in Tuborg 
("Turkish Beverages Sector", see URL: 
http://www.isikun.edu.tr/isam/diger doc/Beverages Sector.html (accessed 8 June 2004); Ftrat 
2004). 
181 
profitability (such as reducing costs, foreign partnerships and mergers). Yet, for example, 
despite being a leader in the strategic telecommunication sector, <;:ukurova Group did not 
have a rational diversification and continued to finance its wide business profile with 
non-performing group credits. 58 Therefore, even though <;:ukurova Group has been one of 
the largest conglomerates and implemented a more prudent policy in its other bank 
YKB, 59 it eventually failed in its finance division. It fell into the same category as the 
primitive accumulators with its use of Pamukbank. Because of the wide debates on the 
Pamukbank seizure, the BRSA (2002c) for the first time published a detailed report that 
explained the reasons of a bank-takeover. The following extract from the report 
demonstrates the similarity between many other primitives and <;:ukurova Group: 60 
The bank [Pamukbank] has had high Group and FX risks, low quality assets, insufficient 
own funds and low liquidity. Hence, its financial structure was highly distorted. The 
Group used the funds of the Bank for its own purposes, to the extent of endangering the 
bank's safe functioning. (BRSA 2002c, 1 0) 
The most important problem of the bank was non-performing group loans. The 
BRSA noted that the bulk of these group-loans (82%) was extended to <;:ukurova Group 
companies operating in industry and the construction sectors (BRSA 2002c, 4, 6). 
Therefore, even though the old-primitives had many characteristics of the 
dynamic accumulators, they did not emerge in the 1990s as dynamic accumulators 
because, despite the capacity to achieve this state, they were not managed well. 61 Their 
58 See Capital (2002b ). 
"However, it must be noted that <;:ukurova Group companies had credit debts to the 
YKB as well, and these debts were restructured under the corporate debt restructuring of the so-
called Istanbul Approach as part of the agreement made between the BRSA and the Group. 
· 
60 
<;:ukurova Group also used Interbank to back its expansion before selling it to the 
Nergis Group in 1996 and after the confiscation of Interbank in 1998, the SDIF found out that 
<;:ukurova Group was still in debt to Interbank (see Arslan 200 I). According to inspector reports 
in 1994 and 1995, more than half of the non-performing credits in this bank belonged to 
<;:ukurova . Group companies (URL: 
http://www.netbul.com/superstar/ozeldosyalar/ekonomi!icibosaltlanbankalar!kredi.asp (accessed 
13 December 2002)). 
61 For instance, in addition to the confiscation of the bank's financial s_ubsidiaries (Es 
Factoring, Es Leasing, Es Yatmm, Esbank Aktiengesellschaft in Austria), Zeytinoglu Group also 
lost its four industrial firms (Es~im Eski~ehir <;:imento, Esen Eski~ehir Makine ve Tesis Imalati, 
Esyem Eski~ehir Yem Sanayi and Jarnak Jant ve Makine Imalati). After the bank seizure, the 
Group owner Halit Crngtlboglu argued that they made these industrial firms shareholders in 
Esbank to overcome adverse effects of 1994 financial crisis on the bank as then advised by the 
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managers chased the easy revenues of finance protectionism and failed to develop their 
dynamic competitiveness. 62 
7.5 High-performing Primitive Accumulators: Drawing the Line 
It would be false to suggest that there was a wide gulf between some of the old 
primitives and the successful, dynamic accumulators. Any line drawn - as to which 
profiles were deemed viable and which warranted confiscation - has to be somewhat 
arbitrary. 
Some seizures did give rise criticism of the BRSA by the primitive 
accumulators on the grounds that their banks could have been rehabilitated/saved instead 
of being subject to seizures. Yet, the state (and the IMF) gravitated towards seizures over 
rehabilitation in order to ensure sufficient concentration in banking. 
The underlying reasons were obvious. Firstly, the need for scale in the banking 
sector allowed only a certain number of accumulator banks to remain in existence. 
Secondly, selection of survivors ensured that all survivor banks would develop global 
integration. 
The question was which banks would survive? Which investments are likely to 
guarantee long-term surplus value cannot be known with certainty in advance and many 
seized banks protested the judgement that they were not viable. For example, the owner 
Treasury. Moreover, eight of the remaining 16 companies out of the original 25 companies 
needed to be closed down during the recent crisis (see ~entilrk 2001, 52-53). All this caused a 
substantial decline for Zeytinoglu Group. 
62 For instance, Toprak Group was distinguished by its investments in the Eastern 
Anatolia 'to serve to the development of the region' while, in general, Turkish conglomerates 
tended to generally avoid investing there since it was less profitable. Toprak Group fmanced 
those new investments with its bank funds as the expected finance from state investment scheme 
failed. Furthermore, Toprak Group became one of the conglomerates that made the largest 
investments in the 1990s. The continuous investment tendency of the owner Halis Toprak who 
was known as 'one cannot have enough of it' ~mbark Kil9iikyildmm 2001, 27) created conflicts 
with professional managers in holding companies as he wanted to make new investments without 
enough feasibility analyses. Thus, this irrational investment policy was a factor for the difficulties 
that Toprak Group faced during the economic crisis. Also, this strategy contributed to the 
insolvency of Toprakbank as the holding companies began to overuse the ·bank resources because 
of their high capital needs. 
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of Balkaner Group, Ali Balkaner, who was accused of siphoning money from Yurtbank 
through a complex network of front companies and off-shore bank, stated: 
The vast majority of offshore accounts, which will total $60 million once they mature, 
has been spent on real estate investment and has earned value both to the bank and the 
state ... The money has not gone bankrupt, nor has it fled. 63 
And Balkaner maintained in his defense: 
It is true that my group companies took bank loans, but the allotment of the bank loans 
was legal. It made a contribution to the economy of the country by building housing 
estates with the bank loans. The existing economic crisis and the Marmara earthquake 
affected us. We could not pay the loans because we could not sell the real estate. Our 
problem was caused by a shortage of liquidity.64 
Similarly, Korkmaz Yigit, the owner Of Bankekspres, declared: 
It was said in the complaint that how the $128 million was put to use was unclear. We 
used this money for investments. I demonstrated with documents where this money went. 
We did not waste it. They showed the reports of the bank auditors as proof of the 
allegations. These reports do not reflect the truth.65 
It would appear that these conglomerates' investments were not the sorts that the 
state (and the IMP) wanted to support: they did not fit the globally competitive 
corporation model of the Turkish state and the IMP. Investment in real estate may have 
been profitable, but it did not produce relative surplus value and relative surplus value 
(labour productivity based on technology) was the state's and (especially) IMP's model 
for global viability. 
The application of the same criterion became apparent also during the 
confiscations of five banks (Baymdtrbank, EGS Bank, Kentbank, Tari~bank and Sitebank) 
in July 2001. At that time, high tensions arose among some bank owners, the state and 
63 
"Insolvent Yurtbank's ex-boss assures depositors", Turkish Daily News, II January 
2000, URL: http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/01 II 00/econ.htm. 
64
"Balkaner defends himself with tears", Turkish Daily News, 20 March 2001, URL: 
· http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/03 20 01/dom.htm. 
· 
65
"Yigit and other suspects in BankEkspres trial released", Turkish Daily News, 12 May 
2001, URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/05 12 Ol/dom2.htm. 
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the IMF since the IMF wanted their immediate seizure while the BRSA tended to give 
more time to improve the banks' financial structures. 66 
The vital importance of the IMF influence on banking reform can be seen here by 
the fact that these banks were seized only hours before the IMF was expected to endorse 
a $4 bn stand-by loan for the Turkish state. 67 As such, after the controversial seizure of 
Demirbank, the owner Cmgtlhoglu accused the state and the IMF of creating a liquidity 
squeeze that caused to the bankruptcy of Demirbank. He contended that the CBT 
continued to enforce the strict implementation of the stabilisation program during the 
November 2000 crisis even though more liquidity could have seen a number of banks 
stay viable: 'the CBT could bring down even the largest players of banking such as 
Isbank and Akbank. The job of CBT should be to harmonise the market, not to make 
profit' he argued. 68 Even the Cmgtlhoglu Group contended that Demirbank was one of 
the biggest supporters of the stabilisation program with its large T-bills portfolio and they 
paid the cost of this support. The BRSA, however, replied that the responsibility for the 
huge risks belonged to the management ofDemirbank itself. 
So the restructuring of the Turkish economy for global integration required 
financial conglomerates that look attractive to the international financial world for 
cooperative arrangements: i.e. large scale, concentrated and high relative surplus value 
producing capital. The question, therefore, for the state and the IMF, was how to create 
the needed large-scale capital in Turkey. The elimination of some possibly viable 
dynamics (old primitives) contributed to this end. That is why the confiscation of 
Pamukbank of the large <;ukurova Group was the most difficult one for the state. 69 The 
following statement by the General Manager of Denizbank, Hakan Ate~, reflects well the 
66 See "Ex-owners ofEGS Bank say bailout unfounded", Turkish Daily News, 3 August 
2001, URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/08 03 01/econ.htm#el . 
67 
"Government takes over five troubled banks", Turkish Daily News, 23 December 1999, 
URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/12 23 99/dom.htm 
The BRSA (2001d, 2) declared that these banks were confiscated as their recapitalisation 
plans to raise CARs to 8 percent by end-2001 'were considered either unacceptable or the banks 
were not able to comply with their plans'. 
68 
"Cingillioglu Merkez Bankas1'm Su~lad1", ntvmsnbc news portal, 7 June 2003, URL: 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/219188.asp?Om~ 16J . .. 
69 See "BDDK Ends <;::ukurova Control on Two Banks", Turkish Daily News, 20 June 
2002, URL: htto://www.turkishdailvnewS.com/old editions/06 20 02/econ.htm. 
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need for cooperation with global financial capital by the banks of the dynamic 
accumulators: 
When we ask that "if holding banking is finishing, what will follow it?'' we can say that 
we are orienting towards a world with larger-scales and more different partnerships. In 
fact, foreigners are aware of the reality of Turkey better than us. Their correspondence 
relations cover all developing economies of the world. If they get monthly one telephone 
call from Israel and twice from Egypt, they get daily five calls or job proposals from 
Turkey. Naturally, Turkey cannot meet these with today's shallow banking system. We 
have to deepen and enlarge the scales. How can it be provided? Of course, it can be 
obtained through more capital allocation by shareholders who have real enthusiasm for 
banking and ... If the currently implemented program becomes successful, banks' 
earnings will be so much higher that they could not be compared with the past, with the 
T-bills since having share in .financial institutions that are integrated with global systems 
will bring huge incomes to you. Thus, this [scale] expansion has emerged as a necessity 
for the banking sector. (Activeline 2000a, 5-6, emphasis added) 70 
7.6 Conclusion 
The common characteristic for the primitive accumulators was the perceived 
absence of a long-run-viable pattern of accumulation. Instead, they retained dependence 
on the state (profits from government securities; privatisation; highly regulated industries; 
and excessive connected lending) and, in general, could only expand into low technology 
industries and undeveloped areas. They could not survive in a competitive, advanced 
capitalist environment. Some of these conglomerates such as (:ukurova and Toprak 
Groups, despite having large industrial activities/ wider sectoral range, tended to 
overuse their banks in order to further accelerate their accumulation. 71 In a time of 
70 See also the statement by i§bank General Director Ersin Ozince regarding expectations 
for rising synergies of Turkish banking with global financial markets, ''Bankac1hgm gelecegi 90k 
parlak'', ntvmsnbc news portal, 26 October 2001, URL: 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/1 15357.asp. 
71 It is argiled that Toprak Group had followed a cautious strategy in Toprakbank in the 
face of a possible consolidation and did not place bank funds to government securities. In 
addition, the Group used the bank resources in :favour of holding companies under legal limits. 
However, during the financial crises, the Group lost control (see ~mbark Kil9ilkyildmm 2001, 
27). The owner Halis Toprak admitted that from its establishment until 1997, the Group did not 
get credits from Toprakbank. However, because the state did not pay promised investment 
incentives in time, the Group 'compulsorily' turned to the use of bank resources. Therefore, he 
argued, the seizure by the BRSA was not wrong. The wrong step was made by the state with the 
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economic downturn or intensified competition (that came with global integration), the 
primitive accumulators could not adapt their accumulation strategies to the new 
conditions. 
In addition, the new primitive accumulators of the 1980's and 1990's had 
weak/non-existent industrial bases and a limited level of their accumulation compared to 
the more established larger conglomerates. Therefore, their capital deficiency was an 
acute problem hindering expansion. Thus, it appeared as a more effective reason for these 
conglomerates to plunder bank resources. Moreover, they based their accumulation on 
high volatile/margin sorts of activities for a quick expansion. This, in turn, made them 
more vulnerable against fluctuations in those sectors and recessions in global/domestic 
economy. 
Whatever the existence of an industrial base and the acuteness of capital shortage, 
these conglomerates tended to manage their banks towards the easy profits derived from 
state debt finance and used them for rapid but speculative accumulation. However, when 
banking reform started to contract, state lending these banks could not make the 
necessary restructuring. Their weak financial structures were further hit by financial 
crises. As the IMF notes: 
At year-end 2000, the four large banks had an average risk-weighted capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) of 23 percent, while the remaining 23 commercial banks had a CAR of 13 
percent. Since then, the financial condition of most of the largest and some small 
commercial banks, altogether representing nearly half of the commercial bankirtg system, 
has been strengthened as a result of exceptionally high earnings during the recent crises 
episodes. At the same time, the remaining commercial banks have experienced 
substantial losses from high interest rates and the depreciation of the lira. (IMF 200 I a, 
12) 
As a result, while the IMF and the state put pressure on the bank owners to inject 
new capital into their banks, 72 the primitive accumulators lacked the necessary capacity 
to achieve this end. They had some failed attempts to establish alliances with domestic-
foreign partners to save their banks, as in the cases of Iktisat Bank, Bank Kapital and 
EGS Bank. However, these ailing banks, most of which were monitored by the Treasury 
failure in the payment of those incentives (see "Bir Daha Tokat Yersem Tesislerimi Kapa!irun", 
Milliyet, 25 March 2002). 
72 See IMF (200la, 11-12); IMF (200lb, 19), IMF (2001i, 21). 
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under the Code 64 of banking law for years, could not escape from the elimination during 
banking reform. 
To sum up with the words ofRahmi Koy, the Chairman ofKoy Group: 73 
The challenges of 2001 cleared the deck so to speak. Strong companies with viable 
businesses weathered the storm and emerged stronger; companies that grew very fast on 
political influence and largess were swept away by harsh market conditions and changing 
government policies prevalent during the year. We see this as a significant and hopeful 
change in business culture in Turkey. It is now clear to all that in the long run companies 
cannot make money without adding value to their products and services. 
But insofar as all capital was hit by cyclical downturn, where is the line between 
the dynamics and old primitives? It would appear, though it cannot be verified, that the 
line was determined by the number of banks that was needed to form a dynamic and 
globally linked finance sector. Here the IMF presence became critical in steering the 
Turkish state. The IMF made the stale liquidate potentially viable capital to keep the 
number low as only a certain number of banks could continue to exist profitably. Also, 
the cooperation with global finance required a limited number, but larger scale, Turkish 
banking players. 
The line between the dynamic accumulators and old-primitives could only be 
drawn by the IMF not by the Turkish state itself because the state was too enmeshed with 
some of these old-primitives to make the decision on its own. Some old-primitives could 
have survived, but they did not. At this point a quite political decision came in. Less 
dynamic, but possibly viable companies were eliminated by the decision of the IMF. 
This implies that, without the IMF, the restructuring in banking could not have 
taken place as it did. The Turkish state alone could not easily contrive the insolvency of 
some of Turkey's largest and most prominent corporations. Yet the longer term interests 
of capital, as articulated by the IMF, required a reorientation of capital accumulation. The 
IMF demanded a shift in industrial accumulation away from primitive accumulation and 
production of absolute surplus value towards relative surplus value extraction. 
73 '-'Ch~rman's· Message", URL: 
http://www.koc.eom.tr/englishlkurumsallbaskanin msg.asp (accessed 8 November 2002). 
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8.1 Introduction 
Financial restructuring was not a process of bringing 'deregulated' market 
forces to bear on the Turkish financial sector. It was a systematic process of selecting 
which banks and which conglomerates were to remain viable and which were to be 
liquidated. 
In Chapter 7, we saw how the process of selection applied to those banks that 
were liquidated. As a rule of thumb, . the characteristics of the liquidated banks' 
conglomerates were their fundamental dependence on state subsidies and the dominance 
in their industrial investment portfolios of industries that relied on low wages (absolute 
surplus value) or speculation to secure their profitability. They were not long-term viable. 
But the lines of demarcation between projected viability and non-viability are 
not clear. We saw that the category of 'primitive accumulator' is a quite general one, and 
each individual bank and conglomerate had diverse characteristics and investments. They 
didn't all fit neatly into a sing;Ie category. But, for the most part, they were seen to lack a 
predisposition for the production, on a global scale, of relative surplus value. However, 
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there were some conglomerates (amongst the 'old primitives') which could credibly 
claim they had the required characteristics. for survival, but were nonetheless liquidated. 
There is not a many of clear and categorical difference between those conglomerates 
which were and those which were not likely to be viable in the long-term. 
Where the state drew this line was both difficult and somewhat arbitrary, and 
there should be no suggestion that the state is the custodian of all wisdom and drew the 
line at exactly the 'right' point. The state has no such privilegeq status, and there is no 
right point. 
But it is apparent, as was shown in Chapter 7 that the Turkish state, under the 
influence of the IMF, wanted a relatively small number of survivors. If Turkish banking 
was to enter the 'big league' of globally-integrated finance, there was only room in that 
league for a handful banks that are large in assets and profile. They have to be appealing 
allies of the established large banks and large industrial capital. 
So the banks that did survive are differentiated from those that were liquidated 
not just by their viability (for some primitive accumulators were apparently viable) but 
by their ability to compete with the big league of international banks and industrials. 
Hence they are called in this thesis the dynamic accumulators because they have the 
characteristics and patterns of expansion that are most like those of the world's leading 
banks and industrial corporations. 
In this chapter, the characteristics of these dynamic accumulators are identified 
and an attempt is made to determine why the state and the IMF chose them to be the 
future of Turkish banking. 
In general, two characteristics are apparent. First, the profitability of banking 
operations in these conglomerates was not contingent upon state subsidies during the 
period of finance protectionism. Certainly profits were boosted by the subsidies, but the 
decrease of subsidies did not throw these banks into crisis. Second, and associated, they 
systematically developed a base in competitive accumulation in industry outside of a 
dependence on finance protectionism. In particular, they diversified via international 
investment into high-value added (and high relative surplus value) locations and 
industries. As a result, they have become part of global capital seeking global expansion 
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and profitability rather than a fraction of capital dependent on favourable domestic 
conditions of accumulation and therefore, ultimately on state protectionism. 
Certainly, it is the older conglomerates that have been most active in this form 
of restructuring, but so too have been some rising capital groups of the 1980s. In this 
chapter, three different forms of accumulation are identified amongst the dynamic 
accumulators, each playing a particular role in the on-going integration of Turkey's 
finance sector into global accumulation. 
8.2 The First Division within the Dynamic Accumulators 
This division of the dynamic accumulators is composed of some of the 
largest/oldest conglomerates of Turkey dating back to the birth of the Turkish Republic in 
the 1920s. They have a long-term base in industry. They expanded under the lSI and, 
critically, converted from commercial capital to productive capital. These large 
conglomerates also penetrated into banking from the 1940s onwards 1 and have the top 
banks of the country today. 2 
But their distinguishing characteristic is more than size - for some relatively 
large banks were liquidated in the restructuring. These banks are internationalised, both 
in their banking activities3 and their industrial conglomerates: they accumulate in an 
internationalised circuit of capital. 
1 The exception is i~bank, founded in the 1920s. 
2 The peculiarity of Koy Group is that it had a small share in banking with KoyAmerikan 
Bank (1986) after selling off its stakes in Garanti Bank (see Chapter 4). The Group decided to 
expand in fmance in 1994 and established overseas banks (Koybank Netherland (1996), Kos:bank 
· Azerbaijan (2000), leasing, insurance, factoring, and consumer finance companies (see Erus 1999, 
42). It continues to expand in domestic and global finance markets. As Chapter II will address, 
the Group has already become one of the larger players of Turkish banking during banking 
reform via the merger ofKoybank with Unicredito ofltaly. 
3 Since the 1980s, these conglomerates have had a presence in international fmancial 
markets via overseas banks. In this process, especially Sabanc1 and Dogu~ Groups have come to 
the fore. Sabanc1 Group was the first conglomerate having an overseas bank (in England) in 1983 
with Ak International Bank (after 1993, Sabanc1 Bank) and then established Akbank International 
N.V. Netherlands in 2001. Other conglomerates followed Sabanc1 Group by having many 
overseas banks in various regions of the world throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. For 
instance, Do~ Group built United Garanti Bank International in Netherlands (1991), Garanti 
Bank Moscow in Russia (1996), Garanti Funding Corp I & 2 in Cayman Islands (1996), Ci 
Investment Ltd in Malta (1996), Doc Finance SA in Switzerland (1992), and Instruments Finance 
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In general, these conglomerates began to internationalise via exports in the post-
1980 period and, commenced international productive investments in the 1990s in the 
form of joint ventures or sole initiatives. From this basis, even before the Turkish state/ 
IMF sought to restructure banking, these capitals had already made the transition and 
they thereby stood out as conglomerates largely immune from the decline of finance 
protectionism. 
But the critical issue was not just international expansion (for some of the 
primitive accumulators were also expanding internationally) but how and where the 
conglomerates expanded. In particular, amongst these dynamic accumulators there was a 
propensity to develop foreign partnerships in both their domestic and international 
expansion. Foreign partnerships provide implicit benefits such as access to technology 
and finance, hedging risk, opportunities to further expand, etc. But in the context of 
Turkish restructuring, these partnerships provided rapid expansion through two key 
benefits: shared costs and, more importantly, technology know-how. 
Kay Group of Koybank, Sabanc1 Group of Akbank, i~bank Group of i~bank 4 and 
Dogu~ Group of Garanti Bank 5 could be grouped under this first division of the dynamic 
accumulators. There are two common characteristics in their restructuring: 
Company in Cayman Islands (1997). On the other hand, the i~bank Group established i~bank 
GMBH in Germany in 1992. 
4 The distinctive feature of the i~bank Group is that it is organised as a bank-centred 
conglomerate from its start. Having a quasi-state bank mission in its establishment, (some of its 
shares were owned by Atatiirk), i~bank participated in the economic program of the newly 
established Republic. The companies with which i~bank has had equity participation formed a 
quasi-holding structure, the bank being at its centre (see Kocab~oglu eta!. 2001, 609). 
Therefore, 4bank was not established as a family holding banking, but has been a public 
company (Kocab~oglu et a!. 2001, 597; 610). Its ownership evolved towards a private bank 
shareholder structure from the 1980s. As of March 2004, i~bank's own private Pension Fund held 
43,42 % of the stakes; 28,09% were Atatiirk's shares that were represented by Republican 
People's Party and 28, 49"/o were free floating. In May 1998, 12.3% of the Bank's total shares 
previously held by the Turkish Treasury were sold to national and international investors ("Bizi 
Tamym", URL: http://www.isbank.com.trfbizitaniyinlib-tanivin-ortaklik.html (accessed 6 June 
2004) ). 
5 The peculiarity of DaM Group, which originated in construction in the 1960s, is that 
today it is mainly finance-focused and industrial production has only a small share in the Group's 
activities. Ferit i;lahenk of the Group stated that ' ... our main sector is finance. Finance covers 
62% of our group. Second one is automotive 20%. Retailing is 12%. Construction is 3%. And 
there are tourism and food in the 'others' group' (from press meeting by Ferit i;lahenk, 18 October 
2001, Ferit i;lahenk:in Basm Toplanllsi Kon~ma Tam Metni", 
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• Firstly, they have been concentrating in anticipated high-growth as well as 
high productivity sectors in which they can be expected to be competitive in 
deregulated markets over the next decade, and they have dropped investments that 
do not meet this criterion. 
• Secondly, accompanying the narrowed focus, they have been reducing 
dependence on the domestic market and orienting themselves more towards 
external markets in their main businesses. 
We will identify these characteristics in tum. 
The concentration in key sectors has been a major development for these 
conglomerates. As older companies, they share a similar history of growth. They began to 
diversify across sectors early, 6 but have started to rationalise their operations since the 
1990s away from low productivity areas such as textiles and into high productivity 
operations, capable of export competitiveness, such as consumer durables. SabanCJ 
Holding was typical of this trend: 'having a global vision and aiming to expand beyond 
Turkey', 7 the Group left textiles to develop in information technology explicitly as a 
strategy to leave absolute surplus value production based on low wages and to enter 
specialist, high technology (relative surplus value) production for global markets. 8 
Similarly, the Kos: Group restructured its broad business portfolio to narrow its focus on 
the sectors that they could be competitive in the coming period such as 
URL:http://www.Doilusholding.com. tr/savfa.cfin?Menu=71 &N0-355&Savfa=Haberler 
(accessed 28 November 2002). 
6 The over-diversification·ofthe large Turkish conglomerates was a matter of criticism by 
international investment banks. For instance, regarding the Sabanc1 Group see the arguments by 
Thomas Chadwick, Merrill Lynch analyst, in Karaagas:h (1999). 
7 Salap Sabanc1, Head of Board of Directors of Sabanc1 Holding (~engoniil2002). 
8 Salap Sabanc1 explained that he was quitting the textile business because of the need to 
shift towards automation from labour-intensive sectors to be able to compete in world markets 
(Poyraz 2000c, 33-40). 
The Group also sold off its sakes in Toyota SA. This was consistent with the Group's 
policy of focusing on its main business. As domestic demand for automobiles remained far below 
expectations in 2000, Toyota Japan decided to restructure their production unit in Turkey as an 
export-base to Europe and so to locate it within the global chain of Toyota. As the Sabanc1 Group 
has a strong domestic sale network (while Toyota has in Europe), Toyota and another partner 
Mitsui bought the stakes of Sabanci Group in the joint venture while Sabanci Group has the 
majority stake in another joint venture established for the sale and marketing of Toyota cars in the 
Turkish market (see Tekinay 2004a, 88, 92; Frrat 2004). 
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telecommunications. 9 It planned to withdraw from the sectors in which it was not a 
leading producer and without growth potential. 1° Ferit Sahenk, Head of the Board of 
Directors of Dogu~ Holding, expressed this same agenda when he spoke of the need for 
'structural change according to the necessities of globalisation'. 11 To be a regional 
company that keeps up with competition, Sahenk stated, the Group decided to focus on 
finance, automotive, food retailing, construction, tourism and TV broadcasting while 
withdrawing from food production, 12 internet service provision, and aviation. 
i~bank Group, which was the most diversified of this sub-division, started a 
process of sales from the mid-1990s which accelerated during banking reform. The major 
restructuring within the Group, started in 2002, reduced the vulnerability from over-
diversification.13 The conglomerates' ·overall restructurings went hand in hand with the 
reorganisation within their banking arms via the sales of non-financial equity 
participation by banks (an issue which will be addressed in Chapter 11 ). 
In relation to investment within Turkey itself; there has also been a shift to the 
new strategic sectors. Notable here have been the benefits of state privatisations of key 
industries, ranging from telecommunication to energy. These high-growth-potential 
sectors have been at the forefront in the leading conglomerates' future plans. Like 
Sabanc1 14 and Kov 15 Groups, which project energy and telecommunications to be 
amongst their main businesses, i~bank Group has recently made large scale investments 
9 See Abdurrahman Y1ldmm, "Sanayicilik Artlk Hamalhk Oluyor", Sabah, 25 January 
2000. 
10 
''Kay iki Misli Biiyiiyecek", Radikal, 21 January 2003. 
11 Zeynep Tugrul, ''K.e~ke Tiirkiye'de Birvok Dogu~ Olsa", Sabah, 14 May 2003. 
12 Some stakes in three food companies were sold to the Group's partners. For instance, 
the stakes in its subsidiary Filiz Makarna was sold to the Italian partner, Barilla in 2003 (see the 
statement by Ferit Sahenk in 'Ferit F.Sahenk: Bardajlln dortte iiyiinii dolu gliriiyoruz', News 
fromDogu~ Holding, 10 April 2003, URL: http://www.dogusholding.com.tr/default.asp"llang::tr ). 
13 For the details of the subsidiary policy by ~bank Group see Kocaba~oglu eta!. (2001, 
602-607). In the recent sale process, concern over conforming to the new legal limits was also 
given as a reason for new large investments of the i~bank Group in petroleum distribution and 
telecommunication (see footnote 16). 
14 See "Sabanc1: Yeni Sektorlere Girecegim", Diinya, 15 August 2000. 
15 See the statement by Ali Kos; in Poyraz & Kofteoglu (2002, 26). Kos: Group, which did 
not have a strategy for the telecommunication sector by 1997, made a partnership deal with world 
giant SBC in 1998 in order to accelerate its expansion in this sector. Kos: Group aims at being the 
main player in the Turkish market and within the triangle of Europe-Asia-Africa (haisat Yatznm 
1999). 
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in these sectors. 16 Furthermore, as Se9kin (1999, 182) indicates, in the 1990s, Turkish 
conglomerates oriented to non-tradable industries in which they would have higher 
competitiveness and market power, such as retailing, finance, media (entertainment 
0 d ) d 0 0 17 m ustry , an mternet servtees. 
The second characteristic of this division is its increasing international focus 
and reduced reliance on the domestic market. To this end, export and overseas production 
grew particularly in the late 1990s. For example, in 1999, Rahmi Ko9, Chairman of the 
Ko9 Group, . stressed that they had to make huge efforts to increase their export and 
international activities: 
Our turnover is still dependent on the Turkish market. In the free competition 
environment in which all foreign companies are coming to Turkey, we are conscious that 
growth cannot be realized by relying on the domestic market. We seek to increase our 
export over I billion US dollar with a 33 % rise. 18 " 
16 The bank joint venture with Dol!;an Group won the auction sales for the GSM 1800 
tender and the privatisation of petroleum distribution company Petrol Ofisi A.S (PO AS) in 2000 
(see Ye~ilo!!;lu 2000b ). 
17 In the case of retailing, its high growth potential, cash advantage as well as expected 
synergy with other sectors attracted all of these large conglomerates. For instance, the Do!!;u~ 
Group declared that it aimed to use its supermarket chains as an alternative distribution channel 
for bank branches (see the statement by Ferit i>ahenk in "Ferit l>ahenk Finansal Forum Gazetesi 
Rllportajt (21 May 2002), URL: 
http://www.Dogusholding.com.tr/sayfa.cfm?Menu~7l&N0=400&Savfa~Haberler (accessed 28 
November 2002). To this end, the Group bought Macro superntarket chain from Tekfen Group 
and merged it with its Tans~. 
The Ko9 Group, besides growing in the domestic market with its Migros chain of stores 
that is Turkey's biggest retailer of food and basic consumer goods, has also been establishing 
supermarket chains abroad (e.g. in Russia, Kazakhistan, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria). As . well, the 
Group acquired 50% share in Opet, the gas distribution company, with the expectation of new 
synergies (''Message from Rahmi M. Ko9", URL: 
http://www.Koc.com.tr/english/kurumsallbaskanin msg.asp (accessed 7 May 2003). 
Also, Sabanc1 Group has been expanding in retailing (in food, ready-wear and electronic-
optic segments) with foreign partners such as the Carrefour SA hypermarkets (Karaaga9h 1999, 
119-122}. In 2002, Sabanc1 Group allotted 113 of the total investment plan of US$ 350 million to 
the retailing group (Poyraz 2002a, 25), indicating the significance of this sector for the 
conglomerate. With the purchase of Girna and Endi retailing chains from Fiba Group in May 
2005, Sabanct Group became the market leader followed by Migros of Ko9 Group. 
18 See 'Ko9'ta Global Yllnetim', Sabah, 27 March 1999. 
As a result of this stance, for example, the consumer durable business of Ko9 Group 
became less dependent on domestic market than ever before: it set an export target of 80% of 
total production in 2002 (Rahmi Ko9, URL: 
http://www.Koc.com.tr/english/kurumsallbaskanin msg.asp (accessed 8 November 2002) ). 
19 In particular, with the entry to the Custom Union with the EU in 1996, the Ko9 Group 
faced intensive competition in its two main businesses, household durables and automotive, in 
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The objective for the Ko9 Group reflected this same agenda: 
Today's strategic goal for us is to be an international institution and a world company 
which is centred in Turkey. With this objective, we aim at strengthening our domestic 
competitive power and to enlarge our international activities through a restructuring. 20 
Other corporations in this division signal a similar strategy. Crucially, in this 
process, they prefer collaborations with corporations outside Turkey. Some of these 
investments have been with large domestic companies in other countries, but the leading 
international investments have been with larger TNCs. For Sabanc1 Group, collaborations 
with leading world corporations continue to be the key for global expansion. 21 Ko9 
Group has intensified its international production investments both as sole initiatives and 
as part of the global networks of its partner TNCs. 22 Dogu~ Group set up partnerships 
with Volkswagen in automotive and with CNBC-e of NBC Group in media. Also, as part 
of the trend towards having an outward orientation, the Group turned to its traditional, 
which the Group faced productivity problems (as did many other companies that had been 
· sheltered under custom barriers for years). To overcome this problem, some Group companies 
were merged (see Power !999b, 55). Besides the intensifying competition, during the recent 
crises, the Group was negatively affected by demand contraction in automotive and white 
household appliances covering 80% of the total Group turnover in 1998 (0~ 1999, 34). These 
two factors led the Group to reduce its dependency on these businesses in the domestic market. 
As well, in an attempt to decrease its dependency on the EU (as it continues to be the main 
market for the Group), the Ko9 Group started to diversifyits activities in developing markets, 
especially in Russia, Morocco, Algeria, Poland, India, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan (see Faruk 1997, 36-37; "K09'un Kriz Endisesi Yok", Finansal Forum, 14 October 
1998). 
20 See the statement by Rahmi Ko9 in 'Ko9 Once Gii9lii Siyasi idare', Yeniyuzyil, I April 
1998. 
21 For example, in 1999, Sabanc1 Group established a 50/50 joint venture company with 
Dupont of America, DuPontsa, which owns Sabanct's and DuPont's polyester business in Greater 
Europe and it has become the largest producer in tl)e region. As another example, the Group 
es\ablished 50/50 joint ventures with DuPont and founded Dusa Argentina and Dusa Brazil to 
serve the South American tyre market in 1999 ("Sabanct Group in.· Brief', URL: 
http://www.Sabanci.com.tr/english!hakkinda hakkinda.htrn) (accessed 11 November 2002). As a 
result, 'the nylon and polyester businesses as the global business of the holding currently make a 
turnover reaching \4 of the total turnover of the Group. Almost half of this turnover is being 
produced and sold outside Turkey' Ali Sabanct ofSabanct Group stated (see Poyraz 2002a, 29). 
22 For instance, its household durables producer Ar9elik has become a European company 
with production facilities there. The Group also made large investments in the automotive sector 
in 1998 following agreements with its partners Fiat and Ford, and besides Kazakhstan, Tunisia 
and China, it opened new production units in Uzbekistan which was chosen as the automotive 
centre of the Central Asia ( 'Ko9'ta Global Yonetim', Sabah, 27 March 1999). 
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core business of construction 23 and follows an international expansion strategy of 
chasing construction projects in many countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Morocco, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine) preferably as joint business with foreign capital. 
Thus, the leading conglomerates' future strategies are remarkably parallel, 
involving them in international expansion and indeed in some degree of competition with 
each other. This intersection implies the new importance of the finance sector in these 
strategies: the synergy potential of banking activities has come to the fore as the banks' 
role in financing group-expansions has been further restricted under new regulation, an 
issue which will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
It is important to note that, while these dynamic accumulators represent a 
significant break with the buSiness culture and protectionism of the past, 24 they continue 
to be the driving force of accumulation in Turkey with their multiple activities inside and 
outside Turkey. As a result, financial" sector reform, deregulation and privatisation have 
not led to the neo-classical ideal of a competitive market, but the respecification of the 
hegemonic part of capital. This point is also verified by Barham and Field (1997, 14): 
It is somewhat ironic that, while a wealth of new business opportunities has been 
generated over nearly 20 years of liberalisation, the powerful holding companies whose 
names are almost synonymous with Turkey's economic history have not loosened their 
grip. These conglomerates remain a cornerstone of the country's business edifice. Their 
management and financial strength have enabled them to evolve with surprising speed 
and agility while maintaining an often dominant presence in a bewildering range of 
markets. Core industries such as cars, may face difficulties and new groups may arise 
and compete relentlessly, yet the tycoons have shown an impressive flexibility and 
maintained their ability to detect new business opportunities and line up finance and 
international backing for them. The opening of new markets in Eastern Europe, Russia 
and the· Turkic republics of the Caucasus and central Asia has further fired the 
ambitions of Turkey's business class. 
23 The share of construction in total Group turnover steadily diminished in the last decade. 
Goniil Talu, Head of the Board of Directors of Dogu~ Construction, linked the diminished share 
of construction to the rise of the finance sector. She also pointed out the domestic focus of their 
Construction Group had brought further decline during the recent crises (see Frrat 2002a, 86). 
24 Although the large conglomerates lead the chailge in business culture in Turkey in 
many ways (such as through institutionalisation of management and sales of businesses), they 
face difficulties in this process. For example, they want to sell some businesses, but finding 
buyers among Turkish capitalists is difficult, while foreign capital is cautious of investing in high 
risk country (see the statement by Hasan Bengil, Head of Foreign Trade Group ofKos: Holding in 
Poyraz 2001b, 47). However, the change process is running slowly, but surely under the 
leadership of the largest conglomerates. 
l 
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8.3 The Second Division within the Dynamic Accumulators 
Apart from the largest conglomerates, some other surviving banks belonged to 
old and large conglomerates: for example, the Tekfen Group of Tekfenbank, OY AK 
Group of Oyakbank, Zorlu Group of Denizbank, Anadolu Endiistri Group of 
Alternatifbank, <;olakoglu Group of the TEB, Ba~aran Group of Anadolu Bank and GSD 
Group ofTekstilbank.25 These form the second division within the dynamic accumulators. 
They have three distinctive characteristics: 
• Firstly, like the first division, these conglomerates have a sound industrial 
basis in the production of surplus value. They also expanded into industry 
during the lSI period and completed the integration of productive and 
commercial capital before.l980. 
But they are different from the largest conglomerates in key ways. 
• Secondly, their entry into banking dates only from the 1980s and 1990s. 26 
As they were late entrants to banking they are not intrinsically finance capital, 
25 GSD Group could be included here because of its shareholders' industrial focus even 
if it is one of the relatively small rising conglomerates of the 1980s. 
The nucleus of GSD Group was based on the GSD Foreign Trade Company built in 1986 
by 96 garment and textile manufacturers. This company was established to break the control of 
large trade houses, which aimed to take advantage oflucrative incentives for companies with high 
export volumes, on small- to- medium scale textile producers. The GSD Foreign Trade Company, 
which became 'one ofthe country's top export houses' (EUromoney 1998b), was converted into a 
holding structure when it expanded into finance with the establishment of leasing, factoring, 
insurance brokerage, international investment companies and GSD Investmeni Bank throughout 
the 1990s ("GSD in Brief', URL: http://www.gsdholding.com.trlbrief.htm (accessed 6 December 
2002)). In this process, GSD Group first purchased a 30 % stake in Tekstilbank, which was then 
owned by Alan Group, a major textile manufacturer and exporter, and became the major 
shareholder with 74.79 %share in 2002 when Akm Group could not afford a necessary capital 
increase in the bank 
26 While seeking to include banking capital to their circuits in the 1980s, under some 
restrictions on new bank establishments, <;olakoglu Group entered banking by converting a local 
bank to the TEB. On the other hand, Tekfen Group secured an investment banking licence in 
1988, given the state preference for investment banks rather than commercial banks. OY AK 
Group entered banking by purchasing shares in a foreign bank and then acquired the whole stake 
in 1993. In addition, the 1990s offered a new mechanism for bank acquisition: privatisation of 
state banks. Zorlu and B~aran Groups were successful in winning the privatisation bids of 
Denizbank and Anadolubank respectively. For the detailed discussion of this entry process see 
Chapter4. 
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but (sustainably) profitable industrial corporations. Accordingly, their 
restructuring followed different lines from the older companies. 
• Thirdly, and critically, they tend to be smaller than the older companies. 
With those smaller scales, they have gone to less competitive/smaller sites in 
their IDI, particularly Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union Republics, 
especially the Turkish speaking CIS countries. 
So while the first division of the dynamic accumulators represents a sustainable 
Turkish presence in the global centres of capital, this division has a sustainable presence 
in newly-emerging sites of global accumulation. 
In terms of the first characteristic, there is little difference with the older and 
larger dynamic accumulators, except for scale. Like the older conglomerates, these 
smaller and newer ones avoided complete dependence on finance protectionism. Their 
banks, which form the small-to medium scale part of the sector, are distinguished by their 
solid financial structures and prudent approaches towards liquidity and credit structure. 
For example, the TEB, 27 Tekstilbank 28 and Tekfenbank 29 have r.eputations for prudence 
and conservative management. Accordingly, the bank-conglomerate relations within this 
sub-division differed from the protection-dependent.primitive accumulators from the very 
beginning. For example, Denizbank has become an early representative of the new form 
of holding banking in Turkey. 30 The President and CEO of Denizbank, Hakan Ate~ (see 
Activeline 2000a) stated that Zorlu Group bought the bank with the aim of doing banking 
instead of transferring bank resources to holding companies: 
I would like to stress that this is unique to Turkey. Since . the beginning, our 
shareholders had committed themselves to maintaining a strong capital base by 
increasing the paid-in capital every year on top of each year's profit. Consequently, 
27 ~engoniil (2001a; 2001 b) indicated that the TEB did not have open currency positions 
and was not active in the government securities market. The low T-hill and repo exposure 
allowed the bank not to be harmed by the rising interest rates during the recent financial crises. 
Moreover, the bank had a high active quality thanks to its low credit concentration on SMEs. See 
also Munir (1998). 
28 See Levent (2002c ). 
29 See Demirci (2003b); "Tekfenbank Targets 25 pet '98 Asset Rise", Turkish Daily 
News, 11 June 1998, URL: http://www.turkishdailillews.com/old editions/06 11 98/econ.htrn. 
30 In contrast to the embezzlement cases of other privatised banks (Silmerbank and 
Etibank), Denizbank and Aoadolubank have followed a prudent banking strategy since their 
acquisitions in 1997 by getting ready for disinflation. 
199 
Denizbank's capital adequacy ratio has averaged above 20% for the 1997-2001 period 
whereas the compulsory ratio is 8%. 31 
These banks also participated in state debt finance. Yet, their more cautious 
policy and accompanying high liquidity positions helped them to survive during the 
financial crises when high risk exposure by the primitive accumulators' banks made them 
weakened and ultimately contributed to their exclusion from banking.32 Thus, in contrast 
with the primitive accumulators, which had capital shortages or were in debt, the cash 
holdings by the second division's conglomerates not only allowed them to cover the costs 
of the crisis, but also to take advantage of rising interest rates during the crisis. 
Their expansion in production is also parallel with the older dynamic 
accumulators. Their lSI activities, as a whole, Jed logically to export growth and under 
the wide export support of the 1980s, rising export activities had a crucial role in the 
acceleration of capital accumulation for these conglomerates. For example, the <;:olakoglu 
Group, focusing on iron and steel production, and Ba~aran Group, mainly engaging in the 
production of industrial and medical gasses, iron and steel, were in the top- 10 list of 
largest exporters in Turkey. 33 
They were like the older-larger conglomerates in two further respects. Firstly, 
these conglomerates sought to capture a share from the ongoing privatisations of state-
owned industries in Turkey's strategic sectors such as energy and telecommunication. 
Zorlu and OY AK Groups were the most determined ones on this regard. 34 
31 URL: http://www.denizbank.com.tr/engllish/index.htm (accessed 15 November 2002). 
32 Oyakbank's General Director Foley evaluated the state borrowing policy in the 1990s 
as a very profitable source for especially small banks and added that having large open positions 
was a kind of gamble, but not real banking. He stressed that Oyakbank did not have large T -bills 
portfolio and had tried to do real banking although many other banks would continue to finance 
the state as long as state borrowing went on (Oztiirk 1999, 58). 
As such, Ahmet Nazif Zorlu of Zorlu Group stressed that the strong liquidity position of 
Denizbank during the recent crises was helpful since no bank could survive by borrowing from 
the interbank market with 6-7000% interest rates at that time (see Si~man 1998, 97). 
33 As regard to international banking, apart from B~aran, ZOrlu and Tekfen Groups, this 
division's conglomerates established/acquired banks abroad throughout the 1990s: 
Oyakankerbank in Germany (1996) of the OYAK Group, a Dutch-based bank-The Economy 
Bank NV (1998) of <;olilkoglu Group and many off-shore banking units and financial service 
companies show that these conglomerates have already been in a process of internationalizing 
their financial arms by following behind the largest conglomerates. 
34See Volkan-Mutlu (2003, 48). 
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Secondly, this second division of the dynamic accumulators increased their 
efforts in international trade and production activities. They set up new partnerships with 
foreign capital to facilitate their global and domestic expansions. For instance, OY AK, as 
an export-oriented conglomerate, 35 is now on the verge of IDis. Co~kun Ulusoy, General 
Director of OY AK Group, stresses the necessity for global opening-up in order to reduce 
the risk from being domestically-oriented (see Volkan-Mutlu 2003, 50). 
Investment in the transition economies was also undertaken by some of the 
liquidated conglomerates - the new primitives, as described in Chapter 7. But the critical 
difference, which is central to the survival of this second division of the dynamic 
accumulators, is the sorts of exposure they carried in the transition economies. These 
dynamic accumulators invested in more stable, long-term investments in core industries 
such as household consumer durables and brewing, while the primitive accumulators 
were vulnerable to the uncertainty·· of returns from their investments in high risk 
industries such as housing construction and finance. 
For instance, as the Turkish beer market has a limited potential for growth, 36 
Anadolu Endustri Group focused on IDis and established production facilities for 
brewing and soft-drinks in Romania, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine with its foreign partners throughout the 1990s}7 Tekfen 
Group 38 further expanded its core business of international construction in the 1980s and 
".OYAK Group, originating in the pension fund of the Army (1961) that developed itself 
into an industrial and financial group, became 'one of the country's most successful business 
empires' (Leyla Boultan, Financial Times, 9 October 2001). The Group has joint ventures with 
well-known international names and activates in various sectors such as cement (1963), 
automotive (with Goodyear (1961) and Renault (1969)), finance, food, chemical, tourism, trade, 
retailing, construction, transport, security, finance and insurance. · 
36 During the 1980s, the Anadolu Endustri Group was negatively affected by government 
restrictions on the sales of beer. However, due to debt consolidation with banks and the sales of 
some large companies such as BMC, Anadolu Export and Nasa(~, it recovered in the 1990s (see 
Oguz 1998) and continued to its expansion during the recent crises. 
37 The high degree of global orientation can be followed from the following quotation: 
'The mission of the group is to become the leading beverage group from the Adriatic to China. In 
addition to this with all the investments outside Turkey, the domestic consumption and exports 
Efes Pilsen was the 1Oth biggest brewery in Europe. After the latest additions in Russia and 
Moldova at the end of 2003 the company is estimated to be the 6th largest brewery in Europe' 
("Turkish Beverages Sector", URL: 
http://www.isikun.edu.tr/isarn!diger doc/Beverages Sector.html (accessed 8 June 2004)). 
38 Tekfen Group began in construction in 1956 and has become known around the world 
today. International contracting, mainly in the energy sector, and agro-industry are the core 
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1990s especially in the Eastern Gulf Area, the Caspian Region and Russian Federation, 
besides having other direct investments in Germany and Uzbekistan. Its construction 
operations are distinguished from the new primitives' construction activities in the sense 
that they are highly-sophisticated projects, including engineering, production, 
constructing and assembling. 39 Also, as in the case of Zorlu Group, they diversified their 
geographical range. The Zorlu Group established production facilities in France, South 
Africa, the US, Iran, Russia, and Bulgaria with foreign partners in some of these. 40 The 
Group planned to further expand in textile production worldwide via partnerships with 
leading international corporations in the 2000s and has been negotiating to this end. 41 Its 
subsidiary V estel also plans to establish a production facility with local capital in Mexico 
b . A . 42 as an export ase m menca. 
Further, they also revised their business portfolios to drop businesses which 
were not core or growth-promising. ·For instance, Tekfen Group restructured between 
1998 and 2000, and dropped its left unprofitable textile and light bulb production. It also 
sold off its 'Makrocenter' supermarket-chain to Dogu~· Group as it did not want to make 
large investments in retailing which required scale economies. On the other hand, 
OYAK Group, with the strategy of quitting the sectors which it could not Iead,43 dropped 
unprofitable businesses before the crisis such as retailing 44 and aimed to grow in priority 
activities of the Group with foreign partners. The distribution of the Group's turnover in 2003 
was contracting 47,2%, agro-industry 35%, banking 13,2%, and others 3,8% (see Tekinay 2004b, 
78-80). 
39 For instance, Tekfen Group was chosen by BP as one of the five world corporations to 
participate in some projects which were parts of Baku-Ceyhan petroleum pipe line (see Tekinay 
2004b, 80). 
40 Zorlu Group bought French Bel-Air Textile Company having a large distribution 
network in Europe in 1998. 
41 See Nur Ozkan, "Zorlu'da Hedef 5 Milyar Dolar Ciro", Diinya, 13 July 1998. For 
instance, the Zorlu Group wants to overcome possible obstacles for textile export from Turkey 
through production and marketing activities in the US. These barriers are expected to come with 
new agreements on textile export which will replace current quotas in 2005 (Para 200la, 34). 
42 See Nurten Erk, "Vestel Amerika Kltasma Amerika'dan A91iacak", HOrriyet, 19 
February 2001. 
43 The President and CEO of OY AK Group C0skun Ulusoy says that 'we have to be in 
the front position in everything we do'. 'If any of our companies is not in the top five, we11 sell 
it' (see Euromoney 2001 c). 
44 Coskun Ulusoy stated that their retailing chain-OYPA's activities had ceased, but since 
retailing is one of the strategic sectors and OYP A needed to reach a large scale to compete, it may 
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areas of telecommunication, information technologies, energy, banking, finance, housing 
and mining. 45 
Many of the conglomerates under this sub-division also used joint ventures as a 
way to hedge against volatility. Having joint ventures with foreign capital provided 
flexibility for restructuring during the recent crises. For instance, Tekfen Group sold off 
its equity-shares in Mis Siit, producing milk, to the foreign partner Nestle as its 
operations. started to contract under the global strategy of Nestle and so did not promise 
as much growth potential as expected by the Group (see Poyraz 2002b, 32-33; Tek:inay 
2004b, 79). Also, Anadolu Endustri Group left its Honda partnership with the Japanese 
and is determined not to enter new sectors apart from energy. 46 
To sum up, the first and second divisions of the dynamic accumulators achieved 
rapid accumulation by integrating the three functions of capital, (money capital, 
productive capital and commercial capital) within their circuits. Even though the larger 
conglomerates of the first division have progressed more than the second division's 
industrial conglomerates, they have all made important steps in internationalising their 
circuits of productive, commercial and money capital in ways that show the capacity for 
long-term profitability. Hence, together with their solid accumulation basis, further levels 
of internationalisation and prudent banking policies, these conglomerates not only passed 
through the storm of crisis, but also emerged stronger and successfully thrived after the 
end of finance protectionism. 
continue to operate with a foreign partner after the crisis period in Turkey (see Volkan-Mutlu 
2003, 49). 
45 See 'OY AK Bor 4>ine Giriyor', HOrriyet, 20 July 2002; "CEO's Message", URL: 
htto://www.OY AK.com.tr/english/about-message.html (accessed 3 December 2002). 
46 The sale of stakes by Anadolu Endustri Group in the joint venture with Honda was 
because of the conflicts over two issues. First, Anadolu Endustri Group wanted to increase 
exports while Honda wanted to focus on the domestic market. Second, Honda asked for a capital 
increase by themselves implying their shares would rise at the expense of their Turkish partner. 
Hence, even if Anadolu Endustri Group preferred to expand in the automotive sector instead of 
leaving, the disagreement on the future direction of the joint venture led Anadolu Endustri Group 
to drop it out (see the statement by Metin Ecevit of the Anadolu Endustri Group in Frrat 2004; 
"Japon Honda'yla Yo!umuzu ihracat ve Yerlilik Oram Ayrrd1", Hiirriyet, 7 March 2002). 
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8.4 The Third Division within the Dynamic Accumulators 
This sub-division refers to the rising conglomerates of the 1980s and 1990s that 
do not have a (significant) industry focus. They aimed at niche markets rather than rapid 
industrial expansion, and show sustainability by this modest role. These are not 
international banks, but can serve the Turkish and (some) to other national retail banking 
markets. 
In addition to finance, these conglomerates mainly operate in service industries 
such as media, retailing and construction and, thus, resemble the first-division within the 
new-primitives which have accumulated in highly volatile/marginal sectors. However, 
despite this similarity, the banks within the third division of the dynamic accumulators 
were not seized due to some specific characteristics of their accumulation patterns. 
Dogan Group ofD1~bank, Fiba Group·ofFinansbank and MNG Group ofMNG Bank are 
covered under this sub-division. 
Like the other dynamic accumulators, this sub-division benefited, but was not 
dependent upon finance protectionism. They were not reliant on subsidized finance to 
fundth . th . t 47 48 e1r o er mvestmen s. 
Accordingly, their investment strategies were integrated and sustainable. For 
instance, Dogan Group, as a leading media group, first accumulated in trade. During the 
lSI period, it worked as the sales agency of Kos: Group's automotive. companies and 
commercial accumulation accelerated in the 1980s via marketing automobiles and 
household durables produced by large conglomerates. Dogan Group developed with 
state-incentives in tourism, media 49 and fmance 50 in the 1990s. 51 The Group currently 
47 For instance, D1~bank stated its position in banking as follows: 'In a volatile operating 
environment, D1~bank's defensive posture enables the Bank to remain in the game for the long-
run, effectively gaining a solid market share as others exit. High liquidity, a low repo portfolio 
and a relatively low gross open foreign exchange portfolio leave D1~bank we11 positioned to 
manage the fmancial cns1s in Turkey' ("Dogan Group in Brief', URL: 
http://www.Doganholding.com.tr/bief.html (accessed 27 November 2002)). 
48 This conclusion is also verified by the non-industrial, small MNG Group. This 1970s' 
construction-origin Group expanded into tourism in 1996 and finance, air cargo, media, and 
recently the defence industry. Today, the Group is one of the largest groups in the tourism sector. 
The Group's MNG Bank sti11 continues to operate as a sma11 player in banking. 
49 Having the largest share in the print media sector (with horizontal and vertical 
integration, from publishing to distribution and marketing), Dogan Group has also 
! 
(. 
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seeks to create further synergies between the finance, energy and telecommunication 
sectors in which it benefited from the ongoing liberalisation and privatisation processes in 
Turkey. 52 Hence, 
despite having Turkey's biggest media companies, fuel oil distribution and energy have 
become its main lines of business, followed by finance. 53 
The Fiba Group, on the other hand, has a finance-retailing focus and the synergy 
between these two sectors is the core of the Group strategy both domestically and 
internationalised its printing and broadcasting activities. It also started joint ventures with foreign 
partners in 1996 such as Egmont, Burda and AOL-Tirne Warner in the mass communications 
sector (see the statement by Mehmet Ali Yalcindag, CEO of Do~ Holding Publications, URL: 
http://www.Doganholding.com.tr/news/bighlight2.asp (accessed 8 June 2004)). The 
conglomerate continues its international expansion in newspaper publishing and broadcasting in 
the EU, the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
As regard to industrial activities, the Group entered industry in 1977 via Otokar operating 
in automotive industry, and further expanded with the acquisitions of Dita~ and <;elik Halat. As 
Tufan Darbaz, CEO of the Group stated, the share of industrial activities has a minor share in 
total Group turnover even though Dit~ and <;elik Halat are the market leaders (see Globus 2003, 
12). 
50 Do~ Group entered banking with the establishment of Alternatifbank in 1992 and 
also acquired D1~bank as the second bank during the 1994 crisis. Alternatifbank was sold to 
Anadolu Endustri Group in 1996. The Group expanded its fmancial arm internationally through 
subsidiary banks in Malta and the Netherlands. 
51 The expansion was due to the use of its high cash position for new acquisitions during 
the 1994 financial crisis. lis 'discovery of the stock-exchange', with the public float of some 
Group companies before the crisis, allowed the Group to face it with high liquidity (see Nurten 
Erk, ''Barmanbek: Telekomunikasyon Sek!Orilnde Mutlaka Olacal1;lz", Hi.irriyet, 7 August 2000). 
52 The latest important step made by Dogan Group was the acquisition of POA$, the 
market leader for retail sales and the distribution of petroleum products in Turkey, from the 
Privatisation Board in partnership with ~bank Group. Dogan Group expects to take advantage of 
the wide distribution network of POA$ for the group's existing retail and financial service 
activities, . mainly in banking ("Chai= 's Message", URL: 
http://www.Doj!anholding.com.tr/chainnan.htrnl (accessed 27 November 2002)). The Group aims 
to internationalise the activities of POA$ and is interested in privatized companies in Romania 
and Bulgaria in petroleum (see Globus 2003, 12) to expand towards energy generation from 
distribution (see Ala 2000, 80). 
" See the statement by Tufan Darbaz, CEO of Do~ Holding, URL: 
http://www.doganholding.com.tr/newslbighlightl.asp (accessed 8 June 2004). 
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internationally. 54 Forty percent of the Group's activities are internationally oriented and 
its growth strategy centres on international markets as of 2001. 55 
Here, their pursuit of synergy, along with a cautious growth policy, appears to 
be an important factor leading these conglomerates to pass through the storm of the 
reform while many new-primitives operating in similar sectors faced decline. For 
instance, while Ba)'lndir Group, the retailing ex-partner of Fiba Group in Romania, lost 
substantial market share (because it used its domestic and overseas bank branches to 
finance its more ambitious expansion), the Fiba Group itself followed a cautious/focused 
growth policy along with bank prudence. 56 
Orner Aras, Vice-Executive of the Board of Directors of Fiba Holding, 57 stated 
that since they did not have large industrial investments, there was no need to fund such 
corporations during the crises. In addition, due to the synergy between retailing and 
finance, he added, they could continue to grow even in a time of crisis. Furthermore, 
Finansbank was not seriously affected by the devaluation in 2001 because of its extensive 
overseas links with financial affiliates (see Sengonii12001c). 58 
In summary, the members of the third division have remained mainly focused on 
finance and other service sectors and thus, unlike the first two divisions of the dynamic 
accumulators, do not capture surplus value through industrial production. This has made 
them commercially viable but with limited capacity for expansion. However, even though 
this characteristic of their patterns of accumulation has allowed them to take a place in 
the newly formed FC of Turkey, it has also made them the most vulnerable fraction of the 
dynamic accumulators. In particular, they are vulnerable to future takeovers by foreign 
banks or by other dynamic accumulators, most obviously by those of the second division 
which will be looking to increase their scale to secure long-run competitiveness. 
54 The Chairman HilsnU Ozyegin indicated that the Group will grow through creating 
synergy between the two fields (see "Fiba Holding Chairman Hilsnil Ozyegin 'The Future is 
Retailing' ", URL: htto://www.fibaho1ding.com.tr/e-b-perakende.html (accessed 15 November 
2002)). Meanwhile, the Fiba Group withdrew from the media sector, while expanding in retailing 
via new acquisitions (see <;:oban 2003). · 
" For instance, in addition to the largest shopping centre in Romania, the Group plans to 
open a second one in Romania as well as in Ukraine (see Hila! 41k An, "Ozyegin'den 
Finansbank Yakla!ilflll", Finansal Forum, 2 April2002). 
56 Nirrten Erk, "Fiba: Hem iyimseriz Hem de Temkinliyiz", Hilrriyet, 14 January 2003. 
57 Nurten Erk,"Fiba: Allah'tan Sanayi Sekt5rilnde Degiliz", Hilrriyet, 21 May 2001. 
58 The Fiba Group has banks in Russia, Romania, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
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Supporting this proposition, Fortis of Netherland-Belgium recently made a deal with 
Dogan Group for the purchase of D1~bank, as will be discussed in Chapter 11. 
8.5 Overall Characteristics of the Dynamic Accumulators 
With a bird-eye-view it is seen that the first division engages with large TNCs 
investing generally in advanced capitalist countries along with expansion in transition 
economies. 
The second division plays an almost imperial role, assisting Turkish finance and 
capital to move into developing and transition economies of the old Soviet empire, 
consolidating especially on the Turkish language regions. But while there have been 
quick profits to be made in these frontiers, the dynamic accumulators (unlike the 
primitive accumulators who have also sought to expand there) have invested in stable, 
long-term investments in core industries. 
The third division plays a different role again. They have been less aggressive 
in their industrial expansion, and following a pattern of accumulation centred on the 
provision of banking facilities, enjoying their conglomerates' synergies with service 
industries. This sub-division, being the least linked into surplus value production has a 
lesser role to play in industrial restructuring and the international expansion of Turkish 
capital. It can be conjectured that they are viable, well performing banks whose destiny 
will be determined in future bank rationalisations. 
The dynamic accumulators, especially the first and second divisions, are 
distinguished by their orientation to expand accumulation via surplus value production 
rather than remain reliant on finance protectionism afforded by the state. In particular 
their dynamism lay in their global orientation, and the sense that accumulation within 
Turkey alone was not sustainable. Moreover, they not oDly gravitated to international 
accumulation, but they did it predominantly in activities that had long-term competitive 
potential. This showed up !n a number of ways. 
Firstly, the dynamic accumulators successfully managed the transition period 
for the new banking era. Although almost all private deposit banks benefited from high-
yielding T -bills, the confiscated banks appeared as unsuccessful in managing the 
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associated risks which made them vulnerable in the liquidity squeeze of the November 
2000 crisis and the sharp devaluation of Turkish Lira during the February 2001 crisis. For 
the dynamic accumulators it was different. For example, i~bank General Director Ersin 
Ozince stressed core banking focus of the bank alongside the engagement with state debt 
finance as follows: 
i§bank has always done a very wide based banking. I mean it was also one of the 
institutions that relatively benefited from high real interest rates and state borrowing 
policies in the past. However, it benefited relatively because today it is being said that 
the sector is returning to real banking .... i~bank has never gone far away from real 
banking. It is impossible for the bank to do this. 
Infact, we were not much focused on T -bills. We had to be like that. One can not 
manage a bank having over 850 branches with the revenue from T -bills. Smaller, 
dynamic balance sheets can be managed [by relying on T-bills]. (Ayy!ld1z 2000, 7) 
Some dynamic accumulators even could take advantage of the financial crises, 
which severely hit the primitive accumulators' banks and left them insolvent. 59 Thus, the 
crises functioned to draw the line between the primitives' and dynamics' banks more 
clearly. As an IMP report (2001a, 11) verifies, the banks that had loanable liquidity 
provided a resource transfer from the primitive accumulators as well as the state: 
These fiscal costs [to the state of the interest rate hike because of the large overnight 
exposure of the state and SDIF banks] are partly mirrored by the increase in interest 
receipts of the private banks that are net lenders in the interbank market, including the 
major private banks, the core of the private banking sector in Turkey. While these 
banks had to face an increase in their borrowing from domestic and external customers, 
their financial position was strengthened by the interest payments received from state 
and SDIF banks. At the same time, some small-and medium-sized banks were instead 
more severely hit by the crisis. 
59 Even if the financial crises created losses in banking as a whole, some dynamic 
accumulators could compensate their losses at some degrees (see Soydan & Karagilll!i 2001). For 
instance, Akbank succeeded to take advantage of its high liquidity position when interest rates 
soared while facing currency losses because of its high open FX positions (see Nurten Erk, 
"Akbank: Kriz Bize Dokunmad1", Hilrriyet, 11 January 2001; Soydan & Karag!ill!i (2001, 22)). 
As a result, according to Ali Sabanc1, while in 2001 the trade aild industrial turnover contracted 
about l/5 in dollar terms, their finance group has a performance exceeding the expectation of the 
Sabanc1 Group (see Poyraz 2002a, 28). 
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Secondly, the dynamic accumulators not only managed the transition in banking 
well, but could also overhaul their overall group strategies by redetermining the sectors 
and locations in which to accumulate. Indeed, the revision of the sectoral range was 
linked to the change in bank-conglomerate relations in the new era. As finance 
protectionism started to wither away, the functionality of banks in overall accumulation 
strategies needed to be reconsidered. The dynamic accumulators seemed to be successful 
in doing the necessary preparations to this end in the pre-reform era. Banks started to be 
seen much more functional in creating group-synergy through interactions among various 
sector activities. 6° Furthermore, these conglomerates shifted their focus simultaneously to 
retailing, energy, t.elecommunication and information technologies not only because these 
are strategic, high growth potential sectors of the current period, but also because they 
could create the sought synergy effect with other sector activities such as finance, media, 
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etc. 
Thirdly, accompanying this overall restructuring, the Turkish conglomerates in 
general and FC in particular have been accelerating their internationalisation efforts 
which imply further integration with global capital. As Ercan (2003b, 2) notes, especially 
large scale capitals could not achieve the same rising export performance of 1980-1989 
period and tended to orient to the domestic market instead in the 1990s. Accompanying 
the recent restructuring, however, it was observed that the domestic orientation phase is 
over. The conglomerates have been increasingly chasing global expansion. 
Fourthly, despite the common characteristics, there are differences among the 
divisions of the dynamic accumulators; the three divisions represent different agendas of 
restructuring. In Chapter 11 it will be seen that they followed different paths during the 
early stages of the consolidation process in banking: the first division tended to get 
stronger through partnerships with global capital; the second and third divisions tried to 
solidify their positions through mainly the state-facilitated acquisition process, for some 
"'The conglomerates aim at using distribution channels (customer databases) in various 
sectors in common to increase total Group-turnovers. For instance, Oyakbank provides 
automotive credits for OY AK Group's car company, OY AK.-Renault (see Levent 2005). 
Restructuring of banks by the dynamic accumulators will be the issue of Chapter 11. · 
61 Verifying their success in managing the transition, for example, Do~ Group reduced 
the share of finance in its portfolio from 83% in 1998, to 63% in 2000 and to 56% in 2003 as 
other sectors came to the fore due to the restructuring within the conglomerate (see Ala 2004a). 
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to be ready for foreign partnerships in the future. In the current context the importance of 
the difference is that they engage with different forms of global integration, 
Between these sub-divisions of the dynamic accumulators, the basis is laid for a 
new regime of accumulation in Turkey which is profoundly based in global integration. 
8.6 The Role of the Dynamic Accumulators in Capital Restructuring 
The adjustment of the Turkish banking sector to international banking standards 
is part of global capital's pursuit for standardised conditions for value creation on a world 
scale; an issue addressed in Chapter 5. These conditions placed inevitable pressure on 
relations between capital and labour within Turkey, as well as between different parts of 
capital. 
The dynamic accumulators· understood that domestic accumulation driven by 
profitability and productivity, rather than rent-seeking, had become necessary and rules 
of competition were. destined to be rationalised as Turkey opened up to global capital. 
(This required raising finance from international capital markets, and attracting FDI as 
well as increasing exports). Moreover, this necessitated the elimination of the primitive 
accumulators which were still dependent on and sought to be nurtured by state finance 
protectionism. 
To this end, the dynamic accumulators stressed the necessity for a decrease in 
state borrowing which was the primitive accumulators' basic source of expansion. As 
long as the state continued to borrow with higher interest rates, this would lead to a rising 
costs of fund and prevent the return to 'real' banking. The General Director of i~bank, 
Ersin Ozince indicated as much: 
It is more true to say that the real banking period is coming up. Why is it coming? 
Today Turkey has a hope for a gradual elimination of unfair competition within the 
domestic market also under ·the pressure of international competition. This means that · 
everybody will be equally subjected to the rules. The ideal situation has not been yet 
achieved in the banking sector. However, in my opinion, if our preference is for a 
liberal capitalist system, free market system, its indispensable first condition is the 
management of money and capital. markets with the norms of adv;mced markets 
without concession. Real banking will come when it is done with the rules of today's 
advanced economies. It means that real banking starts in a country if state domestic 
borrowing policies change, if it orients towards retail banking or commercial banking 
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from T -bills. Rules of competition work equally for everybody; the rules equally work 
for the state, private, domestic, foreign but there are still some deficiencies that need to 
be removed at this respect. (Nokta 2000, 8) 
Moreover, the global integration and associated command of the rule of markets 
required not just financial sector reform, but wider industrial reform, as well. With the 
long history of FC in Turkey, one could not occur without the other. Despite high profit 
rates and dramatic erosion in real wage rates in the post-1980 period, 62 profits were not 
fully converted into new investments, as state borrowing under finance protectionism 
offered a much easier and lucrative source of placement to the fractions of capital that 
had available funds. The source of the increase in the manufacturing industry's 
production and export was mainly based on the rise in the utilization of installed capacity 
even though some conglomerates also developed to varying degrees via new fixed capital 
investments. Consequently, Turkish manufacturing industry was increasingly outdated, 
and faced the need to become internationally competitive or dissolve. The consequences 
of bank restructuring for industry will be addressed in Chapter 12. 
The dynamic accumulators understood these needs because their own 
aspirations for global expansion were being impeded by the various forms of state 
protectionism that dominated the Turkish economy. But more than simply appreciating 
IMF and state policy as affirming their accumulation aspirations, what is distinctive about 
the dynamic accumulators is that they actually led the state's reforms. The dynamic 
accumulators were already internationalising and rationalising their accumulation while 
·the era of financial protectionism was at its peak. Indeed, it was precisely the fact that 
these capitals had already globalised that the Turkish state/IMF reform could develop 
policies to make them the hegemonic fraction of capital. Had these dynamic 
accumulators not already made the transition, the financial deregulations would have seen 
all banks in Turkey become insolvent! The state and the IMF needed the dynamic 
accumulators in order to implement their policy of global integration. 
Hence, it was not surprising that the dynamic accumulators demanded a state-
managed change in the accumulation regime towards increasing international 
62 Regarding the position of labour within the restructuring in capital accumulation 
regime in the post-1980 period see Chapter 5, Subsection 'Labour'. 
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competitiveness. For instance, Rahmi Kot;: of Kot;: Group stressed: 'the politics should not 
be used in interest allocation anymore and politics should not be done through the 
allocation of state resources'. 63 Accordingly, he demanded a state which ' ... will create a 
private sector that works freely and under competitive market conditions and will 
eliminate unfair competition'. 64 Zorlu and Anadolu Groups also demanded that the state 
focus on 'the transition from a rent economy to a production economy'. 65 
Nor is it surprising that these conglomerates were extolling the virtues of 
globally-integrated accumulation. For instance, Rahmi Kot;: of Kot;: Group emphasised the 
need for integration with Europe and the world because of both the Custom Union with 
the EU and World Trade Organization treaties. According to Kot;:, these treaties put 
responsibility on the Group to compete with the world. 66 The following statement by the 
Chairman of Dogu~ Group, Ferit Sahenk, verifies this need for adaptation to the global 
rules of competition: 
This program is a program for change. The situation in Turkey was not created by only 
a finance crisis. The world wants us to work and perform to certain standards. If we 
also want to grow, we have to be consistent with the world. If we want to bring these 
funds to Turkey, we have to be a member of this club. There are conditions for being a 
member. This is an imperative brought by globalization. 67 
Therefore, the leading conglomerates led the state reforms in Turkey. The following 
statement by Ferit Sahenk reflects their consciousness in adhering to standards of global 
corporations: 
The [Dogu~] Group had already been a forerunner of the execution of organizational 
requirements such as corporate governance, audit requirements and transparency of 
financial disclosure, in line with the necessities imposed by Western financial markets. 
These were later introduced by the Government as statutory requirements through the 
aegis of the IMF as long overdue market reforms aiming to increase the investor 
~ . 
appetite and corporate transparency. . 
63 "Dervi~ Son Umidimiz",Sabah, 21 March 2001. 
64 
''Koy: Once Giit;:lii Siyasi idare",Yeniyiizyil, I Aprill998. 
65 Nurten Erk, "Oziihan: 2001 Zor Get;:er", Hiirriyet, 5 January 2001. 
66 
"Devlerin Y olu 2l.Yiizy!lda Kesi~ecek", Y eniyiizy!l, 21 August 1998t;: 
67 Ruhi Sanyer, ''Kriz Boyun Egmeye B~ladt", Radikal, 12 November 2001. 
~ ''From the Chairman", URL: 
http://www.Dofulsholding.com.tr/savfa.cfin?Savfa=DHolding&Menu=BaskanMesaj (accessed 
28 November 2002); 
r 
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8.7 Reflections on Alternative Interpretations 
A focus on fractional divisions and patterns of accumulation clearly gives a very 
different interpretation of reforms from both the neo-classical economists and the 
nationalist/developmentalist political economists. 
The former need not divert the analysis here. It is readily apparent that analyses 
that invoke the logic of market forces provide at best a limited· perspective on the 
processes that have driven change and the interests that are served by change. The 
fractional analysis verifies that the need for the change in banking cannot be attributed to 
distorted market forces because of inefficient state policies. Instead, relations between 
fractions of capital (i.e. the conflicts between productive-commercial capital and FC in 
general, and between the primitive accumulators and the dynamic accumulators within 
FC in particular) constituted the underlying dynamics for change. 
Of more interest is the contrast of this study's analysis with the analyses of the 
nationalist/developmentalist political economists. They base their analyses on the 
dichotomy between the IMP/foreign capital and national interests. As discussed in detail 
in Chapter 3, these scholars tend to hold the IMF responsible from imposing a change 
process on Turkey which conflicts with national interests (Boratav and Y eldan 2001, 
Yeldan 2001a, Manisah 2003). They also criticise 'large capital' in Turkey for 
collaborating with TNCs. 
On the contrary, the fractional analysis shows that change has been mainly 
anchored in domestic class dynamics. Rather than an imposed rupture, reforms have 
secured the continuity of the hegemonic part of capital, now freed of the costs of financial 
protectionism and transformed it into global accumulators. In the process, our analysis 
Rahmi Koy of Ko~ Group also praised his Group's leading role in applying superior 
standards of corporate governance and its being the first Turkish company that implemented 
inflation adjusted international accounting standards in its financial disclosures ("Chairman's 
Message", URL: htto://www.Koc.corn.tr/englishlk:urumsa1/baskanin msg.asp (accessed 8 
November 2002)). 
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has showed the limitations of a nationalist discourse when capital itself is strategising and 
circulating on an inter-national scale. 
The nationalists developed the view that neo-liberal policy in Turkey has made 
the country the playground for speculative attacks of international finance seeking 
arbitrage gains. Therefore, the ongoing transformation of Turkey is attributed to foreign 
imposition and inadequate state policies. They argue that these transformations conflict 
with the national interest. This approach, however, fails to grasp the structuml dynamics 
of 'domestic' capital accumulation process which have led the conglomerates to 
articulate with global capital in specific forms. 
For instance, Manisah (2003) argues that large Turkish holding companies 
placed themselves in a dependent position with TNCs, sacrificing a domestically-
integrated Turkish economy in which capital, the state, the working-class and farmers 
would have been in a union to collectively support national prosperity. The result, he 
contends, is de-industrialisation and dependency. 
This interpretation is a limited perspective, contingent more on its nationalist 
assumptions than on detailed analysis. While competition and relations among capitals 
are increasingly organised as intertwined global networks, macroeconomic performances 
of individual countries do not coincide with the performances of individual capitals 
(Ercan 2003a, 616, 651). Therefore, while the needs of internationalising individual 
capitals and nation-centred collaborations (among fractions of capital, the state, working-
class and farmers) have diverse spatial bases, developmentalists yearn for a different 
form of internationalisation for individual 'national' capitals. Manisalt, for example, is 
· opposed to the diffusion of foreign TNCs inside Turkey. He also draws attention to 
increasing control of TNCs over Turkish partners in joint ventures. He suggests that 
Turkish capital is becoming part of global marketing and production networks of Western 
capital (although no specific evidence is given in support of this). He advocates an 
independent (from 1NCs and international institutions), integrated development strategy 
with other domestic agents on the basis of a long-run collaboration in the national interest. 
Our analysis of the dynamic accumulators (and, indeed many of the primitive 
accumulators) shows that individual capitals seek to accumulate internationally 
irrespective of nationalist considerations. Three issues warrant consideration here. Firstly, 
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some advance their accumulation by being part of global networks of TNCs, but with 
Turkey a key site ofproduction.69 For instance, Kos; Group's Tofa~ follows this strategy 
in its partnership with Fiat, using Turkey as a production and export base. 70 Secondly, 
some others enter partnerships based entirely on off-shore production. They prefer joint 
ventures with partners from those sites to start production if they think that it will provide 
a more rapid expansion in those markets. For instance, Zorlu Group has sought 
collaboration with Mexican capital to produce televisions in America. Thirdly, some 
other capitals pursue global .expansion via sole initiatives. Kos; Group successfully 
implements this strategy in Aryelik which has become one of the leading producers of 
household whitegoods in Europe. Similarly, Zorlu Group's home-textile production in 
Europe displays another successful example of this form of internationalisation. The 
scope of manoeuvre in specific sectors determines each individual capital's expansion 
strategies. After setting up partnerships with world giants in automotive and media and 
then seeking for foreign partners in finance and retailing, Ferit $ahenk of Dogu~ Group 
colourfully verifies the thesis's argument: 
At which point are we [the Dogu~ Group] now [after the restructuring of the Group]? 
We operate in the sectors that are currently part of Turkey's strategy, as well. We will 
collaborate in those sectors with world institutions, the institutions which compete at 
the world scale and will see Turkey as part of their growth and development. Some of 
them will be partnerships while we will have strategic alliances in some others. (Ala 
2004a,2) 
However, it must be said that Manisah' s scenario is not entirely without 
foundation. Ko<;: and Sabanc1 Groups, in some of their partnerships with the TNCs, have 
become integrated with global production/sale networks of the TNCs instead of mainly 
producing for the local market. But the reasons for such cases only confirm the approach 
taken in this thesis. In the case of Ko<;: Group, the reason leading its Tofa~ to be part of 
· the global network of Fiat was related to the intensified competition caused by the 
Customs Union with the EU. As the international investment bank Merrill Lynch (see 
Power 1999b, 62) advocated, after pursuing the strategy of selling outmoded models with 
69 Regarding the worldwide trend for international integration of production through 
strategic alliances and other cooperative agreements between large corporations and 
complementary partners see Hoogwelt (1997, Ill). 
70 See Lole (1999, 40-41). 
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high prices under the protection of trade barriers, Tofa~ rapidly lost its share of the 
domestic market and so decided to resolve this problem through integration with Fiat's 
global strategies as its producer and exporter. This strategy change allowed Tofa~ to be 
converted from a local producer to a global producer.71 Thus, in this case, Ko~ Group 
elevated itself to a global player albeit under the command of Fiat. Rather than implying 
de-industrialization and dependency for Turkey, these strategies are assisting Turkish 
capital to expand systematically into both the advanced capitalist countries and into 
transition economies. 
It is argued that in the recent withdrawals of Turkish conglomerates from some 
sectors of the Turkish economy (e.g. automotive) occurred also because of the changing 
strategies of foreign partners (see Ftrat 2002a). After entering Turkey with a domestic 
partner, some became more confident in doing business in Turkey alone and began to 
separate from their Turkish partners ·(e.g. Toyota & Sabanct). In this process, Turkish 
capitals reviewed their business strategies and if the partnership was not their core 
business, or beyond their capability of acting alone, they separated; otherwise, they 
continued without foreign partner. There are cases in which Turkish conglomerates 
preferred to end the partnerships when they saw that the global strategies of TNCs had 
become a barrier to their own expansion. For instance, SabanCI Group left its partnership 
with the French company Danone in 2003 as it could not achieve its expected levels of 
profitability with this partnership and now continues to grow in food production on its 
own (see Ftrat 2004). This is also the circumstance in which Anadolu Endustri Group 
ended its partnership with Honda (see footnote 48). Thus conflicts, as much as 
collaborations between capitals, continue! 72 
71 For the high export success of Tof~ after the agreement with Fiat in 1994 see 
GOziitok (2005). 
72 It would be interesting to find out how many overseas mergers and acquisition cases 
that the leading Turkish capitals have benefited from as a counterfactual to the argument of 
acquisitions of Third World corporations by 'INCs. 
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8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter, in combination with Chapter 7, has posed Turkish banking reform 
in terms of the underlying contradictory interests of fractions of capital. It depicts how 
intra-capital class dynamics are being transformed from domestic·centred capital 
accumulation to global accumulation under the state and IMF supervision. 
This approach is significantly different from the standard interpretations of 
banking reform which pose finance and banking as a discrete sector with its own 
determinants and equilibrium. We have seen, on the contrary, that the driving logic of 
banking reform was deeper than just bank treasuries. That is because the tensions within 
banking preceding and accompanying the reform coincided with wider conflicts within 
total capital beyond banking. Given the ownerships of banks by holding companies with 
investments in diversified sectors, the fall or survival of the banks was determined by 
overall accumulation strategies of their conglomerates, not just their financial practices. 
The finance protectionism of the pre-reform period provided resources for 
accelerated accumulation for certain fractions of capital but especially for FC was a 
deliberate state policy. The state boosted financial incomes through its borrowing policy 
on behalf of the benefactor fractions. It also condoned, at least implicitly, the move into 
banking by unqualified capitals as well as the use/embezzlement of banks by their 
conglomerates. 
With the end of finance protectionism, a new regime of accumulation required a 
restructuring in the patterns of accumulation of conglomerates. Accordingly, as the IMF-
supervised regulations have been established by the state for 'serious' accumulation, this 
led to an elimination and reorganisation within capital and FC in particular. 
Crucially, in this reorientation, as finance protectionism has withered away, the 
dynamic accumulators needed to further intemationalise their accumulation and thus, 
they needed to increase their engagement with global capital (given the capital scarcity in 
Turkey). This need for further articulation with global accumulation by the dynamic 
accumulators caused further state-managed change in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Despite the widespread argument of weak nation states, under the pressures of 
globalisation, deregulating their financial (and other sectors) according to neo-liberal 
217 
postulates, this study has shown that the Turkish state actually facilitated the necessary 
transformation in the capital accumulation regime in line with the interests of the 
fractions of capital that seek to accumulate globally further. The post-1980 period is 
marked by the socialisation of the costs of this global expansion of Turkish capital. The 
state support for export-based accumulation and the following state finance protectionism 
were functional to this end. Moreover, the pursuit of further globalisation coincides with 
the intensifying competition among late capitalised countries which in turn aggravates the 
need for capital (Ercan 2003b, 1 0). Thus, consistent with (Ercan 2003b ), collaboration 
with global capital to accelerate accumulation has become the key issue in the current 
agenda of Turkish capital. 73 
73 Therefore, it was not surprising that Turkish capital in unison demanded from the state 
to do necessary change 'in the climate of investment' in order to attract FDI. As a result, the 
recent passing of Foreign Direct Investment Law (no. 4875, 5.6.2003) encouraged foreign 
investments in Turkey (Ercan 2003a). For a short review of the law see also Ozeke (2003). 
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9.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters it was stressed that banking reform reorganised Turkish 
capital via further integration with global capital. For this reorganisation, it is contended, 
state fmance protectionism had to be eliminated. The end of finance protectionism 
required the reconfiguration of holding banking. 
For the reconfiguration of holding banking, the state mainly used two mechanisms 
and set up the legislative base to this end. The first mechanism, bank seizures, eliminated 
the organic links between the primitive accumulators and their banks (as will be 
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discussed in the following chapter). The second mechanism was the increasing legal 
restrictions on the control of banks by the dynamic accumulators. This chapter looks at 
the new legislation that rearranged the funding relations between the surviving banks and 
the owner dynamic accumulators. 
For many people in Turkey, the changes to the banking system were assumed to 
be part of the process of Turkey becoming a member of the EU. This argument was also 
promoted by some politicians. This chapter, however, develops two alternative 
propositions. First it shows how the Turkish nation state facilitated the integration of 
domestic accumulation with global capital. This contrasts with the widespread depiction 
of the Turkish state as 'the feeble state'. This chapter presents evidence of the legislative 
changes the state introduced. It will be shown that the Turkish state mediated between 
competing interests within capital by pursuing the agenda of further integration with 
global capital, and at the same time secured the integration under a mollified transition 
for Turkish capital. 1 Second, this chapter takes a closer look at the actual process of 
legislative change and shows that the state did not only enforce structural change, but its 
policies helped to construct (in part) the sub-fractional divisions within FC. The argument 
that Turkey had to 'fit in with the EU's banking standards' however was important 
because this argument helped to legitimise the changes that the state introduced. 
9.2 Setting-up the New Relations between Banks and Conglomerates 
Banking reform was a process of the state breaking-up holding companies and of 
re-establishing the hegemony of a particular fraction within FC. Analysing the state's 
legislative initiatives will provide a deeper understanding of the state's intervention into 
the fractional conflicts. 
The official statements by governments and Ministers that were provided when 
they were introducing legislative amendments gives some insights into the logic of the 
state. For instance, a report by the Turkish Parliament's Planning and Budget 
Commission (Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 1999b) on the draft Banks Act 
1 This finding supports the proposition by Sassen (1996) who argues the central role of 
nation states in producing or legitimating new legal regimes in the process of globalisation of 
capital. 
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No 4389 is highly revealing. The parliamentary report pointed out the negative 
implications of the proliferation of holding banking. The report emphasised that the high 
profitability of Turkish banking was based on state debt finance and that this aggravated 
the state's debt burden. To prevent bankruptcies of banks, which were misused by their 
conglomerates, the report said, necessary judicial and administrative precautions should 
be taken. 
In the Parliamentary Assembly, many deputies pointed out how the links among 
holding banks, the state borrowing policy and the full insurance scheme undermined 
Turkish banking. For example, Ali Co~kun, Deputy of the Virtue Party, argued (TGNA 
2001c, 4) that this link brought the economy and political will under the pressure of 'a 
rent sector' and made the country 'a colony' which was financially under IMF control. 
· On the same basis, Sait Ab9a of the Virtue Party indicated holding banking was a crisis-
prone feature of Turkish banking: 
While the banks were cleane!l out, we can clearly see that unfortunately the supervision 
mechanism has not worked. The system has been cleaned out in two ways; within the 
triangle of politics-mafia-bureaucracy, we see two channels for the bank embezzlements 
which were based on political corruption and holding banking. 
While on the one hand, through the establishment of fictitious companies, resources have 
been transferred to those companies, on the other hand non-performing credits have been 
given to subsidiaries. In this way, banks have been embezzled and unfortunately, we see 
that the governments have been merely a spectator. (TGNA 1999c, 32) 
On the basis of these sorts of arguments, a sweeping judicial and regulatory 
change was implemented to break down holding banking.2 A detailed discussion of each 
legislative/regulatory arrangement is beyond the confines of the thesis. However, what is 
crucial here is that every single component of this comprehensive regulatory process 
served the same agenda of setting-up the new relations between banks and their 
conglomerates. These state-provided changes included: 
• the gradual decrease in the full insurance for deposits, 
2 Even though the direction was towards breaking-down holding banking, the Assembly 
was not unanimous. Some deputies supported holding banking for the country. For instance, 
Ekrem Pakdemirli, Deputy of the Motherland Party, (TGNA 1999c, 46) argued that under the 
new regulations, banks would not be able to finance highly-needed large projects, especially 
export-oriented ones, without forming consortiums. 
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• the establishment of internal control and risk management systems, 
• the adoption of international accounting standards and ensuring 
transparency in financial statements, 
• the establishment of control over off-shore banking activities, 
• the strengthening of regulations over affecting bank establishment and 
bank ownership, and 
• the setting-up of further restrictions on banks' overall group exposures, etc. 
These all functioned to break down the close links between holding banks and their 
conglomerates. 
As Chapter 4 addressed, many banks have financed their group companies with 
loans and equity holdings despite the legislative restrictions introduced since 1979. As 
noted in Euromoney: 
Historically, private-sector banks have evolved as financing arms of the families behind 
them. Shareholders used bank funds to finance new project.s and in the 1970s it was not 
unusual for a bank to allocate 75% of its loans to its owners. Since the 1980s, though, 
there has been a trend, encouraged by government legislation, to restrict lending to 
shareholders and for banks to turn into independent profit centres. But old habits die hard 
and the field is getting crowded with newcomers with big appetites. The extent to which 
bank and family business is separated differs from bank to bank but in general the 
borders are undelineated and invisible. (MUnir 1998) 
With Turkey's banking reforms, the policy of using holding banking as the financial 
source of the enhanced accumulation ended. 
The following analysis will address how laws to limit interlocking ownership 
between banks and conglomerates developed during the reform process. Of the many 
comprehensive judicial and regulatory arrangements, the amendments to banks' 
connected lending and non-financial equity holdings will be focused on because the new 
codes on the group exposures of banks are at the ~ore of the redefined relations between 
holding banks and their conglomerates. 3 
3 For other legislative arrangements that modified the relations between holding banks 
and their conglomerates see BRSA (2003c). 
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9.3 Legislative Amendments to Banks' Non-Financial Equity Holdings and 
Connected Lending 
In June 1999, December 1999 and May 2001, ballking law were amended in order 
to restrict the overall group exposure of banks. In what follows, these three amendments 
on banks' non· financial equity holdings and connected lending will be discussed. 
9.3.1 The Banks Act No. 4389: the First Step towards the Anglo-Saxon Model 
The government launched its financial sector reform program with Parliament 
passing a new banking law in June 1999 (WB 2000, 97). The Banks Act No. 4389 
(18.6.1999) introduced restrictions on bank credits that were similar to the norms of the 
EU (Reisoglu 1999, 3). The Clause No.I! (see Turkish Government 1999a) generated 
four critical controls. Firstly, it preserved the restrictions of the previous Banks Act No. 
3182: the clause limited the share that banks could acquire from a non-financial 
institution with 15% of a bank's own funds and required that the total amount of such 
shares should not exceed 60% of a bank's own funds. Secondly, the limit on total credits 
to subsidiaries were to not be more than twice a bank's own funds. 4 5 
Thirdly, a new restriction was put on bank credits. The law introduced the concept 
of large credit in line with EU standards: the Act defined credit which was more than 
10% of bank's own funds (as direct or indirect credit, to a person or firm) as large credit 
and restricted the total oflarge credit to a maximum of eight times the bank's own funds. 6 
Fourthly, the state aimed to make the limits on direct (25%) and indirect credits (50%) 
closer to each other (Reisoglu 1999, 8). To this end, the Act further limited total credits 
4 However, the Act No.4389 removed the total credit limit of 20 times the bank's owo 
funds. Hence, the relation between credit and a bank's owo funds was not considered in terms of 
total credits. Reisoglu (1999, 6) contended that it could not be argued that the state did not see 
benefits of keeping the limits or saw a drawback in building a link between banks' owo funds and 
total credits because the state did riot give any reasons for this change. 
'The new law removed the previous arrangement that 'any shares in a company, which 
were less than ten percent of that company's capital, should not be taken into account in the 
calculation of the foregoing limits for banks' participation' (see Reisoglu 1999, 10, 35). The 
government said the reason for this change was to limit the exceeding practices of holding banks 
(TGNA 1999a). 
6 Under a four-year transition period. 
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given to bank shareholders. 7 As such, total credits given to real or legal persons having 
indirect credit relations were limited to 50% of bank's own funds. 8 On the other hand, the 
limit on credits given to a real or legal person was increased to 25% of bank's own funds 
instead of the previous limit of 20%. 
The government's reasoning for these legislative changes was that it would 
prevent the concentration of risk. 9 Reducing credit risks of banks by restricting indirect 
credits given to groups of companies as well as to bank shareholders was effective. In 
addition, allowing banks to give more credit to a single company was expected to provide 
a relief to the finance problems being faced by SMEs. Furthermore, the upper limit on 
total large credits was seen as reducing the opportunity for large scale capitals to obtain 
large amounts of credit. 10 All these changes made it legally possible for bank resources 
to be used outside their conglomerates. The significance of this orientation was that it 
signalled the standardisation process of conditions of accumulation for Turkish capital in 
line with global competition. 
9.3.2 Law No. 4491: Abrogation of the Specific Limits on Banks' Non-Financial 
Equity Holdings 
The Banks Act No.4389 was amended only six months later by Law No. 4491 
(19.12.1999) (see Turkish Government 1999b). This amendment restricted direct or 
indirect lending to a real or legal person, to connected parties and to bank shareholders 
with 25% of a bank's own funds (Ozeroglu 2000, 1). To this end, the direct and indirect 
credit limits were matched at the same level of restriction (25%) (Reisoglu 2000, 1). 11 
7 To this end, the previous limit of 50% of bank's own funds was preserved, but the 
definition of this credit was widened by including of the credit given to the second-degree 
relatives (blood and affinity) of bank shareholders (in a four year transition-period) (see Reisoglu 
1999, 8). 
8 Instead of the previous 75% maximum rate (under a five-year-transition period). 
9 See TGNA (1999a); the statement by Recep Onal of Democratic Left Par(y in TGNA 
(1999c, 13). 
10 Gi!lcem Akta§,"Banka Kredileri Tabana Yayiiacak", Finansal Forum, 5 July !999. 
11 The limit on total credits to bank shareholders was further restricted as those were to be 
evaluated under the general credit limit of 25 % of bank's own funds instead of the previous 
specific limit of 50%. To this end, the distinction between bank shareholders and other real or 
legal persons was removed and Clause No.ll/8 which separately arranged credits to bank 
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All these changes caused the concentration of risk on any one particular group to be 
reduced. 
Importantly, with this amendment, subsidiary shares were accepted as credit and 
the limits of 60% of a bank's own funds on total subsidiary shares and of 15% on shares 
from a single subsidiary were annulled. Since subsidiary shares were included in the 
definition of credit, the limit on credit extended to a subsidiary became 25% of a bank's 
own funds. On the other hand, the limit on total credit to subsidiaries (which was two 
times of a. bank's own funds) was annulled. Whether or not these changes on subsidiary 
shares restricted the opportunity of fund transfers from holding banks to their 
conglomerates became controversial. 
When the limit on total subsidiary shares was removed, this meant that banks 
could increase their number of subsidiaries as much as they wanted. Yet, given that the 
shares in a subsidiary higher than I 0% of a bank's own funds were accepted as large 
credits, Reisoglu (2000, 2) contended, the upper limit on total large credits was expected 
to restrict the subsidiary shares which were larger than I 0% of a bank's own funds. 
However, some newspaper columnists criticised the amendment on the grounds 
that it might reinforce the holding banking structure despite the large credit limit. The 
criticisms were based on the argument that since the previous limit on total credits to 
subsidiaries (up to the double of a bank's own funds) was removed, and large credits 
could be expanded up to a total of the eight times the amount of a bank's own funds, 
large credits to subsidiaries found room for expansion. This limit was so high, it was as if 
it was removed completely. Cerna! Ersin of A~am Daily12 contended: 'in the past, banks 
were finding various formulae to have new subsidiaries because of legal limits. Now, it is 
as if there is no limit on new subsidiaries'. Vahap Munyar of Hiirriyet Daily noted that 
bankers unanimously said that this amendment opened the door for banks to establish the 
holding structure themselves instead of being part of a conglomerate. 13 This meant FC 
could recentralise as a result of the new legislation. 
shareholders was abrogated~ Furthermore, the indirect credit limit was decreased to 25% of 
bank's own funds from 50%. 
12 Cemal Ersin, "GSM ihalesi ve Bankalar Kanunu", Ak§am, 28 April2000. 
13 Vahap Munyar, "Bu Kanun Bankalari Holding Yapacak", Hiirriyet, 24 April2000. 
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In the Assembly debates, however, the amendment was evaluated as limiting the 
banks' overall group exposures. There were two lines of opinion within the opposition 
parties. Some deputies were cautious/critical about the proposed restrictions on banks. 
Some others, however, stated their support for the legislative change in order to break 
down holding banking. 
The cautious/critical ones 14 drew attention to the fact that the restrictions implied 
that Turkey was leaving a policy of using bank subsidiaries for the industrialisation of the 
country. Those deputies were the voice of the dynamic accumulators which still needed 
to adjust their portfolios of connected lending and subsidiary shares to the new limits. 
Among those accumulators, I~bank came to the fore. As Chapter II will show, I~bank 
continued to sell off subsidiary shares during banking reform in order to conform with the 
new limits and particularly because of its new investments in the privatized 
telecommunication and energy sectors. The stress on the continuous importance of bank 
subsidiaries for the country's industrialisation has been explicitly declared by I~bank 
management itself. 15 
The deputies who were most critical of the changes argued that, although this 
amendment was. a reaction to the embezzlement of some banks in the past, it would force 
all banks to sell off their subsidiaries. Using the example of the large scale POAS 
privatisation which was won by i~bank, 16 it was contended that the state would face 
difficulty in the privatisation process as .the banks would not be able to make successful 
bids if they could not realise substantial capital increases. 17 
However, even the critical deputies' concern was more on giving a long enough 
transition period for banks to adjust to the new limits rather than a radical opposition to 
the break-down of holding banking. The large-scale subsidiaries owned by i~bank were 
pointed to and it was reported that some large banks would be unable to sell their 
14 See for example the statements by the Deputies of the True Path Party Kernal Kabat~, 
(TGNA !999f, 4; 50-51); Ali Naci Tuncer (TGNA 1999g,4); Ufuk Sllylemez (TGNA 1999g, 56); 
and the Deputy of the Virtue Party, Asian Polat (TGNA 1999g, 54). 
15 See Chapter 11, sub-section 11.4.1. 
16 In partnership with Dogan Group. 
17 See the statement by Asian Polat of the Virtue Party in TGNA (1999g, 54). 
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subsidiaries within the proposed six-year period. 18 For instance, Kemal Kabata~, Deputy 
of the True Path Party, (TGNA 1999f, 4; 50-51) contended that the inclusion of 
subsidiary shares in the definition of credit was not a criterion of the EU: 'this 
arrangement is specific to us, it is a peculiar implementation which is derived from our 
narrow approach and, to a large extent, it is being imposed by the IMF stand-by program'. 
According to Kabata~, since subsidiary shares were accepted as credits, the high value of 
some bank subsidiaries would easily exceed the 25% general credit limit. 19 Therefore, 
Kabata~ asserted: 'the banking sector is being trapped; it faces a high pressure for the 
contraction of credits and the liquidation of subsidiaries'. These arrangements, he argued, 
primarily concerned 'leading private banks and would lead these banks to find a solution 
to get rid of the prestigious bank subsidiaries which were established due to the state 
subsidies'. Even though Turkey was giving up the policy of bank subsidiaries which had 
created significant industrialisation in the country, Kabata~ argued, since the state had 
encouraged that model itself, at least banks should be given a longer period of time for 
adjustment. 
On the other hand, some deputies from the opposition parties supported the 
proposed restrictions by pointing out the link between holding banking, bank 
embezzlements and the full insurance scheme for deposits. Their position was mainly in 
line with the agenda of productive and commercial capital, particularly with the small and 
medium scale ones. For instance, Bekir Sobac1 of the Virtue Party, (TGNA 1999f, 49) 
justified the inclusion of subsidiary shares in the definition of credits: 'because powerful 
capital groups have established their banks and financed their subsidiaries in such a 
country that has been heaven for deposits thanks to the given guarantee'. Cevat Ayhan of 
the Virtue Party (TGNA 1999g, 57) added that these restrictions would allow small-to-
medium scale firms to have access to credits that were currently allocated by banks to 
their subsidiaries. 
18 See the statement by the Deputies of the True Path Party Ali Naci Tuncer in TGNA 
(1999g, 4) and Ufuk Soyleinez in TGNA (1999g, 56). 
19 Kabatas implied the inclusion of indirect subsidiary shares tinder the general credit 
limit of 25% of a bank's own funds. That is because the limit on shares in a single subsidiary was 
already restricted with a lower one, 15% of bank's own funds, previously. 
227 
The governing coalition parties, not sutprisingly, supported the restrictions. 
Masum Tiirker, Deputy of the Democratic Left Party, (TGNA 1999f, 52) assessed the 
inclusion of subsidiary shares in the definition of credits would encourage banks either to 
increase their bank's own funds or to eliminate some indirect credits and subsidiaries to 
adjust to the new limits. Minister Recep Onal (TGNA 1999f, 56) supported the 
establishment of the 25% limit that restricted direct .and indirect credits and subsidiary 
shares on the grounds that this would prevent high concentration in bank resources and 
allow their allocation to a large number of firms with minimal risk. Onal stated that 
subsidiary shares were considered as credits also in the EU and the risk that could be put 
on one person, (including subsidiary shares and credits), was limited to 25% of a bank's 
own funds. Onal maintained: 'we want to make our banks adjust to this 25% risk limit in 
the next six years'. 
9.3.3 Law No. 4672: the Redesign of the Specific Limits on Banks' Non-Financial 
Equity Holdings 
One year later after the above legislative change, the Banks Act was amended 
again. Law No. 4672 (29.5.2001) put back the previously-removed separate restrictions 
on subsidiary shares (see Turkish Government 2001a). This was critical to the 
determination of whether banks would be classified ·as primitive or dynamic 
accumulators. 
The new law brought in stricter restrictions to limit overall exposure to related 
parties. In line with EU directives, the law required the redefinition of a bank's own 
funds, the introduction of a consolidated bank's own funds and the calculation oflending 
limits on a consolidated basis.20 These changes aimed to limit banks' group credits even 
further. The BRSA's power to influence lending limits and CARs increased through the 
20 The position of banks is evaluated by consolidating the financial statements of their 
direct and indirect affiliates and of their partnerships as well as the partners, and of the financial 
and non-financial partnerships owned and controlled directly and indirectly by these .Partners. 
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r 1 Agency's ability to define 'own funds' at its discretion. 21 In addition, the definition of 
i 
credit was broadened with the inclusion of forwards, options and other derivatives. 22 
More importantly, the amendment re-established the separate limits on banks' subsidiary 
shares. A bank was now allowed to participate with up to 15% of its own funds (for each 
such participation) in a non-financial institution, provided that the total sum of such non-
financial participations did not exceed 60% of its own funds. 23 24 Although changes to 
the separate limits on subsidiary shares were considered, their inclusion in the definition 
of credits continued. 
The redesign of the separate limits on equity holdings was a shock for the banks 
which had recently acquired new subsidiaries. They protested that the amendment left 
two options for them: either some subsidiaries would have to be (completely or partially) 
sold off or the banks' own funds would have to be raised (Bilgin 200 I, 23 ). 
The amendment aimed to reconcentrate banking capital as a preparation for global 
competition. The banks which could increase their capital (with or without the sales of 
subsidiaries) might have a chance to fall into the category of the 'dynamic' accumulators 
(i.e. not to face seizures). In this respect, the legislation was critical in drawing the line 
between the primitive and dynamic accumulators. 
The transition inevitably created tensions within FC as individual capitals had 
different capacities to cope with the change. Because of protests by some banks, the first 
extension of the deadline (four years) was prolonged to eight and a half years.25 As a 
21 Kemal Kabalru;i, Deputy of the True Path Party, (TGNA 1999g, 5) stated that the BAT 
had opposed the implementation of the consolidated basis for standard ratios and other legal 
limits by arguing that it was not feasible under the existent subsidiary structures of banks. 
22 Furthermore, by a new regulation by the BRSA (the Regulation on Establishment and 
Operations of Banks) on June 27, 2001, additional measures supported the amendment in the 
banking law. This regulation categorises banks' shareholders and subsidiaries in the same risk 
group and calculates loan exposures for a single group considering direct and connected lending 
in order to prevent (credit) risk concentration (see BRSA 2002e, 38). 
23 For the amendment in May 2001 see also (Canevi & <;:etinkaya 2001). 
24 However, the subsidiary shares which were less than 10% of that company's capital 
were excluded in the calculation of the limit on subsidiary shares. This was criticised by the 
deputies ·who put their opposition to the change in the Banks Act during the commission 
negotiations in the parliament. They argued that this would allow banks to transfer more 
resources to their subsidiaries (see TGNA 200lb and 200lc). 
25 Nurse! Karsavuran, ''Bankalar 8 Yil Daha Sanayide", Finansal Forum, 4 May 2001. 
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result, banks had to adjust their subsidiary shares to these new limits by 31 December 
2009. 
Parliamentary debates regarding the amendment give further insight into the 
economic and political dimensions of the legislation. The amendment was criticised on 
the basis of the tension between national and foreign interests. The following statement 
by Deputy Nevzat Yals;mtas of the Virtue Party reflected this tension: 
Banks are now crying out. They are sending us letters, they are calling us. Some people 
look at [the issue of] subsidiaries doubtfully. Why do they do this? In the development of 
Turkey ... banks played an important role because capital accumulates in banks. In 
developed countries, capital has already accumulated and even overflowed and turned to 
become international capital. Now we can see the tracks of that international capital in 
the letters of President Bush ... He says ''be brave with the telecommunication [Law]. In 
my opinion, he is threatening us and saying "if you do not do this, you are a coward". 
(TGNA 200lc, 39) 
Some other deputies considered the redesigned limits on bank subsidiaries to be 'a 
. death sentence for national banking'. Firstly, they were concerned about the privatisation · 
process in key sectors as the state might need the participation of the Turkish 
conglomerates incorporating banks in those privatisation bids. For instance, Asian Polat 
of the Virtue Party (TGNA 200lc, 86) drew attention to the objection by i~bank and the 
BAT to the redesign of the separate limits on subsidiary shares in May 2001. Polat stated 
that i~bank had offered two privatisation bids and provided more revenue to the state than 
expected. But because of these stricter restrictions, it could not bid for Turkish Airlines. 
Since other banks were also limited by the same restrictions, they could not bid either, 
and as a result, no local buyer could be found to buy Turkish Airlines. 
Secondly, it was argued that the subsidiaries of national banks might be captured 
by foreign capital, as Ali Co~kun of the Virtue Party (TGNA 2001c, 6) indicated, Co~kun 
stated that, in the nine-year transition period, i~bank would have to sell off its 85% stake 
in its worldwide corporation.Si~e Cam, but no domestic capital could afford to buy it. 
Asian Polat, also of the Virtue Party, (TGNA 2001 c, 86) mentioned a letter sent 
by the management of i~bank to the Assemply commissions. In this letter, j~bank asked 
for the removal of the inconsistency between the indirect credit limit and the total 
· subsidiary share limit. This inconsistency, it was said, was caused by the inclusion of 
subsidiary shares in the definition of credit. This brought indirect subsidiary shares and 
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indirect credits to subsidiaries all together under the indirect credit limit. Therefore, it 
restricted the total resources that could be allocated to subsidiaries having indirect credit 
relations (both in the form of shares and credits) to 25% of banks' own funds. This meant 
that, in the case of perseverance of the indirect credit definition (i.e. not the exclusion of 
indirect subsidiary shares from the definition of indirect credits), the total subsidiary 
share limit (60% of a bank's own funds) would become ineffective. i~bank warned that if 
a change was not made, it would have to sell off $i~ecam. However, a proposal to the 
Assembly to address this inconsistency was not accepted. 26 
The BAT (2001 b) contended that because the risks on subsidiary shares were 
redesigned, these shares should no longer be included in the definition of credit. However, 
Orban Emirdag, the then General Director of Pamukbank and Member of the Board of 
Directors in BAT (BAT 2001 b), claimed that as subsidiary shares continued to be 
included, only direct subsidiary shares should have been considered instead of direct and 
indirect subsidiary shares altogether. However, despite all these objections, the pursuit of 
looser restrictions was not successful. 
9.3.4 The 'Inconsistency' between Laws No. 4491 and Law No. 4672 
The government stated that the cqange in the Banks Act in June 1999 would 
provide full synchronisation with the EU standards (see TGNA 1999a). The BRSA 
(200 1 b, 5) also confirmed that the amendments to bank credits in December 1999 were 
consistent with EU directives. This argument was also repeated by the government 
regarding the May 2001 amendment: 
With the change in the Banks Act No.4389 through the law no. 4491, all subsidiary 
shares of banks were allowed to be considered under the general credit limit with the 
26 Ozince evaluated the nine-year-transition period to be suitable for the adjustment of 
bank subsidiary relations in the Anglo-Saxon model. However, regarding the other dimensions of 
this adjustment process, such as the effects on small shareholders, he pointed out the shortness of 
the deadline and warned that 'accumulation of national banking will be wasted'. Ozince also 
drew attention to the supportive arrangements which were made in the EU to facilitate mergers, 
separations and equity changes ainong companies in the 1990s and demanded similar 
arrangements to be made in Turkey: ' ... in the past two years, any facilitating law was not passed 
in terms of either taxation or capital markets. How will i~bank be able to sell off $i~e Cam which 
is one of the most important factories of the Turkish glass industry?' (Diinya, 11 May 2001). 
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treatment of all kinds of subsidiary shares as credits. However, moving from the principle 
that banks should operate mainly in financial markets, as consistent with both the EU 
arrangements and other international implementations, direct or indirect investments of 
banks through subsidiaries in non-financial sectors are separately restricted In this 
framework .. .in addition to the continuity of the [previous) general credit limit, a specific 
restriction was put on equity investments of banks in non-financial partnerships (TGNA 
2001a) 
Since the EU standards had remained constant throughout the period of the bank 
reform legislation, the rationale of the redesign of bank limits (Law No. 4672) in terms of 
the EU standards is far from convincing. More convincing is that there was a systematic 
reason for the state policy: as the findings of this study show, the state was actively and 
strategically restructuring the banking sector to make it globally competitive. 
The clear effect of the two stages of the reform was that it facilitated acquisitions 
of more subsidiaries by banks, recentralising capital under FC. This, it was argued in 
Chapter 5, was central to the state's strategy for developing a concentrated, globally 
integrated banking sector. 
During the Assembly debates, Cihan Payact of the True Path Party (TGNA 200lc, 
47-48) drew attention to the inconsistency between the reasoning of the synchronisation 
with the EU standards and the legislative change at the end of 1999. Payact stated that 
with this change, banks were allowed to have subsidiaries and give them credits without 
any restriction apart from the 25% bank's own fund limit. This last change, he argued, 
encouraged banks to become holding companies whereas previously holding companies 
tended to have their own banks. PayaCI pointed to the newly acquired bank subsidiaries in 
the telecommunication and energy sectors. He maintained that if there was no special 
reason for the removal of separate restrictions on subsidiary shares in December 1999 
and their redesign in May 2001, this implementation could be accused of 'incompetence 
. and ignorance'. It would appear Payact was not fully aware of the significance of the 
legislative change. He simply advocated that a suitable adjustment period needed to be 
given for the new restrictions 'since the banks that acquired new subsidiaries in the 
meantime are innocent'. But the wider significance for our analysis should not be lost. 
The chief bank auditor Ozeroglu (2000, 2) also asserted that, as long as banks 
acted within the limit of 25% of a bank's own funds (in having shares and giving credits 
to a single subsidiary), they could acquire an unlimited number of subsidiaries. Ozeroglu 
232 
added that there was no other obstacle for banks apart from the limit on large credits and 
it was so high that it did not form even an actual limit. Hence, contrary to the argument 
that banks would sell off their subsidiaries and not acquire new ones, banks were 
establishing holding structures. The acquisitions of the last privatised SEEs by some 
banks showed this was the case, Ozeroglu stressed. 
A similar argument was made by the BAT (2001b). The Association stated that 
the December 1999 amendment provided a wider scope for banks to have more 
subsidiaries (in order to justify its demand for the exclusion of subsidiary shares from the 
definition of credit in the May 2001 amendment). The Association contended that, when 
subsidiary shares were included in credits, a bank could place funds up to 25% of its own 
funds into a subsidiary and hence, total resources that could be placed in subsidiaries 
could be much more than the 60% total subsidiary share limit. 
In summary, the December 1999 amendment aimed to limit the concentration of 
risk by· banks in real or legal persons, bank shareholders and a group of holding 
companies with 25 % of a bank's own funds. This required the sale of the subsidiaries 
that exceeded this limit and meant a fundamental restructuring of banks, particularly for 
leading banks such as i§bank. However, on the other hand, banks were allowed to place 
more funds into subsidiaries, which were under this limit, in the forms of credits and 
shares. In other words, the banks were allowed to have more subsidiaries, but in lower 
value subsidiaries (lower than 25% of banks' own funds). The May 2001 amendment 
reversed these total limits. 
Why did the state 'change its mind' and reverse its position by amending the 
Banks Act in December 1999 and May 2001 -a period ofless than two years? It seems 
clear that the EU standards, which did not change over this period, were not the driver of 
change. The next section provides an answer to this question. 
9.3.5 A Mollified Transition 
What was the material basis of the legislative discontinuity? This study suggests 
the underlying reason which led the state to allow banks to have more subsidiaries under 
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the general credit limit of 25% of a bank's own funds was related to the then crisis 
conditions in Turkey. 
Under the adverse effects of the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian crises, the 
contraction in external and domestic demand augmented the rate of non-performing 
credits especially in the textile, automotive and trade sectors from 1998 onwards. In the 
process, banks preferred to take over new subsidiaries and fixed assets in exchange for 
unpaid credits rather than recording them as non-performing assets and setting aside 
necessary loan-loss-provisioning in their balance sheets. For example, the value of 
subsidiary shares increased to 1.8 quadrillion TL up from 655.3 trillion TL and fixed 
assets also rose to I. 7 quadrillion TL up from 952 trillion TL between June 1998 and 
June 1999. Despite these 'involuntary' ac9uisitions, non-performing credits also 
increased around 591% in TL terms (399% in $US terms). The rate of non-performing 
credits to total credits increased to '10% in June 1999 up from 2.5% in June 1998 
(Ye~iloglu 1999, 217). Erhan Ersoz, the General Director ofVizyon Consulting, stated: 
The banks have benefited from tax incentives for a couple of years and sold off their non-
financial subsidiaries. Now, they have been acquiring new subsidiaries for one year 
willy-nilly. Hence, the value of permanent assets in the balance sheets is rising. 
(Ye~iloglu 1999, 217) 
The increase in the non-performing credits mostly belonged to the SDIF and state-
banks while private banks had the largest share in the rising equity participations and 
fixed assets. 27 Meanwhile, the sudden increase in permanent assets 28 in 1998 halved the 
27 For example, private banks had subsidiaries amounting to 1.5 quadrillion TL of total 
subsidiaries which were equal to 1.8 quadrillion TL. Three banks which were then owned by the 
SDIF (Tilrk Ticaret Bank, Interbank and Bank Ekspres) had non-performing credits amounting to 
335.6 quadrillion TL equal to one-third of the total non-performing credits of the sector 
(Ye~iloglu 1999, 217-218). 
The state banks had non-performing credits equal to 594.5 quadrillion TL while private 
banks, foreign banks and development-investment banks had a low volume of non-performing 
credits that amounted to 140 quadrillion TL at that period (Ye~ilog!u 1999, 217). See also Diindar 
(1999). 
28 Non-performing credits, equity participations, affiliated companies and fixed assets. 
. 
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net working capital 29 of banking, but especially private banking. The decline in net 
working capital can be seen in Table 9 .I. 
Table 9.1 Net working capital of banking (USD mn) 
Year Net Working Capital 
1995 923 
1996 1,313 
1997 2,612 
1998 1,296 
Source: L4 V (1999, 46). 
Before· the 1999 legislative amendment, Engin Aras, General Director of 
Yurtbank pointed to the adverse affects of the crisis on banks' balance sheets, reflected 
through increasing permanent assets. He stated: 'one should look at whether permanent 
assets are exceeding the banks' own funds or not. If they are exceeding, precaution 
should be taken. If they are not exceeding, it means that the situation can be managed 
with the banks' own funds' (Ye~iloglu 1999, 218). 
However, the non-performing credits reached US$ 11 billion by June 1999 by 
exceeding even the total banks' own funds which were then equal to US$ 7.7 billion. 
Therefore, it became essential to manage the growing voluntary/involuntary acquisitions 
of subsidiaries. To do this, increasing banks' own funds and/or selling off some 
subsidiaries and fixed assets became critical. However, this was almost impossible for the 
banks to do under the then prevailing crisis conditions (Ye~iloglu 1999, 218- 219). 
From these data it can be contended that the December 1999 amendment aimed to 
facilitate the legal basis for the increased equity holdings under the problem of rising 
non-performing credits. Importantly, this facilitation was beneficial for the survivor 
banks of the period (although some of these banks were later seized). 30 The overall effect 
29 Shareholders' equity+ current year income +previous year income -(non-performing 
assets+ equity participations+ fixed assets+ affiliated companies). 
30 It must be noted that three days after the Banks Act came in force, five other banks 
were confiscated by the SDIF in 22 December 1999. These banks were Egebank, Yurtbank, 
SOmerbank, Esbank and Y~arbank. 
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was the legislative facilitation of increasing subsidiary shares and fixed assets. In effect 
this constituted a state subsidy to the banking sector under the prevalent crisis conditions. 
While the 200 I legislation provided the legal base for the ongoing expansion in 
the banks' subsidiaries, this expansion did not cause any sudden adjustment. Banks were 
given a transition period until 2009 in order to adjust their equity holdings to the limits. 
The following statement by Orban Emirdag, the then General Director of Pamukbank and 
Member of the Boards of Director in the BAT, is striking: 
The restrictions on equity participations, which were previously removed via the Banks 
Act No.4491, were put again. If a transition period was not given, the redesign ... could 
have caused important economic consequences. You make an arrangement, open your. 
front side [the legislative change allowed the banks] and in the meantime, also some 
developments have occurred in Turkey. Some banks have acquired significant (volume of] 
subsidiaries. Now, six months later to tell 'sell off' [to them was not suitable]; 
furthermore, the state gained significant revenues from some of those subsidiary 
acquisitions [the privatized SEEs]. It was not right now to reverse the bridges and to 
expect the sales of those subsidiaries in a short time. To this end, a nine-year adjustment 
period was given. For the first time we succeeded [to obtain such a long transition period]. 
(Emirdag 2001) 
The state support continued, via new incentives given for the sales of subsidiaries and 
fixed assets, when the restrictions on subsidiary shares were put again in 200 I. 31 
Therefore, the state not only decisively managed the legislative process for the 
breakdown of holding banking, but also mollified the transition under the then prevalent 
crisis conditions. 
9.4 Conclusion 
The legislative arrangements during banking reform are popularly considered to 
have involved the Turkish banking sector adapting to suit to the EU banking regulations 
31 With the amendment in Corporate Taxation Law (The temporary clause no.29/6 which 
was added by the Law No.4684), if the revenues from the sales of subsidiaries and fixed assets 
(which were owned by banks and the shareholder institutions in those banks altogether) were 
added to bank capital, the revenues would be exempted from corporate and some other taxes on 
July 3, 200 I onwards. In addition, the same exemption was given to the firms that had credit 
debts to banks. The transfers of subsidiary shares and fixed assets by debtor firms to banks in 
exchange for the debts were covered under·the same exemption (Giingi:ir 2001, 22). See also 
Yayla (2001). 
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as part of the process of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union. Yet, behind 
this rhetoric, there was an agenda to restructure capital in Turkey. 
First, the legislation helped build a market-oriented, competitive banking structure 
through a reorganisation within FC: that is, the legislation redefined the relations between 
banks and their conglomerates. To this end, the limits on banks' connected lending and 
subsidiary shares were further restricted along with increased consolidated supervision 
and improvements in the monitoring of banks' operational risks. 
Second, the process of legislative change had implications for the dynamic 
accumulators as they solidified their hegemony within FC and formed the core of the new 
banking sector whilst the primitive accumulators were eliminated. The redefinition of 
bank-conglomerate relations assisted the transition to the new accumulation regime (the 
increasing international orientation in accumulation) which had been sought by the 
dynamic accumulators. 
Third the legislative changes also mattered in terms of making a distinction 
between the dynamic and primitive accumulators. The expansion in bank subsidiaries 
was a central issue that determined which conglomerate would survive and which would 
not. We saw in Chapters 7 and 8 that, before the restructuring itself, there was not a clear 
division between the many old primitive accumulators and the dynamic accumulators. 
But, it was argued, the distinctive characteristic of the old primitives was that the types of 
exposure they had left them vulnerable to an economic downturn. This, indeed, is what 
happened. 
As well as using legislation to break down holding banking in Turkey, the state 
also was active in supervising the adjustment of the sector. The state provided time for 
the transition to occur so that it would result in little disruption to the banks that were 
benefiting from the new regulations 
As a result, Turkey's banking capital became concentrated and centralised and 
more likely to survive global competition, and the banks of the dynamic accumulators 
had to increasingly orient themselves towards funding beyond individual circuits of their 
owner capitals. This indicated the standardisation of the rules of competition for Turkish 
capital. 
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The Turkish state was not a 'feeble state' but central to the restructuring of 
Turkish capital. The state facilitated a globally-oriented banking reform as a requirement 
for further integration of domestic process of accumulation with global capital. 
i 
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THE BREAK-DOWN OF HOLDING BANKING-II: 
THE BANK SEIZURES 
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I 0.2 The General Rationale Underlying the Bank Rationalisation Process 
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Banks 
I 0.6 Tensions within Finance Capital about Bank Rehabilitation: Seizures versus 
Alternative Modes 
I 0.7 Conflicts within Capital about Apportioning the SDIF banks 
I 0.8 Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
What led some banks to be seized but not others was explained in the previous 
chapters within the broader context of the patterns of accumulation of conglomerates. It 
· was argued that bank seizures excluded the primitive accumulators from finance so that 
the dynamic accumulators solely could form FC under the redefined parameters of bank-
industry relations. In finance the relative power balance among conglomerates was 
altered as the seized banks were either liquidated by the state or acquired by the dynamic 
accumulators and foreign capital. 
This chapter discusses how the seizure process proceeded. The analysis of the 
seizure process will show how the state mediated between opposing interests within 
capital within the context of IMF supervision. 
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The seizure process involved more than 20 banks, and in many important respects, 
each case was different. However the objective of this chapter is to identify the role of the 
state in the rationalisation of failed banks, and it will be shown there were five general 
strategies used by the state to rationalise the banks. Table I 0.1 identifies the five ways in 
which seized banks' assets were rationalised: takeover, merger with the other SDIF-banks, 
sale, liquidation, and merger with state banks. Takeover by the dynamic accumulators 
was clearly the dominant form of rationalisation. 
Table 10.1 
Taken-over 
Tfirkbank 
Bank Ekspres 
Interbank 
Egebank 
Yurtbank 
Sumerbank 
Esbank 
Y~arbank 
Etibank 
Bank Kapital 
Demirbank 
Ulusalbank 
tktisat Bank 
Sitebank 
Tari~bank 
Baymdubank 
Kentbank 
EGS Bank 
Toprakbank 
Pamukbank 
!mar Bank 
Rationalisation of Turkey's Banks by the SDIF and Current 
Status (as of June 200?) 
Merged with 
other SDIF-
banks 
Sfimerbank 
-Egebank 
-Yurtbank 
-Y~arbank 
-BankKapital 
-Ulusalbank 
Baymdtrbank 
- Etibank 
-Interbank 
- Esbank 
-EGS Bank 
-Toprakbank 
~tktisat Bank 
-Kentbank 
Sold Under 
Merged with Under SDIF's 
State Bank Control Liquidation 
Bank TUrkbank Pamukbank* Baymdtrbank 
Ekspre• 
Sumerbank !mar Bank 
Demirbank 
Sitebank 
Tari~bank 
* Pamukbank merged with the state-owned Halk Bank. 
Source: Updated from SDIF 2003 (9-10). 
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This chapter's focus on bank seizures includes both the management of the 
seizure process and the resolution of the seized banks (these two processes together are 
called 'bank rationalisation'). In particular, the chapter addresses how bank 
rationalisation served to protect the interests of the dynamic accumulators and foreign 
banks. It shows that Turkey's bank rationalisation involved a complex interaction 
between three forces: contradictions within capital, actions by the national state, and 
pressure from the IMF. The first section of this chapter explores the rationale behind the 
bank rationalisation process. Second, it discusses the contradictory interests within capital 
about bank seizures and which particular fractional agenda the state intervention served. 
The third section considers the legal framework the state established to allow the bank 
rationalisations to occur. 
. 
Drawing from these issues, the chapter next discusses the role of IMF 
involvement in the process of bank seizures by considering the issue of the protection of 
the interests of foreign creditors. The analysis shows that banking reform removed the 
weak members of FC to enhance its strong parts for a more globally integrated FC. 
Fourthly, the fractional analysis further looks at opposing interests within FC on the 
mode of bank rehabilitation for a deeper understanding of the state (and IMF) 
intervention in the seizure process. The fifth section considers how the state intervened in 
the conflicts between the different fractions of capital, including providing subsidies to 
support the bank rationalisation. 
This chapter's analysis challenges with the nationalist interpretation of banking 
reform which argues that bank seizures served to protect foreign interests. Yet as will be 
seen throughout this analysis, the bank rationalisation process provided relief mainly for 
'Turkish' capital (particularly for the dynamic accumulators). 
10.2 The General Rationale Underlying the Bank Rationalisation Process 
In Chapter 6, the dynamic accumulators were identified as the survivors of the 
bank reform process. Yet their survival was not fully independent of the elimination 
process of the primitive accumulators. Indeed, this elimination process was fulfilled in a 
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way that strengthened the dynamic accumulators and rationalised the strong Turkish 
banks for global competitiveness. 
The state assisted the dynamic accumulators via the bank rationalisation process 
in five ways. Firstly, the state intervention avoided systemic crises in financial markets. 
Secondly, the state accelerated the rationalisation process so that the dynamic 
accumulators could quickly unburden the remnants of the old regime. Thirdly, state 
intervention provided the dynamic accumulators with access to good assets of the 
primitive accumulators' banks. Fourthly, the state guaranteed the risks offoreign banks in 
Turkish banking as a protection which went ultimately also to local banking 
conglomerates. And lastly, the management of the bank rationalisation process assisted 
the rising centralisation and concentration of (banking) capital, which was a precondition 
for international banking expansion by the dynamic accumulators. 
Therefore, the IMF wanted · bank seizures in order to get rid of finance 
protectionism, but it does not follow that this was done in the name of 'free markets', for 
we find the state continuing to protect the dynamic accumulators throughout the bank 
rationalisation process. The seizures were not only to eradicate the primitive 
accumulators without causing a financial crisis. The driving logic, indeed, was more 
systematic: the advancement of accumulation by the dynamic accumulators including the 
advancement of the relationship between foreign banks and the dynamic accumulators. 
Nor should the IMF be seen simply as the enforcer. The IMF certainly oversaw 
the process of banking reform, including legislative amendments, so that very detailed 
arrangements were stipulated in the Letters of Intent. Furthermore, the IMF overruled the 
Tirrkish state as the state tried to go softly, trying to mediate between fractions of capital. 
For instance, during the takeov~rs of five banks in July 2001, Engin Ak~akoca, the Head 
of the BRSA, strikingly revealed the role of the IMF in bank seizures: 
The banking watchdog had planned to give these banks three to four weeks to improve 
.their conditions after the passage of tax favors, a plan which was shelved due to IMF 
resistance. More appropriate solutions than a bailout could have been devised if this 
opportunity was granted to these banks. 1 
1 
"Ex-owners ofEGS Bank say bailout uofounded ", Turkish Daily News, 3 August 2001, 
URL: http://www;turkishdailvoews.com/old editions/08 03 Ollecon.htm#e1 . 
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Being aware of possible political implications of such an explanation, however, 
Ak9akoca needed to add: 'it wasn't an imposition but joint action.' 2 
Thus, the IMF position was controversial during the reform, and especially 
criticised by the nationa!ist/developmentalist view. 3 However, rather than being an 
imposer of 'external forces', the IMF was an integral part of the realignment of capital 
within Turkey, where it both served the interests of global financial management and 
facilitated parts of Turkish FC in becoming globally viable. 
10.3 Conflicts within Capital about Bank Seizures 
There was conflict between the primitive accumulators, the dynamic 
accumulators and industrial/commercial capital over the restructuring of the bank system 
and over who would pay for the costs. As would be expected, the reaction of the 
primitive accumulators to bank seizures was self-defence. As would be expected, the 
reaction of the primitive accumulators to bank seizures was self-defence. The primitive 
accumulators opposed confiscations which expelled them from finance and contributed to 
their decline in other sectors. They demanded state support for their banks to make them 
viable and cope with the transition to the new era. For instance, before the confiscation of 
his bank, Kentbank Vice-General Director Ugur Giirses stressed the role of the state in 
the engagement of banking with state debt finance as follows: 
There is a criticism that the banks are buying and selling T -bills and not doing real 
banking. If the banks are on the streets, it is because of fmancing the state. None of us is 
innocent ... In Turkey, as regard to open positions, it is argued that banks have been 
assuming an excessive interest burden and risk. Banks cannot do this by saying 'let's 
make profit'. If the banks did this, it means that one side condoned it. Therefore, the issue 
should be seen within a broader picture and the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Board should work in such a framework. (Bozku~ 2000, 44, emphasis added) 
Similarly to other primitive accumulators, Giirses wanted to remind the state of 
one fact: both the state borrowing policy and accompanied underwriting practices of 
2 
''Turkey bails out five insolvent banks, closes two others", Turkish Daily News, 11 July 
2001, URL: http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/07 !I 01/econ.htm#el . 
' See the statement by Deputy Kemal Kabat~ of the True Path Party in (TGNA !999f, 2). 
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banks to support their conglomerates were the products of the state. Hence, Giirses 
implied, although finance protectionism was to come to an end with banking reform, the 
BRSA, as the orchestrating institution of this change, should consider the state's 
obligations, too. The BRSA should not seize the banks that simply responded to 
incentives provided by the state itself. 
On the other hand, the dynamic accumulators were strong supporters of the 
elimination of the primitive accumulators. They wanted to get rid of the bank players that 
had been mainly depended on state-based rents. The dynamic accumulators, as indicated 
in Chapter 8, needed this elimination as a precondition for the restructuring of their own 
accumulation globally. Not only did they fear the systemic risk that might follow from 
the protracted decline of the primitive accumulators once finance protectionism ended, 
they also sought to command the some of the operations abandoned by the declining 
primitive accumulators. The consequence, said the dynamic accumulators, would be the 
increased strength of remaining banks and increased confidence in the banking sector 
generally. The General Director of Akbank, Zafer Kurtul, opposed the argument that 
seizures led to distrust in banking: 'on the contrary, the trust on large banks has been 
strengthened. This is a very healthy development. If you notice, the seized banks were 
very small banks; as known, they were fmancially weak banks'. 4 
The dynamic accumulators demanded a quicker elimination of weak banks by 
stressing their negative effects on the whole economy. For instance, after the takeovers of 
Etibank and Bank Kapital, Chairman of the Koy Group Rahmi Koy complained about the 
ease with which people could establish banks in Turkey and added: 'the banks should not 
have been so easily unleashed'. 5 According to Koy, if necessary interventions had been 
inade in time, the losses of the sunken banks would have been cut by half. The following 
statement reflects well the frustration by the dynamic accumulators regarding the 
slowness in the seizure process: 
The disturbance in the banking system and the non-elimination of ailing banks caused the 
crisis conditions. In September [2000], we asked [the state] to eliminate the banks that 
could not adapt to falling interest rates, but they were not [eliminated]. They tried to be 
kept alive by undertaking the burden on the state with high funding costs. Their 
4 
"Kurtul: SorunluBankalan Art1k Dogrudan Tasfiye Edin", Hilrriyet, 16 July 200 I. 
5 
"Ko9: Bankalar B~1bos B!raloldi", Hilrriyet, 30 November2000. 
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continuity in the system has damaged the healthy banks, as well. Because of the 
weaknesses or high risk exposures of a few banks at the end of November, we ended up 
this point. .. If during the November crisis ailing banks had been seized by the SDIF, we 
might have not been experiencing the problems today ... Banks should be taken under 
control and problematic banks should be excluded from the system. This period should 
nor be very long; it must be done at most within one or two months according to a 
timetable ... Until the elimination of unhealthy banks, [foreign capital] will not trust the 
system and foreign funds will not come into Turkey in the long-run ... For the interests of 
the country, this selection should have been done at once or twice. 6 
However, while the primitive accumulators' banks were being transferred to the 
SDIF and the burden of the bank rationalisation was put on the state, the question of who 
should pay the cost of bank losses arose. 
The business associations of productive/commercial capital, such as the TOBB, 
ASO, ITO and MUS/AD, were angry about bank embezzlement and criticised the 
takeover of bank losses by the state. for example, at the early stage of the reform, Zafer 
<;:ag!ayan, Chairman of the ASO, warned the state not to bear the cost of banking reform 
which was estimated then as US$ 5bn. He said of the process of bank seizure: 
These banks did not have difficulties because of a conjunctural deterioration in the 
economy. These banks became ailing because they were badly managed and hollowed-
out. This trend was known at least for two years. If the reports of inspectors had not been 
swept under the carpet and intervention had been taken in time, the bill would not have 
been so high. Hence, the responsible bankers and officials should be prosecuted. 7 
For these associations, the real question was who had lost money in the primitive 
accumulators apart from their owners? After the confiscations of five banks in July 2001, 
<;:aglayan complained about the high cost of bank seizures to the state amounting by then 
to US$ 20bn: 
Banks are returning to their real owner, to the state who has given the guarantee to them 
and has composed the system for years. We will pay the cost of these seizures as citizens. 
I wish we [industrialists] could have said to the state that "you have saved these five 
banks. Coine ... and save also us whom you have ruined". (<;:aglayan 2001, 91) 8 
6 See the statement by Burhan Karacam, Head of Board of Directors of Koybank, in 
Nurten Erk, "Bu Bankac1hk Sistemi ile Sorunlar Bitmez", HOrriyet, 26 March 2001. 
7 
"<;:aglayan: Program Bankalar Operasyonu ile Delininesin", Diinya, 28 December 1999. 
8 See also the statement by Deputy-Chair of the TOBB, Ali Osman Ulusoy in "TOBB: Bu 
Kadar Banks Turkiye I yin <;:ok Fazla", HOrriyet, 27 November 2000. 
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As these business associations represented those capitals who did not have their 
own banks, the associations did not directly benefit from the takeover of financial burden 
by the state. Therefore, they opposed the bailouts that came with bank seizures and 
instead, demanded direct bank liquidation. For instance, the Head ofthe ITO, Mehmet 
Yt!dmm slammed the government for implementing an economic program which only 
favored the financial sector. 9 On this basis, Ytldmm criticized the authorities for bailing 
out banks and urged them to let banks fail as would happen in a liberal economy. 
Yildmm added: 'as long as you keep bailing the problem banks out, you will not prevent 
abuse'. 10 
The MUSIAD also criticised takeovers of ailing banks by the state and, instead, 
demanded their bankruptcy in order to prevent becoming a burden on the Treasury. 11 The 
Association claimed that the state created unfair competition in favour of those 'dishonest 
businessmen' who misused their banks by spending money for bank rehabilitation. 
Instead, the MUS/AD demanded that the state channel these funds to 'the real economy' 
in general, and to SMEs in particular via the encouragement of banks by the state. 12 
The TUSIAD also stated there was a need for state policies that would support 
productive capitalists. Yet the Association was the biggest supporter of bank restructuring 
with a priority over the 'real sector'. The TUSIAD adopted this position for two reasons. 
Firstly, the leading capitals composing the membership profile of the Association were 
9 See ''Businessman urges government revision", Turkish Daily News, 19 December 
2000, tJRL: http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/12 19 00/econ.htm; 
"Mehmet Yildmm: Zorlamrsak Milli Koalisyon Yapahm", Hiirriyet, 18 December 2000, 
URL: htto://arsiv.Hilrriyetini.com.trlbur/tork/00/!2/18/ekonomi/29eko.htm. 
10 
"Yildmm: 10 Bankaya Daha El Konulacak", Dilnya, II August 2000. 
11 For example, after the seizure of five other banks in July 2001, the MUSIAD criticised 
the intermittent bank takeovers. The Association argued that this either served to give further time 
to ailing banks or proved that the state policies used for strengthening these banks in the 
meantime were useless (see Press Bulletin, No. Bas.Kom. 05-61, URL: http:// 
www.musiad. or g. trlbasinbulteni/11 temrnuz200 1.htm ). 
12See MUS/AD Press Bwletins: 
No. 062, 27 July 2000, URL: http:// www.musiad.org.trlbasinbulteni/27temmuz2000.htm; 
No.l04, 20 November 2000, URL: http://www.rnusiad.org.tr/basinbulteni/20kasim2000.htm; 
No.Bas.Kom.05-3, 9 January 2001, URL: http://www.musiad.org.trlbasinbulteni/09ocak200l.htm; 
No.Bas.Kom.OS-61, 11 July 2001, URL: 
http://www.musiad.org.trlbasinbultenillltemmuz200l.htm. 
Also see MUSIAD (2001); "i§adamlan:Sektordeki Belirsizlikler Kalkmalt", Dilnya, 23 December 
1999; andMUSIAD (2002). 
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the fraction most attuned to the norms of global accumulation; they sought further 
adaptation to these norms in their pursuit of being global players. These leading capitals 
knew that the restructuring in banking served this end. Secondly, and more fundamentally, 
the TUSIAD represented conglomerates incorporating banks. Mostly these conglomerates 
benefited from the smooth decline of the primitive accumulators through bank seizures 
and from the socialisation of the costs of the bank rationalisation. 
In brief, business associations of productive/commercial capital, who had been 
disadvantaged in accessing financial resources, supported banking reform. However, 
these associations also demanded that priority be given to the corporate sector over the 
banking sector and especially criticised the financial burden of bank rehabilitation to be 
taken over by the state. 
10.4 The Establishment of the Legal Basis for Bank Seizures 
Analysing the establishment of the legal basis for bank seizures reveals crucial 
insights into the reform as a class fractional process. 
Despite the opposing views between the TUSIAD and 'the other business 
associations that represent productive/commercial capital, bank seizures became the 
dominant mode in bank rehabilitation. Legislative arrangements were made under the 
close surveillance of the IMF. As will be discussed below, the Turkish left criticised bank 
seizures on the basis that the seizures mainly protected the interests of foreign banks 
which had credit receivables in Turkish banks. However, bank seizures meant more than 
this. Firstly, .the bank rationalisation process was managed in a way that the dynamic 
accumulators could .safely unburden the dysfunctional members of FC. Secondly, the 
dynamic accumulators found a source of expansion through the accompanying 
consolidation in the finance sector. 
To this end, the SDIF became the mechanism for the state to manage bank 
rationalisation and losses. To do this, first there was a need to remove a legal deficiency 
that might have prevented the use of the SDIF l)y the state. 
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The SDIF was established in 1983Y It had been administered and represented 
by the CBT and then transferred to a new authority, 'the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA)' that began operation in 2000. From December 2003, the 
SDIF has been managed and represented by its own board instead of being a legal entity 
under the BRSA's control. 
The aim of the SDIF was limited to protecting depositors against financial 
breakdown through the insurance of savings deposits under certain limits. Therefore, the 
SDIF was not authorised to assist the rehabilitation and the liquidation of financially 
weak banks (Akkurt eta!. 1992, 27). The then-prevailing law authorised the Treasury to 
liquidate or to rehabilitate problem banks. However, it did not enable the government to 
take over banks, inject new capital when necessary, or buy non-performing bank assets; 
but these were the processes required to terminate the primitive accumulators. An 
amendment to the banking law to authorise the SDIF to perform those measures was 
already a matter of discussion in the early 1990s. 14 Then, with the amendment to the 
banking law in 1994, 15 the SDIF gained the authority to strengthen banks' financial 
structures and if necessary to restructure them. 16 
The Constitution Court cancelled the authority law No. 3991 that the decree 
No.583 (16.4.1994) had depended on in November 29, 1994. Banks Act No. 3182's 41 
articles (over 96 articles) had been changed via this decree. 17 Therefore, the decree was 
deprived of its constitutional base and a legal inconsistency established in the banking 
13 With decree No.70 (22.7.1983) modifYing Banks Act No.7!29 (see Turkish 
Government 1983). Previously, according to Banks Act No. 7129, the Banks Liquidation Fund 
· (Bankalar Tasfiye Fonu) had the effect of helping banks which were in financial trouble (Gok9e 
1996, 1795). 
14 See Akkurt et a1 (1992, 27). 
15 With· decree No.538 (22.6.1994) modifYing Banks Act No.3182 (see Turkish 
Government 1994). 
1~ Intervention in ailing banks and their rehabilitation had been a concern for the IMF 
since the 1994 financial crisis. See IMF (1995, 20) for the IMF's view on the legislative changes 
which formalised the respective roles of the Treasury and the SDIF, and also on the establishment 
of a formal lender oflast resort in 1994 for troubled banks by the CBT. 
17 Indeed, the Court. also cancelled the previous decree No.512 which amended the 
banking law in 1994 by stating that banking law could not be modified by a decree and gave a 
deadline until June 1994 for a new banking law. However, instead of a new banking law, decree 
No.538 was issued and therefore, the legislation problem had remained unresolved since 1994 
(see the interview with Oztin Akgii9 in ''Bankalar Yasa Tasans1 Karnuoyunda Neden 
Tartl~!hruyor?", Dilnya Daily Financial Institutions Supplement, 26 April 1999, p.6). 
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system (E~siz &Yamakoglu 1999, 6). However, new legislation could not be passed18 and 
the High Court started to cancel the related clauses of the banking law as an application 
for cancellation occurred. The cancellation by the High Court in December 1998 was 
related to the clauses arranging the transfer of banks to the SDIF (clauses 64/2 and (i5) 19 
and the Court gave a six months period for a new legislation. 20 This meant that if a new 
law was not passed by June 1999, the Turkish state would have lost the right to 
confiscate ailing banks under its full guarantee. The new banking law could not be 
passed until the last month of the deadline because of conflicts within the TGNA. 21 
What would have happened if the banks had not been transferred to the 
management of the SDIF? Oztin Akgiis; answers as follows: 22 Operations of the banks 
would have ended through another clause (no.68) of Banks Act No.3182. With the 
implementation of this article, the liquidation of the bank would have started and since 
the bank probably could not have niet its obligations, its bankruptcy would have been 
declared. In this situation, the SDIF would have been responsible only for savings 
deposits and could have gained access to the bankrupt's estate as a privileged creditor. 
Therefore, all commercial deposits, other banks' deposits as well as foreign banks' 
credits in these banks, which were not covered by the full insurance scheme, would have 
been under risk. 23 
As the deadline for a new banking law came closer, under the persistent insistence 
by the IMF (see IMF 1999b), Banks Act No. 4389 was passed in the Assembly in June 
1999 just before the six month-deadline. 24 The government's reasoning for the law 
18 For the reasons for not passing a new banking law see TGNA (1999c, 15-16). 
19 Tbis annulment occurred owing to the application to the Council of State for the 
cancellation of the takeover of Turk Ticaret Bank in 1997 (see TGNA (1999c, 28); Tevfik 
Giingiir, "Bankalar ile ilgili 'II Haziran 1999 Sendromu' Nedir?", Diinya, 8 June 1999). 
20 bztin Akgils;, "Yanh~ Karann Agrr Faturasl'', 2 February 2001, Cwnhuriyet. 
21 See "Bankacthk Reformu Kadilk Oldu", Diinya, 12 February 1999. 
22 Oztin Akgils;, "IMF ve Bankalar Kanunu" Cwnhuriyet, 14 February 1999; Oztin Akgily, 
"Yanh~ Karann AgJr Faturast", Cwnhuriyet, 2 February 2001. 
23 Indeed, this occurred in the recent past of Turkey. During the 1994 financial crisis, 
when TYT Bank, hnpexbank and Marmara Bank went bankrupt, foreign private creditors lost 
their loans in these banks and demanded compensation from the Treasury by threatening it with a 
possible decrease on the credit rating of Turkey. Finally, the Turkish government undertook the 
foreign loans in these bankrupted banks (see Kazgan 2001, 29). 
24 See BAT (1999a, 2). 
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pointed out the possibility for losing the policy tool of bank seizures owing to the 
cancellation of the provision No.65.25 
An important aspect of this new Jaw was related to transfers of banks to the SDIF. 
With this change, article No.14 (which took place of article No.64 of the previous Banks 
Act No.3182) provided the legal base for confiscation. In addition, legal exemptions of 
state banks ended with Banks Act No. 4389 and state banks became subject to the all 
clauses of the Act just like private banks (see Reisoglu 1999, 8). As state banks became 
free from the obligation of takeovers of ailing banks (consistent with Banks Act No. 
3182), this change had significant implications in terms of how the burden of bank 
seizures was undertaken by the state. 26 
The first draft of the new banking Jaw allowed the BRSA to merge an ailing bank 
with another bank without necessarily having the consent of the receiver bank. Yet this 
statement was removed because of' the opposition by private banks. 27 Then, it was 
rewritten so that 'voluntary' banks - private or state - could merge with or takeover 
ailing banks with the support of the SDIF if such support was necessary (clause no. 14/3-
b) (Reisoglu 1999, 13-14). As a result, the other mode - seizure - became a real 
possibility: the burden of rehabilitation of ailing banks was taken over by the SDIF as a 
result of Banks Act No. 4389. 
25 See TGNA (1999a); also the statement by Aydm Ayaydm, Deputy of the Motherland 
Party (one of the then governing coalition parties) in TGNA (1999c). 
26 Although according to this Act's Clause No.64/2 takeovers of banks by the SDIF or 
their transfers to any other bank were possible, no bank was transferred to the SDIF in the pre-
restructuring period. Reisoglu (1999, 17) explained this situation as follows: 'in the previous 
period, there was no transfer to the SDIF and indeed, it was not possible to do this. Tltis was 
because, until the bankruptcy of a bank after the cancellation of its banking license, a long 
process, huge efforts and time were necessary.' Accordingly, the state banks were used to 
socialise the. losses of the sunken banks in the preceding period (Stlmer, E.H. 1999, 23; 
Karahanogullan 2003, 263). 
27 Regarding the opposition by the BAT see Okan Milderrisoglu, ''Bankalar 'Giirilcil 
Usillilne' Kar§l', Sabah, 9 June 1999. 
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10.5 The Implications of the IMF Involvement for the Interests of Creditor 
Foreign Banks 
The IMF' s support for bank seizures and state bailouts showed that its role could 
not be cast simply as a neo-liberal enforcer. Yet the IMF did face dilemmas in the process. 
The IMF credits given to Turkey after the 1999 stand-by agreement were a matter of 
criticism at the international level. For instance, Martin Wolf of the Financial Times 28 
argued that the IMF should not finance creditors against their risks or the governments 
that implemented wrong policies. Wolf said that the then ongoing economic program 
could bring stability to the Turkish economy, but one thing should be made clear to the 
Turkish government: 'this is the last chance'. The US administration warned the Turkish 
government that the support for this economic package might not be provided again. 
However, IMF Managing Director Horst Kohler backed the IMF credits to Turkey 
by stressing the high probability of success of the economic program: 
I think the Turks have gone through a difficult, painful process of recognizing 
reality ... The Turkish people are solid people, hard working, well known for paying back 
loans, debt. .. Under the leadership of Minister Dervis an adjustment program has been put 
together that goes very far. It withstands all comparisons to other adjustment programs. 
And, in particular, it is true that they make a strong stab in restructuring the bank sector, 
which is the core problem. 
This program is also based on clear commitment and action to combat corruption and to 
make the political process more transparent, to depoliticize the economy. All of the 
political parties in the coalition are.involved in the program. (IMF 200lc) 
While the IMF supported the credits given to Turkey, it was at the same time concerned 
with the moral hazard problem. Private creditors should not have expected to be 'bailed 
out' by the official sector and instead, should have shared the burden in the crisis 
resolution efforts. 'Debtors and private creditors must always be aware that the IMFs 
financial assistance is not there to relieve them of their responsibility for the risks they 
take. The IMF is not an international lender of last resort, in the sense of providing 
unlimited liquidity' (IMF ZOOid). The IMF was pleased with the involvement of private 
creditors in the resolution of the Turkish financial crisis: 
28 Martin ·wolf, "A Last Chance for Turkey", Financial Times, 23 May 2001. 
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We have applied this approach most recently in both Turkey and Argentina. In each of 
these countries, the authorities deliberately chose to use a growth-oriented policy 
approach and market-oriented solutions for meeting their large external financing 
requirements and restoring access to private capital markets. The adjustment programs of 
Turkey and Argentina reflect strong commitments not only to fiscal discipline, but also to 
eliminating state interference in the economy, integratingforther into the global economy, 
and preserving a culture of respect for property rights. All of these are crucial 
ingredients of a good investment climate. Although there are risks, the IMF's members 
unanimously agreed that this way of proceeding deserves support. An integral part of 
their supportive approach to Turkey and Argentina was and is the expectation that the 
private sector remains engaged. Given Turkey's strong, market -oriented adjustment 
program, it should be quite natural that Turkey's private creditors will maintain and even 
increase their exposures. (IMP 200 lj, emphases added) 
In brief, the IMP applauded the 'market based, extraordinary measures' 29 taken by 
the Turkish state and called on private creditors to share the burden. However, while the 
IMP praised the workings of the free market, the economic reality was that the 'solid, hard 
. working' Turks paid for the bank rehabilitations as the costs of bank restructure were 
socialised through the SDIF and, indirectly, state consolidated revenue. 
During banking reform, the IMP assured credit risks of foreign private creditors in 
Turkish banks. This was done by two means. Firstly, bank seizure rather than liquidation 
was facilitated. Secondly, as will be addressed below, the protection was extended via a 
state guarantee for all domestic and foreign liabilities of private deposit banks during the 
November 2000 financial crisis. This meant that the financial burden of bank 
rehabilitation was taken over by the SDIF under IMP auspices. As a result, the SDIF (and 
so the Turkish state) became the lender of last resort for both Turkish bourgeoisie and 
foreign creditors. Yet the IMP did not see a contradiction with its free market ideology; 
instead the Fund saw it as a 'free market' outcome! 
Akgii9 links the legislative arrangement in June 1999 to the intention of the IMF 
to provide the state guarantee for foreign banks' credits given to Turkish banks.30 Since 
29 See IMF (200le) and IMF (2001t). 
30 Oztin Akgiiy, "IMF ve Bankalar Kanunu" Curnhuriyet, 14 February 1999; Oztin Akgiiy, 
"Yanh~ Karann A~r Faturasl'', Curnhuriyet, 2 February 2001. 
The BRSA (2003a, 12) indicated that the foreign liabilities of the SDIF -banks, which 
amounted to US$ 2 bn, were equal to 6.4% of the total liabilities of these banks. In addition, 
before the announcement of the guarantee fqr all liabilities of banking, of US$ 26 bn total 
deposits, US$ 16.8 bn were covered by the insurance scheme for deposits. 
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transfers of banks to the SDIF were assured with this legislation, all foreign credits given 
to these banks were under the state guarantee. 31 
On the other hand, the BRSA (2003a, 13-14; 2003b, 21-22) stated that the agency 
could have rehabilitated the banking system via the liquidation of ailing banks by 
repaying only savings deposits liabilities which were covered up to TL 50 bn. The BRSA 
emphasised that in this case, net liabilities to foreign banks (US$ 1,3 bn) would not be 
covered. This would have created an internal and external loss of confidence in the 
financial system ultimately leading to runs on bank deposits as well as closure of foreign 
credit limits to solvent banks. Therefore, the BRSA contended that it needed to first 
transfer the problem banks to the SDIF and then resolve them under the auspices of the 
SDIF. 
This solution was preferred by the BRSA for four reasons. Firstly, it was cheaper 
than the liquidation alternative since some banks had collected funds with extremely high 
costs. Secondly, the legal process was short compared to direct liquidation. Thirdly, 
through the transfers of deposits from the SDIF~banks to solvent banks, the rehabilitation 
process was made easier. Lastly, the BRSA believed that the employment in the sector 
was partially secured via the sales of branches/banks. As a result, the legal base for bank 
seizures was facilitated through Banks Act No. 4389. As Akgiis; argued, with this change, 
the IMF aimed to guarantee bank confiscation instead of direct liquidation. 32 
This approach of the IMF became obvious again during the November 2000 
financial crisis when the existing guarantee for the failed banks was extended to the 
whole banking sector. On December 6, 2000, the government announced a temporary 
state guarantee on all bank liabilities. In other words, the state accepted a full guarantee 
for foreign banks' credits even though the domestic banks might have gone bankrupt. 
31 Consistent with Akg(ls;, Gilngllr Uras of Milliyet Daily drew attention to how the 
insurance scheme, which had been limited to savings deposits, became pointless since bank 
confiscations (instead of their direct liquidations) brought also commercial deposits and foreign 
credits under the guarantee of the SDIF. This meant that the state undertook extensive guarantees, 
including for foreign banks' risks in the banks of the primitive accumulators (see Milliyet, 21 
October 2000). As such, prominent Turkish economist Korkut Boratav evaluated this guarantee 
as a concession given to international fmance capital by the state that was blackmailed to cut 
external credits ("Bankalann Bors;1anm Hazine Ustlenmemeli", Curnhuriyet, 25 February 2001). 
32 Oztin Akg(ls;, "IMF ve Bankalar Kanunu" Curnhuriyet, 14 February 1999; Oztin Akgiis;, 
"Yanh~ Karann Agi.r Faturas1", Curnhuriyet, 2 February 2001. 
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Therefore, the potential bank risk for the SDIF was transformed into an actual 
guarantee. 33 This was a kind of double guarantee. Indeed, the then-implemented seizure 
process guaranteed foreign banks' credits. However, the announced guarantee gave 
reassurance that any bank facing difficulty was definitely going to be taken over by the 
SDIF and thus, foreign creditors would not carry any risks. 34 Foreign banks as well as 
Turkish private deposit banks needed this reassurance because private deposit banks had 
syndicated credits due that needed to be renewed. 35 
The full state guarantee for foreigri creditors was expected to encourage the 
involvement of foreign creditor banks in the resolution of the November 2000 crisis. 
Therefore, in exchange for continuous foreign credit flows, the Turkish state was to bear 
an immense risk for entire liabilities of all domestic deposit taking banks. On the day of 
the Turkish Prime Minister's announcement of the guarantee, IMF Managing Director 
Kohler (IMF 2000e) applauded the decision by the government 'to protect depositors and 
other creditors in Turkish banks'. In the process, an amendment to the banking law in 
May 2001 (Law No.4672, clause No.14-6/b) 36 made the funding of this guarantee legally 
explicit (see Turkish Government 2001b), giving rise to criticism within the Assembly. In 
the Assembly debates, Oguz Tezmen of the True Path Party (TGNA 2001c, 16) criticised 
the state's guaranteeing debts of sunken banks which might have resulted from the 
misuse of their owners. Tezmen also questioned why foreign banks did not take on their 
credit risks in the sunken banks and added that the IMF credits would return to those 
foreign banks while it would eventually be paid by Turkish citizens. 37 
While the full state guarantee was criticised in the Assembly, on the IMF side, it 
was necessary to eliminate risks for foreign banks in the Turkish market (see IMF 2001g, 
22). The guarantee helped to prevent further turmoil in the market during the November 
33 See "IMF Dayatmas1yla Garanti", Cumhuriyet, 19 January 2001. 
34 See ZU!fikar Dogan, Finansal Forum, 25 January 2001. 
35 
"Ozel Bankalann Borcu Korkutuyor", Cumhuriyet, 15 June 2001; for the legislative 
and finance procedure of this guarantee see Turkish Government (2000). 
36 The guarantee carne into effect until then through the Budget Law (see Banu Salman, 
"Banka Irle~tirme Modeli <;:ilktil", Cumhuriyet, 4 October 2001). 
3 Reflecting the tension within the assembly, some other opposition deputies also 
criticised the arrangement. They predicted higher borrowing costs for the private sector than the 
Treasury and questioned the logic of giving guarante.e to these bank debts (see the statements by 
Celal Adan of the True Path Party (TGNA 2001c, 51), Asian Polat, Deputy of Erzurum City, 
(TGNA 2001c, 53-54) and Cevat Ayhan, Deputy of Sakarya City, (TGNA 2001c, 56 and 65). 
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2000 and February 2001 financial crises and facilitated continuous flows of credit from 
foreign banks to Turkish banks. 38 That meant the extension of the protection to private 
Turkish banks and finally to their conglomerates. 39 
Meanwhile, while the conglomerates incorporating banks provided a shelter in 
finance from the state during the crises, this was not true of private investors. As the IMF 
(200la, 22) stated: 
The private investors have generally not been protected from the impact of the crisis. The 
government has allowed the corporate sector to independently cany the burden of a 
depreciated exchange rate and high interest rates on their balance sheets. 
In terms of the fractional analysis of the thesis, this statement reveals that the global 
integration of capital was the first priority of the reform. The further internationalisation 
pursued by large capital groups necessitated the rising concentration and centralisation of 
capital which, in turn, created some 'losers' within Turkish capital. 
The analysis of the seizure process shows that although the link between the 
legislative facilitation of confiscations and foreign creditors' interests was credible, the 
bank seizures did more than this. Confiscations of ailing banks by the SDIF were 
necessary to make the restructuring process of banking manageable for the state and for 
the dynamic accumulators. Vural Ala.~dc, Member of Board of Directors of Dt~bank, 
(Yigit 1999, 50) contended that the state preferred seizure to direct liquidation because 
bankruptcy of banks could have caused a systemic risk, in other words, bankruptcy of 
other banks and turmoil in corporate sector, as well.40 Therefore, confiscations secured 
38 The negotiations between the Turkish state and foreign banks through the IMF 
continued during the February 2001 crisis (see IMF 2001a, 23) and open credit lines to Turkish 
banks were secured due to the state guarantee (see IMF 2001h; Turkish Government 2001c) .. 
39 In the Letter of Intent dated 28 January 2002 (clause 29), it was committed that once 
soundness in the banking sector was restored, the general guarantee might be lifted with due prior 
notice (see Turkish Government 2002). As a result, in July 2003, the BRSA announced that the 
blanket guarantee protecting all depositors and other creditors in intervened banks as well as the 
limited deposit scheme fully protecting individuals in banks that were liquidated without 
intervention were going to be abolished in July 5, 2004 (see IMF 2003, 21). On July 5, 2004 both 
schemes were abolished and replaced with a limited deposit insurance scheme in line with the EU 
standards. 
40 The Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that the government was most careful not to 
allow bank bailouts to cause production losses and unemployment in the industry and would try 
to keep the bailed out banks on-stream, he added (see "Turkey Plans Major Step to Overhaul 
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the needed trust in the banking system for the dynamic accumulators by blocking possible 
adverse effects of bankruptcy of banks on viable banks. Furthermore, seizures allowed 
the state to undertake the high financial burden of bank rehabilitation and supported the 
hegemonic part of capital and ultimately the Turkish capitalist class in general through 
the socialisation of the costs.41 
10.6 Tensions within Finance Capital about Bank Rehabilitation: Seizures versus 
Alternative Modes 
We have identified the broader conflicts within capital on bank seizures. Here we 
explore the opposing interests within FC as the prior issue for a deeper understanding of 
state policy under the influence of the IMF. 
The IMF, with its global vision, pushed the state to support a particular resolution 
as the state tried to go softly in discarding the primitive accumulators. The seizure 
process was carried out despite the demand by the primitive accumulators for support and· 
the preference by some dynamic accumulators for direct liquidation. Under the decisive 
pro-seizure stance of the IMF, the state managed the seizure process in a way which 
served the interest of the dynamic accumulators as a whole. 
As the IMF opposed supportive measures for ailing banks, the December 1999 
and May 200 I amendments to the banking law increasingly eliminated those kinds of 
measures and eased the seizures. This trend continued until almost all weaker banks were 
eliminated. Towards the end of 2001, the use of non-seizure methods started to be 
discussed among the govetnrr)ent, the IMF and the WB. This shift heralded that banking 
reform was moving to a new stage in which the state increasingly focused on 
Banking", Turkish Daily News, 2 November 2000, URL: 
http://www.turkighdailvnews.com/old editions/11 02 00/econ.htm) 
41 The BRSA (2003c, 24) indicated that the accumulated loss of the SDIF-banks as of 
takeover dates amounted to US$ 17.3 bn: 'A remarkable portion of the total loss of the SDIF-
banks is due to funds used by majority shareholders from their own banks in excess of the legal 
limits. Indeed, total funds used by majority shareholders directly or through other SDIF-banks 
amount to US$ II billion'. The BRSA (2003c, 26) stated that of a sum of US$ 22.5 bn was 
required for restructuring of the SDIF-banks. Of this amount, US$ 17,3 bn was obtained from the 
public sector and the remaining US$ 5,2 bn from 'private sector resources', i.e. from the SDIF's 
own resources (which included insurance premiums, fines, collections, revenues from bank sales 
and over -due deposits). 
, 
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strengthening the remaining viable banks under the supervision of these international 
financial institutions. 
Table 10.2 The Jist of seized banks 
Bank Date of Seizure Critical Legislation/event 
TUrkbank November 1997 Banking Jaw no.3182 
Bank Ekspres December 1998 Banking Jaw no.3182 
Interbank Jamiary 1999 Banking law no.3182 
Egebank December 1999 December 1999 amendment 
Yurtbank December 1999 December 1999 amendment 
Y~arbank December 1999 December 1999 amendment 
Esbank December 1999 December 1999 amendment 
SUrnerbank December 1999 December 1999 amendment 
Bank Kapital October 2000 2000 Financial crisis 
Etibank October 2000 2000 Financial crisis 
Demirbank December 2000 2000 Financial crisis 
Ulusalbank February2001 2001 Financial crisis 
lktisat Bank March2001 2001 Financial crisis 
EGSBank July2001 May 2001 amendment 
Kent bank July 2001 May 2001 amendment 
Sitebank July2001 May 2001 amendment 
Tari~bank July 2001 May 2001 amendment 
Baymchrbank July2001 May 2001 amendment J 
Toprakbank . November 2001 Winding up of seizure process I 
Pamukbank June 2002 Winding up of seizure process 
linarBank 
. 
July 2003 Winding up of seizure process 
Ada bank July 2003 Winding up of seizure process 
As Table 10.2 shows, until the December 1999 amendment which made bank 
seizures easier, there were only three banks under the receivership of the SDIF: Turk 
Ticaret Bank, Bank Express and Interbank. Just three days after the amendment on 
December 19 (with the beginning of a three-year stand-by program with the IMF), the 
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main wave of bank seizures started. Five other banks, (Egebank, Yurtbank, Siimerbank, 
Esbank and Ya~arbank), were confiscated on December 22. This was followed by the 
seizures of two other banks (Etibank, Bank Kapital) and by the seizure of Demirbank 
during the 2000 crisis. Then, two new banks, (Ulusal Bank and Ik:tisat Bank), were 
confiscated during the 2001 crisis. Soon after the May 2001 amendment, five more banks 
(Baymdubank, EGS Bank, Kentbank, Tari~bank and Sitebank) were seized in July. This 
was followed by the seizures ofToprakbank in November 2001, Pamukbank in 2002 and 
lastly the takeovers of Imarbank and Adabank in 2003. The insistence of the IMF on 
seizure as the main mode of rehabilitation and consistent legislative changes between 
1999 and 2001 facilitated these confiscations despite resistance by the primitive 
accumulators and divisions within the BAT. 
A closer look at the sequence of legislative changes reveals that the new Banks 
Act No.4389 in June 1999 (clause No: 14) facilitated further support for ailing banks from 
SDIF funds.42 Reisoglu (1999, 13) asserted that these precautions aimed to save ailing 
banks instead of forcing their bankruptcy as happened previously.43 Yet the same article 
also permitted bank confiscation without having necessarily arduous conditions (Reisoglu 
1999, 16). Misuse of bank resources by majority shareholders, (which caused losses that 
exceeded the banks' own funds), and their non-repayment to the SDIF, were reasons 
enough to transfer the stakes belonging to those shareholders to the SDIF. In other words, 
the seizure process was also made easier at the same time. 
The banking law was modified again in December 1999 and alternative measures 
for ailing banks were mostly replaced with a more radical stance. 44 The General Director 
42 The sub-items no.2 and no.3 provided support through the BRSA at the initial stages of 
deterioration in the financial structure of the bank. For instance, according to the sub-item no.2, to 
strengthen liquidity position of an ailing bank, the BRSA was authorised to purchase its 
subsidiaries and real estates or to provide advances in return to these assets or to make deposits or 
takeover its receivables and to guarantee obligations ofthe bank. 
43 However, the law at the same time provided some precautions against risky activities 
of ailing banks. As Reisoglu (1999, 12) stated, clause No. 14 aggravated precautions against 
ailing banks compared to the previous Banks Act No.3182. Therefore, one of the early 
precautions under the sub-item no. 1-c was to increase insurance premiums for deposits or to 
impose I 00% provisioning for deposits collected by these banks. In this way, their risky activities, 
which were based on the collection of deposits with extremely high interest rates, were blocked. 
44 The above measures, which were covered under the sub-item no.2, were placed in 
Clause No. 14/6-b in the subsequent Banks Act No. 4491. This replacement meant that these 
supportive measures could be used forthe banks that were under the receivership of the SDIF (for 
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of Pamukbank and Member of Board of Directors in the BAT, Orhan Emirdag (2001) 
drew attention to the IMF pressure at that time to make bank seizures the main mode in 
bank rehabilitation. According to Emirdag, the reason was that the seizure method was 
assumed by the state and the IMF to be the 'least cost' form of bank rehabilitation. 
However, Emirdag advocated the need for alternative mechanisms beside seizure (such as 
liquidation, rehabilitative measures before confiscation, mergers, etc.). 45 
Importantly, regarding the mode of the bank rationalisation, there were different 
views within banking and so within the BAT. Here Einirdag appeared as a voice of a 
particular fraction: the primitive accumulators. As the bank that he represented 
(Pamukbank which was confiscated in 2002) had been monitored by the Treasury for 
years and seizure was a real possibility, Emirdag demanded some alternative measures 
for ailing banks. However, Emirdag's explanation shows that the primitive accumulators 
were not effective within the BAT in influencing the design of the banking law regarding 
bank seizures. 
On the other hand, the dynamic accumulators agreed with the elimination of 
weak banks, even though they had opposing preferences on the form of this elimination. 
The material basis for these differences was the various growth paths in finance that were 
projected by individual dynamic accumulators. For the ones that might not benefit from 
the acquisition of seized banks, direct liquidation was a better alternative as it would not 
put the burden of the losses on the state. For example, one of the top-players, i§bank 
expressed its preference for direct liquidation instead of seizures. General Director of 
i§bank Ersin Ozince (Finans Diinyasz 2002, 20) stated that during his chairmanship in the 
BAT, he opposed a full burdening of all debts of ailing banks by the state. Ozince stated 
that the elimination of weak members was an outcome of a free market system and added: 
'it is very inconvenient that this selection has occurred through the transfers to the SDIF 
instead of usual liquidation mode'. 46 According to Ozince, banks should have been 
the ones that were not seized because of misuses of bank resources). This implied that these 
measures continued to be used for bank rationalisation,. but for the rationalisation under the SDIF-
management. . 
45 For a similar critique of bank takeovers by the management of the YKB, wmch was 
owned by <;ukurova Group together with Pamukbaok, see Karacan (2002, 36). 
46 
"ODTU Bankaczhk Konferansmda Szla Denetimin Onemine i§aret Edildi", Cumhuriyet, 
4 December 200 I. 
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liquidated and their savings deposits been paid as happened previously. 47 However, as 
will be addressed in the discussion of the rehabilitation of the SDIF-banks, for the banks 
that could capture seized banks, the confiscations (along with state subsidies for their 
sales) were preferable because they offered an opportunity for rapid expansion. 
Despite the opposite views within the dynamic accumulators, the BAT demanded 
the subsidised sales of the seized banks instead of direct liquidation. Three factors might 
affect this stance. First of all, power balances within the BAT might lead the Association 
to demand a state-subsidized bailing-out. A second factor that made direct liquidation 
inapplicable for the Association could be the fear of a systemic risk for the dynamic 
accumulators. Third, the obvious preference by the IMF for seizures must also have been 
an influence. Indeed, the use of seizures was a precondition for the stand-by arrangement 
request by the IMF Board. The Letter of Intent dated December 9, 1999 puts it as follows: 
Taking an iosolvent bank from its owner. is a very important market discipline on the 
behaviour of banks and the prompt iotervention by the Agency in the event of insolvency 
protects the assets available to depositors and the other creditors. Therefore, the Banks 
Act will also be amended to require the take over by the Saviog Deposits Insurance Fund 
(SDIF) of all insolvent banks. The new amendments will give the SDIF the authority and 
responsibility to restructure a problem bank to facilitate its sale in full or io part, or to 
liquidate the remainder based on existing laws. (55 .. clause) (Turkish Government 
1999c) 
The IMF (2000f) praised the amendment to the banking law and new bank takeovers 
which came just three days after the passing of the law. 48 
The prioritisation of seizures over other mechanisms caused debates within the 
assembly during the negotiations on the banking law. In December 1999, some 
opposition parties criticised the preference for seizures and contended that while the 
management of the SDIF might tum to an impasse, this amendment would mean a rescue 
operation for the cleaned-out banks. 49 In response, the State Minister Recep 6nal 
(TGNA 1999g, 71) argued that tJ:le change in the banking law was not made to facilitate 
bank seizures by the SDIF since the Treasury already had such an authority. However, 
47 
"Herkes Evlenecek'', A~am, 4 December 2001. 
48 See Levent Akbay, "Bankac1hkta Kritik Karara Ramak KaldJ.", Dilnya, 15 December 
1999. 
49
.See the statements by Kemai Kabat~, Deputy of True Path Party io TGNA (1999f, 4-
5); and by Veysel Candan, Deputy of Virtue Party in TGNA (1999f, 33). 
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6nal did not mention that some pre-supportive measures for financially weak banks, 
which were covered in the previous banking law, were eliminated. 
Some private banks tried to provide supportive measures for ailing banks during 
the 2001 amendment to banking law. 50 However, once again the state and the IMP 
preferred seizures. 51 The General Director ofPamukbank, Orhan Emirdag (2001) recalled 
the BRSA suggestion for supportive measures for ailing banks in the draft Banks Act No 
4672 in 200 I. Emirdag stressed that whilst these measures were included in the draft that 
was sent to the BAT, they were excluded from the version which was later sent to the 
TGNA. Accordingly, Emirdag indicated 'the things which had not succeeded with Banks 
Act No.4491 would be tried this time' and added 'indeed, an important chance was 
missed out'. 52 In other words, the state and the IMP were still pro-seizure at that stage of 
banking reform, signalling that there were still more banks to be seized. Despite the 
demands of the primitive accumulators, the IMP was decisive in the completion of the 
confiscation process for ailing banks so that the next stage in bank rehabilitation which 
was strengthening rem!!ining viable banks could begin. 
However, the dynamic accumulators for whom the SDIF-banks did not offer a 
critical alternative for expansion started to publicly criticise the seizure strategy. For 
instance, the General Director of Akbank, Zafer Kurtul, stated: 
5° For example, the release of required reserve holdings during a crisis and repurchases of 
undue T -bills from banks by the BRSA. 
51 Emirdag (200 I) gave the example of one of the last seized banks by then. He stated 
that even required reserve holdings were not released to that bank and thus, it had to borrow at 
7000% overnight interest rates. Therefore, he argued, even if the bank was going to be 
confiscated, at least by releasing these holdings, the cost of seizure could have been decreased 
significantly (the implied bank was probably Demirbank which was confiscated in the November 
2000 financial crisis). . 
52 Zulfikar Dogan also asserted that during the preparation of Banks Act No.4672, a 
provision that would warn banks to improve their fmancial structures through recapitalisation and 
sales of properties before seizure was dismissed after the objections by the IMF and the WB (see 
"Banking Law: Three Changes in 18 Months", Turkish Daily News, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/05 09 01/econ.htm ). 
Tank Yilmaz of Milliyet Daily stated that the WB opposed the plarmed changes in the 
banking law providing support for ailing banks. The WB argued that those kinds of supports 
would not be effective in rehabilitating ailing banks, but would transfer the resources to bank 
shareholders. Thus, according to Yilmaz, these pre-seizure mechanisms were eliminated from the 
Jaw draft (see "Bankalar Yasasr'na Diinya Bankasr Rotn;;ii", Milliyet, 2 May 2001). 
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Problematic banks should be liquidated directly [instead of being transferred to the SDIF]. 
That is because a huge burden for the Treasury has occurred due to the full guarantee 
being given for all domestic and foreign liabilities of seized banks and a negative 
environment has been created in terms of achieving equilibrium in interest rates. 53 
Along with the criticism made by some of the dynamic accumulators, towards the 
end of2001, the seizure method started to be discussed among the IMF, the WB and the 
Turkish state. This heralded a change in the bank rehabilitation strategy. In those 
discussions, instead of confiscation, capital injection to banks through the state support 
became an alternative. The high cost of bank seizures was generally reported as the 
underlying reason for the change in the mode of bank rehabilitation. 54 However, a deeper 
reason also existed. The primitive accumulators had already been largely eliminated from 
the system due to confiscations. 55 Therefore, it was time to move to the next stage and 
support the remaining, more viable banks in order to build the new banking system. This 
phase began the major involvement of the WB in banking reform. The mechanisms that 
were used by the state to support the more solvent banks throughout the reform will be 
discussed in Chapter I I. 
10.7 Conflicts within Capital about Apportioning the SDIF banks 
The next problem to be solved as part of the restructuring of Turkey's bank 
system was how to dispose of the banks, debts and assets that had been acquired by the 
53 
"Kurtul: Sorunlu Banka1art Arttk Dogrudan Tasfiye Edin", Hilrriyet, 16 July 2001. 
54 For instance, Kerem Aikin of Finansal Forum Daily pointed out that the IMF was 
concerned that further confiscations would have been much more costly to the state (Kerem Aikin, 
"Krueger, Bankacilik ve IMF'nin Duyarstzli,gt", Finansal Forum, 25 October 2001). 
Also, Banu Salman of Cumhuriyet Daily indicated that a satisfactory result could not be 
achieved by accelerating the collection of the receivables of the SDIF-banks and keeping 
responsible the ex-owners/managers of the cleaned-out banks with their all properties. In the 
mean time, banks' CARs declined because of the two financial crises and bank owners had 
difficulty in fmding the necessary resources they needed to increase their banks' capital. In 
addition, of the funds that were transferred to the SDIF-banks amounting to US $ 20 bn, 7.6 bn 
was in foreign currency and together with the continual devaluation of Turkish Lira, the cost 
continued to grow (Banu Salman, ''Banka iyile§tirrne Modeli yiiktii", Cumhuriyet, 16 July 2001). 
55 While these discussions were made in public, there were only two more banks to be 
confiscated (in November 2001-Toprakbank and in June 2002-Pamukbank) by excluding the late 
takeovers oflmarbank and Adabank in 2003. 
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SDIF. The tensions that the state tried to mediate during this clean-up process require 
consideration. 
The dynamic accumulators, business associations and some international finance 
institutions agreed that a quick resolution by the state wa~ needed as the operation of 
these banks under the SDIF-management slowed down the transition to the new 
accumulation regime. In response, the state accelerated the resolution process. This 
helped the dynamic accumulators, which preferred state subsidies to the uncertainties of a 
market-based rationalisation, in two ways: Firstly, they removed the remnants of the old 
regime more quickly and accelerated their restructuring for the new era. Secondly, the 
resolution process offered a cheaper and faster expansion opportunity in finance for the 
dynamic accumulators. 
Indeed, the December 1999 amendment to the banking Jaw not only eased bank 
seiztires, but also accelerated the exit of these banks from the SDIF by giving authority to 
the SDIF to more rapidly restructure the failed banks. Praising the legislative change, the 
WB explained the need for a quicker resolution process as follows: 
To ensure a smooth resolution process, the new amendments gives [sic] the BRSA and 
SDIF top authority to take over all insolvent banks. The amendments also provides [sic] 
the two institutions authority and responsibility to restructure a problem bank to facilitate 
its sale in fu11 or in part, or to liquidate the remainder based on existing laws ... 
The amended banking law established a clearer framework for resolving failed banks. 
Previously, the role of the SDIF under the law was institutiona11y very complex and very 
broadly defined as the primary. liquidity provider to illiquid banks, capital provider to 
insolvent banks, and genera11y to apt as the banking rehabilitation agency. This definition 
has led to the undesirable outcome where it was rather easy for a commercial bank to 
enter the SDIF with all the incentives supporting such an entry, but where no clear and 
quick exit strategy for the banks to be removed from the SDiF existed. Thus the banks 
tended to continue to stay in the SDIF till such time a buyer could be found. (WB 2000, 
100-101) 
On this basis, the WB (2000, I 0 I) contended that the SDIF should be granted further 
operational flexibility to liquidate insolvent banks in the speediest and least costly 
manner, for example, through the purchase and assumption of transactions and insured 
deposit transfers. 
However, despite the amendment for quicker exits of banks from the SDIF, the 
rehabilitation process of the SDIF-banks was widely criticised in 2000 and 2001. The 
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pace of the resolution process was not enough to please the dynamic accumulators, 
business associations and international institutions. Further accumulated losses of these 
banks led to questioning of the management performance of the SDIF (see Activeline 
200 I b, 3 ). The dynamic accumulators complained about the high market interest rate 
driven by the SDIF-banks which raised funding costs in banking as a whole. 56 As the 
BRSA (2003c, 26) indicated, the SDIF-banks faced high funding costs and growing 
currency losses with the outbreak of the 2000 and 200 I financial crises. Also, setting 
aside necessary provisions for their non-performing loans increased the losses of the 
SDIF-banks after their takeover by the SDIF. Therefore, Turkish business associations, 57 
the IMF, the WB 58 and foreign banks 59 called for rapid merger and sales of the SDIF 
banks, pointing out their growing losses and negative effects on banking. 
Crucially, on the question of who would suffer the financial cost of this resolution, 
the BAT (2000) pointed to the state. In order to make the sales of the SDIF-banks more 
attractive, the BAT demanded that the· state offer new alternatives rather than usual 
liquidation procedures in which the sales of assets of the banks were simply used to meet 
their liabilities. Therefore, as discussed in the previous section, despite two contradictory · 
points of view within the dynamic accumulators, the fraction which wanted state-
subsidized rationalisation (which would facilitate a lucrative acquisition opportunity) 
rather than the fraction which preferred market-based rationalisation was successful in 
pursuing its interest through the BAT. The following statement in a report of the BAT 
shows this: 
56 See for example the criticisms made by Akbank in "Kurtul: Sorunlu Bankalari Artlk 
Dogrudan Tasfiye Edin", Hfuriyet, 16 July 2001; and by D1~bank in Nurten Erk, ''Bannanbek: 
Telekomunikasyon Sektoriinde Mutlaka OlacagJ.z", Hlirriyet, 7 August 2000. 
57 For the views of the TUSIAD, MUSIAD and TOBB see ''Business leaders caution 
government against lethargy", Turkish Daily News, 30 September 2000, URL: 
httu://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/09 30 00/econ.htm; "TUSIAD slaps government 
for crisis", Turkish Daily News, 16 December 2000, URL: 
http://w\vw.turkish.dailvnews.com/old editions/12 16 00/econ.htm; see also the speech by 
TUSIAD's Chairman Billent Eczac1b~! in September 2000, URL: http://www.tusiadorg.tr; 
"TOBB: Bankac1hk Sistemi T1kand!", Sabah, 11 November 2000. 
58 For instance see the statement by Charles Dallara, the Director of International Finance 
Institution (IIF) of the WB, in Finansal Forum, 3 November 2000; also WB (2000, 101). 
59 For instance see the statement by Ann Lopez, Credit Suisse First Boston Regional 
Head of Emerging Market Credit Risk Management in Elif Kelebek, "Investment banker urges 
caution, quick action on problem banks", Turkish Daily News, 20 January 2001, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/01 20 Ollecon.htm. 
·~··"'." •-"~ ,·_C:/'~'1 -.>'~i..;;. 
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For example, problematic banks can be recapitalised and then sold to another bank. 
Restructuring of these problematic banks and their sales to another financially-strong 
bank is a very complex transaction and the recapitalisation need requires the use of state 
funds (p. 7). 
Since the SDIF-owned banks have huge bad assets, they cannot imp~ove their situations 
and balance sheets. The money transferred to these banks, thus, has not been enough to 
make them sound. Hence, there is a need to develop a system which can provide a 
separation of non-performing credits from the balance sheets. This requires legal 
amendments. 
The state should create an opportunity for the use of its fmancial instruments for the 
buyers of the SDIF-banks. The new Banks Act provides this opportunity for the SDIF. 
(Such as issuing government securities and allocating this income to the banks that will 
take over the SDIF-banks). 60 (BAT 2000, 14, emphases added) 
The completion of the liquidation and/or sale processes of the SDIF-banks by the 
end of2001 was a commi1ment to the IMF in the Letter of Intent dated 3 May, 2001 (see 
Turkish Government 2001b). To this end, specific deadlines to take bids for the SDIF-
banks were pledged in the letters of intent. 61 The IMF sought a quick resolution as 
follows: 
The SDIF had so far limited success in selling intervened banks. This was partly the 
result of macroeconomic conditions, but could also be attributed to a protracted sale 
process. The staff noted that since a bank's franchise value is lost quickly, especially if it 
stays too long as an intervened bank with limited operations, the SDIF should seek the 
assistance of outside financial advisors to avoid undue delays in the sale process. (IMF 
200lb, 20) 
On 17th of November 2000 the BRSA armounced an action plan to sell the eight 
SDIF-banks on 17th of November 2000 (and planned to be finished by the end of April 
2001).62 Some private banks (such as Korfezbank and Kentbank) supported the plan, but 
also called for tax incentives for M&As which would make the SDIF-banks more 
60 The Association also indicated that foreign banks should be attracted by the state's 
repackaging of the SDIF-banks as they had much higher levels of global experience as well as 
capital at their hands. Also, verifying that the fraction which sought to expand by acquiring the 
SDIF-banks succeeded in having their interests supported by the BAT, the report argued the 
SDIF-banks should not be sold to large groups that had their own banks in order to prevent an 
oligopolistic structure in the sector which was increasingly formed by large-scale banks (p.l2). 
61 
"Surnerbank on sale, bids until June 22", Turkish Daily News, 1 June 2001, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/06 01 01/econ.htm. 
62 This plan was later widened by including other confiscated banks. See BRSA (2000). 
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attractive. 63 However, some other banks demanded liquidation instead of sales. For 
instance, Tuncay Ozilhan, the CEO of Alternatifbank, argued that the action plan was not 
realistic since it would not be possible to find buyers, especially domestic buyers, in such 
h . 64 as ort time. 
The different reactions showed that banks were not in unison on the rehabilitation 
process of the SDIF-banks. The different opinions can be related to the various needs of 
individual banks in different divisions of the dynamic accumulators: the ones that 
planned to expand through domestic M&As, (thus SDIF-banks were an attractive solution 
to this end) preferred state subsidies (such as Korfezbank and Kentbank). On the other 
hand, those which planned to restructure their banks through foreign partnerships or 
organic growth demanded the liquidation of the SDIF-banks. 
Under the aforementioned action plan for the SDIF-banks, their short-term 
liabilities were liquidated; FX open positions were significantly closed; deposit rates 
were adjusted to market rates; deposit and FX liabilities were transferred to other state 
and private banks in exchange for T -bills; and the numbers of branches and personnel 
were reduced. 65 In addition, various incentives were facilitated for· M&As. 66 In this 
process, crucially, non-performing credits of the SDIF-banks were transferred to the 
Asset Management Unit of the SDIF. In return for these non-performing credits, special 
63 See Kenan ~anh, ''Bankalar Cazip Hale Getirilmeli", Finansal Forum, 18 November 
2000. 
The line between the primitive and the dynamic accumulators became clear during the 
reform process. This is verified also by the fact that some primitive accumulators' banks, such as 
Kentbank, tried to capture a share from the ongoing consolidation process while they were also 
prey within the process. 
64 Ayfer Arslan, "Balik Bankalann Sa!i~I Zor", Dlinya, 22 November 2000. 
65 See BRSA (2003a, 16). 
Furthermore, the main obstacle for the sale of Demirbank ;which had the largest T-bill-
portfolio bearing low-interest rates, was removed via swapping these bills with higher interest 
rates ones and the cost of this operation to the state was calculated as minimum US$ 2 bn (Dlinya, 
18 May 2001). 
66 For example, a temporary clause no.29 was added to the Corporate Tax Law no.5422 
(3.6.1949) with a new law no. 4605 (30.11.2000). This clause exempted banks involved in M&A 
from various tax burdens by 31 December 2003 (Dorukkaya 200!, 75). These exemptions were 
valid for all M&As that might be realised both between operating banks and between operating 
and SDIF-banks. According to <;:ilmez (2000, 122), the main reason for this exemption was the 
increasing number of banks transferred to the SDIF. Furthermore, in 27 June 2001, the BRSA 
(2001e) issued its regulations on bank M&As that facilitated additional incentives for banks. 
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issue bonds granted by the Treasury for the SDIF were channelled to these banks in order 
to increase their CARs.67 
Consistent with Akgii~' s prediction, 68 the resolution of seized banks served to 
provide the dynamic accumulators with public resources as the state took on the burden 
of the unwanted assets/liabilities of the SDIF-banks while purchaser banks selected the 
profitable ones. Moreover, the resolution process eliminated.negative effects of the SDIF-
banks on market prices as demanded by the dynamic accumulators. As the General 
Director of Korfezbank, Hiisnii Akhan, stated, 69 one of the expected outcomes of this 
operation was to decrease the high liquidity needs of the SDIF-banks since these banks 
had to collect funds from the market with high interest rates· to finance their non-
performing credits. Hence, state intervention in the SDIF-banks relieved the dynamic 
accumulators from the burden of these banks and also converted them into a profitable 
source of expansion for this fraction as weii as foreign banks. 
While the SDIF was a key agent in rehabilitating banks, the SDIF resources were 
far from meeting the growing costs of bank seizures. Thus, its financial resources were 
guaranteed by the Treasury. Once again, state debt replaced private debt, i.e. the state 
guaranteed billions of Turkish Lira to underwrite private debt. In addition to the SDIF's 
usual resources, 70 Banks Act No.4389 (Clause No. 15-2/f) aiiowed the SDIF to borrow 
67 These T-bills were supposed to be paid back to the Treasury by the SDIF as the non-
performing credits of the SDIF-banks were collected by the Asset Management Unit. In addition, 
expected revenues from the sales of the SDIF-banks and contributions from the SDIF were 
regarded as the other sources to clear the debt to the Treasury in ten years from December 2002. 
68 With the amendment to the banking law with the law no. 4491 (Clause No.14-S/a) in 
December 1999, the SDIF was authorised to transfer assets that are deemed appropriate to a 
bank that would be newly-founded or an operating one that would volunteer. This arrangement 
_also included the transfer of organization, personnel who agreed, and insured savings deposits, 
and the reserves in liabilities. 
Oztin Akgii~ claimed that the criterion for appropriateness would be determined by the 
preferences of the purchaser banks and this would cause non-performing credits to be left to the 
SDIF while valuable assets of the SDIF-banks would be acquired by purchaser banks. In addition, 
since the same clause also allowed the SDIF to pay the difference in cases where transferred 
assets of a bank were less than the transferred liabilities, Akgii~ evaluated the arrangement as a 
rescue operation for purchaser banks by public funds (see Oztin Akgii~, "Bankalar Kanunu Ni~in 
Degi~tirildi?", Curnhuriyet, 6 February 2000). For the examples of this form of subsidy see 
Chapter 11. . . , 
69 Kenan ~anh ,"Bankalar Cazip Hale Getirihneli", Finansal Forum, 18 November 2000. 
70 These were insurance premiums; deposits, custody accounts and claims which had 
been prescribed by Article 1 0; contributions deposited by the founders of a bank, which had been 
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resources from the Treasury. As the restructuring process of the SO IF-banks has placed 
ever greater demands on the finances of the state, Banks Act No.4491 widened the 
opportunity for the SDIF to use Treasury resources 71 and for the financial needs of the 
SDIF continued to be covered by loans from the Treasury (see Turkish Government 
2000). 
The IMF justified state subsidies of the SDIF-banks on the grounds that the 
banking system had to be restructured urgently. The explanations of the IMF highlighted 
that the state funds were going to be used for meeting these banks' domestic and foreign 
liabilities (see IMF 2001a, 15). 
In the process, the government encouraged Turkey's top four banks (i~bank, YKB, 
Garanti Bank and Akbank), to acquire/merge with some of the SDIF-banks and other 
small-to-medium scale banks in the sector.72 However, these large banks did not agree, 
putting forward onerous conditions for mergers. They also demanded tax incentives for 
company mergers since subsidiaries of the SO IF-banks would cause problems in mergers 
with these banks. 73 
Meanwhile, the November 2000 and February 2001 crises made the sales of these 
banks more difficult. Thus, one of the main reasons for the amendment to the Banks Act 
(with Law No.4672) in May 2001 was to facilitate the rapid rehabilitation and sales of the 
SDIF-banks (see TGNA 2001a). The 'Strengthening the Turkish Economy - Turkey's 
granted permission for establishment; fifty percent of judicial and administrative fmes on account 
of violations of the provisions, etc. (see Banks Act No.4389 Clause No.1 5-2). In addition, the 
Fund was already authorised by the previous Banks Act No.3182 Clause No.66 for cash advances 
from the CBT. This was also covered under the new Banks Act Clause No. 15-5/b. 
71 The CBT was also given a lender of last resort role for ailing banks. The WB highlights 
this as follows: 'The role of lender of last resort should appropriately be the role of the Central 
Bank, as envisaged under the current Central Bank law, whereby the Central Bank can provide up 
to two times the capital of a bank in temporary liquidity difficulties. Banks that remain illiquid in 
spite of the liquidity support provided by the Central Bank ·should be declared insolvent and 
transferred for resolution as "failed banks" to the SDIF. The December 1999 banking law 
amendment incorporated these principles in the law' (WB 2000, 101). See also TGNA (1999f, 7-
8, 21). 
72 
"Ozel Bankalara Teklif', Radikal, 6 December 2000; "Hem Ka~t Hem Banka Aim", 
Milliyet, 7 December 2000; "Government Embarks on IMF-Backed Bank Clean-Up", Turkish 
Daily News, 7 December 2000, URL: 
http://www.turkishdailvnews.com/old editions/12 07 00/econ.htrn. 
73
"Hem Ka~t Hem Banka Aim", Milliyet, 7 December 2000; "IMF istedi 7 Banka Daha 
Gitti", Hilrriyet, 11 July 2001; tax incentives for mergers between subsidiaries were also arranged 
later in the process (see "Fon YII Sonunda Bosalacak", Finansal Forum, 13 July 2001). 
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Transition Program', (which was put into effect after 2001 crisis), identified the swift 
resolution for the problem of the SDIF-banks as essential for the stability of the financial 
system (Turkish Government 2001e, 24-27). The general approach of the program to the 
SDIF banks was to secure their sale or liquidation under the foil guarantee of the state. 
To meet the financial obligations of the full guarantee, which was given to the depositors 
and creditors of the SDIF banks, the Banks Act was modified in May 2001. This 
permitted debts arising from government borrowing securities, issued by the Treasury in 
order to provide loans to the SDIF, to be abolished by the Council of Ministers (see 
Turkish Government 2001a, clause no. 15-2). Veysel Candan, Deputy of the Virtue Party, 
indicated that this was evidence that embezzled bank resources might not be recovered 
(TGNA 2001c, 44). 
Whilst the cost of bank seizures were nationalised through the SDIF, the losses 
were partially met by the sales of SDIF-banks' subsidiaries and real estate. The state also 
tried to collect the receivables of the SDIF-banks (Sonmez 2003, 71). 74 However, as 
limited success was achieved on this regard, the losses ·of the sunken banks continued to 
be a controversial issue in Turkey.75 Finally the debts of the SDIF to the Treasury were 
cancelled with legislation in 2005. 
74 The slowness of the judicial process related to previous bank liquidations caused some 
cases to be dropped they exceeded the statutory time limit. The state tried to accelerate 
collections of the receivables by the SDIF via legal changes. With the change in Banks Act 
No.4672, bailed out banks' claims were treated as a Finance Ministry tax claim (Clause No. 15). 
In the process, the collection effort by the state had to be slowed down so that the 
interests of the dynamic accumulators could be protected during the resolution process. The 
priority of collecting receivables of the SDIF-banks caused tensions within banking. The private 
banks criticized this as unfair since they also had receivables from the same debtor firms. 
According to Deputy Asian Polat of the Virtue Party (TGNA 2001c, 19), a TUISAD report 
evaluated the arrangement to accelerate the collection of receivables from the SDIF-banks as 
conflicting with the constitutional equality and property rights. The TUSIAD stated that this 
privilege for the SDIF-banks might increase unfair competition in the sector (see TUSIAD Press 
Bulletin, No. TS/BAS/01-43, 8 May 2001, URL: http://www.tusiad.org.tr). The BAT also 
opposed the arrangement. As a result, the consideration of the receivables of the SDIF-banks as a 
Finance Ministry tax claim was restricted to the receivables from shareholders of the SDIF-banks 
and from their subsidiaries (see Etnirdag 2001). 
" The discussion of this process is beyond the confines of this thesis. For an official 
description see BRSA (2003c ). 
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Despite the incentives offered to the SDIF banks and interested domestic and 
foreign banks, such as Citibank, Standart Bank, Kazkommertsbank, Demirbank, 76 
Akbank, D1~bank, Finansbank, Dogu~ Group, and Koybank, 77 the sale process of the 
SDIF-banks did not work as well as expected. Of the potential domestic and foreign 
buyers, some were eliminated by the BRSA because they did not have the necessary 
qualifications for bank ownership, while some others withdrew their applications during 
the sale process because of the then ongoing economic crisis. As the time for finalising 
the sale/liquidation process of the SDIF-banks by the end of 2001 (a commitment to the 
IMF) came closer, deposits of the SDIF-banks were sold in auctions by transferring T-
bills in exchange for these deposits to the purchaser banks to ease liquidations. 78 79 As 
Chapter II will address, the dynamic accumulators and foreign banks became the 
beneficiaries of these sales. 
The bank rationalisation process played a crucial role in the reorganisation of 
capital during banking reform. This process served to secure the conditions of 
accumulation for the dynamic accumulators while appeasing the primitive accumulators 
so as to avert a deeper financial crisis. The dynamic accumulators captured the seized 
banks, their financial and non-financial subsidiaries and their chosen assets and liabilities. 
76 Cmgtlhoglu Group of Demirbank expressed its willingness to buy a bank from the 
SDIF even before the confiscation of Demirbank. After the seizure, the Group wanted to take 
back Demirbank when persons whose banks went bankrupt because of extraordinary conditions 
such as crises were allowed to be bank owners again with the banking law (see "Cmgtlhoglu Eski 
Bankasina Talip", Sabah, 9 May 2001). As a result, the owner Halit Cmgtlhoglu bought 70% 
shares ofHalkdemirbank which was transferred to the SDIF with the partnership ofDogu~ Group 
(35% -35%). The remaining 30% shares continued to be owned by statebank "Halkbank" (see 
Necati Dogru, "Yalilama!Kafeslerme!Cmgtllama! Z1rhlama!", Cumhuriyet, 20 April2002). 
77 See ''Fon Bankalanna Talip <;:ok", Milliyet, 15 December 2000; "11 A!JcJ Masaya 
Oturuyor", Milliyet, 24 February 2000. · 
78 
"Mevduat Devri 10 Arahk'ta Tamam", ntvmsnbc news portal, URL: 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/122188.asp; "Turkiye IMF Taahhutlerini Yerine Getirmeye 
Hazirlaniyor", Finansal Forum, 28 November 2001. 
79 The IMF (200li, 22) indicated the need to fmalise the resolution process as follows: 
'To. complete the resolution, the authorities would auction any deposits that were unsold, along 
with matching government securities, to other operating banks. Since Ziraat (the largest state 
bank) had agreed in principle to act as the residual buyer, all SDIF bank deposits should be 
successfully sold and transferred, without having to directly pay out depositors in cash. Finally, 
any remaining assets and liabilities of the SDIF banks would be transferred to the Collection 
Department (COD), which the authorities were considering to merge with a possible bridge bank'. 
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Some of the seized banks which were not acquired by local capital groups or foreign 
banks were liquidated by the state. These liquidations relieved the dynamic accumulators 
from their liabilities in the name of rationalization. And the residual costs of the process 
were carried by the state as the lender of last resort. 
10.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, state intervention in the fractional conflicts was considered in the 
case of the bank rationalisation process. The analysis focused on how this process was 
managed in favour of the dynamic accumulators. It was seen that, despite the demands by 
the primitive accumulators to be saved, the seizure process was completed under the 
decisive supervision of the IMF in such a way that it protected the interests of the 
dynamic accumulators as well as the interests of foreign creditor banks. 
Accordingly; the bank seizures played a pivotal role in the determination of the 
line drawn between the dynamic and the primitive accumulators. 80 The crucial point here 
is that the continual selection of the failed banks throughout the seizure process 
distinguished the two divisions within FC, implying the historically determined nature of 
its hegemonic fraction. 
Despite the free market agenda that is widely attributed to the IMF, the IMF 
supported the socialisation of the cost of the bank rationalisation. The legislative changes 
for bank seizures made it possible for the state to carry the huge cost of the reform that 
nobody else could have undertaken. This relieved the bourgeoisie from the cost, while 
also reducing the foreign banks' risks in Turkish banking. By eradicating the systemic 
risk, the dynamic accumulators could restructure themselves in order to further advance 
their accumulation internationally. Thus, neither the argument of external intervention by 
the IMF nor corruption in banking could provide a solid explanation for the driving logic 
80 As Oyakbank General Director, Mebmet Ozdeniz, (Activeline 2002b) indicated, the era 
of holding banking 'as the use of banks in favour of their own group companies' is over in 
Turkey. To this end, the legislative superstructure that was established by the state for the 
continuity of capital accumulation in the country was effective. Thus, as Ozdeniz stated 'there 
have always been solid, well-managed banks in Turkey. While these banks might get stronger 
during banking reform, new robust banks might join them In this way, Turkish banking which 
would be formed by these strengthened banks may get much closer .to the world banking 
standards'. 
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of banking reform. The reform was rooted in the contradictory interests within Turkish 
capital which arose from the various accumulation strategies of its fractions. The break-
down of holding banking through state initiatives restructured Turkish banking for a new 
capital accumulation regime in Turkey. 
CHAPTERll 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE DYNAMIC ACCUMULATORS 
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11.1 Introduction 
The elimination of the primitive accumulators from finance was only the first step 
in the reform of banking. In order to reconstruct Turkey's FC, the dynamic accumulators' 
banks also needed to be strengthened. 
The dynamic accumulators restructured their banks as part of their overall 
corporate reorganisations (see Chapter 8). While the reorientation of accumulation for 
global competitiveness reduced reliance on state finance protectionism, it nonetheless 
needed state facilitation to enter alliances with the most advanced global capital. The 
state subsidies facilitated M&As to secure the concentration and centralisation of banking 
capital. 1 In this process, especially large banks became the main beneficiaries by 
1 Throughout the restructuring process, the dynamic accumulators wanted a softer 
transition to solve the problems that had accumulated in banking over years. They were 
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increasing their market share. On the other hand, some of the small-to-medium scale 
banks increased their scale while some others pursued a strong niche player position. 
Apart from M&As, there were other state initiatives to support the dynamic 
accumulators' banks. These mechanisms aimed to relieve the dynamic accumulators from 
credit and market risks. 
Firstly, the voluntary debt swap operation with the Treasury in June 200 I helped 
private domestic banks to reduce their open currency positions and increase their 
devalued capitals during the financial crises.2 
Secondly, state support for private banks through the corporate debt restructuring 
(via the so-called Istanbul Approach and the establishment of Asset Management 
Company) aimed to eliminate the blockage in the credit system which became more 
severe ~s rising non-performing credits during the crises sharply reduced credit exposure 
of banking (see BRSA 2002a, 3-4). 
Thirdly, the state stepped in to strengthen banks' capital structures through the 
bank recapitalisation program. The ongoing economic crisis, the difficulties in finding 
domestic and foreign partners, and difficulties in selling fixed assets all served to limit 
banks' ability to raise their CARs by themselves (see BRSA 2003a, 25-26). 
These various mechanisms that were utilised to consolidate the dynamic 
accumulators are beyond the confines of the thesis and will not be discussed in detail. 3 
concerned that the banking sector was being restructured under crisis conditions in Turkey (for 
example, see the statement by Akin Ongllr, Member of Board of Director of Garanti Bank in 
Nurten Erk, "Ongllr: HIZII Davrarnp Bankalan Bogmaym", Hilrriyet, 12 Februray 2001); 
However, bank consolidation was not immune from tensions within capital. The state 
support for banks triggered further tension between productive/commercial capital and the 
dynamic accumulators. While the former did not support bailouts of failed banks, the state 
provided new resources to banking. According to productive/commercial capital, to overcome the 
crisis in Turkey, the state should have first supported the 'real sector' instead of banking. Thus, at 
different stages of this consolidation of the finance sector, those tensions continued to come to 
surface through public debates. 
The dynamic accumulators were the main beneficiaries of state policy. However, banking 
reform was a pre-condition for the overall restructuring of the capital accumulation regime to give 
Turkey's economy a global orientation. The priority on the restructuring of banking was a first 
step in removing blockages in the credit system. Thus, state subsidies for the banks/dynamic 
accumulators, indeed, did make the transition smoother for total capital. 
2 With this swap operation, a portion of TL denominated domestic debt securities 
maturing in 2001 and 2002 was exchanged with three and five year FX-linked and one and two 
year TL denominated floating rate bonds (for more details see Activeline 2001c; Sllnmez 2001; 
Yeldan 2001b). 
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Yet it is important that the reform of banking was not simply a free market solution; the 
Turkish state and the IMF were constructing a globally viable Turkish FC. 
Among these various mechanisms, this chapter focuses on M&As with particular 
attention on two issues. The first issue is the process of domestic centralisation of capital 
by the selective takeovers of assets of the primitive accumulators. The second issue refers 
to the global concentration of Turkish capital, especially via partnerships with leading 
global banks. In both dimensions, the state's policies have been central. 
This chapter's objective is to address how the dynamic accumulators consolidated 
and the role of foreign banks in their consolidation. Accordingly, it addresses how we are 
to understand the relationship between 'foreign' and 'Turkish' banks. The analysis begins 
by looking at how banking capital concentrated and centralised in the pursuit of 
competitiveness in Turkish banking. Secondly, under the pressure of global competition, 
the chapter shows how independent control of batiks by conglomerates has been 
gradually dissolving. The chapter proceeds with bank restructuring within the first 
division of the dynamic accumulators. Two dimensions in this restructuring appear 
critical: the pure banking orientation through the sales of non-financial equity · 
participations and searches for partnership with global capital. Thirdly, bank restructuring 
within the second and third divisions of the dynamic accumulators is analysed with 
particular attention on two issues: the acquisitions of the SDIF-banks and unsuccessful 
attempts at partnerships with global banks. Lastly, the role of foreign banks in the 
consolidation of the dynamic accumulators is discussed. It will be seen that foreign banks 
cannot be seen as exogenous, but have been part of the restructuring of accumulation 
within Turkey. 
This chapter's analysis challenges the nationalist interpretation of the reform. The 
continuous state intervention during the consolidation of surviving batiks shows that the 
Turkish state critically managed the transition to a more globally integrated banking 
system. This finding verifies the proposition of this thesis that the nation state is not 
external to 'globalisation'. Instead, the state is part of the reproduction of social relations 
of capital and functions in the integration of domestic processes of accumulation into 
global accumulation in line with the agendas of particular fractions of capital. 
3 For more detail see BRSA (2003a). 
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11.2 Rising Concentration of Banking Capital for Competitiveness 
A central theme of bank restructuring is 'competitiveness'. In the context of 
conglomerates, this refers to both competitiveness in the finance 'sector', but also in the 
supporting forms of accumulation that attach to banks. 
'Competitiveness' has become something of a buzz word in economic policy 
since the 1980s: indeed, it is a core element in the ideology ofneo-liberalism. We saw in 
Chapters 5 to 8 that competitiveness was the main rationale given for the Turkish bank 
reforms. Generally, competitiveness is cast in two related dimensions, the difference 
usually reflecting differences in policy domains of the nation state, although with a 
theoretical dimension, as well. One dimension is competitiveness of 'local' producers: 
the capacity of local production to compete without subsidies against imports, or to 
compete in export markets. Here, the- agenda is the withdrawal of state subsidies and a 
program of regulatory reforms with the intention of emulating in reality the ideal type of 
competitive markets. For the neo-classical economists, the view is that, with this policy 
regime, policy in an international context will become self-selecting: those industries and 
firms which are 'efficient' will naturally come to the fore. In the absence of trade barriers, 
there is no difference between local and international competitiveness. 
The second dimension addresses the competitiveness of 'national' firms in global 
markets. While the neo-classicals recognis.e no difference between these dimensions, 
there is often a policy difference (different jurisdictions of the state) and also a theoretical 
difference. Reference here is most obviously to Michael Porter's well recognised concept 
of 'competitive advantage', which differs from comparative advantage not on the need 
for domestic market forces, but precisely in respect of the role attributed to state policy in 
the construction of international competitiveness. In the service sector, for example 
banking, competitive advantage can be promoted through policies that generate the 
capacity of banks to operate in globally integrated financial markets, including offshore, 
as 'foreign' banks. 
In accordance with both these notions of competitiveness, we can interpret the 
policy of the Turkish state and the IMF. The dynamic accumulators, with decreasing 
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profits from T -bills, tended to increase their profitability from core banking operations. 4 
The development of domestic policies for competitiveness was central to the reforms. 
Some of the dynamic accumulators had been nurtured to fill competitive gaps in the 
domestic market, especially in retail services and the provision of capital to SMEs. But 
the largest project of reform was the integration of Turkey's largest surviving banks into 
global banking. This project was the dominant objective of banking reform: the 
promotion of bank M&As, the selective takeover of assets of the primitive accumulators 
and the nurturing of partnerships with foreign banks. The purpose of these restructures 
was not to create a 'free market', but involve the state and the IMP directly in the 
construction of a banking elite of dynamic accumulators that could integrate Turkish 
capitalism into global accumulation. 
The dynamic accumulators were not unified, i.e. immune from internal conflicts. 
For some small and medium scale banks, survival became dependent on either scale 
expansion or niche market focus. However, the first tier-banks demanded from the state 
a more oligopolistic sector. For them, 'the rapid decrease in concentration in the last 
years should increase to an acceptable level again'. 5 The TUSIAD (2000) and the BAT 
(2000) also saw that, without a rising concentration of banking capital, Turkish banks 
could not face competition by the world's largest and most profitable banks. If they were 
to compete or to collaborate with globally mobile money capital, the dynamic 
accumulators needed to strengthen their banking arms. Therefore, these associations 
asked for state subsidises to help these corporations undertake M&As. 
The key here was surviving banks gaining access to the assets of the defunct 
primitive accumulators. The state accelerated this process through direct incentives 6 so · 
that the dynamic accumulators (and foreign banks) attained a higher market share. This is 
what the BRSA expected: 
The rehabilitation of the state and SDIF banks will significantly reduce the pressure on 
interest rates and provide a level playing field for the banking sector. As the [government] 
securities given to the state and SDIF banks for recapitalisation purposes are retired, these 
4 See the statement by Sernih Bilgin, Vice-General Director of Ko9bank in G5ziltok 
(2000, 41-42). 
' See the statement by Ersin Ozince, General Director of i~bank and Chairman of the 
BAT in Ozince (2002). 
6 For the incentives in the M&A process, see BRSA (2002e); BRSA (2001e). 
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banks' asset size will decline and thus their weight in the financial sector will decline. As 
a result, the private banks will be able to mobilize larger volume of domestic deposits and 
at lower costs. (BRSA 2001a, 16) 
The rising concentration through M&As can be seen in Table 11.1. Prior to the 
reform, the sector had the European Union's fourth highest concentration rate following 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark (Sayilgan 1999, 82). The domination of the 
largest five and ten banks (in terms of asset, deposit and credit size) fell between 1980 
and 1997-98 as finance protectionism attracted a large number of new banks. 7 Despite 
the falling sectoral concentration, however, the largest five banks had a market share of 
around 50% in the mid-1990s. With the banking reform of 1997 onwards, the tendency to 
fall reversed and both the largest five and the largest ten banks increased their shares 
sharply in total assets, deposits and loans. 8 
Table 11.1 Concentration in the banking sector (% share in sector total) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 
* 
Largest Five** 
T. assets 63.4 63.5 54 48 44 44 46 48 59.9 
T. deposits 69.4 70.4 59 53 47 49 50 51 54.7 
T.loans 71.2 65.0 57 50 46 40 42 42 62.5 
Largest Ten 
T. assets 82.2 80.9 75 71 67 68 68 69 82.2 
T. deposits 88.3 89.0 85 73 70 73 69 72 76.3 
T.loans 89.7 81.0 78 75 72 73 73 71 86.8 
* As of November 2003. 
** The 2003 ratios for the first five private banks are 44.3, 52.0 and 44.6 respectively. 
Sources: BAT (2001a, 2); Sa)'llgan (1999, 82); BRSA (2004, 3). 
In this process, the bank numbers decreased as can be seen in Table 11.2. 
7 The fulling concentration rate was especially due to the creation of new Turkish banks. 
As Denizer (2000, 11, 15-19) notes, foreign banks, operating in retail banking, had a minimal 
impact on the concentration rate. However, despite their small scales, they enhanced competition 
and reduced domestic bank profitability, Denizer indicates. 
8 However, with an amendment to Banks Act No.4672, merged banks were not allowed 
to control more than 20 percent of the total sector assets. 
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Table 11.2: Number of banks in Turkey (1980-2003) 
1980 1990 1994 1999 2001 2003 
Commercial Banks 31 54 55 62 46 36 
Public 8 7 6 4 3 3 
Private 19 25 29 31 22 18 
Foreign 4 22 20 19 15 13 
SDIF - - - 8 6 2 
Investment and 6 10 12 19 15 14 
Development Banks 
Public 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Private 2 4 6 13 9 8 
Foreign - 3 3 3 3 3 
Total 37 64 67 81 61 50 
Sources: Developed from BRSA (2002d, 2), BAT (2004, 19). 
There are now four-to-five large banks and another four-to-five banks trying to 
capture a higher share in multi-specialised banking. Two foreign banks, HSBC and 
Citibank, are also aiming to join the largest· players. Some 30-40 small-banks, on the 
other hand, operate in niche markets. 9 
11.3 Gradual Dissolution of the Independent Controls of Banks by the Dynamic 
Accumulators 
As Chapter 4 noted, Turkish conglomerates have used their control over banking 
capital to fuel their accumulation since the 1940s. Holding banking formed the basic 
channel for conglomerates to reap state subsidies. While enjoying privileges in accessing 
financial resources in a protected domestic financial system, the conglomerates faced 
change under the pressure of global competition. This was not only limited to the 
primitive accumulators which lost their banks. Crucially, the dynamic accumulators have 
also been experiencing the gradual dissolution of their independent control over banking 
to varying degrees and in different forms. This is the issue addressed here. 
Interestingly, prior to banking reform, the dynamic accumulators had started to 
criticise holding banking as an obstacle to M&As. They argued that the persistent attitude 
by the conglomerates to sustain their independent bank ownership precluded overall 
efficiency of the sector: 
9 See Tasas1z (2002, 32). 
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There are some banks whose financial structures do not fit the banking sector. These have 
caused a financial burden on the economy. The troubles given by the problematic banks 
should be ended. To this end, they must be either merged or liquidated ... Family banks 
have been an important factor preventing mergers in the sector so far. They do not accede 
with wide partnerships. Together with the falling inflation rate, the sector can lose its 
attractiveness and thus, the family banks could think more positively about mergers. 10 
(Para 1999, 62) · 
However, instead of domestic mergers, the dynamic accumulators have tended to 
maintain their independent ownership. This fact shows two things: Firstly, the 
aforementioned critique of holding banking by the dynamic accumulators was mainly 
aimed at the elimination of the primitive accumulators so that the former could then 
benefit from M&As. Secondly, it also suggests that the dynamic accumulators saw their 
independence in finance as crucial for their overall accumulation. This independence 
allowed them to keep synergy gains between finance and other sector activities within 
their conglomerates instead of sharing with rival Turkish conglomerates. 11 This may be a 
reason for why the dynamic accumulators, as this chapter will show, mostly prefer 
foreign partners to domestic ones as they need to establish alliances in finance under the 
pressure of global integration. 
Some dynamic accumulators preferred to acquire the SDIF-banks, while some 
others, having more than oile bank, merged their own banks. For others, a foreign partner 
was more attractive. Although only two of these attempts have reached fruition so far, it 
can be expected that this is the most likely future path to growth. After all the 
acquisitions of the SDIF-banks and the mergers among those banks with common owners 
10 Alev Gos:mez, General Director of Altematifbank; see also the statement by the Vice-
Executive of Denizbank, Fikret Arabac1 in Finansal Forum, 26 November 2000; and BAT (2000, 
6). 
11 Bank mergers with other conglomerates conflicted with the interests of bank owners. 
However, other cooperation mechanisms carne to the fore such as the common use of A TMs and 
POS terminals, strategic alliances and joint ventures. The Vice-General Director of Denizbank, 
Dins:er Alpman (Bayar 2003a, 59) complained that doing business separately eroded 
competitiveness in banking via higher costs; see also the statement by Garanti Bank General 
Director Ergun Ozen in Ozen (2002). 
It can be expected that with the ongoing contraction in profit margins for many banking 
products and services, further collaboration will be required in Turkish banking. Verifying this, 
for instance, Denizbank and Garanti Bank realised a first in Turkish banking by collaborating in 
credit card markets via the use of same credit card 'Bonus'. 
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are completed, the merger process is likely to continue between conglomerates as global 
competition pushes them more in this direction. 
Indeed, a second wave in the consolidation process is expected to start as falling 
profit margins and pressure for higher productivity will force voluntary mergers. 12 In 
particular, those banks which have a small credit and deposit base will find it difficult to 
increase their size and profitability. Therefore, while the number of banks will further fall, 
the dominance of large banks will rise along with an increase in the share of foreign 
banks. In addition, the number of niche banks is expected to rise to fill the spaces not 
covered by the large banks. 
11.4 Bank Restructuring within the First Division 
This group of banks includes !lie top-tiers of the sector: Akbank of Sabanc1 Group, 
i~bank of i~bank Group and Garanti Bank of Dogu~ Group. 13 Their solid position in 
banking parallels the higher levels of accumulation by the leading owner conglomerates, 
as Chapter 8 indicated. Ko~bank is also located within this division of banks as the 
banking arm of Turkey's leading conglomerate Ko~ Group. Despite its smaller scale 
before the reform, Ko~bank was successful in catching-up during the consolidation 
process and entered the first division. 
The first division of the dynamic accumulators are distinguished not only by their 
size, but also their operation in the internationalised circuit of capital. These leading 
conglomerates have a number of key characteristics: 
• They were already large enough to survive in a globally exposed market after 
the reform. 
• They began their restructuring in the 1990s, before the reform, and were 
mostly rationalised before the reform. 
12 See the statement by Garanti Bank General Director Ergun Ozen in Leven! (2003, 232). 
13 The YKB, which is among the top-tier banks, has a unique position. Despite not being 
seized, the bank had to change ownership as part of the protocol made between the BRSA and the 
owner C::ukurova Group after the seizure of other Group bank Pamukbank. As it lies between the 
dynamic and primitive accumulators' banks, the YKB is not included in the discussion of the 
dynamic accumulators' banks. 
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• They rationalised their banking artns to develop partnerships with large global 
banks. 
We discussed the first two characteristics in Chapter 8. Here, the third issue is discussed 
in detail. 
The first division's banks were already capable for keeping their leading positions 
by themselves. Hence, their tendency for collaboration with global financial capital 
derived from a strategy to be stronger rather than an immediate compulsion to which 
some other small-to-medium scale banks have been subjected during the consolidation 
process. They tend to utilise partnerships with foreign capital instead of domestic capital 
as a way to accelerate their transformation into global accumulators. 
The individual restructuring of these conglomerates preceded the state-managed 
reform of banking. This group of banks started their preparations from as early as 
beginning of the 1990s. In addition to the ongoing process of reducing non-financial 
equity participations by Akbank, i~bank, and Garanti Bank, (preparing for the day when 
inflation and interest rates subside), this group of banks as a whole has put greater 
emphasis on efficiency, developing new products and traditional lending along with 
extensive investments in technology. They also solidified their multi-specialist banking 
focus to keep their high rank positions. Also, as a preparation for foreign partnerships, the 
conglomerates reorganised their finance arms by merging their own banks and/or 
gathering financial companies under one roof of a financial group. 
In this restructuring process two characteristics particularly distinguish this 
division's banks: the sale of non-financial assets, and a tendency to enter into 
partnerships with foreign capital. These will now be addressed in turn. 
11.4.1 Sales of Non-Financial Equity Participations 
The early start of break-down of holding banking within the first division helped 
Akbank, Garanti Bank and i~bank to weather the storm during banking reform. 
Among the top-tiers, Akbank and Garanti Bank were distinguished by their 
orientation towards pure banking activities. These two banks foresaw the forthcoming 
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consolidation process and started their preparation in the mid-1990s. 14 For instance, 
Akbank sold off its non-financial equity participations to the Sabanc1 Holding Company 
between 1996 and 1998 (Soydan 1999, 132). The bank also reduced exposure to group 
companies well below the legal maximum. 15 The arms-length policy between banks and 
industrial companies was also implemented by Garanti Bank, 'the crown jewel of Dogu~ 
Group' (Barham & Field, 1997, 48). Having large investments in finance since the 1980s, 
the group solidified its position by transferring its non-financial equity participation to 
Dogu~ Holding and also taking over the financial equity holdings of Dogu~ Holding. 16 
This restructuring made Garanti Bank a financial supermarket in which all financial 
services were available. What drove this orientation was firstly the expectation that 
growth would be derived from the synergy between banking network and other financial 
as well as non-financial activities such as automotive, trading and retailing. 17 
Secondly, Akbank and Garariti Bank had a concern for bank profitability and 
competitiveness. Industrial subsidiaries were a burden and risk for banks, according to 
Erol Sabanc1, the Head of Board of Directors. of Akbank. 18 Given that even giant foreign 
banks focus on pure banking, Sabanc1 contended, banks should only engage with banking: 
'banks should not be partners in industrial companies. Akbank sold off all its industrial 
subsidiaries. Akbank does only banking'. 19 Euromoney (200lb) covered the success of 
Akbank as 'Top-performing Akbank mulls joint venture': 
During this time [since the 1960s] the government encouraged banks to invest in industry. 
Few matched the Sabanc1s' success. In the past two years nearly 20 stricken banks have 
been taken into government administration chiefly because shareholders illegally 
appropriated or unwisely invested their funds. Many other banks got saddled with 
cumbersome and unprofitable investments and find themselves as quasi-holding 
companies. 
14 See the statements by Suzan Sabanc1, Vice-General Director of Akbank in Y e~iloglu 
(1995, 142-143) and by Akin Ongor, Member of the Board of Directors of Garanti Bank, in 
Nurten Erk, "Ongor: Hizh Davramp Bankalan BogmaYJn", Hiirriyet, 12 February 2001. 
"See Milnir (1998); URL: 
http://www.akbank.com.tr/e/investor relations/to our shareholders.asp (accessed 11 November 
2002). 
16 
"Garanti, Dilnya Markas1 Olacak", Dilnya, 19 October 2001. 
17 See the statement by Ferit ~ahenk, in Ruhi Sanyer, "Kriz Boyun Egmeye B~ladJ", 
Radikal, 12 November 2001. 
18
· "I~tirakleri Satlik GeryekBanks Olduk'', Hiirriyet, 11 March 1999. 
19 Finansal Forum, 30 January 2002. 
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By contrast, Akbank funded many winners. In the 1990s all non-financial participation 
assets were sold and the profits ploughed into the capital. Today Akbank is the only pure 
bank play among the top five banks. "Akbank grew because Erol Sabanct always 
·ploughed the profits back into the family-owned bank," says Belli (an executive banker]. 
"He could have distributed it to the shareholders. He didn't." 
On the other hand, despite selling some subsidiaries in the 1990s, 20 i~bank 
needed to sell off more equity holdings during banking reform in order to adjust to new 
limits. 21 This sale process, part of the overall reorganisation within the conglomerate, 
started in 2002. The reorganisation included sales and mergers of some subsidiaries as 
well as public offerings of others in the stock exchange. In this process, the Group sold 
especially the subsidiaries which operated in non-strategic sectors and had been generally 
acquired in exchange for non-performing credits. While overhauling its sectoral 
diversification, i~bank Group invested in energy distribution and telecommunication. 
These investments aimed at benefiting from the synergy between banking and these 
future promising sectors in Turkey (as discussed in Chapter 8). 
i~bank acknowledges that the transition towards the Anglo-Saxon Model provides 
specialisation, transparency for shareholders and cash inflows to be invested in profitable 
banking activities. However, differing from Akbank and Garanti Bank, i~bank still sees 
equity investments in diversified sectors as profitable. Despite the reduced number of 
subsidiaries, the Group still continues to operate in various sectors. 22 
20 See Soydan (1999, 133) and Kocab~oglu et al. (2001, 605). . 
. 
21 Even though it was distinguished by its high number of subsidiaries among the large 
banks as ~bank General Director Ersin Ozince stressed, the bank conformed to the limits on 
connected lending and non-financial equity participations (see Ye~iloglu 2000a, 63-64; "Sorun 
Istemiyoruz", Yeni Binyil, 22 May 2000). 
The number of the bank's equity participations reduced to 80 at the end of 1999 and 57 in 
March 31, 2004 from 134 in 1980 
(URL: http://www.isbank.com.tr/ir/ir-comorate-participations.htrnl (accessed 8 June 2004); URL: 
http://www.isbank.com.tr/englishlnews004.html (accessed 8 June 2004). · 
The Group accelerated the sales of equity holdings after winning tenders in 
telecommunication and oil distribution (see "GSM'i Alan i~bankas1 Htzla ~tirak Sa!Iyor", 
HUrriyet, 22 April 2000; "~bank Accelerate Share Sales", Turkish Daily News, 22 April 2000, 
URL: htto://www.turkishdailvnews/old editions/04 22 00/econ.htrn#ell. 
22 i~bank General Director Ersin Ozince (Finans Diinyasi 2002, 23) stated that their 
mission in contributing to national capital formation will continue. Ozince especially stressed the 
importance of the continuity of national ownership in the glass industry for both the Group and 
Turkey. Also, according to Ozince (Y e~iloglu 2003a), non-financial equity participation will be 
more profitable given the lower profit expectations in Turkish banking than the other sectors in 
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11.4.2 The Tendency for Partnerships with Global Capital 
As the integration with global financial markets exposed the finance sector to 
rising competition, within this division of banks, there has been. a tendency for 
partnerships to be developed with advanced foreign banking capital. Their superior power 
in the domestic financial system allowed these top-tiers to follow such an expansion 
strategy (unlike the second and third divisions). These banks follow this strategy to 
solidify their existence in the domestic market as well as to facilitate their expansion into 
'ghb . . 23 nei ounng countries. 
For instance, Salap Sabanc1, the Head of Board of Directors of Sabanc1 Holding, 
(Poyraz 2000c, 33-40) indicated that Akbank preferred a partnership with one of the 
world leaders instead of acquiring the SDIF-banks or merging with another Turkish bank. 
This was expected to elevate the bank much more ·rapidly because, according to Sak1p 
SabanCI (Ala 2003a, 113- 116), even Akbank, which was known as 'one of the two 
strongest institutions together with the army', was small compared to global players. 
The sales of non-financial equity participation prepared Akbank for a foreign 
partnership as Erol Sabanc1 of Akbank stated: 'the time for bank partnerships came up. I 
prepared Akbank for this. I believe that the most attractive choice for foreign banks 
seeking to invest in Turkey is Akbank'. 24 
which !§bank's subsidiaries operate (see URL: http://www.tsbank.com.tr/ir/ir-comorate-
participations.html (accessed 8 June 2004) ). 
23 As an exception within this division, the !§bank Group does not have a tendency to 
establish foreign partnerships. Instead, as can be seen from Table 11.3, the bank preferred to 
merge its two investment banks, Smai Ya!Inm Bank and Turkiye Smai Kallanma Bank to create a 
stronger bank, besides selling its minority stakes in D1~bank. Despite being open to foreign 
partnerships or attractive acquisitions, !§bank General Director Ersin Ozince states that expansion 
via capturing a higher market share during the consolidation process is more preferable for them 
(see Ayfer Arslan, "Ozince: Hedefimiz, En Hakim Serrnaye Grubu ve Banka Olmak", Diinya, 26 
August 2002). 
24 
"Sabanc1' dan Yabanc1'ya Davet: En Cazibi Akbank'', Htlrriyet, 9 November 2001. 
However, Akbank has not made a deal yet and the rumour about the flirtation with 
Deutsche Bank did not tum to a partnership (see OztOrk 2001a, 78). According to Salap Sabanc1, 
they could not fmd a foreign partner because of the unstable political conditions and economic 
crises in Turkey and, to avoid cheap price proposals, they had to wait for a better conjunc1:Ilre 
("Akbank Gelinlik <;:a~da'', ~am, 4 December 2002; "Akbank'i Ucuza Vermem", Finansal 
Forum, I 0 September 2003). 
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Garanti Bank also followed the strategy of integration with foreign banking 
capital so it could compete globally. The aforementioned restructuring of the finance 
group was to be done because of rising competition by foreign banks in Turkey, Ferit 
Sahenk of Dogu~ Group indicated. 25 In the process, the Group merged its three banks 
(Garanti Bank, Osmanh Bank and Korfezbank) as a first step in getting a foreign partner 
(see Table 11.3). 26 Indeed, Dogu~ Group accelerated this merger process as the talks with 
Banca Intesa of Italy took longer than planned. 27 Although negotiations with Italy's 
Banca Intesa were restarted in 2004 (after previously-failed talks),28 these did not end up 
with a deal either. Garanti Bank is currently seeking a foreign partner as part of the 
bank's goal to become a regional bank covering Balkans, Turkic Republics, and Middle 
East (see Levent 2004a, 228, 232). 
Table 11.3 Intra-group bank mergers within the first division 
Conglomerate Merged Banks New Bank Year 
I~ bank Smai Yatirim T.Smai Kalkinma T. Smai 2002 
Bank Bank Kalkinma Bank 
Do~ Korfezbank OsmanhBank OsmanhBank 2001 
Dogu~ Osmanlt Bank Garanti Bank Garanti Bank 2001 
Source: Developed from BRSA (2003c, 53). 
The restructuring within the finance arm of the Dogu~ Group verified the leading 
roles of these conglomerates in influencing the state-managed change in finance. The 
following quotation from Ferit Sahenk of Dogu~ Group shows this well: 
25 Ruhi Sanyer, "Kriz Boyun Egmeye B~ladt", Radikal, 12 November 2001. 
26 In addition to the positive outcomes of the merger of three Group banks on overall 
group activities, Garanti Bank succeeded in increasing its market share and achieved sustainable 
efficiency, profitability and growth according to Ferit ~ahenk of Do~ Group (see "Garanti 
2002 'de Karhhga Yeniden Kavu~tu", ntvmsnbc newsportal, URL: 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/210416.asp?Om=S208, II April2003; "Garanti, Diinya Markasi 
Olacak", Diinya, 19 October 2001; ~elale Kadak, "Ferit ~ahenk: ibre iyi Giinleri Gosteriyor'', 
Sabah, 18 June 2003). 
27 Ruhi Sanyer, "Kriz Boyun Egmeye B~ladt", Radikal, 12 November 2001. 
28 It was argued that the reason for the failed talks was not the September 11 attack in the 
US, but the lack of authorization by the ttalian central bank, the Bank of Italy, for the partnership 
with Garanti Bank. Intesa first needed to improve its ratios by selling off its problematic bank in 
Brazil to be able to realize the planned partnership with Garanti Bank (Y e~iloglu 2003b, 160). 
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In 1998, we saw that Turkey could not live with inflation anymore; neither companies 
nor countries can be managed with an inflation-based thinking; in this trend, some 
temporary profits derived due to inflation are to disappear .... We decided that scale 
economies and productivity have become sine qua non for surviving in banking ... [after 
the initiated restructuring in Doli~!~ Group's financial sector companies since 1998] as the 
last stage of our strategic plan, there was the merger phase to be realised. We could have 
done this only after some legislative amendments. The previous stage of this restructuring, 
which was the creation of a joint management of human resources and technology for our 
banks, was the most important factor for the bank mergers. The last four years' works by 
the group will make it easier. .. [to merge the group banks]. We are also such a group 
which has made large investments in other financial companies apart from banking. We 
made these investments to be able to well respond to customer needs before these needs 
emerge after the end of the inflationary era. 29 
Other banks also, took steps to develop partnerships with global capital. To 
compensate its backwardness in finance, Ko~ Group merged its seven finance sector 
companies, including Ko~bank and its overseas· banks, under the umbrella of 'Ko~ 
Financial Services Company (Ko~ Finansal Hizmetler A.S.)'. Then, in 2002, Ko~ Group 
established the first foreign partnership with Unicredito Italiano. With this restructuring, 
Ko~bank became the sixth largest bank in three years and planned to be one of the top 
three largest banks in five years. To be able to eliminate the big step between Ko~bank 
and other four largest banks, 30 in January 2005, the Ko~-Unicredito joint venture 
purchased the YKB, the fifth-largest bank in the sector. The YKB, as part of the protocol 
made between <;:ukurova Group. and the BRSA, had to be sold by <;:ukurova Group by 
January 31 2005. 31 
Table 11.4 Foreign partnership within the first division 
ConeJometate Forei!!n Bank Joint Venture · Year 
Ko9 Unicredito Ko9 Financial 2002 
Services Company 
29 Press meeting byFerit ~ahenk, 18 October 2001, in URL: 
http://www.Doi!usholding.com.tr/savfu.cfrn?Menu=7l&N0=355&Sayfa=Haberler (accessed 28 
November 2002) (emphasis added). 
30 See the statement by Halil Ergur of Ko9bank in Tasas1z (2003, 92); Capital (2002a, 
49); Ye~iloglu & Tekinay (2002, 47). 31 Because of the seizure of Pamukbank, the owner <;:ukurova Group needed to sell its 
shares in the YKB and withdraw from banking as required by bank laws. For more details see 
· Ozeke (2005); "Yapt Kredi Bankast Ko9'un Oldu", ntvmsnc newsportal, 31 January 2005, URL: 
http://www.ntvmsnc.com/news/307306.asp ·. 
287 
In brief, the leading conglomerates tend to have foreign partners in order to 
survive in global financial markets as banking is an economies of scale industry. The 
rationalisation of their finance arms since the 1990s has prepared these conglomerates to 
this end. 
11.5 Bank Restructuring within the Second and Third Divisions 
Among the small-to-medium scale banks within the second and third divisions, 
the TEB, Altematifbank, Tekstilbank, Finansbank, GSD Bank and MNG Bank have 
remained a niche player position. On the other hand, Oyakbank, D1~bank, Denizbank, 
Anadolubank and Tekfenbank have followed an expansion strategy into the league of 
multi-specialised domestic banking. 
The banks of the second and third divisions displayed three characteristics in their 
restructurings. The first characteristic (which distinguishes them from the top-tiers) was 
that there was no need for the sale of industrial subsidiaries given the pure banking 
orientation of these banks. They strengthened this banking focus during the reform via 
the synergy pursuit with other sectoral activities. 
The second characteristic was that these small-to-medium scale banks followed a 
different way of restructuring in the M&A process. Whilst the first division pursued 
integration with global money capital, the second and third divisions strengthened their 
positions within FC via state-subsidised M&A process. For these banks, opportunities 
offered by the acquisition of the SDIF-banks and organic growth were still meaningful. 
Furthermore, acquisitions helped them not only to expand in banking, but also to enlarge 
their overall financial services groups. 32 
32 However, Anadolubank and Tekstilbank did not use acquisitions to expand. 
Anadolubank focused on corporate banking (especially on international trade linked to the owner 
Basaran Group's extensive foreign trade activities). It also started to extend into to retail and 
commercial banking via organic growth as another strategy to become a medium-scale bank (see 
Levent 2002a; Levent 2004b ). 
Tekstilbank, on the other hand, focused on corporate banking, (especia1ly export finance) 
in synergy with GSD Group's wide export activities. This bank emphasised that it would operate 
only in banking and would not have any other financial or non-financial subsidiaries (see Levent 
2002c). 
1. 
,, 
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The third characteristic of these divisions was the unsuccessful partnership 
attempts with global capital at the early stages of bank reform. Despite this group of 
banks wanting foreign partners, it was less feasible for them compared to the first-tiers. 
Therefore, they utilised the state-subsidised M&A process as a strategy to prepare for 
future partnerships. 
This section will take a closer look at the second and third characteristics of this 
group of banks. 
11.5.1 Acquisitions of the SDIF-banks 
As discussed in Chapter 10, the state managed the resolution process of the SDIF-
banks in a way that favoured the dynamic accumulators. The dynamic accumulators 
could purchase selected assets of the SDIF-banks as they preferred. For instance, banking 
reform offered a cheaper and easier growth opportunity for Denizbank which had sought 
to expand in domestic and external financial markets. Denizbank General Director Hakan 
Ate~ expressed his expectation from the M&A process as follows: 
There will be a space emptied by the eight [SDIF-] banks. Therefore, this space will be 
filled up by domestic and foreign groups which know how to do business well; are able to 
manage; are aware of and able to use technology; and have money. Honestly, we see 
ourselves confident among them. (Activeline 2000a, 5) 
As can be seen from Table 11.5, Denizbank acquired Tari~bank as well as particular 
branches, deposits and credit cards of other SDIF-banks. 33 
Table 11.5 Bank acquisitions within the second division 
Conglomerate Banks Subjected to Acquisition New Bank Year 
Zorlu Deniz bank Milli Aydin Bank Deniz bank 2002 
(Tari~bank) 
OYAK OyakBank Sumerbank OyakBank 2002 
Tekfen Tekfen Yatmm Bank Bank Ekspres TekfenBank 2001 
Sources: Developed from BRSA (2003c). 
33 See Activeline (2002c ). 
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During the sale of Tari~bank to Zorlu Group, the bank's real estate and non-
performing credits were left to the SDIF, while other commercial credits, securities and 
agricultural credits were transferred to the buyer. Since Zorlu Group did not pay the SDIF 
for the purchase, this was evaluated as a free transfer. This sale Jed to .a debate between 
Zorlu Group and the ex-owner of Tari~bank, Tari~ (the union of agricultural 
cooperatives). Tari~ noted the Joss to the state which had injected capital into Tari~bank 
before the sale and had taken over the bank's non-performing credits.34 In reply, Zorlu 
Group said that the injected capital into Denizbank (before the transfer of Tari~bank) had 
aimed to eliminate capital deficiency in Tari~bank. The conglomerate also stressed that 
with the transfer, the state had freed itself from losses that might have emerged if there 
were a liquidation of Tari~bank. 35 Whatever the merits of these arguments, the result was 
that the state offered a prize catch to Zorlu Group which thereby attained distinctively 
high financial ratios in Denizbank due· to this acquisition (see Demirci 2003a, 29). 
Similarly, Oyakbank of OY AK Group benefited from the acquisitions of 
Siimerbank and selected assets of other SDIF-Banks. By recognising that survival in the 
new era would require either being a large or being a niche player, OY AK Group chose 
to expand Oyakbank. 36 The state made these acquisitions more attractive by allowing the 
Group to choose which bank liabilities it wanted to take over. 37 
OY AK Group utilised acquisitions to accelerate its growth (Finans Dunyasz 2001, 
21). Having an existing branch network was the main reason for the acquisition of 
Siimerbank, which itself had merged with five seized banks (Siimerbank, Ya~arbank, 
Bank Kapital, Egebank, and Yurtbank). OY AK Group stated that it saved ten years of 
effort by acquiring Siimerbank: 'we had to acquire at the rate of 10 to 15 new branches 
34 See Necla Yihnaz, "Tari~bank, Denizbank ile Birlesiyor", Diinya, 26 October 2002. 
35 See ''Tari~bank Denizbank'a Devredildi", Milliyet, 24 October 2002; "Denizbank 
Tari~bank'1 Biinyesine Kattl", Radikal , 24 October 2002. 
36 See the statement by Co~kun Ulusoy, the General Director of OY AK Group "Turkiye 
OY AK'a Dar Geliyor", ~am, 23 November 2001. 
37 Yavuz Bar las of Cumhuriyet Daily indicated that during the sale of Sumerbank, as 
OY AK Group did not want to take over FX deposits because of currency risk, those deposits 
were transferred to other SDIF-banks, (Kentbank and Etibank) (see Yavuz Barlas, "Bonolar 
Mii~teri Kas;myor", Cumhuriyet, 12 October 2001). 
290 
per year, you would have needed ten years to create such a network which Siimerbank 
"d d fi ' 38 prov1 e or us. 
Other banks within the second and third divisions also benefited from similar 
subsidies. The investment bank Tekfenbank, achieved its long-term goal of converting to 
a commercial bank through the acquisition of Bank Express as well as benefiting from 
ownership of selected branches of other SDIF-banks. For D1~bank, which aimed to be a 
global player, chosen assets of the SDIF-banks provided the scale expansion it needed so 
it could be distinguished with its high CAR and profitability. 39 40 
Furthermore, these conglomerates not only expanded in banking, but they also 
accelerated their expansion in finance as a whole due to the state-subsidised M&A 
process. For example, OY AK and Zorlu Groups acquired financial subsidiaries of the 
SDIF-banks. In the case of Zorlu Group, acquisitions of leasing, factoring, investment 
brokerage companies, etc. served the strategic action plan of its financial services group 
to achieve the right scale domestically and interrtationally. 41 
The consolidation process also contributed to the expansion of international 
banking by these conglomerates. For example, Denizbank's purchases of overseas bank 
subsidiaries of the SDIF-banks served its expansion into Europe and Russia, its two target 
markets.42 
38 See the statement by Oner Caner of OY AK Group in Euromoney (200lc); also Yigit 
(2002, 44). 
39 See "DI§bank Citayi Yukseltecek'', Finansal Forum, 16 August 2002; Dt§bank also 
planned to acquire Toprakbank and public bank Vakifbank (see "Dt§bank: Satin Alip 
Buyuyebiliriz", Hiirriyet, 23 January 2002). 
40 Branches of Toprakbank were shared among DI§bank, Sekerbank, Tekstilbank, 
Finansbank, Anadolubank and the TEB (see "Toprakbank'in :;:ubelerine Nur Yagdt", Finanasal 
Forum, i3 October 2002). 
41 See the statement by Hakan Ate§ ofDenizbank in Dernirci (2003a, 28). 
42 The purchase of Denizbank AG in Holland and the acquisition of Esbank AG Vi en in 
Austria from the SDIF allowed Denizbank to set up its European arm. Denizbank also bought 
lktisat Bank in Russia from the SDIF by following Zorlu Group's expansion into the Russian 
market with the establishment of a TV factory (Demirci 2003a, 26). 
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11.5.2 Partnership Attempts with Global Capital 
In the early stages of bank reform, some of the small-to-medium scale banks 
sought partnerships with foreign banking capital. Some wanted to use this mechanism for 
growth and to attain the status of a 'top bank'; while others aimed to strengthen their 
niche player positions. Yet, all those talks failed given that the then prevalent crisis 
devalued bank assets and made such partnerships especially difficult (as in the cases of 
Finansbank, Alternatifbank and the TEB). 43 
Table 11.6 Foreign partnership within the second division 
Conl(lomerate Foreil(n Bank Joint Venture Year 
<;olakoglu BNPParibas TEB Mali 2005 
Yatirimlar . 
Table 11.7 Foreign acquisition within the third division 
Conglomerate Foreign Bank Acquired Year 
National Bank 
Dogan Fortis Dt~bank 2005 
However, since this group of banks needed domestic or foreign mergers to 
survive in global markets in the long run, they continued to search for partnerships with 
the assistance of state-subsidised acquisitions of the SDIF-banks. 44 As can be seen in 
Tables 11.6 and II. 7, two recent foreign purchases in this group of banks show that 
foreign M&As are underway for companies in the second and third divisions. 
In the case of the TEB, it originally had a partnership attempt with Citibank which 
considered the TEB because of its transparent relations with the owner <;olakoglu Group. 
45 This however was unsuccessful. Subsequently the TEB acquired selected assets of the 
SDIF-banks to strengthen its niche player position. Then, in February 2005, BNP Paribas 
43 See the statement by H:ilsnil Ozyegin, the Head of Finansbank Board of Directors, 
"Ozyegin: ilk ~ok Atlat!ldt", Finansal Forum, 2 April2003. See also footnote 53. 
44 ln spite of the failed attempts, they are still open to partnerships with domestic and 
foreign banks (see "Alternatifbank Ortakliga Acik", Finansal Forum, I April 2003; also the 
statement by Sinan ~ahinb~, General Director of Finansbank in "Finansbank: Birle~melere 
Aytgtz", ntvrnsnbc news portal, 23 March 2004, URL: 
http://www.ntvrnsnbc.com/news/262732.asp?Om=-24E). 
45 Kadife Sahin,"Alti Ay Icinde Evlenecekler", Milliyet, 25 December 2000. 
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acquired 50% of the financial holding company 'TEB Mali Yatmmlar' which, besides 
other financial subsidiaries, owned 84.25% of the publicly listed bank TEB (see Ozeke 
2005). 
Dogan Group had a different experience with foreign partne:rships. Originally 
Dogan Group had wanted to expand in banking, but the Group was well aware of its 
difficulty. Tayfun Beyazit, the Vice- Chairman and CEO of D1~bank had stated that· 
competition was getting fiercer. Therefore, not only organic growth but also growth by 
acquisition might become more of an issue: 
We wanted to become one of the leading retail banks of Turkey. At present, there are 
four large private and two large state banks in Turkey. Five to six banks are closely 
following those large banks. There is not much room for growth in this sector because 
almost all strategic positions are taken. We had to really work hard to reach our 
objective. 46 
Fortis of Netherland-Belgium purchased D1~bank from Dogan Group and became the 
largest foreign bank in Turkey. 47 Dogan Group is a· good example of the proposition 
made in Chapter 8: 'the third division of the dynamic accumulators forms the most 
vulnerable part ofFC and can be subjected to future takeovers'. 
There are some other still unresolved partnership attempts among this division 
of banks. For instance, Fiba Group aimed to be among the first three largest banks by 
developing a foreign partnership (Oztiirk 2001a, 79). However, the Group could not 
achieve this goal as the talks with French BNP Paribas did not reach an outcome. 4& 
Meanwhile, the Fiba Group restructured its banking arm by merging Finansbank with its 
smaller scale 'Fibabank' (see Table 11.8). This restructuring also covered other financial 
companies as well as non-financial subsidiaries of the group (the retailing franchises 
46
"Highlight ofthe Month", URL:http://doganholding.com.tr/newslhighlight3.asp 
(accessed 8 June 2004). 
47 See "Fortis, D1~bank'i Satin Aliyor", ntvmsnbc news portal, 12 April 2005, URL: 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/318489.asp?Om=-24D. 
48 The Group was also highly interested in the acquisition of Pamukbank which did not 
reach an outcome either (see "Finansbank'ta Hedef% 30 Bilyilme", ntvmsnbc news portal, 21 
January 2004, URL: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/253726.asp?Om=-16U). 
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Marx & Spencer and Gima) and had the goal of developing a synergy between retailing 
and finance. 49 
Table 11.8 Merger within the third division 
Conglomerate Banks Subjected to Merger New Bank Year 
Fib a Finansbank I Fibabank Finansbank 2003 
--
Sources: Developed from BRSA (2002 and 2003). 
The experience of Altematifbank was different yet again. Altematifbank had 
sought a foreign partner to strengthen its niche player position in corporate banking. As 
Altematifbank General Director Alev Go~mez stated, the restructuring of the bank was 
independent of the talks with Credit Agricole and, with or without a partner, it planned to 
become one of the top three wholesale banks. 50 Altematifbank withdrew from retail 
banking activities (which require scale-economies) by ending its individual credit and 
credit card businesses and by transferring its credit card customers to Finansbank (Para 
2002, 46). As a result of this specialisation, Altematifbank reduced its costs by 60%, 
contributing to the rise in bank's profitability. 51 
11.6 Foreign Banks as Part of the Consolidation of the Dynamic Accumulators 
Has this operation [the seizure of Pamukbank] been made to capture the banks of a 
Turk who has succeeded in the world league and to give these banks to foreign capital? 
Or has it been made to eliminate rotten Karamehmets [the owner of Pamukbank] from 
the system and to welcome solid Karamehmets? This is the main question ... that needs 
to be asked. 52 
49 See "Finansbank, Fiba'yt I~ine Ahyor", FinansalForum, 20 November 2002; URL: 
http://www.fibaholding.com.tr/e-p-:-gima.html (accessed 15 November 2002). Yet, in May 2005, 
Fiba Group sold its retailing subsidiaries Gima and Endi to the joint venture between Sabanc1 
Group and Carrefour. 
50 See NilgUn Kara~ "Abank, Frans1zlarla N1~am Bozdu", HUrriyet, 8 September 2002; 
"Abank, Kurumsalda Iddiali", Finansal Forum, 15 August 2002. 
51 Kenan ~anh, "AbankKurumsalda TasarrufYaptl", Finansal Forum, 24 March 2003. 
52 Necati Dogni, ''Karamehmet Ka~tl m1? Batt1 m1? Batnldt m1?'', Curnhuriyet, 22 June 
2002. 
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Here, the concern is for the role that foreign banks played in the reform process. 
This is key because the main objective of banking reform is the integration of Turkish 
finance and banking with global accumulation. The role that the foreign banks played in 
the reform supports this thesis' proposition that the driving agenda of ~anking reform is 
an accumulation agenda, but not a nationalist agenda. 
The Turkish state and the IMF hoped the restructuring of Turkey's weak banking 
sector would attract foreign investors. During the last decade, while foreign banks entered 
other countries which were passing through crises, they tended to either leave the Turkish 
market or operate with a limited capacity. 53 The low participation of foreign banks in 
Turkish banking can be seen from Table 11.9. It shows that the share of foreign banks' 
in the total balance sheet ofTurkish banking remained below 5% in the 1981-2001 period. 
Table 11.9 The size of balance sheets for the bank groups (1980-2001)% 
Period Private Banks State Banks Foreign Banks Development SDIF-
& Banks 
Investment 
Banks 
1981-1985 44.4 45.3 3.5 6.8 -
1986-1990 43.9 44.1 3.4 8.6 -
1991-1997 50.5 38.9 3.5 7.1 -
1998-2001 52.3 33.6 4.2 4.6 5.3 
Source: Kone (2003, 242). 
However, with the restructuring, foreign banks changed their perspective. They 
praised the steps taken to introduce higher transparency and supervision in the sector and 
they started to take up the market share left by the seized and privatised banks (see Table 
53 Originally there were several reasons why they avoided Turkey. Foreign banks 
complained about macroeconomic instability and short sightedness in the Turkish economy. They 
stressed the high market share of state banks and excessive price demands by Turkish baruc 
owners. Other discouraging factors were high bank transaction costs and the non-implementation 
of inflation accounting (which eroded banks' capital as inflationary profits were taxed) (see 
Belma Toprak, "Turkiye'deki Yabanct Bankalar Hem Umutlu Hem de ihtiyath", Dililya, 25 
October 1995; also see Tufan Karaagay "Tilrk Bankalan Kelepire Gitmek istemiyor", Finansal 
Forum, 9 April2001). 
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. 11.1) 54 In the entry of foreign banks, the SDIF involved the state 
'repackaging '/'reconditioning' Fund-banks to attract globally mobile capital. Some 
foreign banks entered via partnerships with Turkish banks. As indicated above, 
Unicredito and BNP Paribas made deals with Ko9bank and the TEB r~spectively. Some 
others chose individual initiatives to enter Turkish banking. Banco Comercial Portuguese 
acquired Sitebank (via Novabank, its subsidiary bank in Greece), and Fortis purchased 
Dt~bank. On the other hand, of the existing players, some pursued expansion while others 
continued to be niche players. 55 Among these, I{SBC and Citibank have expanded to be 
among the top-tier banks in the sector. HSBC acquired Demirbank with whom it had 
partnership talks before its seizure. 56 Also, after searching for a partnership or an 
acquisition, Citibank based its expansion on organic growth (see Oztiirk 2000b, 74) 
Table 11.10 Foreign banks in the consolidation process 
Partnership 
National Bank Foreign Bank Year 
Koybank Unicredito 2002 
TEB BNP Paribas 2005 
Acquisition 
National Bank Foreign Bank New Bank Year 
Site bank Banco Comercial BankEuropa 2002 Portuguese~ovabank) 
Dt~bank Fortis Dt~bank 2005 
Demirbank HSBCBank Demirbank 2001 
Organic Growth 
Citibank I 
54 For example, Unicredito pointed out the IMF-supported restructure of banking was the 
most encouraging factor for their choosing to invest in Turkey (Oztiirk 2002e, 62). Also, Italy's 
San Paulo IMI praised the three-stage-audit of the sector by the BRSA because the audit revealed 
the real situation of the banks for foreign banks (see <;mk 2002, 37-38). 
55 Such as JP Morgan Chase, CSFB, WLB, BNP-Ak, ABN Amro, ING Bank, Arabic-
Turkish Bank, Credit Lyonnais, Bank Mellat and Habib Bank 
56 In. addition, HSBC took over Benkar Tuketici Finansmani ve Kart Hizmetleri (Benkar 
Consumer Finance and Card Services) Company from the Boyner Group in 2002 as a part of its 
expansion into retail banking. 
l 
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The BRSA estimated that the banking sector might reach an asset size of US$ 500 
bn of which 20-25% might belong to foreign banks. 57 The rising entry of foreign banks in 
Turkish banking triggered a concern for the foreign invasion of national banking and the 
adverse impacts of this invasion on the Turkish economy. For instance, during the 
assembly debates on the draft banking law, Mehmet <;i9ek, Deputy of Yozgat City, 
(TGNA 2001c, 27) argued: 'national capital is being destroyed, ... the nation-state is being 
dismantled and our country is being left to the management of global corporations'. 58 
The primitive accumulators 59 and nationalist scholars also attributed bank seizures to the 
interest of foreign capital in the Turkish banking market. It was contended that the IMF, 
which acted under the instructions of foreign large corporations, led some countries (such 
as Argentina and Indonesia) to economic crises which facilitated acquisitions of national 
banks by foreign banks. Moreover, foreign capital tried to penetrate into strategic energy 
and telecommunication sectors to be able to control those countries. It was argued that 
the same scenario was put into effect in the Turkish case. 
However, in the Turkish case, rival conglomerates also supported the bank 
seizu~.:es in order to capture higher market shares. For example, with the seizure of 
Pamukbank, foreign capital, large Turkish conglomerates and Turkish politicians 
collaborated to stop the rapid rise of the owner <;ukurova Group which operated in those 
three strategic sectors. Accordingly, Turkel Minib~ of Istanbul University 60 argued that 
some large capitals already established partnerships with global capital and other parts of 
'national capital' had been put into a process of being acquired by foreign capital. The 
acquisition by foreign capital would continue until national capital in all sectors, from 
57 ·"Ke~ke reel sektore para aktarabilseydik", Sabah, 3 May 2002. 
58 See also parliamentary speeches by Deputies of the Virtue Party: Asian Polat (TGNA 
2001c, 20); Nevzat Yalcintas (TGNA 2001c, 39); Veysel Candan (TGNA 2001c, 43); Mehmet 
Ali ~ahin (TGNA 2001c, 69); also, Oguz Tezmen of True Path Party (TGNA 2001c, 18). 
59 For instance, ~am Daily of <;ukurova Group dealt with the issue in this line (see the 
serial by Tuncay Mollavesioglu: "BDDK'da Akbaba Kriterleri", 24 September 2002; "Namludaki 
Yeni Hedef: Pamukbank", 25 September 2002; "IMF Istiyor Sirketler Satiliyor", 26 September 
2002; "IMF-BDDK Gercegi", 27 September 2002). 
60 Turkel Minibas, "Kapitalizmin Altin Golu", Cumhuriyet, 24 June 2002. 
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industry to mining, from telecommunication to media, might be replaced by foreign 
capital. 61 
The dynamic accumulators needed foreign banking capital to achieve global 
competitiveness and, as indicated above, many of them had talks with foreign banks to 
this end. They expected to increase their capital adequacies, benefit from new business 
opportunities as well as reduce costs through such partnerships. Crucially, of the small-
to-medium scale banks, the ones which· could not find a foreign partner might be destined 
to be either niche players or eliminated under rising competition (Cmk 2001b, 85). Thus, 
they tried to avoid such an end through foreign partnerships. The issue is that different 
parts of the dynamic accumulators are differentiated by their different circuits of capital, 
with different forms of relationship with foreign banks. 
In contrast to the aforementioned concern for foreign acquisition of Turkish banks, 
the top-tier banks of the first division supported the entry of foreign banks as they sought 
to base their expansion on partnerships with global capital. Garanti Bank General 
Director Ergun Ozen stated that the main objective was to build a healthy banking sector: 
'if this could happen with foreign banks, let it be with them' (Bekar 2002, 63). 62 Ferit 
~ahenk of Dogu~ Group contended that needed capital should come from abroad because 
of capital deficiency in Turkey. The entry of foreign capital into Turkish banking was a 
natural outcome of Turkey being a globalising economy. 63 The top-tier banks did not 
have fear from foreign acquisitions. 
Foreign bank entry was treated cautiously by the small-to medium scale banks of 
the second and third divisions. These divisions acknowledged the need for capital growth 
in banking. But they also needed state subsidies vis-a-vis foreign competition. For 
instance, Denizbank General Director Hakan Ate~ claimed that Turkey should reform the 
banking system by allowing foreign investors' participation, but the state should also 
61 From the same standpoint, Necati Dogru of Cumhuriyet Daily drew attention to 
Demirbank and Garanti Bank which offered a catch prize for international banks as banks' stakes 
were substantially devalued during the financial crises (see Necati Dogru, "Ibis Sevincler, Hoduk 
Analizler", Cumhuriyet, 23 July 2001; Necati Dogru, "Turkiye Diz Cokmus Banka Satiyor", 
Cumhuriyet, 21 July 2001). 
62 See also the speech by Ersin Ozince of i§bank: and HaYti <;ulhact of Akbank, "ODTU 
Bankacthk Konferansmda Stkt Denetimin 6nemine I~aret Edildi", Cumhuriyet, 4 December 2001. 
63 
''Bankac1hkta Yabanc1.Pa)'l %40'a <;1kab1hr", 21 April 2005, ntvmsnbc news portal, 
URL: http://wwww.ntvmsnbc.com/news/320198.asp. 
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support national banking. Ate~ stated that 'isolation from foreign capital means being 
· identical with a Third World country, a marginal country'. However, Ate~ stressed, the 
important issue was how great a share foreign banks would get from the Turkish banking 
system.64 
Even though banks within the second and third divisions were nurtured by the 
state-subsidised consolidation process and observed that there had been few foreign bank 
entry,65 they still saw themselves in the 'danger' zone. For example, Tekfenbank General 
Director Mehmet Erten (Demirci 2003b, 153) stated that foreign banks, which mostly 
focused on investment banking, could come to Turkey to be established players in the 
future. In time, Erten added, competition might put more pressure on small-to-medium 
scale banks like Tekfenbank than large banks. Therefore, according to the President of 
Tekfen Holding Erhan Oner, Tekfenbank would need to get a foreign partner in the future 
as the only way to expand its scale even if the bank is not attractive with its small scale 
for a partnership (see Tekinay 2004b, 80). 
Also, the TUSIAD (2000), the primary pressure group of large conglomerates, 
emphasised the possibility of foreign banks' dominance in the banking system following 
the IMF stabilisation program. They draw an analogy with the cases of Brazil and 
Argentina. The Association indicated the necessity of leading the restructuring of the 
financial system in a way that banks' capital adequacy could be strengthened and banks 
gain competitiveness in the medium-term: 
64 According to Ate~, national banking should be protected because national banks will 
support S:MEs more. Also, prices for bank assets were undervalued during the fmancial crises. 
Ate~ stressed: 'banks are the armies of their country in time of peace and they come to the fore in 
fmancing their army in time of wars' (see Finansal Forum, 25 June 2002; "Denizbank'tan 70.1 
Trilyon Zarar", Hiirriyet, 24 June 2002; Activeline 2002c). 
65 Despite the advantages of the Turkish market, the level of foreign participation has 
remained· for three reasons. Firstly, foreign banks have tended to wait until the current economic 
uncertainty ends. In spite of some progress, relatively high inflation rates associated with 
macroeconomic volatility and continuous adverse affects of crises on corporate sector have 
discouraged them. Secondly, foreign banks are concerned about high price sought for banks. 
Devalued bank assets during the 2000 and 2001 fmancial crises made Turkish banks more 
attractive for partnership. However, as Turkish bank owners did not want to sell their stakes 
cheaply, most talks failed. Thirdly, talks were also blocked when Turkish banks wanted to 
include their subsidiaries in the sale deals of banks. As a result, despite a few initial significant 
entries, foreign banks seemed to prefer a 'cautious nibbling' rather than a huge wave of interest. 
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To prevent a loss of market share by national banks through bankruptcies, eliminations 
and contractions and filling-up this gap by foreign banks and therefore, to avoid an 
erosion of national industry, bank mergers should be encouraged; unfair taxes and other 
liabilities must be reduced (TUSIAD 2000, 4). 
The state, on the other hand, .retained a nationalist agenda. It wanted foreign banks 
to enter, but not to eradicate Turkish banks. Its agenda was mergers and partnerships 
more than outright acquisition. Therefore, the state subsidised the banks' transition period 
to make them viable and competent in global markets. It also tried to force bank owners 
to inject more capital to their banks during the bank recapitalisation stage of the reform in 
2001 onwards. The following statement by the State Minister Kemal Dervi~ reflects this 
approach very well: 
We are not against foreign capital. Indeed, we try to encourage it. However, instead of a 
foreign acquisition of the whole "banking system, we prefer its remaining with Turkish 
capital. We do this contribution [the capital injection operation] partially because of this 
reason. Foreigners can be considered as a last solution. Such examples were witnessed all 
around the world. In some countries, banks were acquired by foreign capital with very 
cheap prices.66 
The critical point is that to reconstruct FC as viable in global banking, the state 
both facilitated the entry of foreign banks and at the same time, subsidised the dynamic 
accumulators, in various ways to ensure their continuance. That is why the Head of the 
BRSA, Engin Ak9akoca indicated adverse effects of 2000 and 2001 financial crises on 
banks' capitals and stressed the difficulty in increasing banks' own funds because of 
capital shortages. However, despite the need for global capital, he expected that the 
shares of foreign banks might rise up to · 20-25% of the sector. Hence, Ak9akoca 
disagreed that the sector might be dominated by foreign banks. 67 68 The following 
66 ''Dervi~'in rtizgan bile yetti", Radikal, 6 July 2002. 
67 
"Ak9akoca: Bankacthkta Yabanct Tekeli Olmaz", Hiirriyet, 13 November 2001. 
68 Indeed, as foreign banks' participation has remained well below the expectations, the 
dynamic accumulators started to state that other resources had to be channelled in order to meet 
the capital need in the sector. For instance, 4bank General Director Ersin Ozince (Finans 
Dunyasz 2002, 20-21) claimed that Turkey might not be able to attract foreign capital in a large 
scale since Turkish banking was risky with its ongoing meditation process. According to Ozince, 
, the way of developing Turkish banking is neither domestic mergers nor foreign capital. The only 
way is the elimination of the large scale unrecorded economy and needed resources lie down 
there. 
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explanation by Ak9akoca shows that the BRSA saw global capital as a source for 
strengthening the dynamic accumulators: 
Being strong is more important than everything else. If mergers are necessary for strength, 
then we say "merge". If finding new partners, foreign partners is necessary then get them. 
We say that working productively, making profit is important. Only through this way can 
a banking sector that fits to a powerful economy be achieved. These are our expectations 
from the sector. 69 
The second and third divisions of the dynamic accumulators also saw advantages 
with the arrival of foreign banks because of the increase in capital they could bring to 
Turkey. The CEO of Dt~bank said: 
When we consider Turkey, it's clear that we lack capital resources. In the banking sector, 
the strength and sufficiency of capital resources have vital importance. We can overcome 
this problem by attracting local ~d foreign investors to this sector. There is a great need 
for foreign investors. When we look at the market share of foreign banks, we see that it is 
below 1%. Therefore it is meaningless to ask to ourselves whether foreign banks have 
seized the sector. Besides, I believe we can attract the increasing interest of local 
investors as long as banking is profitable. 
In summary, the strength of capital structure is a "must". To be able ta compete in the 
international arena, this sector needs to be supported by capital. When this is met, the 
banking sector will accelerate and support manufacturing and service industries. This is 
the only way to get out of this vicious circle. 70 71 
In brief, the Turkish state managed the integration of Turkish FC with global 
capital by supporting the existence of 'national banking'. In fractional terms this means 
that the state has overseen the interests of the dynamic accumulators while facilitating 
their global advancement. At this point, a nationalist dimension comes in. But, the 
utilisation of global capital to strengthen the dynamic accumulators is a process which 
itself blurs the distinction between the national and the foreign. Foreign banks become 
part of the rationalisation of Turkish banking in line with global imperatives·by forming 
69 Diinya, 24 July 2002. 
70 Tayfun Beyazit, the CEO ofDt~bank, indicated ("Highlight of the Month", URL: 
http://www.doganholding.com.tr/newslhighlight3.asp (accessed 8 June 2004). 
71 The dynamic accumulators pointed out that with rising shares of foreign banks, 
competition would become more serious and 'both the sector and the country would win' (See the 
statement by Yavuz Canevi, Head of the Board of Directors of the TEB, "Canevi: Birlesmeler 
Kapimiza Geldi", ntvmsnbc news portal, 29 March 2004, URL: 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/263528.asp?Om=S2CU ). 
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the channels for the dynamic accumulators in respecifying their forms of global 
integration. 
11.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed that, in contrast to the argument of deregulation of 
finance and a shift to a market economy, the state (and the IMF) systematically 
constructed a viable, globally integrated banking sector. They nominated which parts of 
capital were capable of competing in global financial markets and used a range of policy 
measures to help the dynamic accumulators to build their different forms of global 
integration. It was not 'a free market solution'. 
The participation of the dynamic accumulators in the consolidation process 
displayed distinctive characteristics among its divisions. The large banks of the first 
division solidified their dominance as they captured higher market shares due to their 
high credibility. The ones having more than one banks merged their banks, Foreign 
partnerships were feasible as well as attractive strategies to elevate their banks globally. 
On the other hand, within the second and third divisions, while some of the small-
to-medium scale banks adopted an expansion strategy with the goal of entering the first 
league, others either tended to maintain their positions or shrink in order to be niche 
players. For the ones choosin~ expansion, M&As offered quick growth and higher market 
shares. The acquisition of seized banks and/or their selected assets formed the basic 
channel for these banks. Today they are subject to further M&As, particularly with 
foreign banks. 
None of these processes, in any of the divisions, could have occurred without 
systematic state subsidies designed to achieve policy outcomes. This chapter has shown 
how the state subsidised acquisition of the SDIF-banks, mergers among banks with 
common owners, organic growth as well as partnerships with foreign banks in order to 
create economies of scale and/or increase capital adequacy. These subsidies appear to be 
ongoing as the state seeks to balance the forces of global competitiveness with the 
nationalist desire to see the 'Turkish' label continue to be tied to leading batiks operating 
within country. 
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Restructuring in Turkish capitalism is a process of the fragmentation of a discrete 
national economy (in banking and in general) and the integration into global economy. In 
this process what is foreign and what is local gets blur. Foreign banks are not external, 
but are part of channels down in which the dynamic accumulators are .reintegrating into 
global accumulation. They have been merging in a seamless way with the dynamic 
accumulators. 
12.1 Summary 
12.2 Implications 
12.1 Summary 
CHAPTER12 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has utilised a class fractionalist approach in order to explain a 
historical process. This has permitted a different interpretation of state intervention in the 
Turkish banking industry which is not addressed by the mainstream schools of political 
economy. 
Bank restructuring in Turkey has been widely interpreted in terms of the 
emergence of a free market agenda. The nee-liberals have cast it as the promotion of 
market. The nationalists see it in terms of an IMF-imposed agenda of neo-liberalism. 
Either way, it is posed as a market process. It has been that, but not in the sense 
understood by either the nationalists or the neo-liberals. The objective of bank 
restructuring was not simply to assert market criteria, but to achieve particular outcomes: 
the global integration of Turkish banking. Models of perfect competition had nothing to 
do with it. On the contrary, it was ~bout state (and IMF) intervention in the reform 
process to manage the contradictory interests within Turkish capital. This management 
was not an ad-hoc series of policies that stumbled towards some political compromise, 
but a concerted, systematic set of interventions to rationalise capital. 
The logic of state policies has been traced back to the contradictory interests 
within Turkish capital that arose from within the capital accumulation process. The 
analysis showed that the change process was rooted in the specific needs of certain 
fractions of capital in Turkey rather than being originated in inefficient state policies or 
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imposed by foreign capital and its international institutions. Those fractions needed the 
state to further their articulation with global capital Therefore, the state managed the 
shift in the form of accumulation while at the same time ensuring stable decline for 
capitals judged incapable of making the transition towards global integration. It was seen 
that Marxist theories of accumulation have the ability to explain this rather complex 
process. 
In ·building this analysis, this thesis has developed both the theoretical principals 
of the relationship between state and capital in the process of global integration, and 
detailed empirical developments in both state policy and bank restructuring. 
The theoretical debates on the relationship between the nation state and 
globalisation are reviewed in Chapter 2. In particular, the focus of analysis was both 
theories of how the state is transformed by globalisation, and the question of whether 
nations could be said to occupy certain positions in a structured global economy. In 
particular, the concern was to show theoretically that the nationalist conception of Turkey 
as a peripheral social formation fails to recognise that particular capitals in Turkey, 
especially the leading banking conglomerates, cannot be so depicted, and the Turkish 
state has been central in advancing their global accumulation. 
The thesis' empirical analysis is preceded in Chapter 3 by an overview of 
standard approaches to the state intervention in the Turkish banking reform. The reform 
was generally explained in terms of the state's restoring macroeconomic balances and 
increasing prudential supervision. Keynesian scholars, who called on the state to regulate 
chaotic market forces, linked the fragility in banking to previous period's 'wrong' state 
policies. For many, these policies were assumed to be externally imposed and in conflict 
with national interest. On the other hand, orthodox economists explained the refonil as 
removing state-based distortions in banking. The alternative position advanced in this 
chapter showed the state steering the reform of banking. The thesis argued that 
contradictions within Turkish capital (in general) and within FC (in particular) gave the 
material basis for the bank restructuring. 
Chapter 4 presents a historical analysis of the integration of banking and industrial 
capital in Turkey. As the financial sector has for most of the 20th century been dominated 
by diversified industrial conglomerates, the analysis of banking reform could not treat 
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banking institutions in isolation. If restructuring is to be seen in terms of accumulation by 
finance capital, it is the relation between bank and non-bank components of these 
conglomerates that proves critical. The focus on fractions of capital, as the key to 
understanding the tensions of bank restructuring, is based precisely on this recognition 
that banking in Turkey was part of disparate and incompatible processes of capital 
accumulation. 
It is demonstrated in Chapter 5 that, given the ownership of banks by 
conglomerates, the state intervention in Turkish banking revealed a more comprehensive 
reorganisation within Turkish capital and its forms of accumulation. The reform by the 
IMF and the state were essentially about identifying those banks with potential for global 
accumulation, and eliminating those without this potential. The reform supported the 
hegemonic fraction within FC to unburden it from the costs of the old regime and to 
facilitate its further intemationalisation. The state intervention also met the needs of 
productive/commercial capital which was in a disadvantageous position in the old regime 
and demanded from the state to restore the conditions for capital accumulation. 
Therefore, rather than being seen as imposed by foreign capital or by the IMF, the 
reform process should be seen as responding to the needs of certain fractions of Turkish 
capitaL The dominant fractions saw that they needed to integrate with global 
accumulation on the basis of productive capital formation and to forego state finance 
protectionism which had redistributed surplus value towards themselves, but was no 
longer sustainable. 
Hence, the reorientation in accumulation towards global competitiveness is used 
in Chapter 6 to explain why the state and the IMF used the broader criteria than bank 
treasuries to distinguish which conglomerates would keep and which would lose their 
banks. This, then, provided the broader context for the analysis of divisions within FC 
over banking reform. 
Chapter 6 develops an analytical framework to identify the divisions within FC. It 
is argued that it is not banks' scale, age or origin of ownership, but positions in relation to 
overall accumulation strategies of their conglomerates that defined the divisions within 
banking. Initially, the thesis has developed a division between 'winner' accumulation 
processes (called dynamic accumulators) and 'loser' P!Ocesses (called primitive 
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accumulators). But in the following two chapters, this duality is subdivided into more 
diverse and specific patterns of accumulation. Using this framework, Chapters 7 and 8 
demonstrated the characteristics of the dynamic and primitive accumulators. 
The primitive accu~ulators, who were excluded from finance, are discussed in 
Chapter 7. These conglomerates were defined as mainly reliant on state-based financial 
rents with a long-run unviable accumulation basis. As they did not have the capacity to 
accumulate competitively in the new era, they were excluded from FC by the reform 
process. 
In Chapter 8 the characteristics of the dynamic accumulators are identified. They 
are distinguished by their capacity to accumulate in globally integrated markets 
competitively and without on-going state subsidies. Most notably, these dynamic 
accumulators can be said to have led the restructuring process, with the state as enforcer 
. . 
of their initiatives·, and eliminating the burden of the banking sector as a whole that would 
have come with the survival of.the primitive accumulators. The state (and the IMF)-
removed the obstacles for their individual restructurings. For the dynamic accumulators, 
the pursuit for further intemationalisation derived from both a necessity and astute 
accumulation. 
It also depended on state legislation to secure its hegemony. Chapter 9 identifies 
the state legislative changes which rearranged relations of equity share and connected 
lending between banks and the owner conglomerates. The new codes served the 
adjustment of the conditions of domestic accumulation to global standards of capital. 
Conversely, the state also had to oversee the organised demise of the primitive 
accumulators. Chapter 10 identifies the state policy of bank seizures and the resolution of 
the SDIF-banks. The analysis shows that the state managed the bank rationalisation 
process to consolidate the dynamic accumulators while allowing a mollified elimination 
of the primitive accumulators from finance. The state broke down the primitive 
accumulators in order to make the dynamic accumulators competitive in the global league. 
Chapter 11 shows the culmination of the history of banking reform. It reveals as 
not a process of bringing 'free market' principles to Turkish banking, but as a process of 
the relation between the state and the hegemonic part of capital. The state has used a 
range of policy measures to subsidise the dynamic accumulators to build global 
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integration and acquire global competitiveness. In this context, the role of foreign banks 
is not, as the nationalists have argued, a case of foreign domination, but of building a 
foundation for dynamic accumulators, in concert with these foreign banks, to participate 
in the globally most advanced sites of accumulation. 
12.2 Implications 
This thesis should not be read as a comprehensive review of all facets of Turkish 
banking: a range of issues to do with details of prudential supervision and changing bank 
services, for example, are beyond the scope of its framework. Nonetheless, there is a 
range of ramifications which can be seen to follow form its analysis. Broadly, these are 
identified in terms of nation, state and .class issues. 
Nationalism 
This thesis started, in its theoretical framework, with a critique of economic 
nationalism. As the analysis of banking reform has been explored, it is apparent that the 
nationalist view obstructs a systematic study of the change process by attributing the 
transition to a foreign force (the IMP, the NIDL, foreign capital, etc.). This view fails to 
engage the relationships and conflicts between different parts of capital within Turkey, or 
the way in which some parts of capital in Turkey were actively seeking to internationalise 
their own accumulation, and to the changing economic role of the Turkish state in the 
context of these divisions. 
No doubt there is a danger of analytical circularity - that the theoretical 
opposition to nationalism is verified in historical analysis because of the sorts of 
questions asked of the reform process (and, indeed that nationalist theory will generate 
nationalist historical analysis). But it can be claimed that this thesis has done more than 
reproduce an analytical circularity. By challenging the notion that Turkey as an economic 
entity occupies a particular and singular position in the global econoiny, the thesis has 
opened up the global context of different patterns of accumulation by different parts of 
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Turkish capital. All the details of the reform process presented in this thesis have 
confirmed this, and so justify the conceptual starting point. 
In this context, the role of the IMF is significant. While many see the role of the 
IMF as locking Turkey into a fixed position in the structure of the glo'!Jal economy, this 
thesis has cast the IMF in a much more subtle, detailed and effective role. The IMF knew 
that foreign banks understand 'real' accumulation and their entry would guarantee the 
reforms that it pursued. In other words, the IMF preferred foreign, established banks to 
lead the way and their nationality was entirely secondary to their structural role as 
effective accumulators. Hence, the objective was to form national banking capital that 
was globally competitive and foreign banks were welcome to contribute to this end. 
There may well be a nationalist dimension here, but the nationalist interpretation 
contending that the IMF wanted foreign banks to replace with national banks is not 
credible. The IMF might want foreigil banks - not because of their foreignness per se, 
but because of how they accumulate, and the uncertainty of the capacity of the older 
Turkish banks to peiform in the global market without sate support. If there were 
guarantees that Turkish banks could instantly be reformed to operate in the same mode as 
these foreign banks, then the foreign banks would not be necessary. 1 The argument that 
banking reform aimed to facilitate new markets. for foreign banks by replacing them with 
national banks disregarded that the reform facilitated global expansion of some parts of 
Turkish capital. 2 The agenda of capital is the driving force of the change. 
The State 
From one specific study, · one cannot make sweeping generalisations about 
theoretical debates - except, no doubt, that this study seems to contradi~t any notion that 
globalisation is about the disempowerment of the state, and to confirm approaches to the 
state that emphasise its role in the mediation of fractions of capital. In the analysis of the 
nation state, the decisive question is which fractions of capital and which forms of 
1 The potential for foreign bank entries provided a tool for the state and the IMF "to 
educate" the Turkish banks in their restructurings in line with the requirements ·of global 
competition. For instance, see the statement by the Vice-Executive of the CBT, ~iikrii Binay, in 
"Aba Altmdan Sopa", Aksam, 15 June 2001. 
2 See the statement by the State Minister Kemal Dervi~ in TGNA (200lc, 23). 
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internationalisation that particular state interventions promote (Bryan 1987, 274). The 
agenda of national governments is at present dominated by the requirements of an 
increasingly transnational business sector. The contemporary state does not simply 
reconcile conflicting interests at home in order to define and promote a national interest, 
but rather promotes a complex hierarchy of sectional interests, including those of foreign-
owned enterprises (Radice 2001, 13). Those who accumulate (or seek to accumulate) 
transnationally demand state regulations which provide a base for the intertwined 
relationships between capitals at the world scale; at the same time, these capitals compete 
to affect state policies in order to increase their competitiveness (Ercan 2003b). Cerny's 
stress on the transformation of the state from the national Industrial Welfare State to the 
Competition State addresses this issue (Cerny 1997). In this process, the establishment of 
new, common forms of regulations by nation states minimises the risks for capital and 
provides the institutionalisation of capital at the global scale (Ercan 2003d). 3 
In the current era, it has been observed in many contexts that conflicts between 
fractions of capital are 'resolved' (at least in a temporary way) on behalf of the agenda of 
global accumulation. Indeed, this could be understood as 'neo-liberalism in operation'. 
Yet everyone, even those fractions, needs to be transformed in line with the requirements 
of global competitiveness. The ongoing restructuring in Turkish capitalism secures the 
consistency of conditions for accumulation with international conditions of profitability. 
This observation on Turkey was also made in other country contexts such as in Australia 
by Bryan and Rafferty (1999, 40) who argued that 'globalisation forces individual 
companies to shape up to international standards on technology, costs, design, service 
and profitability, and the capacity to secure state protection from meeting these standards 
is diminishing'. As capital is being globalised, it is an expected outcome to find the same 
imperatives in different time horizons, cropping out different parts of the world. 
Marxist analysis of the capitalist state needs to approach to the change process as 
an open-ended one. As Panitch (1994, 67), drawing on Poulantzas, reminds us, the 
internationalisation of capital does not automatically lead to an establishment of a 
3 Radice (1999, 8) calls thisprocess as the rising dominance of'Anglo-Saxon' capitalism, 
and the gradual erosion or (as in the Soviet case} abrupt disappearance of all alternative economic 
systems. 
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supranational state. Also, rather than capital's attempting to mobilise a supranational 
form of political authority while reducing power of nation states, it has been observed 
that the multi-layered gove~ance of world capitalism- supranational, national, and local 
- collaboratively manage the complex reproduction of social relations of capital in an 
extended geographical space. 
The important point to emphasize is that domestic accumulation is not outside the 
global process of accumulation but i_ntegral to it, the mediative function of the state will 
be seen to include domestic as well as foreign capital. On this ground, the thesis showed 
that the involvement of the IMF in particular restructurings does not overrule the nation 
state, but reinforces the ongoing importance of the nationality of state. The nation state is 
part of the organisation of global capital. As the tendency for capital is to expand globally, 
the organising capacity of nation state remains a major area of ongoing tension. 
Class 
The thesis has analysed intra-capital class dynamics in the study of Turkey. As 
banking reform facilitated the channels for further integration of Turkish capitalism with 
global capital, it is expected that contradictions between the most internationalised part of 
capital and more domestically-oriented, state-dependent parts of capital.will aggravate in 
the new period. 
The recent crisis in accumulation has led the leading capitals that have been 
seeking further intemationalisation to solidify their position within Turkish capital as the 
hegemonic fraction. Accordingly for the advance of accumulation, state policy in Turkey 
has been increasingly oriented towards the interests of those capitals, forming the 
economically dominant fraction . 
. Specifically within the context of banking, the restructuring process is still going 
on. Despite the significance of the steps taken under the auspices of the state, Turkish FC 
is in need of getting stronger. This, along with ramifications for further foreign bank 
involvement in the restructurings of the ·dynamic accumulators, indicates that the 
structure ofbanking and so intra-capital class structure will keep changing. 
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In this anal~sis of capital,· there are ramifications for labour, as well. Labour has 
become the passive bearer of the restructuring of Turkish capital, and this is clearly the 
case in the restructuring of bank capital. The various financial reforms have all involved 
extensive state expenditure. What was termed finance protectionism -:- the subsidies to 
banks that came from state bonds - were paid for out of government revenue, and that, 
indirectly, means taxation. With the decline of finance protectionism and the shift 
towards globally-integrated accumulation, this was not the creation of laissez faire. The 
subsidies have continued, in the form of support for the centralisation of capital and 
strategies to liquidate the primitive accumulators or recondition them and reform them as 
profitable offerings to the dynamic accumulators. Here, too the costs of these sorts of 
subsidies are to be borne by labour. 
More generally, the sorts of changes to accumulation that have come with the 
restructuring is seeing a decline of many sorts of protectionism of employment and 
industries. As capital needed to forego state-based financial rents and accumulate under 
competitive conditions, the capacity .of 'Turkish' capital to compete in global markets on 
the basis of a productive capital formation will depend on its ability to extract more 
surplus value from labour (besides mobilising new, more subtle forms of state subsidies). 
The agenda now is that capital, with a new global mobility, is now demanding 
globally competitive productivity from Turkish labour, as a condition for further 
investment. This suggests further deteriorating life conditions for workers and thus, rising 
tension within the society. This will in tum increase the importance of the state mediation 
between fractions of capital as well as its role in securing a compliant working class. 
But these intensified demands on labour are being presented to workers not as a 
.globally-driven class agenda but as an opportunity to build the international 
competitiveness of 'Turkish economy'. There is now a growing literature on how 
national identity and the pursuit of national competitiveness is used to achieve 
compliance in a class objective (e.g. Bryan 2001). It seems well verified in the case of 
Turkey.· 
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